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VPreface
”…if a person can’t feel safe, he can never be free…” 
(ADA Richard Bay in the drama series “The Practice”, 
Season 4: Episode 14 – “Checkmates”) 
Preface
This is what an assistant district attorney (ADA) told to a
colleague about the role of prosecutors in order to cheer her up
after losing another case to a devious defence counsel. Who said
that watching courtroom drama, especially American series, is a
waste of time; that they do not teach anything about lawyers’
work in continental law countries? Well... Maybe they do not, but
this prosecutor certainly understood a part of the essence of
freedom and safety and I got to spend amusing moments in front
of a TV.
This ADA was talking about personal safety, but the same
statement is true also for security in general. In the era of Internet
and the discussion of its inherent freedom, this really is a crucial
statement. If we want to preserve at least some of the former
imagined liberty of the Internet its time to take its security
seriously.
But it is also said that they that can give up essential liberty to
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
At first look these arguments seem contradictory. In fact, they are
not. It is true that if you live in constant fear, you will not be able
to enjoy the freedom you have. Likewise, if you give a way part of
your liberty to obtain safety, you will end up with neither of them.
The issue is about balance. These arguments are certainly true in
the tangible world where we live in, but they are true also for the
networked society and the virtual worlds.
This is a legal scientist journey into security in the networked
world. This really is a journey. One which I originally took with
another destination in mind. To be honest, this is not the thesis I
intended to make. It started out as a study of the role of information
security in the central tenets of the constitutional state and the
system of basic rights together with the place of information
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security among central legal principles. If anything, in western
constitutional democracies we build liberty by setting society
upon a certain constitution to deal with the balancing. As I
proceeded, I started doubting the usefulness of such an approach
to other than lawyers in constitutional states like the Finnish; to
also whom it is only of limited theoretical interest. 
While trying to understand to role of the constitutional rights
arguments I faced the role of the coherence argument of law and
noticed the line between the internal and external perspectives on
law. Then something peculiar occurred; the law seemed to
hamper the information security research and practice on many
occasions, the one it was supposed to be enhancing.
At the same time another interesting problem occurred. The
‘law’ and the legislator seemed to assume that the underlaying
infrastructure and the components used therein are secure. Many
of the legal provisions on transactions, contracting and on the use
of constitutional rights in the networks in general seemed to build
on this assumption. At the same time the infrastructure of the
network society was widely recognised to be insecure by the
information security community. 
This puzzled me so much that I had to go deeper. I wanted to
understand why. Being a young and inexperienced researcher I
threw myself headlong on the issue. What started out as a
research at the very core of legal scholarship, legal and especially
constitutional theory, turned out to study the fringes of the law.
This is the outcome of that journey; an odyssey one might say.
So much for my discipline... (Un)fortunately, this still is
somewhat visible in the text.
Before I can rejoin the original path with the wisdom,
especially of the law, gathered during the many encounters on my
journey of exploration, or make another one, the time has come
to give thanks. 
My supervisor, Professor Ahti Saarenpää, deserves my gratitude
above all for the academic freedom and encouragement. The
high scholarly example you set forced me to do my best.
Dissertation examiners Professor Kauko Wikström from the
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University of Turku and Professor Gerald Quirchmayr from the
University of Vienna made valuable comments to draft versions.
I have taken most of them into account. Professor Quirchmayr
kindly agreed to act as the academic opponent at the public
defence.
The odyssey would not have been the same if I had not come
in contact with information security researchers from the
Department of Information Processing Science at the University
of Oulu and from the Oulu University Secure Programming
Group. The former gave me an understanding of what
information security is really all about. The latter not only
acquainted me with the life of a bug, but also gave me a glimpse
of what academic group work can be at its best.
The research could not have been possible without financial
support. The project Scarcity of Justice funded by the Academy of
Finland gave me the original possibility to learn to know myself
as a researcher and to make the initial wonderings in the dark. I
am obliged to the Institute for Law and Informatics at the Faculty
of Law. A thankyou goes also to the Rector of the University of
Lapland and the Finnish Lawyers’ Association. At the final stages
the Faculty of Law gave me a position as an assistant in legal
informatics. I was able to finalise my thesis without overly
burdensome administrative tasks largely due to the understanding
of the acting professor Rauno Korhonen.
Friends have really made the journey. A warm thankyou goes
to Annamari, Anu and Pekka for just being yourselves. Thanks
also to my parents Tuula and Kyösti, to my siblings Hanna, Henri
and Petri, and to friends, relatives and colleagues not especially
mentioned.
Words are not enough for my nearest and dearest Mervi, Sofia
and Selina.
Rovaniemi, May 2006
Jari Råman
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Introduction 1
1 Kaspersen, Foreword, p. 8. Henrik Kaspersen is currently Director of the
Computer Law Institute at the Faculty of Law of the Free University of
Amsterdam in Netherlands (http://cli.vu/en/wiecli.php) [6.3.2006]. He is
probably best known for his work as a Chairman of the Committee of Experts
on Crime in Cyberspace of the Council of Europe that prepared the
Convention on Cybercrime (CETS nro: 185) that entered into force 1.7.2004.
1Introduction
Henrik Kaspersen has stated, while considering the possibilities to
regulate information security ‘already’ in 1993, that “information
security should be an integrating part and a standing quality factor
of information products and systems, without which IS [i.e.,
information system: authors note] could not maintain its predominant
place in our post-modern organisational structures. However, what
exactly should be enhanced? How should it be enhanced and what
factors explicitly should be taken into consideration? Where does the
law come in and what can it do?”1. He was knowledgeable enough
to recognise that the discussion was still too young and needs to find
its direction. No adequate overall solutions to the problems of
information security could be provided at the time. 
This actually is still true, even though over ten years have passed.
Solutions for the problems have been provided, but the hard problem
of insecurity of information systems is still unanswered. It is not
expected to be resolved any time soon, at least not by a silver bullet
or any small number of bullets. What can be done, and what is
increasingly being done, is to find solutions to the smaller problems
inside the overall information security dilemma. 
Contributions from the technological and social side have been
made on several subsections such as the control of access to
information, secure communication, management of information
security, and development of secure information systems and
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2 According to the classification of the subject matters of the young discipline
of information security made by Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen in A Survey of
Information Systems Security Issues and Respective Research Contributions, p. 4-5, access
control includes issues like access control models and policies, information flow
control models, operating systems protection, anti-virus techniques, water-
marking, and cognitive passwords. Secure communication includes issues from
cryptographical algorithms and systems, virtual private networks (VPN),
anonymity techniques and stenography. Information security management issues
concern issues on firewalls, digital signatures, auditing, intrusion detection
systems, and security policies. The issue of development of secure information systems
and software includes secure programming, methods for developing and
managing secure information systems and software, risk analysis, and testing
methods.
3 Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 1.
4 The improvement of the security of software and information systems is not
the only thing needed to secure the information infrastructure, but it is
increasingly being recognised as an important element that has been largely
neglected.
software2. However, much of current information security discussion
(both among researchers and practitioners) is about access control
and secure communication – about detecting, preventing, and
responding to attacks and vulnerabilities, especially in networks. 
But all of this effort addresses symptoms of a problem that has
been severely neglected for long; the lack of secure software and
information systems development. A vast majority of attacks make
use of software vulnerabilities that are entirely preventable and take
advantage of the lack of security properties in systems. As stated by
a pair of leading experts in secure software development, John Viega
and Gary McGraw, in their textbook on secure software development
“behind every computer security problem and malicious attack lies
a common enemy – bad software”3. The most frequently exploited
vulnerabilities are defects in common software products. For
information security to be able to live up to the expectations, the
security of the underlying software and information systems needs
to be improved4.
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5 Secure software development has not been, and still largely is not, part of the
curriculum in most educational institutions teaching software developers. Not
even in the country producing most software, i.e., USA, as made explicit in the
report of a task force of the National Cyber Security Partnership, Improving Security
Across the Software Development LifeCycle, p. 3-4, concerning year 2004. Even
textbooks on secure coding and design for software engineers or information
system developers have been lacking for a long time, at least in English language.
In Finland, the issue of secure software development has largely been missing in
the university curriculum, despite the relatively long tradition of research and
teaching in information security. See, e.g., the report of state of research and
teaching of information security in Finland in October 2004 conducted by Marko
Helenius, Tietoturvallisuuden tutkimus ja opetus. 
6 See the OECD report, The Promotion of a Culture of Security for Information Systems
and Networks in OECD Countries, p. 17 and 22, analysing governments’ effective
efforts to foster a shift in security culture.
7 Regulation concentrates largely on computer crime issues and on the
information security responsibilities of those processing personal data or
providing electronic communication networks and services. There is also
relatively extensive regulation on the information security obligations of
governmental agencies. For examples, see chapter 5 below.
8 Perhaps it is due to the close links to the science and art of information
security that legal informatics has largely concentrated on the same issues as
mainstream information security research. Note that information security as an
Only quite recently has the issue of developing secure software
started to gain attention5. For example, the OECD report that only
few initiatives regarding the development of secure software has been
initiated by its member states by the end of 20056.
It is no surprise that the same goes with the regulation concerning
information security. There is a large and growing amount of
regulation (together with legal problems still in need to be solved
and others corrected) concerning mainly access control, secure
communication and information security management issues like
criminalisation of unauthorised access, regulation of cryptography,
anonymity, digital signatures, data protection (as protection of privacy),
computer evidence, confidential communications, etc7. Issues
concerning secure software and information system development have
largely been neglected as well in the regulatory area (especially by
governmental regulators) as by legal scholarship8.
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object of study in legal scholarship is by no means new even in relation to ICT.
As the German founder of legal informatics as a discipline, Wilhelm
Steinmüller, notes in presenting legal informatics as an example of the way
applied informatics works, legal informatics have had to propose solutions for
urgent social and legal issues of computer applications such as data security
and privacy from its beginning in 1969. See Steinmüller, Information Technology
and Society, English abstract of Book One – Science Theory of Applied
Informatics. Peter Seipel, another pioneer of the discipline of legal informatics
and one of its major figures especially in the Nordic countries, saw already in
1977 that information security is one of the crucial interfaces of ICT and law,
and even an independent field of legal study that calls for an integrated
approach bringing together all branches of law, in his still up-to-date doctoral
dissertation, Computing Law, p. 160 and 262. The development of legal
informatics and its interest in information security is depicted by Ahti
Saarenpää in Tietojenkäsittelystä läsnä-älyyn – katkelmia oikeusinformatiikan
kehityksestä, p. 91-123.
9 In this sense, information security is seen as a collective good, a guarantee of
the functioning of the network society. Of this discussion in Finland see, e.g.,
the most recent contribution of Tuomas Pöysti in ICT and Legal Principles, p.
560-600. However, information security can also be seen as part of our
fundamental right to security at the individual level – as an individual right
instead of a collective good. At this individual level information security
protects our identity and our right to informational self-determination. Of this
discussion in Finland, see the report of the Institute for Law and Informatics
to the Ministry of Transport and Communications Finland, Saarenpää et al.,
Sähköinen viestintä, tietoturvallisuus ja perusoikeudet. The report is part of
coordination of the actions implementing Finland’s National Information
Security Strategy that has been the task of the National Information Security
Advisory Board since it began its work in spring 2004. More information about
Finland’s National Information Security Strategy and of the work of the
As an effort to bridge this gap the study concentrates on the
regulation of secure software and information systems  development
of the different disciplines of information security. The general
argument, and the fundamental position adopted, is that also
regulation should address the reasons for the insecurity rather than
just to react to the symptoms. In this study, following Kaspersen’s
argument, information security is considered to be an important
societal objective - a necessity in the networked society and especially
its information infrastructure without which we, as citizens, could
not use our fundamental rights in the networks9. As an answer to
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Advisory Board, see the web pages of the Ministry of Transport and
Communications Finland, at http://www.mintc.fi/ (at the English language
portal see Communications – Information Security and Privacy Protection –
National Information Security Strategy) [16.3.2006]
10 Thus, secure software development is seen as an important societal objective
or a public policy in the sense Neil MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and their
Consequences, p. 255 footnote 39, understands it in considering the different
grounds or criteria used by judges in the evaluation of juridical consequences
and possible ulterior outcomes of possible rulings. Similar approach to
information security in general has already been adopted in the guidelines for
the drafting of government proposals in Finland (Valtioneuvosto, Hallituksen
esityksen laatimisohjeet), where one of the social effects of the law that have to be
considered when drafting a parliamentary act are the effects on the information
society. The possible effects on information security have to be considered as
part of them. As a statement of the importance of information security this is a
good development as such, even though the drafting guidelines are not widely
used in practice as a recent report on the state and development of law-drafting
in Finland shows (Lainvalmistelun kansliapäällikköryhmä, Tehokkaampaa,
suunnitelmallisempaa ja hallitumpaa lainvalmistelua, p. 211-212).
Henrik Kaspersen’s original question, I posit that secure software
development is a crucial element in improving information security.
It is that kind of a conduct that would be desirable for the law and
regulation in general to promote or encourage, to give some motive
or ground for or, at least, not to hamper unnecessarily10.
This does not mean that the work done in order to minimise the
effects of these symptoms is useless. In contrary, it is very well needed
since the reasons for the vulnerabilities are not going to be altered
in any near future. There has been a strong need, which is not
vanishing, for corrective and preventive information security measures.
However, I think that it is time to start caring for the causes more
seriously also in the regulatory arena and not just to assume that
vulnerabilities in the current magnitude are something that just has
to be lived with.
Before we can continue, there is a need to specify the problem
area and show some central terms. In this chapter the concept used
are clarified. Especially the issues involved with the use of concepts
information security and regulation are considered. At the same time
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11 As Mikko Siponen, Designing Secure Information Systems and Software, p. 45, point
out in his doctoral dissertation, information security research and practice is
done on several disciplines that stem from separate scientific backgrounds;
information system security is rooted in information system science, computer
and database security in computer science, cryptology and communications
security in mathematics, and practitioners usually come from the software
engineering side. Since these research areas stem from different paradigms in
the sense of Burrel and Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis,
p. 23, and thus provide different perspectives, they also generate quite different
concepts and analytical tools. 
the object of research is depicted and qualifications made. At the end
of this chapter the purpose of the study and the research questions
are made explicit together with the methods used and the central
limitations of the study.
1.1 Seeing through a conceptual muddle
Information security is still in that phase of research where almost
every study starts with definitions of the terms used. And these
definitions and the terms used seem to vary even from researcher
and research area to another. Not to even mention the terms used
and definitions given by practitioners. With just a little exaggeration
it can be said that the researchers in different areas of information
security belonging to different paradigms are not aware of what others
are saying and doing and may not even recognise the alternative views
of reality which lie outside their boundaries11. And not even the
professional field is using the same terms due to the specialisation
into different areas of information security work.
Due the diversity of approaches and lack of generally accepted
use of terms information security is in a stage of conceptual muddle.
Actually there is not even an agreement on which term to use and
what areas they cover. Terms such as computer security, IT security,
information system security, information security, and data security
are, among others, used rather synonymously with an effort to depict
the whole profession and the research area with variable subsections.
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Of the more recent terms information assurance and security of
information infrastructure are used mainly by the military and
government agencies in the context of national security and together
with information warfare or information operations. This diversity
in approaches and terms used creates real difficulties also for lawyers
and especially legislators in piecing the whole area.
These afore mentioned wide terms are used to piece together the
different areas of specialisation in information security or to highlight
parts of them: computer security, communications security, database
security, hardware security, software security, personnel security,
cryptology, network security, information system security
management, organisational level information system security,
information security awareness, etc. The definitions of these different
areas vary and they have partly overlapping coverage. 
In this research terms information security and information system
security are used as generic upper level concepts; they depict the whole
area of research and the profession as a totality. These terms are often
used almost synonymously. However, the difference between the
terms information and information systems should be acknowledged;
information and information systems are separate but interdependent
entities in the same way as products and production processes.
Information system security is thus about the security of the different
components of the system (hardware, software, infrastructures, users
etc.) and information security defined literally (narrowly) about the
security of the object of the process in the system. However, there
are several factors where system properties affect the security of
content and vice versa, so the separation is not absolute.
The main reason the above usage of terms is that information is
the target of protection and information systems the processing
environment in the different disciplines (information system security,
computer and database security, cryptology and practitioners).
Information security also emphasises the vital protected asset
(information) of organisations and societies among other assets (e.g.
personnel/citizens and property). Another reason for favouring these
terms to depict the whole area is that they are wide enough to cover
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12 Especially information security as a term depicting the whole profession and
research area is too wide and thus meaningless for many purposes. Its ability to
classify the issue of information security is pretty low and it does not ease the
understanding of it.
13 Information security in general does not need to be defined explicitly to
cover every possible situation. A formal definition applicable to all situations of
it is as much needed as definitions of terms like contract or privacy. The
threats of formal definitions of the term privacy in specific parliamentary acts
to the understanding of the role of privacy in society and the difficulties in
providing a generally applicable definitions has been noted by Ahti Saarenpää
in Yksityisyys, yksityiselämä, yksilön suoja, p. 313-337, in analysing the
conceptual environment surrounding the term privacy as a relational concept.
all relevant issues (administrative and organisational information
security, personnel security, physical security, communications security,
hardware security, software security, data security and operations
security), even though they might be too wide and thus empty in other
circumstances12. More specific (and more meaningful) terms are used
when dealing only with a special area of information security. 
Information security is not particularly well defined even in the
different areas of research (information system, computer science,
software engineering, mathematics) or among practitioners and thus
prone to adjustments. It is a concept that transforms while the society
evolves, because it depicts the relationship between different relational
phenomena. Many context dependent definitions of the term are
inadequate under a different set of assumptions. This is why no formal
definition of the general term of information security is provided in
this study13. It is assumed to be known at the general level and more
detailed conceptualisations are not needed for the research interests
relevant to this study. The concentration is just on one of the research
and practice areas, i.e., the development of secure software, and not
on information security in general.  A formal definition is neither
needed for qualificatory purposes since the qualifications are made
by analysing the subject matter further, and not by formalising
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14 According to Gurpreet Dhillon, Managing Information System Security, p. 3-5, a
computer based information systems can be used to automate only a small part
of the formal system. 
15 This separation between the fields of research has also been made in the
context of secure information system and software development, for example,
by Mikko Siponen in his doctoral dissertation Designing Secure Information Systems
and Software, p. 46. Notice that this separation is not always necessary – it
depends on the approach used and the angle needed in the study in question.
See, e.g., the research of agile software development methods by Abrahamsson
et al., in Agile Software Development Methods: Review and Analysis, p. 7, where this
separation was not considered necessary.
1.2 Qualification of modes
of software and information system 
In this study the concentration is on software development, not the
development of information systems as such. Even though an absolute
separation of them is not possible software can be seen as a
component of an information system. Software often is a central
element, though a system almost always includes a number of software
products and other elements. However, computer based information
system development is dragged along to the degree it compares to
software development.
Two different kinds of information systems of an organisation can
be separated; the formal and the informal. The boundary between
them is made on the basis of which routinely handled operations can
be formalised. A computer based information system, an automation
of a part of the formal information system of an organisation, includes
the software, hardware (for processing and communication), people,
and rules that make a collection of software products work for the
user.14
Note that the background assumptions and research approaches in
information system and software engineering communities differ.
While the former community takes into account also social and
organisational aspects and uses a variety of research approaches (also
those common to social sciences), the latter traditionally focuses on
practical means of developing software15. However, both fields of
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16 This has been emphasised by Richard Baskerville at the beginning of the 90’s
in The Developmental Duality of Information Systems Security, p. 1, and in
Information Systems Security Design Methods, p. 375. Also Mikko Siponen
emphasises this point in the beginning of the 21st century in An Analysis of the
Recent IS Security Development Approaches, p. 101, and in Designing Secure
Information Systems and Software, p. 13. Similarly also in Devanbu and
Stubblebine, Software Engineering for Security, p. 227-228.
17 This is pointed out, e.g., by Juhani Warsta in Contracting in Software Business, p.
34, while analysing the contract processes and relationships in the software
business in a comprehensive manner in 2001. According to Rajala et al.,
Software Business Models, p. 7, the concept of business model is defined as
“… an action plan for a company in a given life cycle phase and under certain
market conditions”.
research have faced similar problems in relation to secure deve-
lopment. In both, and especially in the methods used for the
development, the security design aspects have been neglected thus
requiring separate methods for the development of secure software
and information systems16.
It is not appropriate to speak even of software as a whole – not
even in terms of development. Neither information systems nor
software are unambiguous and indivisible concepts. There are different
software business models that differ also in the ways development
is done17. Typical separation of software business models is between
commercial-off-the-self (COTS), modified-of-the-self (MOTS),
tailored and embedded. There are also different options for developing
products as a part of business model.
As an example, following options have been defined. The core product
option focuses on the development of a single product or product
family to be delivered to several customers as is. Development is done
prior to sales and customization according to individual user
requirements by parameterisation or tailoring is not possible in this
option. The plausible promise option differs from the core product
option in the sense that when the product is first made available to
users, it is not finalized in terms of functionality or quality (this is
typical in open source development but also in internet software
development). The parameterised product option focuses on the
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18 Rajala et al., Software Business Models, p. 40-43 and p. 51.
19 Warsta, Contracting in Software Business, p. 34. Rajala et al., Software Business
Models, p. 41) see the commercial software even going towards a plausible
promise option. This will be discussed further in the following section in terms
of market-driven development.
development of a customisable product that can be tailored to a
degree. In the product platform option the focus of development is on
a uniform core of several products or customer specific solutions
and project option focuses on the tailor-made solution to customer’s
needs even on a one time basis.18
The COTS business model in concentrating on software products
that are not customized (tailored) according to individual user
requirements corresponds with the core product development option.
The MOTS business mode is similar to the parameterised product
with the definition of “customisable product that can be tailored to
a degree”. The tailored approach is equivalent to the project that
focuses on the tailor-made solution to customer’s needs. But as Juhani
Warsta notes, the categorization is a question of definition that is
emphasized by the angle of approach used and needed in each
separate study.19
In the context of considering the development of secure software
and information systems the separation between the extremes of
COTS and tailored is sufficient or as discussed especially in software
engineering; between market-driven (packaged) software development
and bespoked (tailor made) software or information system
development. The development procedure in these business models
is so different that it is useful to separate them.
The characteristic differences between traditional tailor made
(bespoked) or information system and market-driven software
development are fundamental organisational issues, such as the
primary goal (compliance to requirements specification/time-to-
market), the success measurements (satisfaction, acceptance/sales,
market share, product reviews) and the product life cycle (one release,
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20 See, e.g., Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in
Market-Driven Software Development, p. 17-18; Carlshamre, A Usability Perspective on
Requirements Engineering, p. 58-59; Sawyer, A market-based perspective on
information systems development, p. 97. These differences will be considered
further in the heading where their effects to the security of the software are
considered.
21 A parallel analysis of the effects of regulation on both COTS and open
source software (OSS) as business models and development methods is not
justified even though it might create useful insights in relation to their secure
development. The incentive structures, business methods and their influence
on the development are so different that the complexity of the analysis would
become overwhelming. Instead, OSS development method could be seen as a
process-based regulatory instrument that tries to alter the incentive structures
of software development towards better security consciousness. It could be
studied as a counterforce, as a shift back to the origins of software
development (a time before extensive proprietary software development), that
rivals with the market-driven software development characterising COTS
business. This discussion has not, however, been taken further in this study. A
regulatory analysis of OSS development method is a task for future research.
then maintenance/several releases, as long as there is a market for
the product)20.
In this study, the concentration is on market-driven (packaged)
software development; developing for a market-place (conceivable
market segments) rather than for a particular customer or a (group
of) user(s) based on a contract. This mode of development is used
both in COTS and embedded software business models. Other forms
of software or information system development and the related
business models are not dealt with, because the market incentives
and development practices are so different21. For example, the network
effects do not play such an important role in them.
This qualification is further justified by the expectedly continuing
trend in software development to develop and embrace technologies
that reduce the amount of new programming (which is difficult,
labour-intensive, and time-consuming), hence to reduce the costs
involved in developing any software or information system. Perhaps
the most visible example of the trend to avoid programming
functionality from scratch, together with in-house software reuse
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22 This has been pointed out, e.g., by Fred B. Schneider in an influential U.S.
National Research Council report from 1999, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 281, and by
Pär Carlshamre in his doctoral dissertation from 2001, A Usability Perspective on
Requirements Engineering, p. 6. Reasons cited for the increasing use of COTS
software components include, in addition to the minimisation of development
and maintenance costs, lack of software developers inside organisations, and
the desire to reduce risks associated with software development. An important
benefit of using COTS components has also been considered the possibility of
attaining shorter time-to-market for the final products. The advantages and
difficulties in using commercial software packages to improve software
productivity has been discussed already in 1981 by Barry Boehm in Software
Engineering Economics, p. 647-654. This has been pointed out also by Pauliina
Ulkuniemi in her doctoral dissertation in economics, Purchasing software
components at the dawn of market, p. 103, with reference to Feblowitz MD and
Greenspan SJ (1998) Scenario-Based Analysis of COTS Acquisition Impacts,
Requirements Engineering 1998(3): 182-201 and Ochs M, Pfahl D, Chrobok-
Diening G and Nothhelfer-Kolb B (2000) A COTS Acquisition Process: Definition
and Application Experience, Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software
Engineering (IESE), ISERN Report 00-02.
23 This has been pointed out, e.g., by Hannu Harju in a VTT Technical
Research Centre of Finland research note from 2002, Kustannustehokas ohjel-
miston luotettavuuden suunnittelu ja arviointi [Costeffective design and assessment of
dependable software], p. 41.
24 See, e.g., Barry Boehm and Kevin Sullivan, Software Economics: A
Roadmap, p. 326. According to the report by the Committee on Information
Systems Trustworthiness of the U.S. National Research Council (Schneider,
(reusable software assets developed in-house), is the increased use
of (COTS) software components (systems, subsystems, and libraries
of components)22. The proliferation and falling relative prices for
commercial software means that organizations that once would
develop systems they wanted themselves are more likely to buy at
least components if not entire systems. These components are used
even in safety critical systems23. 
Software-based systems are no longer developed in-house and built
from the scratch by each user organisation or for them. Instead, many
(if not most) of information system and software pieces (of which
the system is put together) are bought ready to be installed. Studies
in software economics show that the economics of software
development leave system designers with no choice but to use large
COTS (packaged) components in their systems24.
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Trust in Cyberspace, p. 215) the economics of using COTS products and services
is irresistible for all consumers, including government, and represents a major
shift from the government's historical use of custom-made information
technology.
25 Boehm and Sullivan, Software Economics: A Roadmap, p. 329. The software
industry is analogous to other industries in the sense that most software and
especially information systems are built from smaller software objects.
However, there still is a difference in that the software industry lacks the ability
to confidently swap components in and out of systems – the reliability of the
replacement component and the systems tolerance towards the new
component is difficult to verify as pointed out by Jeffrey Voas in Certifying
off-the-shelf software components, p. 53.
This trend is natural in comparison to other industries: the market
structures supporting software and information system development
are rather primitive when compared to those supporting other
industries. Even though standard components are increasingly
available for software and information system development and every
individual part of a system does not have to be developed from the
scratch, the designers are still “less able to build systems from
specialized, efficiently produced, volume-priced third-party
components” as Barry Boehm and Kevin Sullivan note while mapping
the future of software economics as part of software engineering
discipline in 200025. So, the focus of software business is moving from
tailored (where a lot of new programming is essentially needed) to
COTS business mode and the component development work is
becoming increasingly market-driven instead of being based on
contract with one customer. In short, software engineering is maturing
as an engineering discipline.
In market-driven software development the component producer
concentrates on adapting its products to better reflect the market
needs, and not the needs of a particular user organisation in the early
stages of software development, as is done in tailored software that
is typically developed (analysed, designed and coded) in close
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26 The way software consuming organisations interact with software producers
has changed due to the increased product attention. Traditionally, early and
close links between users and developers has been considered critical. Today,
software consumers and producers use a variety of intermediated means to
communicate their needs to developers. For example, packaged software
developers build to requirements gleaned from a variety of sources, including
help-desk call-log analysis, market research, product reviews, and user groups,
of which direct customer contact is one of the least likely means. This
argument has been raised, e.g., by Steve Sawyer S in A market-based
perspective on information systems development, p. 100. See also Keil and
Carmel, Customer-developer links in software development, p. 33–44, already
from 1995. This is one of the major dilemmas as Johan Natt och Dag
emphasises in his thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Technology in Software
Engineering from 2002, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in Market-
Driven Software Development, p. 19: the challenges of developing software for
larger markets is to satisfy the end user albeit contact with the end user is
limited.
27 This argument has been made, e.g., by Robert Gehring in a position paper
presented at the kick-off on a series of influential workshops on economics
and information security, Software development, Intellectual Property Rights, and IT
Security, p. 2.
28 This concerns also the security requirements of the system as stated by the
Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness of the U.S. National
Research Council in its report from 1999 edited by Fred B. Schneider, Trust in
Cyberspace, p. 110.
29 This is typical especially in the mature product phase at least in the mass
market. In the early phase of the product life-cycle, each customer has to be
won on a case-by-case basis, so the needs of the customer are usually
considered essential. In the growth phase the concentration shifts more
towards identifying customer segments instead of individual customers and the
trend is to abandon the idea of serving every customer individually or directly.
The argument is made, e.g., Rajala et al. in their review of software business
cooperation with the customer26. The focus of software development
has shifted from a customer-oriented view of software functionality
towards a supplier-oriented model of saleability27. The requirements
for software are not tailored for specific needs, but instead they reflect
perceptions of a product-marketing organisation about the
requirements of a fairly broad market segment28. Even the business
plans are derived from the anticipated generic demands of a relatively
large user base29.
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models in 2001, Software Business Models, p. 29-30.
30 Sawyer, A market-based perspective on information systems development, p.
98. Note that it is not just information systems that are developed from
software components. Software systems are developed in similar manner and
in both of them the development can be characterised of combining either in-
house developed reusable software assets or of components bought outside.
31 Software product market represents the forum for exchanging goods and
services between producers and consumers (Sawyer 2001, p. 98).
32 Sawyer, A market-based perspective on information systems development, p.
102.
This, in turn, is highlighting the difference between the deve-
lopment of computer based information systems and market-driven
software development. COTS software is a product for the software
market. As a business mode it is closer to manufacturing industry than
the tailored software business mode that is closer to professional
services activity. So, the development, manufacturing, and distribution
of COTS software increasingly becomes the work of specialized
organisations. At the same time software-consuming organisations
increasingly assemble pieces, not build them. Thus, software
consumers concentrate on information system development
(assembling pieces), while vendors focus on developing packaged
products (COTS software).30Although the result is that the increased
use of packaged components procured from the software product
market31 is changing the focus of software and information system
development, the existence of such a market does not mean the
disappearance of traditional tailored software or information system
development work. Packaged products may not fulfil the needs of
many organizations even though there might be possibilities for at
least some tailoring (closer to MOTS and parameterised product
options) thus making the tailored software business mode more
attractive together with in-house development. That is, while the
market perspective applies to many forms of development, it is
necessary to highlight the market’s emergence and resulting changes
to the development work, not argue for the market’s ubiquity32.
However, the very existence of such a large and growing market makes
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33 This has been noted in a research project concentrating on software
component products of the electronics and telecommunications field and
reported by Leena Arhippainen in her graduate thesis for M.Sc. in 2003, Use
and integration of third-party components in software development. The factors that drive
the costs of using COTS software components have been researched, e.g., by
the Center for Software Engineering at the University of Southern California
(USC/CSE), headed by Barry Boehm. The developed cost-estimating model
called COCOTS (COnstructive COTS integration cost model) build on the
popular COCOMO II model to predict the effort involved in integrating
COTS software products into applications.  In the COCOTS model, the
assessment activity refers to the process by which COTS components are
selected for use. In Reifer, Boehm and Gangadharan, Estimating the Cost of
Security for COTS Software, p. 178-186, the research team incorporates the
enhancements to the modelling of the impact of security on development
effort and duration done in COCOMO II to the COCOTS estimating
framework.
34 Reifer, Boehm and Gangadharan in Estimating the Cost of Security for
COTS Software, p. 180, note that current models for predicting the effort
involved in integrating COTS software products into applications do not
include security as a cost driver. While providing means for estimating the
(governmental) regulation more likely way of influencing the software
and information system development work.
For the sake of clarity, it has to be pointed out that the emphasis
in this study is mainly on component developer, unless otherwise
stated. What is referred to as market-driven development is thus about
the processes of the component developer and not the component
user/buyer. However, it has to be made clear that a component user,
the buyer of a software product, is typically also a software system
or an information system developer, and the development processes
of both sides are affected by the focus on COTS products in the
software market. There are even considerations of separate third-party
component-based software development processes33.
While the crucial problem from the vendor’s perspective is how
to make sure that the product meets the demands of the market at
the right time, i.e., how to plan product releases, one of the major
questions from the purchaser’s perspective is how to elicit and verify
requirements on third-party software. Market-driven development
changes the field also for the purchaser (component user).34 Much
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costs of security for COTS software they also (idem. p. 183-184) estimate on
the basis of their analyses the percentual increases both for the effort and the
duration to the assessment activity (process by which COTS components are
selected for use), for tailoring (activities undertaken to prepare the selected
COTS packages for use) and for glue code development (development and
testing of the connector software, which integrates the COTS components into
the larger application).
35 The development of the mass market for software products has been
accompanied by a shift in systems development and expertise from user
organizations to vendors as pointed out by Fred B. Schneider, Ph.D. and a
professor in the Department of Computer Science at Cornell University, in
Trust in Cyberspace, p. 188.
36 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 198
37 Sawyer, A market-based perspective on information systems development, p.
101; Carmel and Sawyer, Packaged software development teams: What makes
them different, pp. 7-19.
of what is traditionally viewed as software system or information
system development is now opaque to most organizations consuming
software35. The increasing use of COTS software is causing user
organizations to decrease their level of expertise in system
development36. Since production is separated from consumption,
software engineering methods, techniques, and tools are less important
to the consumer than is the outcome of their use. That is, vendors
are being evaluated by their potential customers on the basis of their
products, not their processes. This product focus permeates how
vendors develop software and is a fundamental aspect of why
packaged (COTS) software development differs from traditional in-
house (tailored software) development.37
The use of COTS components in software and information system
development offer great savings over tailored (custom-written)
software: COTS components may be less expensive, have greater
functionality especially if the functionality provided is a good match
for what is needed, and be better engineered and tested than would
be cost-effective for components developed from scratch for a
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38 The testing of COTS components might be better due to the possible
extensive field tests in other products and the vendor’s ability to hire more and
better testers by the help of its size and appeal.
39 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 13 and 90; Harju, Kustannustehokas ohjelmiston
luotettavuuden suunnittelu ja arvioint, p. 51.
40 This concern has been raised, e.g., by Devanbu and Stubblebine in Software
Engineering for Security: a Roadmap, p. 227, and by Jeffrey Voas in Certifying
off-the-shelf software components, p. 53. The user of COTS components
becomes dependent on a third party (outside vendor) for decisions about a
component's evolution and the engineering processes used in its construction
(especially concerning quality and security). In addition, the software and
information system developer must track new releases of COTS components
and may be forced to make periodic changes to her system in response to the
new releases.
41 "The only system which is truly secure is one which is switched off  and
unplugged, locked in a titanium lined safe, buried in a concrete bunker, and is
surrounded by nerve gas and very highly paid armed guards. Even then, I
wouldn't stake my life on it." (the original version of this is attributed to Gene
relatively smaller user community38. However, it means that developers
of an information or a software system (using COTS components)
have neither control over nor detailed information about many system
components39. Software and information system developers are faced
with the risks of constructing systems out of unknown black-box
components40.
1.3 Security and/or quality –
or something in the between?
Security and quality seem easily separable at the first glance. Security
in general (applying to the security of people, property, organisations,
and even nations, as well as information) means at least two things:
a condition in which harm does not arise, despite the occurrence of
threatening events; and a set of safeguards designed to achieve that
condition. There never can be absolute security in neither of the
meanings – every threat cannot be anticipated and the possibility of
safeguards failing is always present41. 
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Spafford)
42 see, e.g., Wesselius and Ververs, Some elementary questions on software
quality control, p. 322.
43 In software engineering the quality of the product is typically enhanced by
improving the software processes. According to Abrahamsson, The Role of
Commitment in Software Process Improvement, p. 22, software process is seen as a set
of activities, methods and practices used in the production and evolution of
software. The underlying assumption is that there is a direct correlation
between the quality of the process and the quality of the developed software
(Fuggetta, Software Process: A Roadmap, p. 27). Software process improve-
ment is concerned with changing the way software development organizations,
teams, and individuals perform their work.
44 Despite the different definitions of quality (which is a theoretical problem),
in practice the evaluation of quality is always subjective. Even if the subjective
and objective quality could be defined and measured, the evaluation of the
results measured is always subjective – the evaluator compares the quality to
Quality in general has multiple definitions, which all are correct
in the specific situations for which they have been developed. One
useful definition of quality in relation to information systems and
software separates between three distinct components: objective,
subjective and non-assessable42. 
Objective quality can be said to exist when the product/service fulfils
its requirements and other specifications in an objectively measurable
way. Process-based quality is a part of this – following good
development process will lead to quality43. Subjective quality is something
that the customer expects from the product or service. It is about
meeting the customer’s expectations of being able to use the
product/service for some specific purpose. The subjective quality
attribute is needed because it is practically impossible to make an
objective evaluation of the level of satisfaction among customers.
The third part of quality is concerned with the non-assessable
components. There are some features in products and services that
cannot be evaluated beforehand even subjectively, because they are
visible only after some time (e.g. how easily the product can be
modified to adapt to changes in not identifiable future customer needs
or does the product do what is expected even with unforeseen
errors)44.
Introduction 21
competing products/services and to her own vision of the way the product/
service should be or have worked.
45 This is the reason why it is so hard to test for security. Security flaws do not
necessarily appear as a functionality problem – a system can function normally
and be completely insecure. These flaws can remain undiscovered until
someone looks for them explicitly. This is discussed in more detail in heading
2.3 below.
Despite the separability of the concepts of quality and security at
the surface, the concepts start to blur when going deeper.
Vulnerabilities, i.e., defects or weaknesses in the design,
implementation, coding, or operation and management of software
and information systems that could be exploited to compromise some
of the security goals of a system (e.g. confidentiality, integrity,
availability) have a lot to do with quality. Poor quality is typical cause
of defects and weaknesses. However, these defects become security
issues only when they can be exploited, i.e., there is a threat that they
might be exploited. In relation to defects in software: a coding bug
affecting the performance of the system concerns quality, but a
software defect that does not necessarily affect the functionality of
the system, but however makes it vulnerable to exploitation, is about
security45. 
Information security and quality are thus closely related with
vulnerability as the combining factor. With better quality products
and services it is possible to diminish the level of vulnerability. Most
systems have vulnerabilities of some sort, but this does not mean that
the systems are too flawed to use. Not every vulnerability results in
an attack, and not every attack succeeds. Success depends on the
degree of vulnerability, the strength of attacks, and the effectiveness
of any countermeasures in use. If the attacks needed to exploit
vulnerabilities are very difficult to carry out, then the vulnerability
may be tolerable. If the perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then
even an easily exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if
the attacks are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable
system is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
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46 This is how Shirey in Internet Security Glossary, p. 190-191, (IETF, RFC 2828)
clarifies the definition of the term “vulnerability”. Information security
endangering vulnerabilities can be caused in different phases of the
system/software life-cycle: requirements analysis (failures in the sensitivity
assessment), development (use of poorly functioning development tools),
implementation (not enabling or configuring security features),
operation/maintenance (not updating software for security purposes, lack of
system audits and monitoring), disposal (improper disposal of information).
Vulnerabilities can be located from different components of the information
system as Pipkin points out in Information Security, p. 68-69: in hardware they
can be devastating but contribute only to a small portion of exploited
vulnerabilities; a prevalent type and most exploited are found in software; in
infrastructure they are typically under the control of outside organisations; in
security processes vulnerabilities are typically the target of social engineering.
47 This means that even if a product is of high ‘quality’ (meets the expectations
of the customer and the specifications) it still might be insecure, e.g. in a
situation where the customer did not know to demand security or it has not
been considered in the specifications or the component of quality was non-
assessable.
will be enough benefit for someone to make an attack.46
Even though many of the information security problems could
be resolved within quality assurance, this alone is not enough, since
even a product of extreme quality could be subject of misuse47. This
is where security functions enter the scene. Security properties
(functions or features) such as access rights, security classification
and requirements (e.g. confidentiality, integrity and availability) has
to be developed into the system. Of course their quality has to be
maintained similarly to the development of other system properties,
but they improve the security of the system as such (e.g. by defining
who is able to access the system, which parts/material and what she
can do). 
Hereby, a difference between the quality aspects of security
(reducing vulnerabilities that could pose a risk to security) and the
security properties (features) that can be seen as requirements of
software or information systems and that should be made part of the
overall product according to user needs is made. The former is a
quality issue (also of the security features) and the latter is a
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functionality issue. The quality aspect of security reduces risks by
targeting the avoidance of defects that could evolve into security
vulnerabilities. The security features side prevent threats coming from
outside, e.g., the attack of computer criminals. The security features
prevent the attackers’ possibilities to abuse the defects, but the
underlying vulnerabilities are remained untouched. The quality aspect
of security is more directed towards the problems inside the product
while the security features concentrate on threats from the outside,
even though they typically are caused by defects in the product.
What is referred to here as ‘quality aspect of security’ is a gray area
somewhere between quality and security. Neither traditional quality
enhancement methods, such as basic software development methods
and traditional testing, nor the development of security features like
access control and other requirements of a software or an information
system that should be made part of the system according to user needs
alone can solve it. This gray area covers one of the most fundamental
problems in information security – security related vulnerabilities in
common software packages.
Even though the concentration in this study is on the quality aspect
of security, also the development of security features are considered
to a certain degree. However, they need to be kept separate in order
to understand the problems.
Two other important concepts in security are threat and risk. A threat
is a potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a
circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security
by exploiting a system vulnerability and cause harm. Threats can be
caused by human errors (by users with access and authorization),
system failures (due to e.g. of mechanical difficulties in hardware or
infrastructure, and unexpected input in software), natural disasters
(e.g. fire, flood, earthquake) and malicious acts (attacks and malicious
software). The threatening events present in dealing with information
security, which are at the same time causes of system and network
problems, can be analysed into two categories: accidental and
intentional. 
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48 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Cyber-security Today and
Tomorrow, p. 4.
49 A particularly insidious "accidental" problem arises because of the fact that
the precise software configuration on any operational system (including
applications, device drivers, and system patches) has almost certainly not been
tested for security—there are simply too many possible configurations to test
more than a small fraction explicitly. As new applications and device drivers
are installed over time, an operational system is more likely to exhibit
additional vulnerabilities that an attacker might exploit. Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board, Cyber-security Today and Tomorrow, p. 4.
Accidental causes of problems in (or threats to) information
systems or networks are generally either natural (commonly referred
to in the insurance industry as Acts of God or Nature, e.g. fire, flood,
lightning strike, tidal wave, earthquake, volcanic eruption) or human
but unintentional. The unintentional human errors can be caused by
humans who are directly involved (e.g. dropping something, tripping
over a power-cord, failing to perform a manual procedure correctly,
miscoding information, mis-keying, failing to perform a back-up),
by other humans (e.g. unintended cutting of a communications cable
during excavation), or by machines and machine-designers (e.g. disk
head-crash, electricity failure, software bug). Accidental causes figure
prominently in many aspects of trustworthiness beside security, such
as safety and reliability48. 
Intentional causes are the result of conscious human choice.
Malicious intent is present. Security experts often refer to the efforts
of these malicious people as “attacks”. Also an attacker – who seeks
to cause damage deliberately – may be able to exploit a flaw
accidentally introduced into a system. System design and/or
implementation that is poor by accident can result in serious security
problems that can be deliberately targeted in a penetration attempt
by an attacker49.
Term risk is used in many ways, more loosely in social sciences
and colloquial language, and with stricter definitions in natural sciences
and technology. Common to these definitions is that risk refers to
the expectation of loss expressed as the probability that a particular
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50 Doctor Julia Black, a Reader in Law at the Law Department of the London
School of Economics (LSE) and the Centre for Analysis of Risk and
Regulation (CARR) which is an interdisciplinary research centre at LSE, has
made a great effort not only in mapping the concept and its relation to
neighbouring concepts such as law and governance, but also in defining the
concept of regulation. See, e.g., Black, Constitutionalising Self-Regulation;
Black, Decentring Regulation; and Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation.
Even though she has specialised on the regulation of financial services, her
theoretical insights are more general. Dimity Kingsford Smith provides an
appraising evaluation of her conceptualisations in What is Regulation?, p.37-47.
threat will exploit a particular vulnerability with a particular harmful
result. So, vulnerabilities contribute to risk because they may allow
a threat to harm the system. Risks are structurally inside of the
processes – they are constructed. In relation with technology they
are inherent.
1.4 What is regulation?
Because regulation is a widely used and generic concept, there is a
need to separate how it is used in this study. The contents of the
concept is sought for in order to limit the scope of this study and to
make qualifications. 
Unfortunately there is as little agreement of what ‘regulation’ is
as there is with ‘information security’. Not only is there a conceptual
muddle (what term to use), but also a disagreement of the contents
of the concepts (what the issue is). However, similar to my earlier
treatment of the concept of information security, no formal,
universally applicable, definition of the concept of ‘regulation’ is given.
This is mainly because others have already ‘mapped’ the concept
extensively50. I can lean on that.
The things that the concept of regulation does are much more
important than what it means. In that purpose I will try to show you
the issues that the concept of regulation includes and by doing so,
hope that I am able to use it to provide some starting points on critical
reflections on contemporary problems in information security
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51 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 19.
52 See, e.g., Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 2; Baldwin et al., A
Reader on Regulation, ch. 1. See also Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p.
8 and Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 129.
53 Hood and Scott, Regulating Government in a 'Managerial' Age, p. 1.
54 See, e.g., Breyer, Regulation and its Reform and Ogus, Regulation. In considering
whether to use law, ‘regulation’ or some other instrument to achieve a
particular policy outcome, ‘legalisation’ is the consequence of an increasing
reliance on law in state intervention, a meaning that must be distinguished
from legalisation as general increase of legal norms (as distinct from social
custom, convention, or informal social norms) in society as pointed out by
regulation. The understanding of regulation given in here is, following
Julia Black, to provide a conceptualisation of regulation that provides
the tools of inquiry into the particular problem of vulnerable
software51. It is used to delimit and construct the scope of the inquiry
together with the facilitation of both the analyses and the practical
discussions of how regulation affects behaviour and how it might be
improved.
At best, regulation is an ambiguous concept. Even the basic
regulatory textbooks give at least three definitions52. In the first,
regulation is the promulgation of rules by government accompanied
by mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, usually assumed
to be operating through a public agency (either specially built for the
purpose or an existing).  This is the way lawyers typically see
regulation; simply as a type of legal instrument or as a part of public
law. In this sense regulation is a rule of order prescribed by superior
or competent authority relating to action of those under its control.
In this traditional use of the term it usually denotes a form of
intervention that consists of setting and enforcing rules of behaviour
for organisations and individuals. It thus contrasts with other forms
of state intervention such as public ownership, taxes and subsides
or physical alteration of the environment53. In practice, discussion
of regulation in the narrow sense tends to run into a broader
discussion of alternative legal policy instruments, particularly over
regulatory reform54.
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Renate Mayntz in Political Intentions and Legal Measures, p. 57.
55 Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, terms ‘regulation’ and ‘regulations’.
56 See, e.g., Weimer and Vining, Policy Analysis, p. 58-159; Breyer, Regulation and
its Reform; Ogus, Regulation, p. 1-121; and Baldwin and Cave, Understanding
Regulation, p. 9-18. However, as noted by Black in Critical Reflections on
Regulation, p. 7, that goal is being displaced, and others added. Notably, the
management and distribution of risk: regulating the ‘risk society’ is a
burgeoning academic and policy area and there are signs that existing systems
of regulation are coupling the correction of market failure with the
management of risk as their organising principle. This is the theme in the
analysis of risk regulation regimes in Hood et al., The Government of Risk, from
2001. Other goals that regulation ought to pursue, in particular those coming
from a socio-legal base, are access to justice (Parker, Just Lawyers), or legitimacy
(Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 77-85), or the achievement of
social justice in some form (Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, chapter
3), or the extension of participative forms of policy building into regulation
(Black, Proceduralising Regulation Part I and II).
However, there is even a more strict understanding of regulation.
According to Black’s law dictionary: “Regulations… are issued by
various governmental departments to carry out the intent of the law.
Agencies issue regulations to guide the activity of those regulated by
the agency and of their own employees and to ensure uniform
application of the law”55. Regulation is rule or order having force of
law issued by executive authority or government. Not even the highly
detailed parliamentary laws typically used, for example, in Finland,
would be included. Only agency regulation and ministerial decrees
are considered as regulation under this strict conception.
In the second, it is any form of direct state intervention in the
economy or social environment, whatever form that intervention
might take. Regulation is any attempt by the government to control
the behaviour of citizens, corporations or other parts of the
government. In this sense the goal of regulation is often the project
of welfare economics: the correction of market failure. In the standard
treatments of ‘regulation’, the ‘why regulate’ question is nearly always
answered in terms of correction of market failures, with the occasional
nod to distributional or other ancillary aims56.
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57 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 8 and 17. This kind of wide
usage of the term ‘regulation’ in Europe (almost as a synonym for governance)
has somewhat hampered the emergence of regulation as a field of study
separate from other disciplines. However, it is used in socio-legal studies like
that of Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School.
In the third, regulation is all mechanisms of social control or
influence affecting all aspects of behaviour from whatever source,
whether they are intentional or not. This definition in its scope covers
all issues from governmental regulation to everything in social and
political sciences. It provides no boundaries where regulation might
end and some other influencing factor take effect. Analytical value
of this conception is minimal. It is so broad that it contributes
nothing.57
These definitions can be illustrated with a picture showing the
alternatives policymaker has in choosing the tools to be used. The
state is just an example of the central authority that performs the
regulation. However, it is the most typical one and has the power to
use legal measures.
Picture 1-1. The nature of alternatives in the choice of law as a policy instrument.
Adjusted from Mayntz, Political Intentions and Legal Measures, p. 58. 
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58 Note that explicit decision not to intervene, to refrain from regulating, can
also be an alternative for legislating as pointed out by Evert Vedung in Policy
Instruments, p. 22-23. However, as Jyrki Tala argues in his doctoral
dissertation Lakien vaikutukset, p. 152, the decision not to intervene has to be
explicit and done systematically in order to be seen as a real regulatory choice.
59 State centrism is the core understanding that many have of ‘regulation’, i.e.,
some form of ‘command-and-control’ (C&C) regulation (regulation by the
state through the use of legal rules backed by mainly criminal sanctions).
However, C&C has also become a shorthand to denote all that can be bad
about regulation as pointed out by Julia Black in Critical Reflections on
Regulation, p. 2; the instruments used (laws backed by sanctions) are
inappropriate and unsophisticated (instrument failure); government has
insufficient knowledge to be able to identify the causes of problems, to design
solutions that are appropriate, and to identify non-compliance (information
and knowledge failure); implementation of the regulation is inadequate
In the first choosing point the alternative is between state
intervention and non-state-intervention58. The possible non state-
centred regulations (such as social norms) affect behaviour or there
is even a possibility for the state to modify the effects of these
regulations. The state can intervene indirectly via these other
regulatory instruments and the actors involved. All of this is
encompassed by the third definition of ‘regulation’. 
The second choice concerns whether to use regulatory (public)
law typically in the form of ‘command and control’ regulations or
other tools of the state (e.g. taxing, direct funding and other economic
incentives, governmental procurement contracting, information, threat
of governmental regulation, conscious decision not to regulate). This
is what the second definition covers. 
The first, and most strict, definition of ‘regulation’ is visible in the
last choosing point; the types of legal measures to use or even in a
more limited version, where regulations corresponds to ministerial
decrees or decrees given by administrative (regulatory) agencies.
The first two are clearly ‘centred’ definitions; i.e. regulation is seen
to emanate from the state. The usual assumption is that government
is the rule-maker, monitor, and enforcer, usually operating through
a public agency (ministry, independent regulatory agency, some less
independent form etc.)59. The second definition keeps to the
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(implementation failure); and that those being regulated are insufficiently
inclined to comply, and those doing the regulating are insufficiently motivated
to regulate in the public interest (motivation failure and capture theory)
including poorly targeted rules, rigidity, ossification, under- or over-
enforcement, and unintended consequences. The extent to which C&C does or
does not live up to this caricature is an empirical question which has been
debated, e.g., by Baldwin in Regulation and by Gunningham and Grabovsky in
Smart Regulation, p. 38-50.
60 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 129.
61 If it is problematic to recognise what information security is, it is even more
difficult to grasp the regulation of it in somewhat a comprehensive manner
despite the efforts to coordinate the regulation in different levels. The first
attempt for a coordinated policy for on information security in the EU was in
1992 with the Council Decision 92/242/EEC of 31st March 1992 in the field
of security of information systems, OJ L 123, 8.5.1992, p. 19-25. More
government as the ‘regulator’ while broadening the techniques that
may be described as ‘regulation’60. The third definition breaks the
connection with the state.
In the conception adopted in this study, regulation is ‘decentred’,
i.e., diffused throughout society. A wider perspective, which deviates
from the pure state-centred regulation, is necessary in order to
understand the wide area of information security and especially the
regulation of secure software development. This regulation is
essentially dispersed in different types of self- and governmental
regulation, and social norms which have similar and even forceful
effects to secure software development. Technologies and methods
for their development also play an important role. 
Not only is the regulation of information security (even the
regulation of secure software development) diffused throughout
society, the existing state centred regulation is also scattered in
parliamentary laws, governmental regulations (decrees) and guidelines,
supra-national regulations such as different sources of EC law (treaties
and general principles as primary legislation; regulations, directives
and decisions as secondary legislation; general principles of
administrative law; international agreements and conventions between
member states) and international conventions and guidelines61.
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successful attempts at coordinated policy has been the communications on
Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information
Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime (COM(2000)890) and
on Network and Information Security (COM(2001)298). Despite the difficulty,
there have been substantial efforts to give at least a somewhat comprehensive
overview of the state centred information security regulation in academic
literature especially by Tuomas Pöysti in ENLIST Information Security
Commentary and by Ahti Saarenpää and Tuomas Pöysti in Tietoturvallisuus ja laki. 
62 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 132-133. With technology, Julia Black,
Decentring Regulation, p. 137, is referring to the understanding of and ability
to employ, manipulate, or alter the physical or human environment and the
products of that understanding. Examples are probability theory (risk analysis),
double entry book keeping (audit), design of the built environment and its
impact on policing etc.
63 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 139.
As a qualification of the subject matter, the notion of decentring
is controversial. The recognition that regulation is ‘decentred’ does
not help to limit the scope of issues studied under this label. On the
contrary; it extends the concept to cover every form of social control
and re-labels almost all questions of social and political science
questions as ‘regulation’. Moreover, the thing that is doing the
regulating is increasingly broadened form the state and some self-
regulatory associations to other actors (committees, firms, epistemic
communities, contracting individuals) and to other ‘factors’ such as
norms, culture and technology62. This has implications on how the
‘regulation’ is done – what instruments are used, as noted by Julia
Black63:
“…if it is government that is seen to be the ‘regulator’ then regulation
is used to refer to the use of rules, legal, quasi-legal, non-legal, which
may have a certain character (mandatory, facilitatory, performance,
technical), which may or may not be accompanied by systematic
monitoring and enforcement of sanctions for their breach (‘command
and control’ regulation) by  government. Or, … it may refer to any
action by government: use of laws, economic instruments,
information, persuasion. … Non-governmental actors have a similar
range of instruments, excluding the legitimate use of force.
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64 In agreeing that regulation does not solely emanate from state the decentred
view (there is similar discussion concerning the ‘law’ under legal pluralism)
leave basically only two possible options for the conception of ‘regulation’: to
abandon any attempt to hold on to a single coherent conception or to attempt
to construct a minimalist core concept. William Twining, A Post-Westphalian
Conception of Law, p. 206, makes this notion in a similar discussion in relation
to the law.
65 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 11-19; Black, Decentring
Regulation, p. 133-139. From the breadth of the basis of her argumentation
becomes visible that the community she is using in mapping the concept of
regulation in conventionalist terms is not limited to English-speaking countries.
The academic and policy community she refers to is much wider.
66 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 17-19.
Governmental and non-governmental actors may act alone or in any
combination. If the market is seen as ‘regulating’ then it is through
the interactions of rational buyers and sellers. If it is the broad
category of ‘social forces’ that is chosen then essentially the analytic tools
of sociology are employed: structuring, framing, enabling, co-
ordinating, ordering, etc.; if it is ‘technologies’ then it is the results of
the development and application of understandings of the physical
or human environment – the outpourings of the applied, natural,
and human sciences.” (Italics added)
In an attempt to construct a minimalist core concept of regulation64
Julia Black has mapped the decentred form of the concept in
conventionalist terms, i.e. by looking how the concept is used in
practice and ascribing the definition to what the community under
consideration (in her case the English-speaking academic and policy
community) identifies as ‘regulation’ (what regulation is used to mean
in that particular community)65. Such an approach avoids the problems
of over- and under-inclusiveness that arise from de-contextualised,
generalised abstractions used in essential (identifies central elements
of the phenomenon and says that when they are present, then the
phenomenon may be termed as regulation – ‘regulation is…’) and
functional (based on the function that regulation performs in society
– ‘regulation does…’) definitions66. 
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67 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 12; Black, Decentring
Regulation, p. 134-135.
The table where she has included the different uses of the concept
perfectly visualises the way ‘regulation’ is expanding as a concept.
Even without further explanations it is useful because it in a compact
form shows the different meanings and contents of the concept. Black
uses the following five step classification of the different sets of
meanings and application of the concept of regulation67:
1. what is assumed regulation is (a type of legal instrument,
process, an outcome, or a property);
2. who or what is performing it (state institutions, non-state
institutions or actors, economic forces, social forces, or
‘technologies’);
3. what institutional or organizational form the regulation is
assumed to take (e.g. ministries, supra- or international bodes,
associations, firms, networks, market, norms, language);
4. with respect to what actors or areas of social life is it occurring
(firms, markets, family, health, education etc.) and
5. how regulation is conducted, through what mechanisms,
instruments and techniques (e.g. rules, taxes, trust, interaction
of rational actors). 
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Table 1: Regulation – an ever expanding concept 
(A) What is regulation? (B) Who or 
what does it?  
(C) What form 
does it take?
(D) With 
respect to 
what actors or 
area of life? 
(E) How is it done, 
via what 
instruments/ 
techniques? 
State institutions 
(regional, 
national, ‘extra-
national) 
- ministries, 
departments, 
agencies 
- supra-national 
bodies (EU) 
- international 
bodies (WTO) 
- courts 
- economics 
(firms, 
markets) 
- any other 
(family, 
education, 
health, 
government, 
etc.) 
- rules (legal, quasi-
legal, non-legal, 
universal, sectoral, 
bilateral) 
- other instruments 
(financial, market 
based, information) 
- monitoring 
- sanctioning 
Non-state 
institutions/  
actors  
E.g. 
- associations 
- committees 
- firms 
- individuals 
- epistemic 
communities 
- networks 
- economic 
- any other 
- rules (legal, 
‘quasi-legal’, non-
legal; multi-lateral, 
bilateral, unilateral) 
- other instruments 
(financial, market-
based, information) 
- monitoring 
- sanctioning 
- trust 
Economic forces Market - economic 
- any other 
- interaction of 
rational actors 
‘Social forces’  E.g. 
- norms 
- institutions 
- language 
- cognitive 
frames 
- culture 
- systems 
- networks 
- economic 
- any other 
E.g. 
- structuring 
- framing 
- enabling 
- co-ordinating 
- ordering 
- translating 
- self-referential 
reproduction 
Type of legal instrument 
Process of: 
• ‘controlling, 
governing, or 
directing’ (OED) 
• ‘altering or 
controlling with 
reference to some 
standard or purpose’ 
(OED 
• enabling/facilitating 
• co-ordinating 
• influencing 
• conferring a pattern 
on something, 
ordering 
• rendering constant 
and the process is: 
• intentional 
• goal-directed, 
problem-solving 
An outcome – the result 
of the interaction of 
actors/networks/’forces’ 
A property of self-
correction 
A property whereby the 
nature and growth of 
parts of an organism are 
interrelated so as to 
produce and integrated 
whole enabling adaption 
(biology) 
‘Technologies’ Understanding 
of and ability to 
manipulate 
physical and 
human 
environment 
- any - products of those 
understandings, e.g. 
statistics, 
probabilities, 
engineering, IT 
Table 1-1. Regulation – an ever expanding concept. Presented by Julia Black in
Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 12, and in Decentring Regulation, p. 134-135.
As Julia Black has noted, the way ’regulation’ is conceptualised
depends heavily on the problem or issue that the writer is focussing
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68 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 9 and 19; Black, Decentring
Regulation, p. 141-3.
69 This is how Professor of law at Stanford Law School and the founder of the
school’s Center for Internet and Society Lawrence Lessig, one of the most
influential person behind the change of the legal culture of IT professionals
towards the possibilities of regulation in cyberspace, uses the concept in
making his argument for regulability of ’code’; eventually that ‘code is law’
(Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Chapter 7 and Appendix; Lessig, The
New Chicago School, p. 661-691). This different usage of concepts in Lessig’s
work makes it really difficult for a lawyer to see the differences in law,
regulation and governance. What Lessig is mainly talking about when he says
that ‘code is law’ is some form of governance or regulation in the widest sense,
not law in any strict sense. However, his aim is not conceptual preciseness but
efficient rhetorics, and in that he succeeds with the analogy between code and
law. However, this type of analogy makes it really difficult to discuss and critice
his theses, as the notion made by Syme and Camp, Code as Governance, The
Governance of Code, p. 24, of the flawfullness of the analogy code and law shows.
They consider the analogy flawed with the notion that a person has freedom to
choose to bind herlself to a certain code, but in relation to law there is no such
freedom. What is unseen is that in many other forms of governance or
regulation (other than law) this kind of freedom exists. And this freedom exists
even in relation to law, but in a more restricted sense and concerns only those
with the ability to move from a jurisdiction to another (e.g., global enterpises).
on68. The understanding of what regulation is dependent on what we
want to do with it. If it is to serve as a descriptive device for an
empirical investigation into what structures or constrains the
behaviour of individuals, organizations, or systems, then a wide-
ranging conception of regulation is needed69. Such a definition would
probably come close to embrace everything on the table above as
being part of the concept of regulation. This turns almost all questions
of social and political science into questions of ‘regulation’. 
The purpose of this study being the examination of the possibilities
of ‘regulation’ to guide behaviour, and not just the description all the
factors and actors that influence behaviour, leads to the concentration
on the intentional attempts to control or order behaviour of others.
The whole notion of regulation guiding behaviour implies purposive
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70 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 284; Christina Redondo,
Reasons for Action and the Law, p. 14.
71 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 20. For a deeper discussion on
the definition see also Smith, What is Regulation?, p. 37-47.
72 As Black notes in Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 21, this does not
mean, however, that regulation in general is the sole the project of, for example,
welfare economics, or addressing the concerns of the risk society. The value
base and the justifications for regulation have to be considered more
extensively.
73 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 19-20; Smith, What is
Regulation?, p. 42-43; Parker et al., Introduction, p. 1-2.
action as explained in the philosophy of law70. This is why I adopt
the following definition of regulation presented by Julia Black71:
Regulation is a process involving sustained and focused attempt to alter
the behaviour of others according to defined standards and purposes with
the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes.
This definition disconnect regulation from the sole activity of
government and enables the decentred understanding; also others
than the governmental actors can and do have an intention to attempt
to control the behaviour of others. Regulation is also a purposive
activity; its orientation is on problem-solving or goal-attaining in the
sense there are outcomes the regulation as a process (activity) is
intended to produce72. Having intentionality as a defining feature
excludes certain parts of the table set out by Black; the categories of
market forces, social forces and technologies. There are no ‘actors’
having intentions to constrain behaviour or, as in the case of market
forces, the outcome of the interactions of actors is not intentional.
The temporal dimension (sustained and focused attempt) limits the
extension of the activity in time.73
The cybernetic understanding of the mechanisms of regulation
(standard setting, information gathering and behaviour modification)
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74 More about these mechanisms and the cybernetic understanding of
regulation see e.g., Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 67-69 and
Hood et al., The Government of Risk, p. 23-27.
75 See section 3.1. This is also noted by Black in Enrolling Actors in Regulatory
Systems, p. 69.
is left out from this definition74. I do share Black with her fear of
regulationists interpreting regulation too narrowly, e.g., only as
standard setting, and concentrating only on the executive or legislative
process of setting standards. However, due to behaviour modification
being the goal of regulation and the research interest in this study
on being on the effects this process assumes to cause on its targets,
the other two mechanisms (information gathering and standard
setting) are combined into the behaviour modification function. They
actually are a part of the regulatory toolkit (ways of modifying
behaviour) as we will see when studying the ways regulation affects
behaviour75. The way standards are set and communicated, and the
methods that are used in information gathering affect behaviour.
There actually are separate types of regulatory tools that employ the
capacity of the information resources of the regulator and that are
based on the ability to authoritatively and legitimately set standards,
goals and objectives.
This definition, so I believe and hope that you agree as we go along,
helps to see the tools of inquiry to examine intentional attempts to
alter the behaviour of those developing software and information
systems. The assumption of at least some intentionality involved in
the conception of regulation used – the intention to direct behaviour,
even if there might be unintended consequences or side effects –
makes it possible to distinguish regulation from all other questions
of social control and ordering.
1.5 Two combined perspectives
into the study of regulation
The need to be aware of the perspective when studying the ways
regulation influences behaviour has been emphasised in regulatory
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76 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 10; Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 37
and p. 384-385 in the English summary.
77 Note that implementation research also emphasises the perspective of the
field level implementation agents (Mazmanian and Sabatier, Implementation and
Public Policy, p. 11-13).
78 In legal education the concentration is typically on the perspective of the
regulators, or more precisely, on the perspective of one of the regulators, that
is, the judge. Lawyers are taught to give interpretations of the law that are valid.
Their analysis starts from the legal system, from the normative world, and its
interpretation. The user perspective into the law, as Håkan Hydén calls it in
Rättsregler, p. 22-23, on the other hand starts from the real world and
concentrates on analysing what the valid law means for a certain economic or
social action. The focus is on the consequences that the law is expected to have
on the practised area.
79 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 10.
80 In addition to the intended target group (if there is such) the concept of
‘objects of regulation’ covers also non-intended ones that might be subject to
unintended effects. This distinction is made, for example, by Vilhelm Aubert in
his study of the social functions of law, Rettens sosiale funksjon, p 124. In the final
end it is the individuals as citizens or consumers, part of a societal or a
studies76. Every intentional attempt to affect behaviour includes at
least two perspective; that of the decision-makers (regulators) or that
of the objects of the regulation77. There always is the person making
the decision to affect the behaviour of the target group and the person
experiencing the constraint of the regulation regardless of the form
of the regulation78. The choice of the perspective affects several issues.
First. The role of intentionality requirement in regulation is
dependent on which one of these perspectives is taken79. When taking
the more usual point of view of the regulator the question is what
tools are available to it to solve a particular problem. The questions
of the most effective and efficient means to achieve the desired
objectives of the regulator, the costs of different regulatory
alternatives, the restrictions and limits in their use become important.
Regulation is an activity (with actors) and the intention of that activity
(and actors) becomes an issue. 
From the point of view the regulated (the object of regulation)
the question turns into what forces are they subject to80. Citizens,
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commercial group, or as an official (part of a public authority) that make the
decisions. However, as part of a larger group the individual is subject to the
rules and norms of these institutions, thus attenuating individual preferences or
desires.
81 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 40-41; Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p.
10.
associations, corporations, courts, administrative authorities etc. as
objects of regulation are more interested in what the regulations give,
demand or constraint, what possibilities it gives and restrictions it
produces than in the tools used. From this perspective regulation is
an outcome and the intentionality element is less relevant; the constraint
is experienced regardless whether the ‘regulator’ (any of the ‘doers’
in Blacks table) intended to direct behaviour or not. 
Second. The perspective affects the conception of the regulators
– parties able to affect the behaviour being regulated. The objective
point of view easily leads to elide the other actors and factors in the
problem field. Concentration on the specific decision-maker distracts
attention from the relationships between different actors and their
possibilities to influence. The point of view of the objects of regulation
is better in recognizing the actual operational environment where one
actor and its instruments are just that – one factor worth noticing.81
Third. The choice of the perspective also affects the way (the
processes under which and mechanisms by which) the effects of a
specific regulation are understood to come into being (to be generated
in technical terms). Here the decision-makers point of view often
causes an implicit acceptance of the hierarchical, top-down
commanding, model of the mechanisms by which regulation  affects
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82 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 40. This hierarchical model, according to which
the objects of regulation follow the orders of the regulator backed by sanctions
in a uniform and predictable way, is a portrait of the way the legal order is seen
to cause effects. This model is behind much of command-and-control
regulation. (Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 22)
83 The unintended effects of regulation are easier to make explicit with the
perspective of the regulated because the spectrum of the regulators is wider
and the understanding of the mechanisms by which the effects are generated is
more diverse.
84 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 41-42 and 351-352 in Finnish, and p. 384-386 in
the English summary.
85 As Jyrki Tala in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 41 (p. 384 in the English summary)
points out, these perspectives should be used together when studying the
effects of legislation.
behaviour82. The subjective point of view makes it easier to see that
this is an oversimplified understanding83.
Fourth. As Tala differentiates between the four factors that shape
the effects of a law reform and that in relation to which the effects
of legislation should be examined (objectives, substance, imple-
mentation, and reaction of the objects of a law reform) he also makes
clear that in their use specific perspectives are stressed84. Analysis of
the objectives and substance of regulation emphasises the perspective
of the decision-maker and the study of the implementation and the
reaction of the objects of regulation stresses the point of view of the
objects.
In this study, the point of view of the regulator and the regulated
are used in the following way85. My concentration is somewhat
emphasised on the decision-makers even though the point of view
of the objects of regulation is also taken; regulation is seen both as
an activity, and (but not merely) as an outcome. The former
perspective is stressed due to the emphasis being on the substance
of regulation as a base of analysis of the regulatory capacities of
regulation. The decision-makers perspective is also emphasised in
the formation of the concept of regulation on the basis of the
intentions of the regulator. 
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By also considering the role implementation and the assumed
reactions of the objects in considering the capabilities of regulation
to affect behaviour, the perspective of the objects (the regulated) is
taken along. The perspective of the regulated is stressed especially
in the analysis of the ways regulation causes effects on behaviour and
basing the mechanisms on the conception that the effects of regulation
become existent only through the decisions (either conscious or not)
of individuals. In short, the perspective is that of an outside researcher
that balances between the perspective of the regulator and the
regulated.
1.6 Research questions, purpose and contribution
This research focuses on analysing the capabilities of regulation to
influence secure software development, i.e., the influence mechanism
of instruments and the factors that shape their influence. In that
purpose, the reasons for lack of security in COTS are analysed and
feasible regulatory tools that could solve the problems are sought.
The goal is to get an understanding of the possibilities of the most
attractive regulatory instruments to influence secure software
development and to develop an approach that would enable the
evaluation of other instruments.
Assuming the importance of the security of the packaged software
components (software products) for the security of our current form
of society, this study concentrates on analysing alternative regulatory
means, i.e., regulatory instruments, designed to achieve the desired
state of affairs. The primary interest is in evaluating alternative
regulatory means to achieve a state of affairs where more secure
software would be available in the market. In short, the research
question of this study is: Can the effects created by the most plausible regulatory
instruments contribute to secure software development and, especially, do they
correlate with the social objective of achieving secure software?
This is done in order to benefit regulatory drafting, i.e. the
preparation of different regulatory instruments, by making explicit
Regulating Secure Software Development42
86 Note the difference to traditional dogmatic legal research where the
information produced is considered to assist the judge in her decision-making
about valid law and the arguments used in the decision-making. In the
regulatory approach used in this study the purpose is to provide information to
the use of regulators by considering the advantages and disadvantages of
several regulatory alternatives. No single solution is searched for. 
The need for a new type of legal scholarship serving not only lawyers acting in
the role of judges, but also as advisers or legislators, has been raised in an
emerging discipline that applies the tools of legal theory to legislative problems.
See, e.g., Luc Wintgens, Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation. In the
German tradition this has been emphasised already in the 1970's, e.g., by Peter
Noll as pointed out by Jan Hellner in Lagstiftning inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 147
(with reference to Noll P (1973) Gesetzgebungslehre, Reinbek bei Hamburg,
Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, chapter 1). Unfortunately my lack of German
language skills have prevented me from going deeper into the the extensive
German language literature following the work of Peter Noll and Jürgen Rödig
that has aimed at providing principled tools for practical law drafting. For
references and a short overview, see Hellner in Lagstiftning inom
förmögenhetsrätten, p. 145-155.
87 This is what Aulis Aarnio in Some Conceptual Foundations of Legal Policy
Research, p. 225-230, refers to as legal policy research. The main research
interest in this study is on the third type of information the policy research
should provide according to Aarnio (idem., p. 229-230), i.e., information
concerning the alternative means leading to the desired final state of affairs.
the different types of instruments that can be used in the regulation,
what their possibilities are in enhancing secure software development
and how they are likely to affect86. In doing so, I come close to the
type of research that is needed for planning and decision-making in
social matters87.
When analysing the regulatory capabilities of different instruments
the purpose is to identify problematic issues in regulation that need
correction. The purpose is also to provide partial information for the
evaluation of which instruments work best. Information on the
capabilities of different regulatory tools to influence secure software
development is a part of the material needed for the comparison of
the desirability of different regulatory instruments. An analysis of the
incentive mechanisms and possible effects provide information about
the possibilities of different regulatory instruments to enhance the
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88 For a definition see the basic textbook of David L. Weimer and Aidan R.
Vining, Policy Analysis, p. 27-28.
89 Similar role has been assigned for regulatory impact analysis in general in a
collection of best practices in OECD countries (OECD, Regulatory Impact
Analysis, p. 7).
development of secure software. This information is useful for the
regulators in recognising the issues to be enhanced and, at minimum,
not to be hindered when pondering the need for regulation. It is
needed for the decision-making of the desirability of regulatory
instruments, and helps regulatory drafting by making explicit the
possibilities and limitations of the instruments.
The difference to the client-oriented advice giving relevant to public
decisions, i.e., the professional activity called policy analysis88, is that
the purpose is not to give direct advice in public policy, but to analyse
different means to enhance certain public policy, i.e., that of secure
software development. Full evaluation of the feasibility and desirability
of different regulatory solutions for the problems of developing secure
software would require information much more widely than just of
the regulatory capabilities of instruments. Issues like the efficiency,
equity, manageability, legitimacy and political feasibility of the specific
instruments or their mixes would be relevant.
However, such an analysis is not feasible in an academic study.
It implies the need of contextual normative and political arguments
which are the work of the regulator and not the researcher. The
analysis of the regulatory capability of specific instruments is not a
sufficient basis for regulatory decision-making89. At best, it is only
a guide to improve the quality of political and administrative decision-
making.
Note that this is neither a pure prediction of the effects of
regulation nor an empirical verification of effects conducted after the
enactment of a specific regulatory instrument. Even in the evaluation
of the effects of regulation on secure software development based
on existing research, the concentration is primarily on the type
behaviour the regulation authorises or proscribes rather than on
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90 This is the way MacCormick in On Legal Decisions and their Consequences,
p. 239 and 254, understands to the role of consequentialist reasoning in judicial
decision-making. I.e., judicial decision-making is not, and according to
MacCormick should not focus so much on estimating the probability of
behavioural changes, as on possible conduct and its certain normative status in
the light of the law.
91 Rocher, L’effectivité du droit, p. 133.
92 However, since secure software development is not an express objective of
regulation, instead it is the central argument of this study that it ought to be,
unintended consequences cannot be bypassed. This is why both intended and
unintended effects, anticipated and non-anticipated, and those that appear in
the subject field of the regulatory instruments or outside of it are still of
interest. According to Tala (Lakien vaikutukset, p. 66-70) and Ervasti and Tala
(Lainvalmistelu ja vaikutusten ennakointi, p. 12) this is the approach used in the
analysis of the effects of laws. Since the analysis concentrates on the capability
of regulation to influence an abstract societal goal (secure software deve-
lopment), of the variety of effects regulation can produce only those that have
relevance for secure software development are gathered.
attempting to make estimations of the probability of behavioural
changes, i.e., what behaviour the rule will induce or discourage90. The
analysis concentrates more on the types of incentives for behaviour
provided by the regulation, than on the probability of actual effects.
The analysis focuses more on the incentives regulation provides for
secure software development than on estimating the probability of
actual behavioural changes.
Similar to the differentiation between intended and unintended
consequences, sociologist Guy Rocher has drawn an illustrative
distinction between law’s “efficacité” and law’s “effectivité”; that is,
law’s capacity to produce intended results and law’s capacity to
produce social consequences in general91. In this study the
concentration is on the ability of regulation to influence secure
software development, its ability induce, under the given
circumstances, such behaviour as will bring about the desired change
in software development towards more security consciousness, i.e.,
the efficacy of regulation in enhancing secure software development.92
This study contributes by adding a regulatory approach to the
recently emerged international discussion on the economic aspects
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93 These supporting research questions are based on the idea made expressive
by Mayntz in The Conditions of Effective Public Policy, p. 127, that
underlying the design of efficacious policy program there must be an adequate
causal theory. There must be correct assumptions about the factors causing a
problem and about what must be changed in order to solve it, and how
regulation can be used to effect behaviour changes. Note that Mayntz uses the
term effectiveness instead of efficacy in talking about the ability of a policy
program to induce behaviour that will bring about the desired change.
94 This research question tries to yield information about the original
conditions prevailing the policy decision on secure software development. The
first type of information that [legal] policy research should provide according
to Aulis Aarnio, Some Conceptual Foundations of Legal Policy Research, p.
229-230.
95 As Mayntz points out in The Conditions of Effective Public Policy, p. 127,
causal adequacy can only be defined in relation to a given problem situation. It
is not a formal characteristic that can be recognised by looking at the types of
instruments used in themselves or the whole policy program itself. This makes
it difficult, according to Mayntz potentially even impossible (idem.), to utilise
the most interesting and important aspects that policy analysis and especially
implementation analysis have provided from several fields of (especially public)
policy, i.e., adequacy of the underlying causal theory and other theoretical
of information security. Not just a deeper understanding of the role
of economic considerations in secure software development is gained,
but also a map of possible regulatory solutions and their capabilities
in influencing secure software development is achieved.
In order to be able the find answers to this general research
question following supporting research questions have to be answered
first93: 
First, what are the current incentives for secure software development in highly
competitive software product markets? In order to be able to analyse the
capabilities of regulation to influence secure software development,
a rough understanding of the incentives for secure software
development has to be gained. However, the making of a somewhat
comprehensive picture of these incentives is only a secondary purpose
of this analysis94. The primary purpose is to find the correct
assumptions about the factors causing problems and about what must
be changed in order to solve it. This is information is needed to find
the regulatory solutions that can solve the problems, i.e., causally
adequate instruments95. Reasons and explanations for the widely
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assumptions underlying a policy program. The adequacy of the theoretical
assumptions underlying a program has been identified as some of the most
interesting and important aspects of implementation analysis by Mazmanian
and Sabatier in Implementation and Public Policy, p. 11.
96 The deeper and more coherent understanding of the problems in secure
software development gathered forms the basis for the identification of
possible instruments. This information is not new to those participating in
secure software development, but as a basis of regulatory analysis this
information has been too scattered and just recently emerged into the serious
discussions of changing practices of secure software development.
97 The interest in the influence mechanism is purely instrumental. The
mechanisms by which regulation affects behaviour are refined only in order to
be able to analyse the capabilities of regulatory instruments.
acknowledged insecurity of the packaged software used extensively
are sought. Preliminary suggestions of possible solutions to the
identified problems in the literature are also sought.96
Second, how does regulation guide behaviour or how can it influence
behaviour? Without an understanding of the ways regulation guides
behaviour the regulatory capabilities of different instruments is
difficult to see and impossible to analyse critically97. This is a somewhat
neglected area, for the reason why a little deeper understanding of
the ways regulation influences behaviour regulation needs to be
provided in order to find the necessary heuristic tools for analysis.
Of interest are the mechanism by which regulation affects behaviour,
who is doing the regulation and the actors to whom the regulation
is directed.
This part of the study contributes to regulatory theory and
especially the analysis of effects of regulation. Insights form various
disciplines make explicit several heuristic tools for the analysis of the
effects of regulation. During the study, the applicability of these
heuristic tools for a wider regulatory perspective and context is tested
and insights into their usefulness made.
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98 The material reviewed is visible in the references of the heading 2.
1.7 Of method and material 
The method of literature review was used in the analysis of the first
supporting research question in chapter 2 where the concentration
is on the current incentives for secure software development and the
incentive structures of the actors. In this chapter an understanding
of the reasons for insecure software is provided; the main problems
are seen to be stemming from the network economic environment
where software product development is done. The literature reviewed
includes security relevant material on software economics and
engineering, information systems science, computer science and
textbooks from information security practitioners. The scattered
analysis of the disincentives for secure software product development
is gathered and linked together with the economic arguments of the
motives for secure software development. In addition to library
catalogues, the material was sought from journals, on-line publications,
conference proceedings, web pages of relevant institutions, online
course-material and personal web pages of the authors.98
Note that since my analysis relies on literary sources and
concentrates especially on academic research, there necessarily is a
time lag in relation to the present methods of secure software
development. In this sense, the analysis stems from an abstract
situation where the quality aspect of security has not been of much
interest and no major effort has been put into improving the security
of software. The argument is that the increasing interest in secure
software development during the last couple of years together with
the consequent improvements is partly due to the regulatory pressure;
i.e., software vendors desire to improve the security of software has
partly been due to the increased threat of further regulatory action.
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99 In chapter 3 heuristic tools are provided for the analysis of the influence
mechanisms. Also classifications both of the instruments used in regulation
and of the possible regulators are made on the basis of the wide understanding
of regulation not just being state-centred. Considerations of the role of law in
the process of regulation are also included.
100 This is typically acknowledged in sociolegal studies, like that of Mathiesen,
Rätten i samhället, p. 30-31, and in legislative theory (see, e.g., Tala, Lakien
vaikutukset, p. 17-21). As MacCormick notes in his philosophical inquiry into
the proper role of consequentialist reasoning in juridical decision-making
(MacGormick, On Legal Decisions and their Consequences, p. 254), legal rules
and rulings in law are not causes of behaviour – they are only grounds for
choice by people. This implies that the law and rulings in law are not the sole
grounds for decision-making.
101 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset 2001, p. 287.
102 As Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. vii, in his philosophical study on
rule-based decision-making that draws from an extensive literature base in
philosophy and legal theory correctly points out, analytic isolation as a method
is superior to that of trying to capture the full complexity of behaviour.
Despite such aspirations for comprehensive accuracy giving faithful depictions
of reality, their accuracy often fails to increase our understanding since they
tend only to replicate the vagueness and the messiness of life.
A change in the method is required when turning to the ways
regulation affects behaviour in chapter 399. The method used in
answering the second supporting research question is that of analytic
isolation. When studying the reasons for actions (incentives) provided
by a regulation itself it is not possible to proceed from the wide angle
of individual decision-making and its comprehensive depiction; also
other factors than just the regulatory instrument in question affect
the behaviour and choices of individuals. The regulation is just a part
of a wider entirety of influencing factors formed by different individual
or social issues that direct behaviour (e.g. motives, beliefs, aims, hopes,
emotions, knowledge)100. The regulations not necessarily are even the
explicit cause of influence as noted by Tala101. The incentives provided
by the regulatory instruments themselves need to be isolated.
Otherwise the incentives get lost into the general motivations for
behaviour, and the reasons for action provided by the regulatory
instrument as such are lost.102 
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103 The sociology of law has largely foregone the experimental method of
isolating the effects of law from all the other influencing factors especially
when studying the intended effects; as the Professor of Sociology of Law at the
University of Oslo Thomas Mathiesen points out in Rätten i samhället, p. 59, the
effects of laws cannot be separated from the multitude of other influencing
factors. The main conclusion of the sociology of law in relation to the intended
effects of laws is that when the law is placed in a social, economic and political
context that supports its intentions, then it is going to effect as intended (idem.
p. 60). This does not, however, render the isolation of the influencing
mechanisms as futile or impossible. It only means that in the evaluation of the
effects of regulation such an approach is not feasible. When analysing
regulatory capacity, the reasons for actions regulations provide, such an
approach is essential. 
104 The distinction between the normative and social functions has been made
especially in relation to law by Joseph Raz in On the Functions of Law, p. 278-
305. The distinction between normative and social functions is not meant as a
classification of functions. It is rather a distinction between types of
classifications, between different principles of classification of functions.
The way  to isolate and identify the reasons for action provided
by regulation itself is the exclusion of human behaviour and other
motivational factors than those provided by regulation as far as
possible; to analytically isolate the influencing mechanisms of
regulation from all the other influencing factors103. The method used
in answering the second supporting research question is isolation of
the mechanisms by which regulation influences behaviour and the
reasons for action it provides of all the possible influencing factors
for human behaviour. The analysis of the ways regulation affects
behaviour is done at a theoretical level and leans heavily on prior
analysis done in legal theory and the philosophy of law, sociology
(especially law and sociology) and political science.
It is illustrative to distinguish between the classifications of
normative and social functions of norms104. It is a separation between
the ways regulation affects behaviour and the effects it either has or
intends to have. The normative functions are the ways in which
regulation guides human behaviour. It is common to all norms, legal
or otherwise, that they guide human behaviour; they are reasons for
performing or abstaining from a certain action. The normative
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105 The other factors that provide reasons for action and the behaviour of the
norm addressees is relevant only at the level of the basic theoretical assumption
that norms are generally followed and enforced (i.e. the regulatory system is
generally efficacious). To the degree this necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for the existence of a legal system (if it were largely ineffective it
would fail to provide reasons for actions and would not guide human
behaviour) is correct will determine the strength of the reasons provided by a
law. The other factors that influence behaviour beside law are further
disregarded. (Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 280, 282 and 287)
106 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 280 and 287.
107 Kauko Wikström makes a similar qualification in his study about guiding
with legal norms, Ohjaaminen oikeusnormeilla, p. 401. He concentrates purely
on the normative guidance provided by legal norms.
functions are the reasons for human behaviour provided by the
regulation. In considering the variety of these reasons the actual
behaviour of people is immaterial; the question of why people comply
with regulation and the other influencing factors are closed as far as
possible out even though their existence is recognised while analysing
the normative function.105
Social functions, on the other hand, are attributed to regulations
because of the social effects they have or are intended to have. The
social functions are determined by the social effects regulation causes
or can cause. Regulations fulfil their social functions because of their
particular normative character; the normative function is part of the
means by which regulation performs its social functions. The social
functions, the effects created, depend on the compliance of the
addressees, the application of the norms and the effects of the
existence of the norms on human behaviour (attitudes, etc.).106
In the analysis of the ways regulation influences behaviour the
classification principle of normative functions is used. The question
is answered by trying to see how normative guidance communicates
itself into the behaviour of the objects of regulation, or, in a rephrased
form, what is the structure of the mechanism used to direct
behaviour107. The normative analysis, by adopting the perspective of
the regulator, supposes that a regulatory instrument (especially law)
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108 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 282. Redondo in Reasons for Action and the
Law, p. 80-81, provides a critical evaluation of this approach.
109 In legal scholarship, it is often incorrectly assumed that the content is also a
sufficient indication of the effects produced by the norm as Jyrki Tala correctly
points out in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 35.
110 The analysis is made from the perspective of the regulator; it is the regulator
that assumes how the regulatory instrument affects behaviour. The different
factors that influence behaviour beside the regulation are excluded. In the
second research question the perspective of the regulated are taken along.
111 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 284; Redondo, Reasons for Action and the
Law, p. 41. As Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, p. 842-843, notes
in discussing the central presupposition of Raz’s theory of authority and law of
the kinds of reasons for action that authoritative legal norms give and
especially in discussing the types of reasons given by morality from the
perspective of the philosophy of the law, the objective reasons which morality
gives to all rational agents need not be subjective reasons. Raz is not charting
the structure of our actual psychology when we reason practically. Instead, his
charting of the structure – the systematic relations that hold – of this reason-
giving nature of law and morality helps us to analytically separate the specific
ways in which regulation influence behaviour apart from all the other
influencing factors. By concentration on the normative functions the political
is separated from the legal or regulatory. The concentration is on the inner
logic of the influence mechanism. However, as Moore, Authority, Law, and
Razian Reasons, p. 843-845, makes explicit, the structure that Raz gives to
objective moral reasons parallels exactly with a familiar picture of the
is a reason for action because of its content108. Thus, the concentration
is on the substance of the norms, the guidance they provide for
behaviour and the mechanisms used in this. This normative analysis
is done in section 3.
However, this normative analysis forms only a part of the
mechanisms that shape the effects a regulation can have or can be
predicted to have109. The normative guidance provided by regulation
influences the effects regulation can have, but is not the only factor.
The pure normative and objective analysis makes explicit only the
means by which regulatory instrument are assumed to influence
behaviour. It does not say much about the factors that shape the
effects of a regulatory instrument in practice110. A pure normative
remark is made, not a psychological one111. 
Regulating Secure Software Development52
subjective reasons on which persons act.
112 These two were chosen for a deeper analysis due to their attractiveness in
tentative analysis. Those practising information security had raised these two,
among others, as feasible alternatives. They were either in use (vulnerability
reporting) or had been strongly proposed to be used (product liability rules).
113 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 287.
A richer overall picture is needed in order to understand the
influencing capability of a specific regulatory instrument and to answer
the main research question. The analysis of the efficacy of the two
different regulatory instruments selected for deeper substantive study
of a large variety of instruments from different regulatory strategies
– vulnerability disclosure in chapter 4 and software product liability
in chapter 5 – necessarily also takes along the behaviour of the norm
addressees (the objects of regulation)112. The effects created depend
on the degree to which laws are obeyed and applied and on the effects
of the existence of laws on human behaviour, attitudes, etc.113. The
method of analysis for the primary research question uses the
classificatory principle of social functions and necessarily takes along
the political aspect.
The normative analyses of the influence mechanisms of the
regulatory instruments utilising the theoretical considerations done
in chapter 3, where the intention is to make explicit the mechanisms
by which the instrument affects secure software development, thus
forms only a basis for the analysis of the efficacy of the regulatory
instruments. In the consideration of the consequences attached to
actions, i.e., additional reasons for action provided by the regulation,
the focus is on those consequences that are especially created by or
employed with the help of the regulatory instrument be they legal or
non-legal. Consequences that are employed otherwise are not included;
instead, they are analysed in the second part of the chapters 4 and
5 where the factors that shape the influence provided by an instrument
are analysed.
Because the pure normative approach is not sufficient to make
visible the efficacy of regulatory instruments, the analysis needs to
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114 The importance of studying the factors between the promulgation of the
law and the behaviour of the public is typically raised in sociological studies of
the effects of laws such as Aubert’s analysis in Some Social Functions of
Legislation, p. 117. Widening the analysis from that of pure content to the
intervening factors implies a shift from analytical isolation to a method that
utilises the empirical research results provided, e.g., by sociology of law.
Instead of pure content of the norms, the analysis concentrates on the social,
economic and political factors that shape the influence, similar to the sociolegal
analysis as presented by Thomas Mathiesen in Rätten i samhället, p. 60.
115 see, e.g., Parker et al., Introduction, p. 6-7. This regulatory space argument
resembles, and mainly stems from, the responsiveness and reflexivity
arguments made by a variety of scholars in sociology (e.g., Habermas,
Luhmann), law (e.g., Teubner) and regulatory studies (e.g., Ayres and
Braithwaite in several studies). Similar to regulatory studies, like that of Ayres
and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, p. 4-5, this study does not adhere to any
of the grand (general and overarching) theories that explain structures and
processes of the regulation of social phenomena. The argument is more
practical; it only calls for the analysis of the context of regulation, the complex
abstract space where it occurs. This is necessary for the understanding of the
regulation in its decentred form where the regulatory capacities, the resources
and abilities of regulators, are dispersed and fragmented.
widen from that of pure content. The analysis of the efficacy needs
to be done on the basis of wider analysis, where the analysis of the
substance of the regulation only is one part. Also other factors that
influence the effects of a regulatory instrument need to be taken along.
In order to understand the efficacy of regulation it is necessary
also to study the variables which intervene between the enactment
of a regulatory instrument and the behaviour of the objects of
regulation114. In the terms of regulatory studies, regulation is analysed
as occurring in a regulatory space where the operation and competition
of various regulatory regimes influences regulatory impact and where
the effects cannot be understood without an understanding of the
practices, norms and social ordering of the target population115.
There still is a need to concentrate on the factors that are in the
control or in the sphere of influence of the regulator. Otherwise the
influence capability of regulation would not be possible to separate
from the multitude of influencing factors. At the same time the already
accepted intentionality of regulatory activity would be lost. However,
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116 This is emphasised by Tala in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 354-356 in Finnish and
p. 386 in the English summary. As Tala also recognises, it is a general problem
in the research on human behaviour that the effects of certain specific factors
cannot be established in a manner that would show it to be a necessary and
sufficient condition for the behaviour. No absolute causal links can be
established between an influencing factor and behaviour due to the complexity
of the human motivations.
117  Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 354-356 in Finnish and p. 386 in the English
summary. Jyrki Tala is one of the leading Finnish scholars in legislative theory
and a professor in legislative research at the Faculty of Law of the University
of Turku. The professorship to which Jyrki Tala acceded in the beginning of
November 2005 is the first of the kind in Finland and in other Nordic
countries.
118 This matrix is based on the assumption that these factors are within the
sphere of influence of the regulator, they can be influenced by the regulator,
and that the four factors in particular shape the effects produced (Tala, Lakien
vaikutukset, p. 382 in the English summary). A central limitation to the
predictive capacity of this approach has to be acknowledged. Since no
the precise isolation of the incentives provided by regulation from
all other, often diverse and contradictory, conceivable factors
influencing human behaviour is not possible under the classificatory
principle of social functions. Every individual or a group has so many
different motives and interest, and the external structures that exist
in a given society that also provide incentives (such as the market in
terms of prices) that no theory or empirical study has been able to
establish or verify the causal link, or to propose a widely applicable
general propositions on the links between the incentives provided
by a regulation and the changes in individual or group behaviour116.
Jyrki Tala acknowledges the problems in the isolation of the
incentives provided by a regulatory instrument and proposes an
analytical framework to trace the visible links and mechanism, and
not the necessary and sufficient conditions (causal relationships), by
which effects of a law reform are created and shaped117. The useful
matrix consists of four factors in relation to which the effects of laws
can be examined; the objectives, the substance (which is mainly
regarded as a means of achieving the objectives), the implementation,
and the reaction of the objects of a law reform118. Tala concludes that
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overarching theory is accepted for the basis of analysing the effects and strict
causal models are abandoned, even economics with its widely used theories of
human behaviour is seen just as another heuristic device among others
(however good in the prediction of effects), the predictions made are more
difficult to verify. Actually they could be verified only in the evaluation phase
of the effects years after the enactment of the regulations.
119 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 349-351 in Finnish and p. 382-384 in the English
summary. Not all shaping factors can be considered, even of those which are at
the margin of discretion of the regulators. They would require much more in
depth and wider analysis. Only those factors that normatively belong to the
instrument are analysed (i.e., are visible form the normative structure of the
instrument and visible mainly for the legal analysis).
120 Black, Law and Regulation, p. 35. In adopting the basic four factor matrix
model drafted by Tala, a conscious choice of stepping into the borderline
between legal and regulatory scholarship is taken. This study can be categorised
as belonging into the discipline of the theory of regulation. The concentration
is on the structure, norm type and content of regulation concerning the
development of secure software. The focus is on the different instruments
used, their incentive mechanisms and the factors that shape their influence and
affect their capacity to influence behaviour.
each of the four factors contributes to the knowledge of the factors
underpinning the creation and shaping of the effects of a law reform;
however, he acknowledges the problem of differentiating between
the highly interrelated and dependent four factors119. 
Even though these factors have traditionally not been central to
legal scholarship, as Tala seems to be suggesting in sketching a model
for the analysis of the effects of legislation, from the wider regulatory
perspective this matrix is not unique. As Julia Black notes, questions
concerning the influences shaping regulation, the design and
deployment of regulatory tools, patterns of decision-making, strategies
of monitoring and enforcement, and responses to regulation are the
central issues addressed in regulatory scholarship.120
Jyrki Tala is sceptical about the applicability of the observations
he makes about the creation and shaping of effects to statutory norms
of another kind, e.g., ministerial decrees or other lower level orders
by public authorities. He is of the opinion that if the way the norms
are created (e.g., which actors participate) have no importance for
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121 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 30-31.
the effects provided, which he strongly opposes, then several of the
notions of the effects of a law reform could be extended also to other
legal regulations121. This is correct as such. But this does not render
the analytical four factor matrix as inapplicable for the study of the
regulatory capacity of different kinds of instruments. The method,
as argued in this study and widely supported by regulatory scholarship,
is applicable to the analysis of all regulation. Just the observations
made about the effects of a law reform with the help of the matrix
are not universal and care should be taken when using them.
With objectives the analysis concentrates on the intentions of those
involved in the drafting of the specific regulation. The intentions of
others than just the regulators (e.g. members of the parliament and
other decision-makers in legislative drafting) are of importance because
typically there are a number of other actors involved with different
roles (e.g., opinion leaders, those giving statements, lobbyists). In
addition, the analysis of the objectives covers also the objective
intentions of an instrument inside a system, detached from the
intentions of those participating in the drafting. These are, for
example, the general functions of an instrument (the maintenance
of public order, settling of disputes and levelling of conflicting
interests in the case the law) and purposes served (e.g., resolving a
certain problem, the enhancement of the public interest). 
The analysis of the objectives tries to answer question what is the
factual situation that is supposed to come true with the regulation;
the state of affairs the regulator means to bring about by particular
regulatory action. When the objectives found are compared to the
abstracted and assumed societal objective of achieving secure software,
it becomes possible to see whether the instrument incorporates an
adequate understanding of the factors affecting secure software
development.
The objectives are essentially visible in the documents created
during the drafting of the instrument, the statements made by the
parties involved in different contexts and the studies made about the
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122 For a short overview of hermeneutics in law, see Morawetz, Law and
Literature, p. 456-457. This is the core of the legal positivist method of inquiry
as best represented by H.L.A. Hart in jurisprudence. Note that I am not
interested in the discussions about the generally applicable concept of law or
regulation (criteria of legality). Instead, I am only interested in the ways
regulation affects behaviour. This is the second essential question of legal
positivism (normativity of law).
123 This has been raised in relation to tort doctrines by Jane Stapleton in
Regulating Torts, p. 132, where she critically evaluates Hugh Collins regulatory
approach to contract law and its applicability to tort law.
124 Stapleton in Regulating Torts, p. 133, raises this in relation to tort doctrines.
instruments. However, there are also hidden intentions that are not
explicitly stated. These are analysed by considering the background
assumptions of different actors and the instrument inside a larger
context and a part of a system. The background assumptions are made
visible by using a hermeneutic approach122.
The analysis of the objectives is essentially speculative in nature.
First of all, the instruments have not been explicitly stipulated, i.e.,
they are constructions of practice instead of explicit drafting123. This
hinders the analysis of the intentions and objectives of specific
regulators since they can vary a lot. In these cases the regulators are
considered, where feasible, as groups that have at least somewhat
similar incentive structures and can be expected to have similar types
of objectives. The huge variety of differing objectives inside these
groups still has to be acknowledged even though analysis cannot make
them visible.
Also the general nature of many of the regulations, i.e., they are
drafted to fit a huge variety of situations, like in the case of contractual
and non-contractual liability doctrines, instead of reflecting a single
socially constructed area of concern such as the software development,
emphasises the speculative nature of the analysis of objectives124. Many
of such general regulations cut across number of social contexts and
in each case the contextual facts will trigger a unique set of concerns
and goals. Thus, the analysis of the objectives of such general
regulations in the social context of secure software development is
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125 What this means is that the objectives gleamed out in such cases are the
mental work of the analyst, instead of explicitly being stated or even
considered by the regulators. However, this concern the whole analysis of the
objectives since they are gleamed out from the background assumptions of the
regulators and only in rare cases can explicit statements especially in relation to
secure software development be found. Even in cases where the objectives are
explicitly stated they need to be compared to the incentive structure and
background assumption of the regulators in order to test whether they are
mere lip-service or rhetoric. The objective intentions of the instruments inside
a system, i.e., their inner logic which in the case of legal regulation typically are
the creations of scholars, are also useful in this. 
126 This essentially is, and can be, just a preliminary analysis. Some of the
instruments (especially vulnerability reporting) are so new and subject to rapid
changes that a sufficient understanding neither of the influence mechanisms
nor the related objectives has not yet been gained. This makes the writings and
other representations of the attitudes of those participating in the regulatory
processes important. This is why writings in newspapers and discussion lists
are relevant in relation to the new and informal types of regulations like
vulnerability reporting.
127 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 102.
essentially a speculative work, especially when no practical cases exist
where the contextual factors have been considered125.
The actual objectives of the regulators in real implementations or
the effects of specific instruments in use are not analysed in this study.
The concentration is on general ideal types of instruments and no
empirical research in conducted. The policy papers, the drafting
documents etc. provide information of the general objectives of the
regulators and the purposes of the instrument used, but no interviews
have been made126. As Tala emphasises, the limitations of the
information concerning the objectives has to be recognised; the
sources that give historic or empirical information can be used to
depict the objectives, and this information is useful in the analysis
of the regulatory capacity, but no reliable, final or complete knowledge
can be achieved127. This is a clear lacking in the study which hopefully
will be corrected in further studies.
Since this study strives for an understanding of the possibilities
of regulation in solving problems in secure software development,
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128 An analysis of specific implementation in certain jurisdictions needs to
acknowledge the variations of objectives between international actors,
jurisdictions and areas with different regulatory styles.
129 Even though legal scholarship, the internal view of law, forms a part of the
method by which the substance of specific instruments are analysed, the
purpose in this study is not to find the best justifiable meanings of a regulatory
instrument. The purpose of the study is not to give recommended
interpretations of specific norms or the systematisation of norms according to
the traditions of a specific jurisdiction. No normative arguments about the
correct interpretation of the substance of the norms are provided. The
instruments are analysed as abstract models (ideal type analytical tools) starting
from the dispositive rules (the standardised rules applicable to situations where
nothing else has been agreed on) and the basic elements of the instruments.
The uncertainties in the interpretations of the substance of the instruments and
their variations between contexts (e.g., contracts that typically deviate from the
dispositive rules) and jurisdictions is acknowledged and the effects of this
uncertainty are considered, but no normative arguments about the right
interpretation of the substances are provided.
rather than an ex post empirical analysis of the effects, also the
objectives of regulators are more or less theoretical and result of the
understanding of the context of secure software development. This
emphasis the uncertainty and incompleteness of this knowledge.
Despite of this, to the degree the objectives can be made explicit, this
information is useful in understanding and analysing regulatory
capacity. The speculative nature of the information just has to be
acknowledged, and the need for empirical verification after
information on the implementation of the instruments can be gathered
from actual implementations128. 
The analysis of the substance of regulation concentrates on the
content of rules and the way it shapes the effects regulation can have.
The internal view of law, the descriptive and prescriptive legal
scholarship by concentrating on the finding of the best justifiable
meaning of a regulatory instrument, is useful in the analysis of the
content of a norm. It gives information on the ways the objects are
supposed to behave and thus of the intended effects of the
regulation129. However, an instrument can also have unintended effects
and effects that appear outside the scope of the norm. Also policy
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130 These assumptions are largely based on welfare economics but has
developed further as depicted in basic textbooks on policy analysis, such as
that of Weimer and Vining, Policy Analysis.
131 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 35-36.
analysis type of study (traditional toolkit analysis) gives information
on the assumed effects of the regulation because the tool choice is
partially based on the assumptions how people react to the specific
types of regulation130. Policy analysis typically considers different
regulatory options, their differences, benefits and disadvantages.
As was already noted above, the analysis of the substance, even
when accompanied with the objectives, does not tell about the actual
effect of a regulatory instrument. Only the intended effects and at
best just potential effects are found. Between the substance of
regulation and the effects created by the regulation exists a variety
if different factors and mechanisms that shape the effects. The
expansion of the analysis from that of the substance (the content)
and the intended effects is necessary because the effects caused by
a regulatory instrument, even if it is normatively binding as law is,
does not translate into behaviour automatically, mechanically or fully
in a way it is intended. The regulation can also provide incentives that
were neither foreseen nor intended by the regulator and they can
appear outside the target subject matter. The guidance provided by
the regulation is altered when the objects of regulation apply it. Their
choices and decisions are influenced also by other factors than just
norm in question and the knowledge of its correct substance (the
standard of conduct it provides).131
When the essence of regulation is influencing or altering behaviour,
it emphasises the relational nature of regulation. It is not just imposed
from above and the effects are not in direct causal relationship with
the regulation. Instead, regulation is just one factor in the governance
of an issue and questions of how the regulation is implemented and
how the objects react become important. This highlights the
importance of the actors under the scope of a regulation, the structure
and the operational environment they form, for the shape of the
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132 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 174 and 177-178.
133 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 323.
134 Especially this analysis demands a deeper understanding of the
characteristics of secure software development and the incentive structures
present. Such an analysis is performed largely when answering the first
supporting research question and analysing the problems in secure software
development in chapter 2.
effects of a regulatory instrument. The implementation (the actors
putting the rules into practices) and the reactions of the objects form
a mechanism that mediates the substance together with the objectives
and the effects.132
With implementation the interaction between the actors doing the
necessary task required for the norm to be effective and the objects
of regulation are of especial interest. Among the question answered
are: how many mediators there are, who is responsible and pays for
the implementation, are the monetary and human resources sufficient
(e.g. the number of persons and the level of expertise). In the analysis
of the reactions of the objects of regulation, the first task is to identify
to whom the specific regulatory instrument is addressed – whose
behaviour is being directed. The starting point is that, in addition to
the preferences and incentive structures of the implementers, the
effects are shaped also by the attitudes and beliefs of the objects of
regulation.
The analysis of the reactions of the objects has been found to be
more fruitful when starting from the different actors, their options
and decision-making contexts rather than from the regulation itself133.
Especially considerations of the decision-making models of different
actors, the role played by them (e.g. private individual or consumer,
public organisation, SME or big commercial actor), the constraints
to their rationality and capabilities (e.g. level of expertise and
knowledge) and their resources are relevant. The likelihood of
opportunism or of voluntary compliance, which is affected by the
incentive structure, is also relevant.134
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135 The abstraction from specific regulatory systems has been the starting point
of regulatory theory. For example, Peter Noll did not bind his arguments into a
specific legal system as pointed out by Jan Hellner in Lagstiftning inom
förmögenhetsrätten, p. 148.
136 Some of the instruments analysed are so new and still evolving that
information about them, even of their structure, is just being gathered. No
hard facts can be stated even of the form some of the instruments take. The
evidence gathered is patchy and susceptible to rival interpretations.
137 The lack of detailed, systematic empirical studies is a severe hindrance. The
casual observations about the reaction of the objects made on the basis of
immediate appearances that dominate many discussions of the public’s
behaviour can be deceiving. An unfounded belief in having understood the
public is a serious barrier to acquiring a genuine understanding.
A special challenge for the information gathering in this study is
that the analysis is not made in relation a specific regulatory action
in a certain time frame and in a certain context or even a jurisdiction135.
Instead the analysis concerns the abstract ideal types of instruments,
not a specific realised regulatory project or one being carried out in
practice in a specific context. The analysis is based on theoretical
considerations and evidence provided by others136. 
An additional problem is that wide empirical knowledge of the
instruments in general and their effects have not been gathered
systematically nor critically evaluated even by others. For this reason,
the analysis involves a huge amount of assumptions and the results
are just indicative despite the assumptions being widely held and
theoretically studied extensively137. Thus the analysis is based on a
prediction of the effects of regulation, not an empirical verification
conducted after the enactment of the specific instrument. This is due
to the study concentrating only the ideal types of instruments, not
a specific realised regulatory measure inside a jurisdiction or a specific
situation, or one being carried out in practice. This leaves the analysis
of the possible effects of regulation on secure software development
exposed to rival interpretations. Hard evidence is scarce.
Because only abstract ideal types of instruments are analysed, the
information collection is restricted. No empirical research is conducted
in this study nor is it feasible in a wider context. An empirical analysis
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138 It has to be made clear the no empirical analysis neither of the imple-
mentation nor of the reactions of the objects is done in this study or could
even have been possible. As Jyrki Tala points out in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 237,
the implementation analysis can be done only years after the specific regulation
has been enacted due to the changing circumstances and the learning that
occurs with time.
139 Of these types of information gathering techniques used to determine the
behavioural response of the regulated entities, see OECD, Regulatory Impact
Analysis, p. 247-252.
140 The restriction of such public consultations must be beard in mind; these
forms of information gathering are inevitably weighted in favour of those
active and knowledgeable participants who provide information. More of the
restrictions of public consultations see OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis, p.
247-248).
of the effects created by regulation for a specific issue (analysis of
the effects of a variety of regulations on a single issue instead of
evaluation of a specific regulation on a variety of issues) is not feasible
in any sufficient amount of detail because it would require a particular
implementations in a specific context, organisation and jurisdiction,
and a longer lapse of time after the enactment of the regulations138.
Such information would be difficult to generalise and of little use for
different regulators. In addition, an empirical analysis even of a specific
instrument in a single category would require significant research
resources. Just an empirical analysis of a specific instrument in a
category would require resource not possible for a single researcher.
Neither can most of the information collection and analysis
methods used in the regulatory impact analysis of specific instrument
implementations in certain contexts (public consultation, engineering
studies, survey design approaches or econometric approaches) be
used139. When such analyses have been conducted in certain
implementations, they are utilised with care. For example, public
consultations performed in specific implementations in certain
jurisdiction will be used, even though they are rare in relation to issues
such as information security140. However, the generalisation cannot
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141 The generalisation of the arguments in regulatory theory is hampered by the
effects of national legal system, such as those made explicit by Daintith, Law as
Policy Instrument, p. 35, in an study about the legal implementation of
economic policy instruments: the formal and explicit constitutional
requirements of the systems, the regulatory style in use and the substance of
the specific national regulatory system in general. However, it has to be noted
that the problems in generalising the regulatory theory arguments between
jurisdictions and specific contexts does not render the use of international
material impossible. It just means that the material should be used with care
and the possible national nuances recognised.
142 This has been pointed out by Attila Harmathy in The Influence of Legal
Systems on Modes of Implementation of Economic Policy, p. 255, in analysing
of the influence of legal systems on the use of different regulatory instruments
in the legal implementation of economic policy. Different legal systems
respond to their cultural context and local economic conventions, so that their
regulation assumes different forms and institutions.
143 It is important to note that the analysis is based on a European perspective
and the examples are mainly taken from the EU level, and from Nordic or
national Finnish regulation.
be done directly for every jurisdiction and context141. Even though
the analysis concentrates on regulatory tools that seem to be more
neutral as far as legal and regulatory traditions and culture are
concerned than do institutions, where historical, social and economic
conditions play an important role in their formation, there still are
significant variations142. Without detailed considerations of the
influences of the differences of regulatory systems and styles between
countries and wider supranational systems, justice is not done to the
significance of local differences and the variety of regulatory styles
in comparative legal systems.143
However, a laborious comparative analysis considering the
contextual and local nuances is not possible in any sufficient amount
of detail with a variety of instruments plainly due to the complexity
of such analysis. The number of variables to be considered would
increase tremendously. Rooting the study into the peculiarities of a
single regulatory system is neither justified since the results of an
analysis of the capacities of specific regulatory instruments to influence
secure software development being applied in a certain jurisdiction
and a context would be difficult to generalise for the exact same
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reasons. However, while endeavouring to generalise, the significance
of the local differences have without a doubt been downsized.
Even though this qualification limits the usefulness of the insights
gathered about the effects of regulation in that the utilisation of the
results requires care in recognising and considering of the possible
national and contextual nuances, the more abstract analysis is justified
on the grounds that the possibilities of several instruments can be
analysed to solve a problem that is essentially international in nature.
This limitation follows from the purpose of this study to find reasons
and solutions for the current problems in secure software
development; rooting the analysis into a specific regulatory system
would limit the available solutions unnecessarily.
The matrix of Tala needs to be added with the identification of
the regulators in the decentred understanding of regulation. It is often
not obvious who is doing the regulating and it is not sufficient just
to analyse the regulators in relation to the objectives. Vice versa, the
objectives and conflicts between them are more easily seen when the
different regulators are made explicit. Who the regulators are and in
what institutional structures they operate directly affects, among other
things, the legitimacy of the regulation in the eyes of the addressees.
In the identification of the regulators in the secure software
development, which is done in heading 3.5, an iterative process of
searching and specifying is used. The starting point are the general
categories identified in previous regulatory studies. This is followed
by an ad hoc collection of actors. The previous knowledge of the
author is amended by literature analysis performed in order to answer
the first research question and by general observation of the subject
matter in the news. This ad hoc collection makes visible certain types
of actors that are convenient to combine into a category. At the same
time it is possible to omit less important actors.
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144 The first part of this chapter discussing the influence of the network
economic environment has been presented in the 37th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, January 5-8, 2004, Big Island of Hawaii. The
paper (Råman 2004) has been published in the proceedings. Special thanks to
the anonymous referees for the excellent comments and suggestions for
amendments and to the participants of the Minitrack on Information Systems
Security Management. 
145 This argument has been raised, e.g., by Premkumar Devanbu and Stuart
Stubblebine in Software Engineering for Security, p. 228-229, while mapping
the future of software engineering in 2000. It is still valid despite the relatively
old and expanding legal obligations to consider security in information systems
development such as the section 18 of the Finnish Act on the Openness of
Government Activities (621/1999) that obligates governmental organisations
to take security into consideration when developing information systems.
Similar provisions have been enacted for many sectors. In the following, the
reasons for this are considered. 
“…  an overwhelming majority of security vulnerabilities are caused by
‘buggy’ code.”
(Schneider FB (ed., 1999) Trust in Cyberspace, Committee on
Information Systems Trustworthiness, Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p. 110,
 http://bob.nap.edu/html/trust/ [8.3.2006])
2 Understanding secure software development144
The main method of securing information systems and software is
adding security afterwards; they still are not developed with security
in mind145. This applies to both aspects of secure software and
information system development: the quality aspects of security
(reducing vulnerabilities that could pose a risk to security) and the
security features that can be seen as requirements of an information
system or a software and should be made part of the system according
to user needs. The former prevents threats stemming from the system
itself (by reducing vulnerabilities in the system) and the latter prevents
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146 This has been raised especially by practitioners of secure software
development, such as John Viega and Gary McGraw in Building Secure Software,
p. 15-16.
147 Researchers have provided evidence of economic benefits from early
attention to security vulnerabilities. After looking at the cost and benefits of
increased security on application development, Soo Hoo et al., Tangible ROI
through Secure Software Engineering, p. 3, concluded in 2001 that catching the
already known or reasonably easy to find security vulnerabilities in the design
phase was more cost effective than in implementation, which is more cost
effective than in testing, and so on. This has been pointed out also by Viega
and McGraw in Building Secure Software, p. 16. Building security (in the sense of
fewer vulnerabilities) into applications from the start improves reliability,
avoids potentially embarrassing and costly incidents, and ultimately saves
money. The basic economic rationale has been explained already in 1981 by
Barry Boehm in Software Engineering Economics, p. 39-41, in relation to non-
security related errors in general. As Blackburn et al., show in Improving Speed
and Productivity of Software Development, p. 884, this kind of attention to
quality (customer expectations and requirements) early in the life cycle of a
project (at the requirements analysis and specification level) leads to defect
detection and avoidance that both increases productivity and improves speed
to market.
threats coming from outside the system, e.g., accidental or deliberate
abuses of vulnerabilities in the system or persons using it.
The quality aspect of security is dominated by the “penetrate-and-
patch” approach146. Vulnerability avoidance is still overlooked, and
security becomes an issue only after a published security breach. This
is so despite of the evidence showing that the practice of waiting until
the end of the development cycle to deal with the vulnerabilities is
wasteful147. 
In software engineering, security requirements are seen as
complementary to the normal, or functional, requirements of a system
(such as the features that the customer would require). The favoured
methods for requirements engineering typically do not even include
security concerns as an integral part of the process. Although some
security concerns are addressed during the requirements engineering
stage, most requirements come to light only after functional
requirements have been satisfied. As a result, security requirements
are added as an afterthought to the standard (functional)
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148 Devanbu and Stubblebine, Software Engineering for Security, p. 227-228.
149 The widely applauded new OECD 2002 Guidelines for the Security of Information
Systems and Networks, p. 8, recognize this in arguing in favour of a culture of
security – that is, a focus on security in the development of information
systems and networks and the adoption of new ways of thinking and behaving
when using and interacting within information systems and networks. The
Guidelines signal – as a consensus of several international professionals a clear
break with a time when secure design and use of networks and systems were
too often afterthoughts. Note that the guidelines are directed at the developers
of network and information systems. They are customers of the packaged
software vendors. However, this does not diminish the weight of evidence
provided of the change of paradigm.
150 As originally noted by Richard Baskerville already in 1992, The
Developmental Duality of Information Systems Security, p. 6-9, the separation
of normal information system development from the information security
process creates problems such as restrictions on proper system functions,
higher costs and shorter system lifespan.
requirements148. This is the case despite the reasonably wide agreement
that security requirements (e.g., confidentiality, integrity and
availability) and other security features (e.g., access rights, security
classifications) should be defined into the system from the beginning
and despite the efforts to integrate security design into the
development processes149.
One explanation for the low quality of software, when compared
to other practice (engineering) and research fields, stems from the
immaturity of software engineering and information systems
disciplines. The methods for development are constantly evolving
(novel methods arise every now and then, and are modified by
practitioners to fit different situations), and they do not consider
information security design issues, which are relegated to separate
secure software and information systems development (developmental
duality)150. In addition, one of the important reasons for the
inadequacy of the space in which software designers today operate
is “that the market structures within which software development
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151 This is what Barry Boehm and Kevin Sullivan argue in Software Economics,
p. 329, while mapping the future of software economics as part of software
engineering in 2000.
152 National Cyber Security Partnership, Improving Security Across the Software
Development LifeCycle, p. 3-4.
153 Schneier, Foreword, p. xx.
154 For a somewhat comprehensive compilation of technical information
security standards from the United States in 2004, see NCSP, Technical Standards
and Common Criteria, Appendix C. A roadmap for the ICT security standards is
provided by the International Telecommunications Union’s Telecommuni-
cation Standardization Sector (ITU-T) where both the standardization
organisations, approved standards and standards under development and new
proposed standards are presented. See the ITU-T Study Group 17 ICT
occurs are still primitive in comparison to those supporting other
industries”151.
The widely recognised lack of experts in software development
that have knowledge in security is also an explanation for this
contradictory behaviour, i.e., security is not taken seriously in the
development phase, even though there is evidence of extensive
benefits and agreement on the importance of doing so. Vendors
simply lack expertise in secure development. Secure software
development has not been, and still largely is not, part of the
curriculum in most educational institutions teaching software
developers. Not even in the country producing most software, i.e.,
USA152. With the realisation of the central role of the security of the
software in the current infrastructures, for the commerce, and for
the society at large, this has become a crucial lacking. As Bruce
Schneier notes in the foreword for one of the first English language
textbook on secure software development: “We need better education.
Programmers must learn how to build security into their software
design, and how to write code securely”153.
However, these can only be partial explanations. While the state
of methods for development is still rather inadequate and experts are
a scarce resource, there are well-known technical and procedural ways
to prevent at least the widely known vulnerabilities and methods to
integrate security in development processes154. Thus, given enough
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Security Standards Roadmap v1.0, November 2005, at http://www.itu.int/
ITU-T/studygroups/com17/ict/index.html [updated 25.1.2006, visited 1.2.
2006]. In addition, several software process improvement methods have been
proposed and many automated tools also exist to support the software
developer in security work.
155 It is notoriously difficult to write defect-free software; especially large and
complex software of our days. Also software developers have to live with the
fact that every product contains errors, some of which may not materialise
until a particular and perhaps unrepeatable, or even malicious set of
circumstances occur. However, this does not prevent software from being
‘good enough’ for the specific situation and customer needs. The expectation is
not, it cannot be a flawless product.
156 To state the obvious: it is not feasible to invest infinite resources on security
development since it is just one requirement and a quality factor that needs to
be fulfilled. Secure development is essentially about balancing costs and
benefits both in terms of schedule and budget.
157 Since the analysis relies on literary sources and concentrates especially on
academic research, there necessarily is a time lag in relation to the present
methods of secure software development. In this sense, the analysis stems
from an abstract situation which was largely present at the turn of the
millennium where the quality aspect of security had not been of much interest
and no major effort had been put into improving the security of software. The
underlying argument is that the increasing interest in secure software
demand from customers, vendors could supply improved quality and
security. Also more experts in secure software development are likely
to arise if knowledge in security becomes a competitive advantage.
It is not that developers are incapable of producing software with
less vulnerability or including security features into systems; they just
are not sufficiently motivated to do so. Beyond the intrinsic difficulty
of writing defect-free software155, there are constraints on the
development of secure software that result from the business
environment: the constraints for the COTS software business model
largely derive from schedule and budget156.
In this chapter I try explain this contradictory behaviour by further
analysing the influence of the constraints from the business
environment on secure software development. The effort is to
understand the reasons why security has typically not been considered
in the development phase157. In order to be able to understand the
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development during the last couple of years together with the consequent
improvements is partly due to the regulatory pressure; i.e., software vendors
desire to improve the security of software has partly been due to the increased
threat of further regulatory action. This development has not, however, been
enough to change the state of security in commercial-of-the-self software.
158 The following presentation is heavily based on the influential first
comprehensive presentation of the economics of the “new” business that was
subject to lively debate in the later half of the 1990s by Carl Shapiro and Hal
Varian, Information Rules. A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1999. The basic economic
structure has not changed since even though the business has. Those familiar
with software economics issues are welcome to proceed to the following
section.
159 Remember that the concentration is on COTS software. The economic
basis of open source software is not considered in this study.
160 This is a crude generalisation – the costs are not completely sunk. When
software undergoes a series of releases that stem from modifying the existing
code and care is put into the design and coding, then less code needs rewriting.
Design documentation makes changes easier and if the same people make the
modifications then their experience makes future development cheaper.
Software engineering methods and processes such as reuse, not just of
software code but also the knowledge gained from past projects, of which see,
e.g., Ellmer et al., Process Model Reuse to Promote Organizational Learning in
Software Development, p. 21-26) are intended to allow developers to gain
from earlier development work and making it possible to recover at least some
of the cost of developing stable code. This has been pointed out, e.g., by
Richard Botting in On the Economics of Mass-Marketed Software, p. 467,
importance and the extent of the schedule and budget constraints
for market-driven development a short look at the economics under
which market driven development operates – network or information
economics – is first needed158. 
2.1 The network economic environment
Software as an information good has an unusual cost structure159. An
information product is typically expensive to produce, but very cheap
to reproduce. The fixed cost related to producing the first copy are
not only fixed but also often largely sunk: fixed costs are not
recoverable if production is halted160. Also variable costs are typically
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while discussing the economic forces acting on the COTS software producer
in 1997. 
161 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 3 and 21; Rajala et al., Software
Business Models, p. 21.
162 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 21 and 179-182.
163 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, pp. 14 and 183. Stan Liebowitz and
Stephen Margolis argue that the term “network effects” should be applied to
markets with increasing returns to scale and the term “network externalities”
reserved for markets in which increasing returns create sub-optimal conditions
(Liebowitz and Margolis, Network Externality, p. 133; similarly in Lemley and
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, p. 5). So, network
effects should not properly be called network externalities unless the
participants in the market fail to internalize these effects.
small: the cost of producing an additional copy typically does not
increase, even if a great many copies are made.161 
Substantial supply-side economies of scale (lower unit costs by
being larger) are gained with this ‘high fixed cost of development and
low marginal cost of producing subsequent copies’ feature typical
in software and information markets (similar to most industries). But
demand-side economics of scale (taking advantage of positive
relationship between popularity and value) is the norm in information
industries. The combination of both demand- and supply-side
economics of scale makes the information industries different: growth
on the demand side both reduces cost on the supply side and makes
the product more attractive to other users; this accelerates the growth
in demand even more, resulting in especially strong positive
feedback.162
Networks of compatible users generate network effects (i.e. value of
the software to the individual user depends on how many other user
there are for the same software product) that in turn give rise to
positive feedback163: as more users deploy the same software, the more
communication partners there are to share files and tips with and the
more encouragement there is for software houses to devote more
resources to developing compatible software. This drives the potential
users of software to buy the product they believe to become the
dominating one and to keep its position. Thereby they get the most
value for their money.
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164 This classification has been made by two U.S. based legal scholars Mark
Lemley and David McGowan in Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, p.
13. The essential criterion for locating a good along this continuum is the
degree to which the good provides inherent value to a consumer apart from
any network characteristics. The greater the inherent value of the good relative
to any value added by additional consumers, the less significant the network
effect.
165 Lemley and McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, p. 18.
Virtual network goods need not be linked to a common system, as the
constituents of a communications network (actual network) are: very strong
positive feedback effects tied to functional compatibility are sufficient. Unlike
actual networks (e.g., telephones and fax machines where the entire value of
the product lies in facilitating interactions between users and the benefit to a
purchaser is access to other purchasers), goods that constitute virtual networks
(e.g., an operating system or an application program) allow even a single user
to perform a variety of tasks regardless of other users of the software.
However, the value of a given software product grows considerably as the
number of additional purchasers increases (e.g., easier file sharing, less need for
retraining and thus more competent employees available). (Idem.)
Network markets can be viewed as falling on a continuum that
may roughly be divided into actual (direct) networks, virtual (indirect)
networks, and simple positive-feedback phenomena164. Computer
software has been seen as a paradigm example of virtual networks -
a good that provides inherent value to consumers that increases with
the number of additional users or identical and/or interoperable
goods165.
In addition to horizontal technological compatibility, software is
subject to increasing returns based on positive feedback from the
market in the form of complementary goods. Software developers
will write more application programs for an operating system with
a bigger market share because that operating system will provide the
biggest market for applications programs. Conversely, the availability
of a broader array of application programs will reinforce the popularity
of an operating system. This makes investment in application
programs compatible with that system more desirable than investment
in programs compatible with less popular systems. Similarly, firms
that adopt relatively popular software (not just an operating system)
will likely incur lower costs in training employees and will find it easier
to hire productive temporary help than will firms using unpopular
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166 Lemley and McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, p. 19.
Note that the strength of network effects will vary depending on the type of
software in question. Network effects will be materially greater for operating
systems software than for applications programs. (idem.)
167 Such markets are called “tippy”, meaning that it can tip in favour of one
player or another. It is unlikely that all will survive (Shapiro and Varian,
Information Rules, p. 176). Whether a market tips or not depends on the balance
between economies of scale (either in demand or supply side of the market)
and variety - with strong scale economies, the market is likely to be tippy, and
if different users have highly distinct needs, the market is less likely to tip
(Idem p. 188).
168 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 14.
169 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 177.
software.166
One of the most striking consequences of network effects is their
impact on the nature of competition between sellers of products
embodying different, incompatible standards. When firms compete
for a market where there is strong positive feedback, only one will
emerge as the winner. As the installed base of users grows, more and
more users find adoption worthwhile and the product eventually
achieves critical mass (a large enough customer base) and takes over
the market167. As a consequence, growth becomes a strategic
imperative, and not just to achieve the usual supply side economics
of scale but also to achieve the demand side economics of scale
generated by network effects. Obtaining critical mass becomes the
key challenge, after which the market is considered to build itself168.
In its most extreme form, positive feedback can lead to a winner-take-
all market, in which a single firm or technology vanquishes all
others169.
This tendency of network markets to tip leads to particularly
intense competition early in the market’s existence. As networks take
time to build up to critical mass (i.e., become widespread enough to
be economically viable), producers that are sufficiently ahead of the
competition (in both time and appeal to the market) with a new
product or application will be able to acquire the necessary critical
mass to exploit economics of scale. Accordingly, the best way to
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170 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 30 and 146.
171 Note that being first to market is not necessarily decisive in the long run,
even though it usually helps as Shapiro and Varian note in Information Rules, p.
181-182.
172 See, e.g., Carlshamre, A Usability Perspective on Requirements Engineering, p. 58;
Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in Market-Driven
Software Development, p. 17; Potts, Invented Requirements and Imagined
Customers; Carlshamre and Regnell, Requirements Lifecycle Management and
Release Planning in Market-Driven Requirements Engineering Processes, p.
961.
173 Sawyer et al., Improving Market-Driven RE Processes, p. 223; Baskerville et
al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p. 52
secure market leadership in the presence of the economics of scale
typical of information industries is through an early presence in the
market: simply being first to market can generate both differentiation
and cost advantages170. The key is to convert the timing advantage
into a more lasting edge by building an installed base of users171.
2.2  Time-to-market and security
Network effects have considerable influence on the behaviour of
COTS software producers in particular: short time-to-market to
exploit the first-mover advantage is crucial to establish a software
product in the market and to profit from the network effects.
Incentives to be the first on the market and to establish one’s own
products as de facto standards are very high. Studies in software
development repeat the economic rationality that in market-driven
development the primary goal is time-to-market172. Time-to-market is
crucial not only for a new system but also for new product features
or concepts in existing systems. Nor does time-to-market constrain
only the initial release: market leaders must keep developing advanced
features, bug fixes, and performance improvements in order to keep
old customers satisfied and to win new ones173. In fact, competition
for best time-to-market is perpetual.
Short development cycle due to time-to-market pressures is a general
phenomenon in market-driven development, especially in the
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174 This was subject to much interest in the late 1990’s and has been reported
especially by Cusumano and Shelby, Microsoft Secrets, p. 15; Blackburn et al.,
Improving Speed and Productivity of Software Development, p. 875; Kuvaja et
al., Specific Requirements for Assessing Embedded Product Development, p.
74; Botting, On the Economics of Mass-Marketed Software, p. 327.
175 Cusumano and Yoffie, Competing on Internet Time, p. 298-299. Shortening
development cycles in Internet software companies has been reported also by
MacCormack in Product Development Practices that Work and by
MacCormack et al., Developing Products on “Internet Time”, p. 144-145, and
in relation to application and smaller niche software developers in Baskerville
et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p. 51, and
Baskerville and Pries-Heje, Racing the e-bomb, p. 55.
176 This has been emphasised by Fred Schneider in Trust in Cyberspace, p. 67 and
72.
177 Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 26 and 35 The complexity of
software engineering under conflicting requirements has been emphasised, e.g.,
by Barry Boehm in Software Engineering Economics, p. 20-21.
178 Baskerville et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p.
51; Wheterbe and Frolick, Cycle Time Reduction.
development of mass-marketed software (including software
embedded in consumer electronics and telecommunications
equipment)174 and Internet software. Already in 1998 the development
cycles have compressed from 24-36 months to 12-18 months for non-
Internet related companies and even to 3-6 months for companies
involved in eCommerce and creating and maintaining Web portals175.
The high incentives to be first to market and to establish one’s
own products as de facto standards means that software development
practice easily becomes distorted to maximize functionality and
minimize development time, with little attention paid to other qualities
(especially non-functional requirements such as security and safety)176
or project goals that conflict with functionality and time-to-market
(fundamentally so in the case of security because more security limits
functionality)177. Anecdotal evidence shows that companies may
compress their quality assurance (QA) practices when the priority
is a shorter development cycle178. A shorter development cycle results
in reduced quality and security, especially if ad hoc processes are used
– as they typically are – in the prioritisation and cost/impact
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179 Sawyer et al., Improving Market-Driven RE Processes, p. 227.
180 The way software-consuming organisations interact with software producers
has changed due to the increased product attention. Traditionally, early and
close links between users and developers have been considered critical. Today,
software consumers and producers use a variety of intermediated means to
communicate their needs to developers. For example, packaged software
developers build to requirements gleaned from a variety of sources, including
help-desk call-log analysis, market research, product reviews, and user groups,
of which direct customer contact is one of the least likely means. (Sawyer,
2001, p. 100, see also Keil and Carmel, 1995, p. 33–44) This is one of the
major dilemmas: the challenges of developing software for larger markets is to
satisfy the end user although contact with the end user is limited (Natt och
Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in Market-Driven Software
Development, p. 19).
181 See, e.g., Blackburn et al., Improving Speed and Productivity of Software
Development, p. 884; Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, pp. 68-74
182 Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in
Market-Driven Software Development, p. 26. This is often because time
pressures change the way requirements are approached. Traditionally,
requirements analysis has been based on the assumption that a large company
assessment of sometimes conflicting requirements such as
quality/security costs and time-to-market179.
For example, despite the wide acknowledgement of the advantages
of good requirements specification early in the development phase,
the documentation and maintenance of requirements tend to be
sketchy. Requirements that are proposed, invented, or designed are
communicated within the development organisation to a large extent
by word of mouth; they are not elicited or played back to the customer
since in market-driven development users (referred to as customers)
are typically unknown during the development phase (there may not
even be a user until the first release of the product)180. Even though
there is increasing research on requirements engineering due to the
wide recognition of the centrality of requirements specification to
the whole development process already in the late 1990s181 and
improvements have been made, many of the general challenges in
traditional requirements engineering are adopted by the market-driven
development organisation (e.g. requirements are erroneous, errors
are detected late, and ambiguities are difficult to resolve)182.
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or institution orders a large software system from either an external vendor or
internal IT department, using a requirements specification as a contract.
However, in market-driven development there is no contractual situation, and
requirements specifications are rarely written (Carlshamre, A Usability Perspective
on Requirements Engineering, p. 57-58; Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of
User Requirements in Market-Driven Software Development, p. 21). Dahlstedt et al. in
Market-Driven Requirements Engineering Processes for Software Products – a
Report on Current Practices, partially verify many of the characteristics of
market driven requirements engineering in a first stage industrial survey of
small and fairly new market-driven development companies in the Swedish
software industry.
183 This has been reported for market-driven software development in general
(see, e.g., Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in Market-
Driven Software Development, p. 17; Potts, Invented Requirements and Imagined
Customers; Karlsson and Ryan, A Cost-Value Approach for Prioritizing
Requirements, p. 68) as well as software for electronic commerce and for web
portals (see, e.g., Cusumano and Yoffie, Competing on Internet Time, p. 14, and
224-234; Baskerville et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate
Quality, p. 52). In interviewing companies using Internet speed development
techniques Baskerville and Pries-Heje, Racing the e-bomb, p. 56-57, found that
vague requirements continue throughout projects. This is one cause for release
orientation.
184 This argument has been raised, e.g., by Ross Anderson, a Professor of
Security Engineering at the Computer Laboratory of the University of
Cambridge, in a seminal paper combining economics and information security
in 2001, Why Information Security is Hard p. 2.
185 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 194.
An important consequence of the shortening development cycle
(due to first-to-market being essential) is the tendency towards release-
oriented development183. Constantly striving to be ahead of competitors,
the market-driven development company frequently delivers new and
improved releases (containing bug fixes and new features) of software
products. The development resources – especially time-to-market,
but also budget – are typically fixed184, at the expense of lower-priority
requirements. Each feature is examined to determine whether its
inclusion in the product is necessary for the product to be competitive
in the marketplace. 
Generally, those features with direct customer appeal win; subtle,
hard-to-demonstrate and pervasive properties – such as security –
tend to be rejected185. They are put of from one release to another
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186 This has been pointed out by on the basis of personal experience, e.g., by
Preston G. Smith in From Experience 1999, p. 223 and has been verified by
Baskerville et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p. 55,
in an interview of software developers and project managers of nine
application and smaller niche software companies using Internet speed
development practices. See also Carlshamre, A Usability Perspective on
Requirements Engineering, p. 58.
187 This is what Baskerville et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate
Quality, p. 53, argue on the basis of  interviews of software developers and
project managers at nine application and smaller niche companies using
Internet speed development practices.
188 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 169.
189 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 169.
in order to meet the release date. This feature or requirement slippage
should not come at the expense of quality and security, even though
this easily is the case186. Security tends to be ignored because it would
require that more time and money be put into development work that
is beneficial only in the long run (no immediate returns). Time-to-
market considerations discourage the inclusion of security features
and encourage the postponement of security to later releases – if they
are considered at all.
A release orientation is necessary for a start-up company since it
cannot generate revenue before it produces functionality, even where
this is somewhat unreliable. The code of the first release lacks security
because any issues that can be postponed, including quality and
security, are disregarded187. For an existing (or even dominating) firm,
the frequency and timing of new versions and upgrades is a way to
control the length of the cycle of customer lock-in into one’s products
as economic theory explains188. It is necessary to produce new releases
and upgrades to prevent aggregate customer lock-in from getting too
low at any point of in time, because the optimal time for a competitor
to enter the market and to attack the installed customer base of the
existing firm is when the aggregate customer lock-in is low189.
However, the quality aspect of security is placed high on the agenda
when a security problem left in a software product has been publicly
broken and is being exploited by attackers. Unfortunately, a patch
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190 Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 16.
191 It has to be noted that even though the distribution of a patch is cheap, the
creation of a bug fix is not. This is what the research on the ROI of security
investments hinted. The development and testing of patches is expensive if it is
done for even nearly all of the different configurations and environments of
the customers. There is a strong customer reliance on the vendor to test the
patches in many environments before their release especially if the patch is
streamed (automatic update). However, since most bugs are harmless and go
unnoticed this cost is relatively low compared to removing majority of bugs
before release.
is essentially the only option used when this occurs. According to John
Viega and Gary McGraw190, the problems of this pervasive ‘penetrate-
and-patch’ approach are, among other things, that not all problems
are reported to the developers that make the patches, that patches
often introduce new problems because they are also rushed out as
a result of market pressures, that often only the symptom of the
problem gets fixed leaving the cause unaddressed, and that patches
often go unapplied or are otherwise ineffective.
But it is no surprise that this penetrate-and-patch approach still
is so pervasive. Not only does it help in getting products onto the
market more quickly by skipping initial security considerations that
seem to slow down development, diminish functionality, and give
revenue only in the long run, but patches are also cheap to distribute.
Distributing a patch for a piece of software is a lot cheaper than for
traditional commodities, due to the immaterial nature of the good
and consequently the virtually zero marginal cost of transmission.
Developers can make patches available to the web or e-mail them
out to customers and the cost of installing the patch falls on to the
customers191.
A fast cycle time together with a release orientation is something
that is impossible to achieve in a serial process. Parallel development is
used widely in release-oriented development: traditional serial phases
are split and assigned to separate groups of developers, which then
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192 About parallel development in market-driven process in general, see
Blackburn et al., Improving Speed and Productivity of Software Development,
p. 878, and in Internet software development especial Cusumano and Yoffie,
Competing on Internet Time, p. 14, and Baskerville et al., How Internet Software
Companies Negotiate Quality, p. 52.
193 Baskerville et al., How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p.
54.
194 See, e.g., Natt och Dag, Elicitation and Management of User Requirements in
Market-Driven Software Development, p. 18; Carlshamre, A Usability Perspective on
Requirements Engineering, p. 59.
perform them simultaneously192. Quality assurance and testing are
also done in parallel with other development phases; if a rapidly
approaching release date forces the company to shorten development
phases, quality assurance and testing also get short-circuited193.
2.3  Remarks on maintenance and testing
The product focus in software development accounts for how software
maintenance changes in the software products market. In traditional
tailored software development, there usually is just one release and
the fixes, additional features and other evaluations are provided as
part of maintenance. In market-driven development this work is done
by making new releases of the same product194. Even though the
COTS software vendors separate corrective maintenance – including
patches and workarounds which are often provided to licensees at
no cost beyond a subscription fee – from other forms of software
maintenance, the changes needed to smooth out poorly done but
operable software functions become the basis of new releases for
which vendors charge additional, often highly profitable licensing fees.
In other words, maintenance takes the form of versioning or
supporting services, for which the customer has to pay separately.
Most of what was once maintenance in traditional software
development now forms the basis of a product’s next release and thus
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195 Sawyer, A market-based perspective on information systems development,
p. 101.
196 Schneier, Computer Security: Will We Ever Learn?, title “No one is paying
attention because no one has to”, paragraph 5. Similarly in Harju,
Kustannustehokas ohjelmiston luotettavuuden suunnittelu ja arviointi, p. 89.
197 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 89-90.
198 Kaner, The Impossibility of Complete Testing, p. 1.
serves to generate additional revenue for the vendor over a number
of years195.
The combination of release-oriented development and patching
and, especially, the use of new releases as an important form of
maintenance lead to a reliance on customer feedback as a significant,
or even primary, quality assurance mechanism in market-driven
development. This is reasonable economic behaviour as one of the
most appreciated and loud advocate of information security Bruce
Schneier so effectively puts it in his famous quote “…90% to 95%
of all bugs are harmless. They're never discovered by users, and they
don't affect performance. It's much cheaper to release buggy software
and fix the 5% to 10% of bugs people find and complain about.”196
This has implications for quality and security. Press coverage is
not guaranteed to be accurate and may not convey the implications
of the problem being reported. The problems that concern only a
smaller user community do not get fixed. Feedback from customers
and the press, by its very nature, occurs only after a product has been
distributed. Reliance on market forces to select what gets tested and
what gets fixed is haphazard at best and is surely not equivalent to
performing a methodical search for vulnerabilities prior to
distribution.197
The development goal of achieving software that is ‘good enough’
– not perfect (flawless) – for the specific situation and customer needs
also applies to testing. A lot of bugs are detected during testing
procedures, but not all errors can be found. As Cem Kaner (among
others) explains it, it is impossible to fully test a program: the testing
procedure can only show the presence of errors in the program; it
cannot show the absence of errors198. Additionally, testing cannot
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199 This has been emphasised by Mary Jean Harrold in Testing: A Roadmap, p.
63, while mapping the role of testing in the future of software engineering.
200 Harrold, Testing: A Roadmap, p. 63; Harju and Koskela, Kustannustehokas
ohjelmiston luotettavuuden suunnittelu ja arviointi, p. 10.
201 Similarly in Pipkin, Information Security, p. 75.
202 See, e.g., Pipkin, Information Security, p. 74; Viega and McGraw, Building Secure
Software, p. 39.
show that the software has certain qualities. Despite these limitations,
testing is widely used in practice to create confidence in the quality
of software199. This is why software is shipped with bugs even after
the verification and validation stage. However, the bugs that remain
do not prevent software from being ‘good enough’.
The verification and validation stage can be one of the more time
consuming, expensive and challenging phases of the software life
cycle. It has been estimated that about 50% of the development costs
of a software product are caused by testing and debugging200. In
market-driven development (a very competitive market), the design
team is often under tremendous pressure to complete this phase.
Market pressures contribute to reducing the time spent on testing
before releasing software to users. More sophisticated testing and
debugging procedures would prolong introduction of a new product
(to the market) as well as add costs and thus decrease the probability
of commercial success. In sum, software is being released and
implemented without adequate testing201.
There are special problems in testing for security. The testing
procedures must be changed to focus on security issues (e.g. testing
for unexpected input, probing a system like an attacker or otherwise
looking for exploitable weaknesses) in order to find the particular
vulnerabilities as the practitioner of security tend to point out202.
Functional testing (treating the component as a black-box and testing
the interfaces of the components) does not find security flaws. Unlike
almost all other design criteria, security is independent of functionality.
Functional testing is good at finding random flaws that, when they
happen, will cause the computer program to behave oddly. Security
flaws have much less spectacular effects; they are usually invisible
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203 This is the argument is repeated at least by security practitioners such as
Bruce Schneier (Secrets & Lies, p. 335-336), Donald Pipkin (Information Security,
p. 70) and John Viega and Gary McGraw (Building Secure Software, p. 42).
204 In market driven development the trend has for long been to enlist the user
community to help in finding errors by making early releases (beta versions)
available to interested users and by freely distributing incremental updates (e.g.,
patches) to the software. Beta testing has traditionally been part of the pre-
release testing (before release to the wider customer base and not just to the
interested beta-testers). Recently, however, software has increasingly been
released to be public as a ‘final’ version, with an implicit assumption that the
end-user, and not just the willing beta-tester, will act as the ultimate ‘beta’
tester. Rather than implementing a full quality assurance program, the vendor
relies extensively on users to report vulnerabilities. 
Proprietary software developers, as contrasted to open source software (OSS)
development projects, especially those with COTS business model and market
driven development practices of interest in this study, are increasingly turning
to their customers for help in the debugging task (to remove bugs from the
software). Proprietary software developers understand just as well as do open
source software developers the value and potential of users in testing. The
principle of release early and often makes sense in both settings. As noted
earlier, proprietary software has been seen as going towards a plausible promise
option in terms of the business model and thus moving closer to the OSS
development method. This means that when the product is first made available
to users, it is not finalized in terms of functionality or quality. The product is
gradually improved in terms of quality and functionality in the subsequent
releases partly due to the feedback from the public.
unless they fall into the wrong hands. Security testing is not about
randomly using the software and seeing if it works, but deliberately
searching for problems that compromise security203. The costs of
testing, together with the time needed, increase when security is
concerned, which is why software rarely end up being ‘good enough’
in terms of security even after testing.
The method used in market-driven development – enlisting the
user community to help in finding errors by making early releases (beta
versions) available to interested users and by freely distributing
incremental updates (e.g., patches) to the software – does not enhance
security, since no amount of beta testing will uncover all security
flaws204. This is mainly due to the need for sophisticated security-
specific testing to find vulnerabilities in the first place. Knowledge
of the testing methods and skills to conduct them are not typically
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205 John Viega and Gary McGraw raise the problems of red teaming for security
in Building Secure Software, p. 42-43. Unfortunately, this method is still
sometimes praised as an efficient way of discovering vulnerabilities. For
example, in noting correctly that faster and often less sophisticated testing
procedures allow for a shorter time-to-market, thus leading to a competitive
advantage, the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications in a report
concerning the need for national information security strategy in 2001 also
stated that end-users are able to find even information security vulnerabilities
quite fast (MINTC, Kansallisen tietoturvastrategian tarve Suomessa [Does
Finland need a national information security strategy?], p 7).
206 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB), Cyber-security
Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later, p. 14. CSTB is a division of the U.S.
National Research Council.
207 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Commission
Communication on Network and Information Security: Proposal for a
European Policy Approach (COM(2001)298 final), Official Journal C 048,
21.02.2002, p. 33-41, paragraph 3.2.1.3.13.
208 Harju, Kustannustehokas ohjelmiston luotettavuuden suunnittelu ja arviointi, p. 51.
widely known in the broader user community. Of the parties searching
for vulnerabilities, hackers and professional tiger teams may have the
skills and motivation (at least to some point), but are in no way able
to do it quickly and efficiently for every software product205. As
pointed out by the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
in 2002, software vendors should “[s]trengthen software development
processes and conduct more rigorous testing of software and systems
for security flaws, doing so before releasing products rather than use
customers as implicit beta testers to shake out security flaws”206. This
has also been emphasised at the European policy level by the
Economic and Social Committee in its opinion on the Commission
Communication on Network and Information Security
COM(2001)298 final207.
A further problem in using customers (either end-users or software
developers using components) as testers is that they typically do not
have access to the component’s source code and to the specific
documentation of the production process, especially where COTS
is concerned208. COTS vendors seeking to protect their intellectual
property usually sell components as binaries, without source code
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209 The legitimate reason for this is that developers want to keep source code
forms of their products and other human-readable documentation as trade
secrets as, e.g., Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer point out from the
U.S. perspective in The Law & Economics of Reverse Engineering, p. 1608, similarly
to Alfred Meijboom’s notion from the European perspective in Legal Rights to
Source Code, p. 107. The procurement policies of the customers of safety-
critical systems (utilities, government, etc.) have traditionally required software
vendors to disclose enough details to evaluate their processes and products for
safety. However, these policies are not compatible with current component
vendors, who are faced with the risk of IPR loss as pointed out by Devanbu
and Stubblebine in Software Engineering for Security, p. 233. Not only are
software components delivered in “black boxes” as executable objects without
source code or design documentation, but usually also the de-compilation back
to source code is forbidden in licenses (note that this is forbidden in copyright
law, but not in trade secret law). Often source code can be licensed, but the
cost may make the practice prohibitive as Jeffrey Voas point out in 1998,
Certifying Off-the-Shelf Software Components, p. 53. The open source and
free software movements offer the source code to the users and also
commercial vendors are, at least to some degree, starting to show their source
code to trusted partners (e.g. governments) also for security purposes.
210 It needs to be pointed out that code evaluation is a necessary but not a
sufficient means for assessing security as emphasised by John Viega and Gary
McGraw in Building Secure Software, p. 115. Security related vulnerabilities can be
found even without a look at any code (source of binary) – in worst cases
symptoms of a security problem are noticed during the course of normal use
(Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 70-73).
211 Such methods have been reported by Jeffrey Voas already in 1998,
Certifying Off-the-Shelf Software Components, p. 53-59.
or design documentation209. The lack of availability of component
source code limits the testing that the component user can perform
(white-box techniques in evaluation of components is not possible)210.
Even though some traditional security analysis is made impossible
for the component user or other customer by the absence of source
code, there are ways for the user to verify and determine the quality
and security of COTS components that do not require extensive
disclosure of the source code or the accommodated design
documentation. There are approaches that treat the component as
a black box, and employ extensive testing to ensure that the system
functions as desired; no additional effort or disclosure of intellectual
property rights (IPR) are required from the COTS vendor211. Grey-box
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212 Devanbu and Stubblebine, Software Engineering for Security, p. 234.
213 Reifer, Boehm and Gangadharan in Estimating the Cost of Security for
COTS Software, p. 180, note that current models for predicting the effort
involved in integrating COTS software products into applications do not
include security as a cost driver. While providing means for estimating the
costs of security for COTS software they also (idem. p. 183-184) estimate on
the basis of their analyses the percentual increases both of the effort and the
duration of the assessment activity (process by which COTS components are
selected for use; 12-20 percent to effort and 5-10 percent to duration), to
tailoring (activities undertaken to prepare the selected COTS packages for use;
8-18 percent to effort and 5-10 percent to duration) and to glue code
development (development and testing of the connector software, which
integrates the COTS components into the larger application; 0-75 percent to
effort and 0-33 percent to duration).
214 Voas, Certifying Off-the-Shelf Software Components, p. 55.
215 Whether these problems can be solved by technological means, or are they
more about simple economic decisions made by the developers of both the
components and their users, thus possibly requiring some sort of regulatory
verification systems use interactive cryptographic techniques or rely
on tamper-resistant hardware to help the vendor to provide evidence
of the quality and security of the component (disclosure of enough
details of the verification practice to convince a sceptical component
user) without disclosing too much information that could endanger
its IPR212. There are also different sets of criteria on which
components are evaluated and verified (e.g. ITSEC, TCSEC a.k.a.
Orange Book , Common Criteria).
Even though the additional testing effort required by black-box
approaches contributes towards the overall quality of the component
user’s entire system, their use is limited because the additional testing
is likely to be time-consuming and expensive213. An additional
limitation on the use of black-box approaches is that they do not
reveal unknown, malicious functionality214. Grey-box approaches have
only very recently appeared and need a lot of additional research.
However, with additional research into the ways in which component
users can test systems efficient techniques and tools are likely to
emerge that will help such users test their applications more
effectively215.
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intervention, is a matter of dispute.
216 This argument is made in one of the first ever textbooks on secure software
development, Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 17.
217 Schneider 1999, p. 89-90; Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 17;
CSTB 2002, p. 13
218 This argument has been made in the relatively recently emerged economics
and information security -discussion, e.g., by Ross Anderson, Cryptology and
Competition Policy-Issues with 'Trusted Computing’, p. 14, and in Anderson, Why
Information Security is Hard, p. 3. The argument has, however, been made already
by Andrew Odlyzko already in 1998, Smart and stupid networks, p. 38-46.
The use of customer feedback in place of other quality control
mechanisms does allow a software producer to externalise costs
associated with product testing. Customers, in turn, have to invest
time and money in finding and possibly reporting errors, in installing
patches, and they also have to suffer from the costs of failures. The
tactic of using customers as serious (perhaps involuntary) testers is,
at best, a dubious one from the point of view of security216. It is surely
not equivalent to performing a methodical search for vulnerabilities
prior to distribution217.
2.4  Appeal to developers and security
When competing to dominate the network market, i.e. to achieve the
critical mass needed to take it over, firms have to appeal strongly to
the developers of the next-generation ‘killer-aps’ and vendors of
complementary goods and services218. Good developers are needed
to create the products that attract customers in the short timeframe
required and vendors of complementary goods help to build up the
critical mass of users for the product and its applications. Also the
appeal to early adopters has to be strong since they are the critical
mass – if they are pleased. One can worry about the rest of the end-
users later.
This helps to explain why the security features in commercial
software, if they are even implemented to begin with, are made easy
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219 Anderson, Cryptology and Competition Policy-Issues with 'Trusted Computing’, p. 14;
Anderson, Why Information Security is Hard, p. 3.
to bypass. Stronger security that is not easy to bypass may diminish
functionality and require more work from and less opportunities
(increased costs and diminished revenues) for the developers of the
next generation ‘killer-aps’ and developers of complementary goods
and services.  Since early adopters typically are persons with high
technology skills that want to try out and test new things, reduced
functionality together with security that is not easily bypassed, might
lower the appeal of the product among this conceivable critical mass.
Due to the relative unimportance of end users (they just want to get
a few crucial tasks done) and the crucial role of the developers that
create the tools that attract the early adopters, the cost of insecurity
(caused, e.g., by vulnerabilities being abused and when upgrading the
system) and other support costs needed to operate with the software
(from implementation, maintenance, testing and dealing with the
failures) is dumped on to the end-users. These costs have long been
hidden.219
In an attempt to appeal to the early adopters and thus to exploit
the positive feedback, vendors may add features to attract this small
number of users with special needs even if those features will be
unused by other users. This can result in lower security due to an
increase in the number of vulnerabilities, the usual lack of testing in
these unused parts, and the security problems incurred when
integrating these additional features into the system.
Because consumers typically possess imperfect information about
the product’s security, vendors can get away with both of these
practices. They can develop easily by-passable security features and
add features with increased number of vulnerabilities.
2.5 Security and lock-in
With network effects the costs of coordinating a large group of
individuals to switch to a competing product can be extremely large;
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220 Network effects are a common source of switching costs: when a product
has become ubiquitous it is very costly to switch to something new (Shapiro
and Varian, Information Rules, p. 47). Internet distribution of new applications
and standards reduce some of the network effects for software by reducing
switching costs. Variety can also be supported more easily if an entire system
can be offered on demand. However, the Internet does not eliminate network
effects in software; interoperability is still a big issue on the supply side and
there still is a strong need for standardisation. (Shapiro and Varian, Information
Rules, p. 189-190)
221 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 110.
222 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 168.
the effects contribute to customer lock-in (i.e., the costs of switching
from a product to another are so large that switching suppliers is
virtually unthinkable)220. And because the building of network size
by a competitor with an incompatible product requires overcoming
the collective switching costs – the combined switching costs of all
users – customer lock-in becomes the norm in the information
economy221. If an installed base of users is established before the
competition arrives on the scene, achievement of the scale economics
necessary to compete can be made difficult for later entrants222. Thus,
first-mover advantage is not only powerful but it can also be long
lasting in lock-in markets.
One implication of the first-mover advantage together with lock-in
in software markets is that the market may settle on a good with a
lower social valuation. Once the market tips toward a single standard,
it may remain on that standard and its successors for a long time even
though an objectively ‘better’ standard is available. Even though all
users would be better off with the new standard, those benefits do
not accrue to the present users, who would have to pay substantial
switching costs. New purchasers also may opt for the established
standard because of the immediate benefit that the established network
offers; they do not take account of the benefit that purchasing the
new product would confer on later purchasers. Even if they anticipate
that the new product will be widely adopted, the benefits of that
adoption to new purchasers may be realised so far in the future that
they are substantially discounted.
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223 The result may be a near monopoly situation, which in turn has been
considered to cause new set of problems also for information security. Since
the concentration in this study is on competitive markets, the monopoly
situation is not taken further. For the occasionally heating debate surrounding
Microsoft and its software products see, e.g., the report written in the name of
the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA,
http://www.ccianet.org [8.3.2006]), a lobby organisation for U.S. based
companies in the computer, Internet, information technology, and
telecommunications industries, in 2003 by Daniel Geer, Becky Bace, Peter
Gutmann, Perry Metzger, Charles P. Pfleeger, John S. Quarterman, and Bruce
Schneier, CyberInSecurity: The Cost of Monopoly. How the Dominance of Microsoft’s
Products Poses a Risk to Security, available at http://www.ccianet.org/filings/
cybersecurity/cyberinsecurity.pdf [8.3.2006] and the discussion in the
November-December 2003 issue of the IEEE Security & Privacy written by
Daniel E. Geer Jr., Dave Aucsmith and James Whittaker (2003) Monoculture,
IEEE Security & Privacy, 1(6): 14-19.
In the present context, this theoretical possibility means that the
market may get locked-in into a product that is insecure (has security
related vulnerabilities or lacks security features) even though a more
secure product is available in the marketplace223. This is because users
do not, in network markets, choose software purely on the basis of
its features and security. Network effects are also significant, because
the utility of software product increases with the number of users
and users of compatible products. A typical user may need a certain
set of features and beyond that be concerned with standardisation
and interoperability. When a market has tipped in favour of one
product, users who, in autarchy, would be willing to sacrifice
functionality for security may choose a less secure product because
of the benefits of interoperability. Because of network effects, users
who would otherwise prefer increased security to increased
functionality might then choose less secure but more widely used
programs. There is no expectation in favour of markets getting locked
into an inferior (less secure) product, but it is a possibility that has
to be taken seriously: when it actually occurs, it has non-trivial
consequences, and there exists at least one other feasible state of
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224 Lookabaugh and Sicker, Security and Lock-In, p. 1. According to theoretical
models, there is no inevitable tendency of markets to lock-in on inferior
products. Even though the theoretical possibility of such lock-in is not
contested, the empirical evidence and the practical importance is (Idem., p. 4).
225 Robert Brady, Ross Anderson and Robin Ball make this argument in
Murphy's law, the fitness of evolving species, and the limits of software reliability, p. 5,
while developing a reliability growth model for software. Cf. Baskerville et al.,
How Internet Software Companies Negotiate Quality, p. 53, who report the
practice of gradually rewriting the code of the first release in order to meet the
contemporary quality requirements.
affairs that might be preferable as tentatively noted by Tom
Lookabaugh and Douglas Sicker in 2003.224
In the case of market-driven development, lock-in into a vulnerable
product is likely. As discussed above, with first-to-market as an
essential feature in achieving a market share needed for bearing the
competition, security tends to become an afterthought. However, the
winner ought to make its product better in quality and security over
time. Yet this might take a long time or not happen at all, because
the code of the first versions has emphasised functionality over
security and a complete rewrite of it is not practical given the
evolutionary model of development: development consists of
modifying previous versions and, over the years, these become so
complex that they simply could not be developed (or redeveloped)
from scratch225. 
Thus, the design space of release-oriented development is highly
influenced by the state of the code after the previous release(s).
Because adding security later in the development phase is difficult
and expensive, and when previous release(s) has (have) emphasized
functionality over security, increasing the security of it in a new release
requires significant resources that will not then be available for
enhancing functionality. But, since functionality still has to be
improved in order to make the new release attractive (due to heavy
competition), the resources are easily taken from features that are
considered less useful (e.g. quality and security). This means that
initially insecure code does not necessarily improve with new releases.
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226 For the argument see, e.g., Lookabaugh and Sicker, Security and Lock-In, p. 7;
Anderson, Cryptology and Competition Policy-Issues with 'Trusted Computing’, p. 14.
227 Note that reverse engineering security systems (conditional access devices)
has been made more difficult by the anti-circumvention rules (e.g. in EC
Copyright and Conditional Access Directives, and US Digital Millenium
Copyright Act). It is practically impossible to reverse engineer a technical
protection measure without circumventing it. Because reverse engineering a
technical protection measure usually requires a tool to perform such activities
these provisions indirectly restrict reverse engineering by outlawing the making
of (or other ‘have something to do with’) circumvention technologies.
228 For an excellent overview of the regulatory background, see the analysis of
Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite in Information Feudalism, p. 184-186, drawing
on data from interviews of key informants of the rise of the TRIPS agreement
(Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Propery Rights).
The positive aspect of lock-in is that software and content
producers in general have an increased interest in security mechanisms
for their value in locking customers into their products and systems226.
This can be achieved by using information security protocols to set
technical compatibility requirements that must be met by connected
applications. A supplier wishing to sell a system component will either
need to be compatible with the necessary security protocols (by
licensing or reverse engineering), or must provide sufficient added
value to motivate a customer to replace all other system components
that require those security protocols, which may result in prohibitive
switching costs227.
This also has consequences in the legal field. The strong and
effective lobbyists of the rights holders and software vendors thus
have incentive to try to have laws enacted that protect their
commercial interests (from illegal copying) and, at the same time,
silently enhance customer lock-in; all one has to do is look at the anti-
circumvention rules in the EC Copyright and Conditional Access
Directives and the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act228. When
security is brought up, the rights holders worry about the safety of
their respective intellectual property assets and possibilities to keep
their market share but do not care much about the security of the
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229 Both of these aspects, using security technologies to protect IPRs and to
secure the infrastructure, are about information security and can use similar
technologies and procedures. However, the security measures serve conflicting
interests. This makes information security research difficult; there are dual uses
in many senses and the security measures can be used for various purposes. 
230 This argument has been made, e.g., by Robert Gehring, Software Patents” —
IT–Security at Stake? 2001, p. 2-3.
231 Please, bear in mind that the analysis concentrates on the abstract situation
present at the turn of the millennium where regulatory pressure has not
initiated any substantial changes.
232 However, in case of secure software this is rare.
233 This has also been recognised at the policy level in the EU (COM(2001)298
final, p. 4 and 13-14). See also the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee on the Communication, Official Journal C 048 , 21,02.2002, p. 33-
41. The market for information security has long been seen as dysfunctional.
underlying information infrastructure229. This attitude poses a critical
problem for security in a networked world: laws that protect possibly
insecure software are going to protect network insecurity at the same
time230.
2.6 Failure of private motivation?231
Secure software, both in terms of the quality aspect (avoidance of
vulnerabilities) and security features, is a commodity bought and sold
on the market and part of the contractual agreements between parties.
The implicit assumption usually made is that the price mechanism
will balance the costs of providing security with the specific need for
security. Certain users will request high security whilst others will be
satisfied with a lower level – although the State may provide for a
minimum level of security in certain specific contexts232. The
preferences of users would be reflected in the price they are willing
to pay for both the quality aspect of security and the security features.
But this assumption seems imperfect when looking at the many
security risks that remain unsolved or the slow market entrance for
solutions as a result of certain market imperfections233.
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The System Security Study Committee of the Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board of U.S. National Research Council pointed this out
already in 1991 (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Computers
at Risk, Chapter 6 “Why the Security Market Has Not Worked Well”, p. 143-
178).
As have been argued above, the industry has the means to develop
more secure software products (both in terms of quality and security)
and they at least should have a very powerful incentive to try to avoid
the defects as early as possible (cost, productivity and time-to-market
benefits). With the wide acknowledgement of the importance of
developing security into systems from the beginning, its ability to
enhance both productivity and speed to market and even the cost
savings possible related to it (it is cheaper in the long run to fix security
vulnerabilities sooner rather than later in the development life-cycle),
why there still is not enough of an incentive for application developers
to stop releasing insecure code?
The short expedition into the world of information economics
and the market-driven development showed some limitations to the
incentives of software producers to improve the quality and security
of their products. It is not that software houses are incapable of
producing systems with fewer vulnerabilities, it is just that they are
not sufficiently motivated to do so. Applying the methods to improve
software quality and security can be resource intensive and will not
be done in market-driven development without sufficient incentive.
Only as much resources are allocated to developing more secure and
better quality systems as can be justified on business grounds. In the
presence of network effects this might not be enough for the society.
This holds also a positive implicit argument basing its claim on
welfare economics. Changes in the private motivation to provide
secure enough software and information systems can lead to a more
favourable equilibrium. The sub-optimal equilibrium, in which a
vendor can be successful without improving security, continues as
long as customers accept the situation, the primary demand for
functionality only (the main purpose of a computing or a
communication device or a system) continues to grow and fuel
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234 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 188.
235 Recall from above the differentiation of network effects and network
externalities. Network effects should not properly be called network
externalities unless the participants in the market fail to internalize these effects.
Thus network effects are not market failures (failures to provide socially
optimal solutions) as such.
236 Technology and procedural rules can be approached to in many ways. The
traditional approach is technological development in the shadow of market
processes; competitive market forces develop new solutions in order to be able
to better meet the demands of the customers. Technology is developed within
the market incentives and the development methods support the market needs.
This is the approach when making the implicit argument that technological
means and development methods are not sufficient to provide secure software
without proper incentives. Under this conception, technology provides a
solution only to certain degree… But technology can also be used in a
regulative manner. It can be put it in place in order to intentionally attempt to
alter the behaviour of others. In this sense the technological measures and
development methods are instruments in the regulation of software
development. They can be altered, if the regulator so desires, to consider the
incentives or even provide proper incentives. However, this does not happen
demand for features234, and developers do not consider the current
release’s possible influence on options in future releases. Network
effects do not prevent this unless the participants in the market fail
to internalise them – and even then the incurred ‘network externalities’
are not likely to have serious consequences on security235. Despite
the current economic disincentives for the development of secure
software, the private motivation to provide software that is secure enough
can raise the level of security. The market actors themselves are
enough to improve security. 
The economic consideration also imply that no amount of
technology or methodological improvement (even acknowledging
the need for and importance of further work on them) is able to give
satisfactory solutions to security; the presence of network effects as
such is enough to pose serious economic disincentives for the use
of the technological tools and development methods. However, this
is a premature conclusion. Both technology and the development
methods can be harnessed for regulatory purposes (i.e., used
intentionally to alter the behaviour of the developers)236. They can
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without the intention to do so and the possibility to influence the behaviour of
others.
be altered, if there is desire, to change the effect of the economic
disincentives. Fortunately, the seriousness of the economic
disincentives has been recognised and demands for their correction
are emerging.
Viewing secure development in a longer term (over the current release)
would make security and quality aspects seem more desirable for the
producer. Each individual release should not only address the
immediate requirements for the current design, but also concern the
release’s possible influences for the options in future releases. For
example, in order to obtain increased security in a future release, it
might be necessary to build the current release with more security
and less functionality than what the immediate requirements calls for.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in market-driven development due
to time-to-market being so essential in conquering market share.
The most promising change is that issue of software vulnerability
and lack of security features is getting wider and wider attention. The
hope is that customers no longer tolerate the poor quality and lack
of security, and learn to demand also other than just functional
requirements; i.e., they really start to demand for quality and security.
When customers are in a position to switch products and services
in a competitive environment, then market forces will eventually
eliminate nonperforming suppliers.
Unfortunately, there are serious hindrances. In many cases there
are no secure alternatives to which user could switch to. The
vulnerability of software is a common problem for the whole software
industry. It is not dependent on certain vendors. And even if more
secure alternatives enter the market, the lock-in effect still hinders
their wider adoption.
Also customer and end-user expectations still seem to be fulfilled
due to the acceptance of a reasonable degree of insecurity and
unreliability or operational difficulty as a trade-off for innovation.
As the near term history of market-driven software development
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237 PC operating systems and applications used to ran on isolated desktops; the
consequences of failure were limited to destruction of perhaps valuable but
certainly not life-critical data and failures had no way of propagating to other
machines. This climate was amplified by economic conditions of the early PC
era. Software was purchased separately rather than being bundled with a leased
computer, as in the mainframe era. Consequently, there was less financial
leverage for dissatisfied customers to affect vendor, and therefore developer,
attitudes. A customer's financial leverage was limited to consuming vendor
resources in calls to telephone help-lines, which could be ignored by inept or
uncaring vendors, and refusing to purchase other software or the next revision
of the malfunctioning product from that vendor. The latter option is reduced
by the diminishing diversity of the marketplace, the need to exchange data with
other users, and the investment the customer may have in data that can be
processed only by the product in question. (Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 88)
238 Greater risks are usually tolerated where highly socially useful products are
provided. Clearly, software has proven enormous utility despite the costliness
of attacks and this is why the related intrinsic risks are tolerated. However, the
current state of security can be changed and greater security can be achieved as
has been argued above. The equilibrium, if such even exists, is not optimal. As
Jennifer Chandler notes in Improving Software Security, p. 20-21, the relevant
inquiry is whether the cost of improving security is more or less than the value
of the improved security. Even though this line of argumentation is not taken
further in this study, the basic argument is that at least in the case of most
common vulnerabilities the improvement of security is cost-justified from the
societal point of view.
239 The situation has not changed all that much from 1999 when Fred B.
Schneider made the argument in an influential National Research Council
report Trust in Cyberspace, p. 188.
explains, COTS software development practices in the personal
computer (PC) era arose in a technical and economic environment
that was very accepting of errors and malfunctions237. The acceptance
of errors and malfunctions still exists to some degree. Customer and
end-user expectations seem to be fulfilled due to the acceptance of
a reasonable degree of insecurity and unreliability or operational
difficulty as a trade-off for innovation238. Customers have demanded
functionality, not security. The primary demand for functionality only
(the main purpose of a computing or a communication device or a
system) has continued and fuels demand for features239.
Yet, this tolerance of poor quality and lack of security will diminish
with time (perception of product as less innovative) and competition
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240 The dominant players can delay the effect of competition in particular,
because high switching costs cause customer lock-in into current products.
241 The trend of demanding security of software has been reported in the U.S.
already in 2002, e.g., by Dennis Fisher in an eWeek article Contracts Getting
Tough on Security available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/
0,1895,1658531,00.asp [29.3.2006]. Whether this, in the final end, is a natural
development in competitive markets or due to increasing threats of regulation
pressuring change is part of the analysis conducted below.
242 However, vendors have also found that, although a customer might claim
that security and quality are important in abstract, when it comes time to spend
money, functionality and performance expenditures often take precedence.
This argument has been made, e.g., by Fred B. Schneider in Trust in Cyberspace,
p. 198, and has been repeated by Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags in
Losses, Gains, and Hyperbolic Discounting.
243 Note that not all of the users have to start to demand security and actually
be ready to pay for it. As long as vendors cannot differentiate informed
customers from uninformed ones, they have an incentive to produce quality.
That is, if the number of informed customers is big enough. Thus, it suffices
that the central users (the critical mass or the vendors of complementary goods
and services) or another big and powerful enough a group starts to demand
security and quality. Of this argument in general see the analysis of Ejan
Mackaay, Economics of Information and Law, p. 149-150, in an effort to introduce
(competitors may introduce new products and releases with new
features, and users will very quickly lower their tolerance if a
competing product does better)240. This is what we are currently
experiencing; customers have started to put pressure also on
proprietary software vendors on security issues and they have reacted
accordingly241. As more and more aspects of society become
dependent on computing, customers have increasingly started to
demand dependably secure software242.
Vendors naturally are very keen to provide what the potential
customers’ desire with respect to security and quality of their products
because companies that fail to deliver on the customer requirements
may soon find themselves without any customers. Commercial
software companies therefore seem to have, at the first sight, a very
strong incentive to ensure the level of security their customers
demand, and they must be willing to invest whatever resources are
necessary to do so243.
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the issues of the costliness of information to the economic analysis of the law
in 1982.
244 Welfare economics as depicted, e.g., by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen in
Law and Economics, p. 39, is the part of microeconomics theory that explores
how the decisions of many individuals and firms interact to affect the well-
being of individuals.
Basically, private markets themselves can resolve many of the
problems discussed above - there is no direct need for intervention
by the government or by another regulator. The laws of market can
solve many of these problems. But is that private motivation, even
if it gets stronger, sufficient to provide an optimal amount of
protection for society as a whole? Are the market actors themselves
sufficient to provide secure software for the needs of society and not
just customers?
This is where we turn to welfare economics244 and other disciplines
that explain why problems might occur. This line of microeconomic
theory suggests other reasons, in addition to the effects of the network
economic environment where the market-driven development works,
why the industry might fail to provide secure enough software from
the societal point of view: externalities (spill-over effects) affecting third
parties in ways not reflected in the price set by producers or in cost
considered by the buyers, and inadequate or asymmetrical information
affecting the relationship between suppliers and buyers. Co-ordination
problems have consequences for both of these market failures (e.g.
though desired outcomes can in principle be achieved by private
transactions at the presence of externalities and asymmetric
information, the costs of co-ordination are so high that it is cheaper
for the law to prescribe conduct). 
The existence of market inefficiencies such as externalities and
imperfect information suggests that the present level of security is
inefficient. These market failure considerations suggest that even if
the private motivation to enhance security amends, it might not suffice
to provide an optimal amount of security for society as a whole. 
The following market failure considerations increase the
understanding of the behaviour of the software vendors. They show
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245 Wolfgang Kilian in one of the first conferences ever considering the role of
law in securing computer networks already justified the need to raise the
question of the role of legal provisions with market failure considerations.
Kilian was in Data Security in Computer Networks and Legal Problems, p. 16,
concerned that transaction costs and efficiency considerations will take
precedence over technical security measures.
246 These are presented tentatively by David Weimer and Aidan Vining in their
textbook, Policy Analysis, p. 134-196.
247 As Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave explain in their textbook on regulation,
Understanding Regulation, p. 9, motives for regulating need to be distinguished
from technical justifications for regulating. The latter are the market failure
explanations given by a regulator that is assumed to be acting in pursuit of the
public interest. The former are the actual motives behind these technical
justifications that may stem for example from the interests of the regulated
industry or be influenced by the economically powerful.
reasons why, despite the increasing demand for quality and security,
sufficient improvement might not happen without intervention from
the outside. They also provide a framework for understanding the
effects of interventions into the market for information security and
secure software especially. The considerations of the regulatory
capability of specific regulatory tools build partially on this
understanding.
These short considerations further justify the step into the
regulatory questions; they justify the importance of looking into
regulation245. They do not justify the need for regulation as such,
especially not alone and without further considerations, for example,
of the failings of the regulatory solutions themselves, of the efficiency
of the tools, of the distributional and other goals beyond efficiency246,
or of the real motives for regulating beside these technical
justifications stemming from market failures247. But they do partly
explain the current situation and set the basis for looking what kind
of instruments (influence mechanisms and incentives) regulation can
provide for the development of secure software. They further justify
why incentives from the outside are relevant and why they are needed.
The analysis also makes explicit that the reasons for regulating secure
software development is a combination of rationales even under pure
market failure analysis.
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Please, bear in mind that where the above analysis of the implications
of network effects on secure software development implicitly
supported the argument that technological or procedural solutions
as such are not sufficient to provide security due to the disincentives
in their use, it was noted (on the basis of the wider understanding
of regulation) that technology and development methods can also
be used ‘regulatively’.
Similarly in here the argument made with the market failure
considerations is not to imply that governmental intervention is
needed or to recommend what the public policy ought to be. The
decentring thesis accepted in this study widens the regulatory field
essentially. It is not only the government that can intervene in the
markets; also other regulators with their capacities can alter behaviour
and they can use the same instruments (excluding the use of force
which is a state monopoly). Thus, the market failure arguments made
below are not meant to speak in favour of governmental intervention.
They speak about the need for regulatory incentives, but they can
come from a variety of sources.
2.7  Information security as an externality
Information in general is a special commodity. On the demand side,
buyers cannot determine the value of information (how much they
would pay for it) until they have it, and having it removes their
willingness to pay for it. There are differences also in the supply side:
information is costly to produce, and yet it costs relatively little to
copy and transmit. Thus, it is extremely hard for anyone who has
devoted resources to the production of information to appropriate
its value through the sale of that information. This is because the buyer
of the information can resell it at the cost of transmission. Owing
to the low cost of transmitting information, information producers
have difficulty selling information for more than a fraction of its value
(economics call this the problem of non-appropriability). Consumers
desire to become “free riders” for information, paying no more than
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248 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 109 and 126.
249 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 42.
250 McNutt, Public Goods and Club Goods, p. 927
the cost of transmission for the commodity (e.g. copying a computer
program for free).248
Why is the appropriation of the value of information so difficult?
An answer can be found from the theory of public goods (economics
see the problem of non-appropriability similar to the public goods
issue). Public good is a commodity which benefit is shared by the
public as a whole, or by some group with it. It has two very closely
related characteristics: non-rivalrous consumption (i.e. consumption
by one person does not leave less for any other consumer) and non-
excludability (i.e. the costs of excluding non-paying beneficiaries who
consume the good are so high that no private profit-maximizing firm
is willing to supply the good)249. 
As Patrick McNutt explains in the Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics250, a pure public good exhibits in extreme measure the
characteristics of non-rivalry in consumption (one person’s
consumption of it does not diminish the amount that others are able
to consume), and non-excludability (no one can be excluded from
enjoying it). The property of non-rivalrous consumption implies zero
marginal cost to existing users in sharing the benefits of the good
with an additional person. If a pure public good is privately provided,
then it will quickly be provided at that zero marginal cost; but at that
price it does not pay any private producer to supply it since their
investment (the fixed costs of production) could never be recovered.
At the same time, the non-excludability of public goods implies that
the benefits of access cannot be fully appropriated by producers: if
someone cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a good,
he or she has little incentive to pay for it but will be inclined to “free
ride”. There is then little incentive for a private producer to undertake
the supply of such a good, which would consequently be
undersupplied.
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251 These considerations suggest that the unregulated market will produce sub-
optimal amounts of information (undersupply), such as in inventive ideas and
in creative works. And this, in turn, suggests the need for governmental
intervention in the market for information. Even though the view that
unregulated market will undersupply information is still dominating most
policy discussions, situations can occur in which no regulation results in too
much information or just the right amount as explained by Robert Cooter and
Thomas Ulen in Law and Economics, p. 127, and Anthony Ogus in Regulation, p.
40. However interesting this wide discussion is, it will not be taken further in
this context due to the lack of direct connection to the issue of information
security. 
Firstly, information contains ideas and person’s use of an idea does
not diminish its availability for others to use, so there is non-rivalrous
consumption of information. Possession of certain information, e.g.
using computer software, leaves it still equally valuable to another
individual because she can have it at the same time. Secondly,
excluding some people from learning about a new idea can be
expensive, because the transmission of ideas is so cheap – the use
of information is non-excludable.251
But this should be nothing new, not even to lawyers, since the
copyright theories and the discussions on freedom of information
and publicity principles are based on the public goods problem. But,
does the public good nature of information create similar problems
to the security of it, in other words, does information security exhibit
in extreme measure the characteristics of non-rivalry in consumption
and non-excludability similar to information as a commodity? 
Actually there is no clear cut answer. In order to make a clear point
in relation to the quality aspects of information security we must come
back to the general information security question for a while, even
though we have earlier limited the study to concentrate only to the
development of secure software part of information security. This
is because the different parts of information security require different
treatment under welfare economics and without shortly considering
them it is not possible to make a clear point about the development
part of information security. There is however, a need to introduce
the concept ‘externality’ into the discussion before we can continue
because economic theories of public goods and externalities caused
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252 Economic theory makes a distinction between public and private
externalities (Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 40 and 110). If the
external cost or benefit affects a relatively small number of third parties, the
externality is said to be a private externality. In such cases, it is more likely that
the externality can be accounted for through private agreements. So, there
typically is no market failure at the presence of private externalities since
private agreement possibly with the help of private law measures is able to
correct them. If the external cost or benefit affects a relatively large number of
third parties, the externality is said to be a public externality. In such cases private
bargaining is likely to be too costly, especially due co-ordination problems. I
will concentrate mainly of public externalities since they raise the real problems
for society.
253 Not all goods exhibit the characteristics of non-excludability and non-
rivalrous consumption to the same degree. Most public goods typically fall
somewhere between the extremes of excludable/non-excludable and
rivalrous/non-rivalrous, and can be called impure public goods as Anthony
Ogus point out in an influential book developing an extensive theory of
regulation based on legal scholarship and economic research, Regulation, p. 34.
Actually majority of the real world’s property lies in between purely private and
purely public goods as Ugo Mattei state in Comparative Law and Economics, p. 52.
This has implication for the corrective public policies as discussed on the
following headings.
254 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 106.
by consumption or production of some good are closely related.
Public externalities252 typically also have these characteristics of non-
rivalry and non-excludability; the external costs or benefits are not
depleted when one person suffers or gains their effects. 
All goods share the characterised of rivalry in consumption and
excludability from supply to some degree253. If a good is rival, only
one person can consume it at a time; if it is non-rivalrous, many people
can enjoy the good without affecting the enjoyment of others. A good
is excludable if the person in possession or the producer can exclude
anyone from enjoying it; it is non-excludable if is impossible or too
costly for the supplier to exclude those who do not pay from the
benefit. For example, once property rights are defined over private
goods, they are relatively cheap to enforce (e.g., the owner can exclude
others from using them at low cost). With public goods, it is costly
to exclude anyone from enjoying them.254
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255 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 40 and 110.
256 Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law, p. 76. The same distinction was made
also about network effects and network externalities above.
257 As Coleman notes in Markets, Morals and the Law, p. 76, internalisation need
not, and often does not, require that the external effect itself is eliminated.
Only the inefficiency in production or exchange that the externality generates is
eliminated.
258 Kunreuther and Heal, Interdependent Security, p. 231-249. Hal Varian
argues similarly about system reliability in System Reliability and Free Riding, p. 1.
Exchange (i.e., trading or agreeing on a bargain) inside a market is
voluntary and mutually beneficial. Typically, the parties to the
exchange capture all the benefits and bear all the costs. However,
sometimes the benefits or the costs of an exchange (a private
transaction) may spill over onto other parties than those explicitly
engaged in the exchange. Because market transactions are voluntary,
these spill-over effects are outside the market system of exchange
and, as a result, are not considered in the determination of the market
price. This is why they are named externalities255. 
Externalities are a category of external effects that are by-products
of an activity that influence the production of other goods or the
welfare of other individuals. As Jules Coleman explains it  externalities
are inefficient external effects; social costs or benefits that result in
inefficient production or non-optimal distributions of welfare256. In
order to ensure that an efficient amount of the item is traded, there
is a need to somehow internalise the externality. That is, there is a
need to ensure that the external costs and benefits are considered
in the determination of the transaction price257.
 
Externalities in information security in general. Yes, information security
at the level of information infrastructures (e.g. communications and
electrical networks) and other networked information systems is
interdependent as denominated by Howard Kunreuther and Geoffrey
Heal: your security can be compromised by the failure of others to
act even if you take appropriate precautions on your own. The security
of system depends on the effort of many parties258. The lack of security
in one system can cause adverse effects on others (e.g. when a virus
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259 This has been noted by the European Commission in its communication on
network and information security (COM(2001) 298 final, p. 14). It is not
required that everyone cooperates. But co-operation only works if a critical
mass of players participates which is difficult to achieve as there are ‘free-rider’
profits to be made.
260 When considering the customer confidence aspect, not only the information
security investments made, but also sharing of security information can involve
spillovers, which result in positive externalities for the industry as a whole.
Enhanced customer trust in transacting with a particular firm also expands the
overall market size within the industry, as the Amazon.com case makes explicit
especially in the online market for books. This has been tentatively explained
by Esther Gal-Or and Anindya Ghose in The Economic Consequences of Sharing
Security Information, p. 3.
261 In other words, investing in security seems to buy less for the firm making
the investment when there is the possibility of contagion from others than in
isolation as explained by Kunreuther and Heal in Interdependent Security, p. 8-
infects or a hacker breaks into one computer in a network, the whole
network easily gets contaminated).
Losses from security breaches at the level of information
infrastructures and other networked information systems can be dealt
with only if a large number of parties coordinate to make the needed
investments259. So, the incentive to invest in infrastructure security
is affected by the security investments taken by others, because the
security level an organisation can achieve is affected by the security
level of others in that network. In this situation, investing in protection
produces involves spillovers that result in positive externalities for
the whole network. For example, when one system owner in a network
(e.g. a telecommunications operator) takes additional security measures
to protect her machines and networks, the overall security of
telecommunications network becomes more secure. But the security
of the network does not have to actually improve since the investment
made by one party may involve spillovers in customer confidence
(increased trust)260.
This benefit given to others by securing one’s own networks is
not considered when deciding the amount of investment made to
for the security measures and too little investment into security is
made261. Because a secure system does not allow users to do any more
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9, andy by Kunreuther et al., Interdependent Security, p. 2. This is emphasized
by the benefits given to others not being internalised.
262 This has been explained by the Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board (CSTB) report Cyber-security Today and Tomorrow: Pay Now or Pay Later, p.
9.
263 As Soo Hoo et al. note in Regional Interest Group on Information Security,
p. 1, information security is a part of the general public good of a secure
information infrastructure, regardless of whether the information networks
that provide public goods such as emergency services, defence, or basic
infrastructure components are publicly or privately owned and operated. See
also Camp and Wolfram, Pricing Security, p. 31-39, where information security is
considered as a public positive externality, but not a public good. However, the
argumentation of information security not being a public good because it is not
a single, indivisible good (instead it is the sum of a number of individual firm’s
or people’s decision) and because the solutions to public goods problem might
differ from those of externalities (government provision e.g. of national
security contra simple interventions to enhance the private market), is valid
only if information security is seen as a pure public good – which it is not.
than an insecure system, system and network operators in private
sector spend only as much on security as they can justify on business
grounds – and this may be much less than the society needs as a
whole. Further, because serious cyberattacks are rare, the payoff form
security investment is uncertain. In many cases, it is society (or other
users) rather than any individual firm that will capture the benefit of
improved security. As a result, system and network operators tend
to underinvest in security.262
Developing secure information and software systems can be seen
as having the characteristics of a public good to some degree; maybe
not in the extreme form (i.e. it is not a pure public good), but it creates
positive public externalities that are not internalized and thus too little
of security is provided263. According to the economic theory of public
goods, the market fails in that it produces too little of the commodities
(network security in our case) due to the lack encouragement to invest
into the security of networks above the needs of that particular
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264 Similar to public goods, the market fails at the presence of positive public
externalities in that it produces too little of the commodities. There is a strong
inducement for consumers of the privately provided public good or at the
presence of positive public externalities to try to be free riders: they hope to
benefit at no cost to themselves from the payment of others.
265 This is emphasised by the European Commission in its Communication on
Network and Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy Approach
(COM(2001)298 final, p. 14).
organisation (the appropriability of the value of increased network
security is limited and ‘free-riding’ on the costs of others is possible)264.
In relation to secure software or information systems development
part of information security this means that developing information
security properties (e.g. security requirements of confidentiality,
integrity and availability) into information or software systems or
correcting defects (e.g. by patching) in components used in their
development can be seen as causing positive public externalities. When
the security of one networked information system is enhanced, also
the users and operators of other information systems in that network
reap the benefits because there are fewer possibilities for security
failures in that network. 
From the viewpoint of the overall security of that network, the
incentive to invest into the security of one’s information systems is
too low because the benefits given to others are not considered in
deciding about the investment. So, the benefits of improved security
are not fully reflected in market prices. When operators, suppliers,
or service providers improve the security of their products a good
deal of the benefits of this investment accrue not only to their
customers but to all those directly or indirectly affected by electronic
communication - basically the whole economy265.
These positive public externalities are relevant also for the
component developer, when the products are used in the networked
information system development. Adding security features to
components used in networked systems enhances the security of the
overall network and gives the whole industry a face-lift (customers
may consider the products of others also more secure which increases
trust as has happened e.g. with the heavy investments made by
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266 Overpricing is not the only cause for the lack of demand for more secure
components. As noted earlier, customers are accepting to errors and
malfunctions due to long term industry practice and desire for features and
performance instead of security. In addition, the positive externalities caused
by the information security investments and raised customer confidence
diminishes their willingness to invest into the security of their systems which
means that there is less demand for more secure components or add-on
security devices.
267 Even though the diminishment of security related vulnerabilities in a
software product used in a networked information system also makes the
overall network more secure by diminishing vulnerabilities that could be
misused, it is not a positive externality case. The product developed is not
vulnerabilities. Instead it is a software component that should have certain
quality and security by default. Vulnerability avoidance is not the product even
though with patching considered as a sufficient remedy for even a security
related defects it seems to have evolved into something like that. But the
product is the software that is expected to have quality and security in addition
to functionality. So, the spillovers from vulnerabilities being misused (security
breaches) resulting in negative externalities are reduced but no positive
externalities are produced while diminishing the vulnerabilities. Protecting
computer networks from viruses and from hackers reduces the chances that a
loss will occur to the agent who takes protection and at the same time reduce
negative externalities. Similarly in Kunreuther and Heal, Interdependent
Security, p. 21.
Amazon.com in customer privacy spilling over to other online
bookstores), thus creating benefits that the component developer does
not consider while deciding about the pricing of the component. Thus
a more secure component tends to be overpriced266.
Externalities and the quality aspect of security. ‘Public goods’ are, however,
relevant only in relation to developing security properties Defects
(vulnerabilities) in common software products that are used as
components in the development of networked information systems
are a totally different issue. They cause the whole networked
information system to be vulnerable267. And since components are
increasingly used also in infrastructure critical markets, these bugs
make the whole information infrastructure vulnerable. The costs
caused by the abuse of these vulnerabilities not only by a hacker or
a virus, but also a malfunction or another unintentional act, are not
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268 The costs (system recovery and upgrade, loosed business time, costs of
dealing with the breaches etc.) are mainly suffered by (are transferred to) the
component user (i.e. private customers and developers of an information or
software system) or the distributor. Due to the difficulties in proving that just
the software of the specific vendor allowed the specific threat took advantage
of the vulnerability and the typical (not always valid) liability disclaimers in
commercial software, the cost of the security breaches caused by bugs left to a
software product are not considered as costs of software development.
However, these costs are not externality costs as such, since they are not
outside the market system of exchange. The costs are just transferred to the
customers. This situation can be corrected by the actions of these private
parties – at least in theory and assuming no coordination problems in the
actions of the private parties. These costs of security breaches can be seen as
private costs – costs that are borne solely by the organization suffering the
breach. They should be separated from external cost.
269 This has been explained by Anthony Ogus in Regulation, p. 21.
paid by the component vendor. When these vulnerabilities are abused
and the whole network threatened (not just the systems of component
users) they can be seen as externality costs (causing negative public
externalities)268.
The classification of externalities into positive and negative needs
to be restated in here, even though it is a basic tenet in welfare
economics. In the case of positive externalities, the third-party spillover
effects are beneficial — benefits external to the private action that
are not captured by either of the transacting parties. In this situation
the social marginal benefits exceed the private marginal benefits. For
example, if a third party acquires a benefit from a producer’s activity
without having to pay for it, that benefit will not be reflected
(internalised) in the income the producer receives and will not,
therefore, be taken into account in making decisions as to how much
to produce. As a result, the market fails in that goods exhibiting
positive externalities will tend to be under-produced (inefficiently
small amount from the society’s view is produced) because the
producer does not appropriate all of its benefits and sets the market
price higher than would if it had reflected the true social benefits.269
With negative externalities there are costs caused to third parties that
neither of the transacting parties bear (i.e. social marginal costs exceed
private marginal costs). The producer does not bear the full cost of
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270 This understanding is drawn from the economically minded theory of
regulation such as Ogus, Regulation, p. 18-20, and Baldwin and Cave,
Understanding Regulation, p. 11. Similar notions are made also in law and
economics. See, e.g., Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 41.
271 The same reasons apply also to public bads (public negative externality, or
simply an ‘externality’), which refers to commodities that the consumers do not
like as explained by Hal Varian in Intermediate Microeconomics, p. 41, as to why
markets cannot arise to supply public goods efficiently: the free-rider problem
prevents private bargaining solutions to the problem of public negative
externalities or public bads and some form of legal intervention is called for.
So, at the presence of public bads too much of the commodity is produced
together with too much harm. In short, public goods relate to positive public
externalities and negative public externalities can be seen as public bads as
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen explaind in Law and Economics, p. 110 and
151.
his actions and part of it is borne by third parties causing the producer
to set the market price lower than if it had reflected the true social
costs. Because more will be demanded and hence a larger number
of the products will be manufactured and sold at that lower price,
goods exhibiting negative externalities will therefore tend to be over-
produced (too much output, too much harm). The reason the market
fails in the presence of negative externalities (external costs) is that
the generator of the externality does not have to pay for harming
others, and so exercises too little self-restraint. The externality-
generator produces too much output and too much harm because
there is a difference between private marginal cost and social marginal
cost (the sum of private marginal cost and the additional marginal
costs involuntarily imposed on third parties by each unit of
production).270
In the presence of such external costs the market fails because the
generator of the externality (vulnerabilities on software products) does
not have to pay for harming others, and so exercises too little self-
restraint271. The pricing of software does not reflect the possibility
and the extent of the damages from security failures associated with
the product thus making the pricing of vulnerable software too low.
As a consequence, vulnerable software is sold more than more secure
ones especially at the presence of asymmetric information typical to
security. The development of software components does not reach
Regulating Secure Software Development114
272 Shah and Kesan, Incorporating Societal Concerns into Communication
Technologies, p. 30.
273 For example, a breakdown in information security within the
telecommunications industry would be likely to cause serious ripple effects
within the financial industry, the healthcare industry, and throughout the
economy (as well as affecting national defence).
enough high quality and security from the public interest perspective.
And when the cost of poor security is not borne by the source, there
is no incentive for the problems to be fixed.
When a defect (vulnerability) in a software – even a well known
– is abused e.g. by a virus or a cracker (i.e. there is a security breach),
there are cost spilled over to third parties, i.e., others than the software
vendor or the customer (often an information system developer). An
example of this is a bug in a common software product that makes
the information systems using it as a component vulnerable for virus
infections; just recall the major virus cases. Lack of security in major
software vendors products affect everyone by propagating viruses,
reducing bandwidth across the Internet due to spurious traffic, and
creating insecure machines that are then used to attack other machines
across the Internet272. The incurred costs might be significant in
relation to infrastructure critical industries273.
The basic conclusion is that, absent government intervention or
other solutions to internalize the externalities, negative externalities
are over-provided and positive externalities are under-provided (public
bads and public goods). Until these externalities can be turned towards
the originator of the vulnerability there will be little economic
incentive to do more. Of course, there are other players to consider:
the ISPs who manage the broadband connections, the security
administrators, and the authors of the malicious code that can most
directly be traced to the damage. Sorting out who is responsible for
what is a big task, but it is something that needs to be done since right
now, the status quo is broken. The true costs of providing effective
information security needs to be directed towards those who stand
to gain.
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In short, security in terms of vulnerabilities in software components
is a negative externality that should be internalized as a cost (negative
impact on society) of development in order to be handled properly.
Developing secure information systems on the other hand, at the
business level of protecting firms assets with more secure systems,
is a positive externality (making the whole infrastructure more secure
by one firm doing it properly), and thus causes underinvestment into
security. This is because it is so difficult to exclude others from
benefiting from the work of one party and because one firm doesn’t
have enough incentives to develop its own security any further than
what is necessary to the firm in question.
In the interest of social welfare a number of specific remedies for
market failure due to information security externalities could be
examined. However, prior to making decisions of specific remedies,
more research should be done to measure the true societal costs (i.e.,
private costs plus the costs of externalities) of security breaches. But
this is more of a job for an economist than a lawyer and we can
analyze the benefits and disadvantages of the remedies even without
specific knowledge of the costs on the basis of assumptions made.
But it has to be emphasized that more information on the costs are
needed when deciding which remedies to use – even though many
are already used even without sufficient knowledge of the true social
costs.
2.8  Inadequacies in the distribution
of security-related information
Customer incentives and possibilities to acquire security-related information.
Competitive markets can only function properly if consumers are
sufficiently well informed to evaluate competing products also on
the basis of their quality. Consumers and buyers in general have strong
economic incentive to acquire information of products qualities due
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274 This argument is typically made as a theoretical starting point in the
economically minded analysis of information regulation like in the
comprehensive review of mandatory disclosure from 1981 made by Howard
Beales, Richard Craswell and Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, p. 502.
275 This general argument is made by Anthony Ogus, Regulation, p. 40, a
Professor of Law at the University of Manchester, in an influential book
developing an extensive theory of regulation based on legal scholarship and
economic research from 1994.
276 This has been pointed out at the policy level by the European Commission
in its communication on network and information security (COM(2001) 298
final, p. 14).
to high possibilities for gain274. However, the costs of acquiring
adequate information on which to make purchasing decisions are often
substantial275; especially so in information security, where information
about security properties and the quality aspect of security is hard
to obtain. They are not only difficult to quantify and assess but also
time-consuming to evaluate. 
In information security markets (both for security features and
secure/high quality software) individuals or organisations acquiring
and using software for private or commercial purposes operate within
an environment in which a great deal is unknown. A lot of it has to
do with the characteristics of the commodity protected – information.
Information commodities (such as software) in general are not only
non-excludable and non-rival to a high degree (the characteristics of
public good), they are also highly non-transparent. Mere complexity
and scale of software products combined with rapid and continuous
changes causes serious problems for customer screening activities
in evaluating and testing the quality of the product, producer’s abilities
and production process. Software and information systems, especially
when networked, have become increasingly complex and are reaching
a wider market that includes many users with little understanding of
the technology or its potential dangers276. 
Most buyers are not knowledgeable about the technical aspects
of information security and, therefore, cannot conduct the informed
assessment that is needed for sound decision making under the basic
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277 Of this argument in general see, e.g., the point made by Ejan Mackaay,
Economics of Information and Law, 146, in an effort to introduce the issues of the
costliness of information to the economic analysis of the law in 1982.
278 Note that the experts used by large buyer organisations obviously have
more substantive knowledge than laypeople. Often, however, the practical
demands of risk management force experts to make educated guesses about
critical facts, taking them far beyond the limits of their data. As noted by
Baruch Fischhoff and Jon Merz in The Inconvenient Public, p. 169, empirical
studies available in 1994 also suggested that when experts must rely on
judgement, their thought processes often resemble those of laypeople.
279 This is due to the increasing use of COTS components instead of in-house
software development (or even information systems development) pointed
out, e.g., by Fred B. Schneider in Trust in Cyberspace, p. 188 and 198.
assumptions of economic theories. In addition, the benefits deriving
from greater information security or the consequences of inadequate
security are difficult to articulate in detail, much less to quantify, which
lowers the incentive for the customers to search information.
The information deficit concerns not only consumers that purchase
software for private purposes, but also industrial buyers. The higher
stakes involved for industrial buyers naturally justify measures to avoid
the common information-deficiency problems that consumers face,
especially when repeated purchases are made277. However, due to the
outright unavailability of information on many of the quality aspects
of security together with the high costs of acquiring existing
information due the lack of methods to gather such information and
the underdeveloped state of metrics in the quality aspect of security,
not even industrial buyers have sufficient information for sound
decision-making. All but the largest and most capable buyer
organizations lack the resources or expertise to evaluate the security
claims made of a software product278.
Recall the argument above that the development of the mass
market for software products has been accompanied by a shift in
systems development and expertise from user organizations to
vendors279. This means that purchasers have less means and skills to
evaluate products. Especially their expertise to evaluate the
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280 Since production is separated from consumption, software engineering
methods, techniques, and tools are less important to the consumer than is the
outcome of their use. That is, vendors are being evaluated by their potential
customers on the basis of their products, not their processes as pointed out by
Steve Sawyer in A market-based perspective on information systems
development, p. 101, and by Erran Carmel and Steve Sawyer in Packaged
software development teams, p. 7-19, at the turn of the millennium. Whether
this means that COTS vendors are less interested in applying software process
improvement methods or even rigorous software development methods is an
empirical question that cannot be answered here.
281 Especially the laws concerning conditional access and intellectual property
right protection devices (technological protection measures) are severely
hampering researches’ ability to verify vendors’ security claims and thus
increasing the lack of trustful information concerning the quality and security
of products. Similarly in Arbaugh, Security: Technical, Social, and Legal
Challenges, p. 111. We will come back to this in chapter 4.
282 This has been recognised also at the policy level in Europe by the
Commission of the European Union in its communication on network and
information security (COM (2001) 298 final, p. 15) and pointed out by the
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB) of the U.S.
National Research Council (Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 184). CSTB is an
independent advisory board for the federal government on technical and
public policy issues relating to computing and communications. See the web
pages of the National Academies at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/
cstb/about.html [21.2.2006].
development processes is decreased280. This is not eased by reverse
engineering being made more difficult (source code is kept as a secret,
and reverse engineering is prohibited in licences and made possibly
illegal in case of products containing security mechanisms designed
to protect intellectual property or conditional access) because it makes
even more difficult for the consumers to evaluate the vendors
claims281. Because the gathering of quality information about a certain
software product by reverse engineering the code is often not an
option, there are fewer provable serious source of quality and security
information to serve as a basis for rational choice.
Not surprising, then, is the observation that relatively little
information on information security is readily available to
purchasers282. Paradoxically there is a huge amount of information
on network and information security available on the Internet and
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283 As noted by a Canadian Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa
Jennifer Chandler in Improving Software Security, p. 5, some software vendors
even try to suppress the publication of independent product reviews through
“anti-benchmarking” clauses included within the end-user license agreement
(EULA) for a piece of software. The clauses purport to bar licensees from
publishing product reviews or disclosing the results of benchmark tests
without the licensor’s prior consent. There may be legitimate reasons for these
clauses such as the desire to prevent the publication of unfair or erroneous
comparisons, but they seem overly restrictive from the perspective of
enhancing secure software development.
284 Most jurisdiction have rules controlling the supply of false or misleading
information, i.e., the negative duty not to misinform the other party to a
contract (not to lie). Basic examples are provisions on fraud and
misrepresentation and its many variants for example in marketing regulation.
computer magazines, not to mention professional publications that
cover this issue quite extensively. However, the information available
on the security and quality of COTS, or any other, software is
relatively smaller. Comparisons, studies, and even vendor claims about
the quality aspects of security and even of security features of software
are still almost non-existent283. Even though a variety of incident
response centres provide information and different types of guidelines,
checklists, best practices, and other useful materials are widely
available, the problem for users is to find appropriate information
that is understandable, up-to-date, and responds to their particular
needs. The existing information is so scattered and difficult to verify
that it is difficult to utilise it.
Seller incentives to provide security-related information. Sellers can typically
provide this information more cheaply because economies of scale
are involved. In a competitive market sellers also ought to have a
substantial incentive to do this in order to be able to distinguish their
products from those of their competitors. There is support in the law-
and-economics literature for the hypothesis that, as long as explicit
deception is forbidden284, sellers have incentives to reveal negative
attributes of their products. Otherwise consumers will rationally
assume that an advertisement will omit a critical piece of information
(say, the weight of a notebook computer) only if the value of that
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285 Those above the average security would disclose under this hypothesis since
otherwise customers would expect the worse of their products. This is
expected to lead also others to disclose since they also want to avoid the
negative inference of non-disclosure.
286 This argument has been presented in the Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics by Paul Rubin in Information Regulation (incl. Regulation of
Advertising), p. 280-281; and by Mark Geistfeld in Products Liability, p. 353.
The argument has also been made by Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, p. 502, already in 1981. Note that an assumption of
the customer’s ability to verify the claims of quality and security is underlying
this argument.
287 Similarly by Carl Landwehr in Improving Information Flow in the Information
Security Market, p. 2.
288 Matthews and Postlewaite, Quality Testing and Disclosure, p. 329.
attribute for that product is low. Thus, producers of products with
quality levels above the minimum will have incentives to advertise
this fact285, and in the limit the market will provide complete
information.286 
Note that this hypothesis underlies an assumption that producers
are exogenously informed about the quality and security of their
products, i.e., that they know whether or not their products are secure.
However, even the COTS software vendor often lacks full knowledge
of the quality aspects of security of his product in many cases due
to the high complexity of the product and the information concerning
it287. As has been argued above, testing for security is often bypassed
due to budget and scheduling concerns. Not even the vendors know
whether their products contain security related vulnerabilities when
the product enters the market. The relevant question then becomes,
whether vendors are incited both to test and to inform voluntarily.
As Steven Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite show in the terms
of economic theory, sellers may not be forced by buyer scepticism
to test quality voluntarily and hence to disclose288. If the seller can
make it verifiably known before the market opens that he has not tested
quality, then the seller can decide not to test without causing
consumers to disbelieve him when he claims to be ignorant. According
to Matthews and Postlewaite announcements of ignorance can be
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289 Matthews and Postlewaite make this point in Quality Testing and
Disclosure, p. 334, with references to similar results made by others in both
monopoly and competitive contexts.
290 Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information. p. 502-
509, and Ogus, Regulation, p. 40-41, make this theoretical argument and explain
the different possibilities. For the sake of clarity it has to be stated that ‘perfect’
information, as assumed in traditional economic analysis of markets, never
exists in the real world and that the absence of ‘perfect’ information, from a
public interest perspective, cannot by itself justify intervention in markets. The
relevant question is whether the unregulated market generates adequate
(‘optimal’) information in relation to a particular area, i.e., the point where the
marginal costs of supplying and processing additional information equals to the
marginal benefits that are engendered. Even though precise estimations of
‘optimal’ information are unattainable, it is a useful theoretical tool for
identifying situations where the information generated by the unregulated
market is likely to be substantially sub-optimal and possibly calls for
interventionist measures. (Ogus, Regulation, p. 38-39; Beales et al., The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, p. 502-503 and 512)
credible if testing or disclosing is costly or if the test results are not
perfectly informative289. 
As has been argued above, testing procedure for security involves
high costs and cannot show the absence of errors; it can only show
the presence of errors in the program. This means that vendors can
make credible claims of ignorance and continue not to test the
program and not to inform without fear of negative inference by the
customers about the vulnerability of their software product. In the
situation where testing for security is extremely expensive, where it
is seen as against the dominating time-to-market principle and does
not fully reveal the quality and security of the product, the vendors
thus do not have to test for security and to disclose information about
the vulnerability of their software in order to dispel cynicism about
its products security. They can simply claim that they are ignorant
of the issue. In such a situation a firm is not forced to test to dispel
scepticism simply because consumers cannot be sceptical.
However, the market may fail to produce adequate information
for several reasons even when the vendors do know the quality and
security of their products, i.e., they are exogenously informed or do
test for security and quality290. For example, the dissemination of false
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291 This basic argument has been made already by Ejan Mackaay in Economics of
Information and Law, p. 149, in an effort to introduce the issues of the costliness
of information to the economic analysis of the law in 1982.
292 According to Anthony Ogus, Regulation, p. 40-41, and Beales et al., The
Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, p. 505-506, especially areas in
which consumers purchase a type of product very infrequently may give rise to
this problem. Of course the likelihood that purchasers will cease to buy the
product due to the discovery of the distortion and encourage others to do so,
and the amount of business lost in that case, also affects the calculation. But if
the distortion is not discovered by the purchasers, then the losses do not
realise. Note that each purchaser does not have to be able to discover
distortions in order to alter the vendor’s calculation of gains and losses in
favour of not distorting the information. Even if most purchasers are ill
informed, but at least few customers do inform themselves, and the vendors
are not able to distinguish informed from uninformed purchasers, then sellers
cannot exploit this ignorance as explained by Ejan Mackaay in Economics of
Information and Law, p. 149-150. 
293 Mark Geistfeld in Products Liability, p. 353, explains the lack of voluntary
disclosure of risk-related information by the consumers’ tendency to overreact
to negative information about products. Consequently, any seller that discloses
risk-related information could cause consumers to believe that its product is
unsafe, so high-quality sellers are better off by not disclosing.
or misleading information and withholding negative information of
products qualities, that might be seen as profitable in the short run
if the claims are believed and not countered by others, can distort
the information provision of a vendor providing both the information
and the commodity. Vendors’ incentive to distort information
provided to the market depends on the prospective gains in terms
of increased sales or profit being higher than the prospective losses291.
The incentive exists especially when, for example, consumers of the
product are ill-positioned to challenge the falsification and seek
remedies for damages suffered or where they face high costs in doing
so292. Not only can gains be acquired from the distortion of the
information, but also the sale of the product and its value in the
market might suffer from the publication of the negative information
(e.g., vulnerability of its products) together with the reputation of the
vendor itself293. Silence about the vulnerability of software or even
the distortion of the information to their own favour, e.g., by
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294 The general argument about incentives to hide negative characteristics is
usually made in regulatory theory, such as in the comprehensive analysis of
governmental regulation done by Anthony Ogus in 1994 (Regulation, p. 40-41).
295 This has been recognised even by the big commercial software vendors. For
example, see the comment of the CTO of advanced strategies and policy (at
the date of making the comment) at Microsoft Craig Mundie, Security: Source
Access and the Software Ecosystem, heading “Response Mechanisms”.
296 This is verfied in a quantitative survey study conducted by Tiina Havana, as
reported in Havana and Röning in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Process. Problems faced by the reporters include finding the right
contact person, to get a response to a report etc.
297 This has been identified, e.g., by Fred B. Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p.
184, in an influential study from the end of 20th century. See also Landwehr,
Improving Information Flow in the Information Security Market, p. 2. One of the key
findings of the Tenth Annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
2005 is that the percentage of organisations reporting computer intrusions to
promising security and quality that is not actually there, is a tempting
option for the vendors.
Especially central for the problem of the security of software is
the incentive to hide information about products negative qualities
like defects and vulnerabilities294. There is a preconception, and
anecdotal evidence from the practitioners, that vendors have had a
negative attitude towards discovering and reporting software
vulnerabilities295. Vulnerabilities, especially security related, have been
stated to be dismissed by many vendors either due to the fear of
negative publicity, or the lack of understanding of the nature of the
vulnerability and the risk that it poses, or both. As a consequence,
the responses to discoveries of vulnerabilities have largely been seen
as defensive, slow and inadequate. Especially the reporters of
vulnerabilities have stated that they faced problems when reporting
to the vendors296 and felt that sufficient interest has not been paid
to the vulnerabilities.
In information security markets there is not only a reluctance to
provide information as to a product’s direct negative internal
properties (potential bugs and vulnerabilities) but also to make data
about actual security incidents and consequences together with actual
losses publicly available297. The reluctance to make such data publicly
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law enforcement has continued its multiyear decline (Gordon et al., CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey, p. 2). The predominant reason given for not
reporting intrusions to law enforcement cited as being very important (by
those indicating that their organizations would not report an intrusion to law
enforcement) was the perception that the negative publicity would hurt their
organization’s stock and/or image. As also pointed out by Gordon et al. in
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, p. 20, this is consistent with the
research by Campbell et al. in The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced
Information Security Breaches, p. 431-448, from 2003 that found reports of
security breaches of personal data having a special adverse effect on a firm’s
stock price. 
298 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 184. Cass R. Sunstein, The Functions of
Regulatory Statutes, p. 52, makes the same argument in relation to all
manufacturers that have poor incentives to provide information about
hazardous products.
299 The case where the informational advantage is on the consumer side can
give rise to moral hazard in the enforcement of contracts, which means that
parties misuse their information advantage. This arises particularly in insurance
markets, where insured parties have a tendency to be more careless due to the
awareness of compensation in case of accident. This leads bigger accidents and
bigger insurance claims. This will be ignored in the analysis.
available is intended to minimize the public perception and awareness
that systems are vulnerable or have been breached. Potential risks
are underplayed, for fear of losing customers. Competition over the
degree of vulnerability may decrease total purchases of the product
rather than help any particular manufacturer to obtain greater sales.298
2.9 Asymmetry of security related information
The above mentioned possible market failures, i.e., inadequacies in
the distribution of security-related information, may occur in the
production and sale of information in relation to quality of software
and its security features. However, informational imperfections may
also prevent the underlying product markets from working properly.
One such situation is when sellers know more about a product than
do buyers, or vice versa (asymmetric distribution of information)299.
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300 This means that potential buyers do not have reliable information about
whether the software they intend to buy meets their specific needs and is of
appropriate quality and security. They first have to buy the product and can
rate its quality and security only after having deployed it. At this time, the
software producer already has made his profit.
301 Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”, p. 488-500.
302 These conditions are presented in a general form, e.g., by Paul H. Rubin in
his article in the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Information Regulation
(incl. Regulation of Advertising), p. 278.
The underlying condition that alternatives exist in the market is assumed and
extensively experienced in the software component market even in relation to
operating systems. Variety in products and vendors is increasing.
In information security markets and in markets for secure software
producers sometimes know which products are secure, but consumers
cannot tell. A relevant information asymmetry arises because
information concerning quality or security is more costly to supply
and process than information concerning price or quantity. Prices
are calculated by reference to objective criteria (currency) and, in
general, are easily communicated. Qualities, such as security, are to
some degree subjective and, particularly in the case of professional
services and technologically more complex commodities like software,
may not be discoverable by pre-purchase inspection300.
In a famous paper, The Market for “Lemons”, mentioned in the
Nobel Price in Economic Sciences won in 2001, George A. Akerlof
demonstrates how asymmetry in the search costs of price and quality
information can lead to seriously detrimental consequences301. Failure
arises in a lemons market because only low quality items are sold, even
though consumers would be willing to pay high prices for high quality
items. This theory predicts that this asymmetry in information will
force more secure products out of the market if secure products will
sell for no higher price of than vulnerable ones, secure products will
be more expensive to produce, and consumers will not be able to
know the difference. This process is called adverse selection.
The three conditions necessary to generate a lemons market
(adverse selection type of market failure) are present to certain degree
in information security and secure software markets302.
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303 Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, p. 5.
304 Economic theory distinguishes three types of goods: search, experience and
credence goods. While the quality of some products (‘search goods’) can be
determined prior to purchase and asymmetric information on a good’s
characteristics can be eliminated before consumption takes place by paying a
search cost, others (‘experience goods’), including almost all types of services
and technologically more complex products, can be evaluated only in the
process of receipt, use, or consumption. In some cases (‘credence goods’), the
quality is known only years later or cannot even be established after
consumption at all. See, e.g. Ogus, Regulation, p. 132-133; den Hertog, General
Theories of Regulation, p. 228-9); Noll, Comparing Quality Signals as Tools of
Consumer Protection, p. 228); Rubin, Information Regulation (incl. Regulation
of Advertising), p. 277.
305 It is often difficult to observe the quality of a software product before
purchase. As Juergen Noll notes in Comparing Quality Signals as Tools of
Consumer Protection, p. 228, that identifies product quality as experience
property.
306 Whereas some dimensions of quality, such as reliability and durability, can
be objectively determined, others involve a high degree of subjectivity and
some are visible only after some time.  Some of the quality aspects of security
cannot be determined even after consumption or can be assessed only with
highly sophisticated technical help, since security related vulnerabilities typically
are not visible in the functionality of the program and testing cannot show the
absence of vulnerabilities (it can only show that there are defects). Thus, parts
of the quality and security characteristics of products belong to the credence
category.
First, consumers are unable to determine quality and security before
purchase because software as an information product is essentially
an experience good, as pointed out by Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian303,
similar to the complex information systems that are possibly
networked304. Its quality is an experience characteristic305, and the
quality aspects of security even a credence characteristic306. Second,
more secure and higher quality products cost more to produce than
lower quality, as has been noted several times above. The third, and
last, condition according to which there cannot be a credible way for
a firm to guarantee quality requires a wider analysis.
The importance of this analysis stems from the notion that to the
degree the last of the three conditions is met, i.e., whether or not there
are credible ways for firms to guarantee quality aspect of security in
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307 The underlying condition that alternatives exist in the market is assumed and
extensively experienced in the software component market even in relation to
operating systems. Variety in products and vendors is increasing.
308 Note that this is the sharp distinction between the above notion of sellers
having strong incentives to provide adequate information. This incentive exists
only if there is some way for consumers to check on the claims of the sellers. If
the lemons problem can be solved, sellers of higher than average quality
products will have incentives to reveal information about their products
quality. Consumers may then assume that any product which does not disclose
quality is of below average quality, and the informational problem is solved.
(Rubin, Information Regulation (incl. Regulation of Advertising), p. 281).
309 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 288.
their software products, then the market mechanism may break down.
This will happen because no firm will be able to convincingly promise
high quality items. As a result consumers cannot be sure of obtaining
the higher quality and so will not pay the higher price for quality items.
Thus, even though consumers would be willing to pay a higher price
in order to obtain quality, there will not be an effective way in which
this desire can be satisfied.307
 
Convincing communication of quality and lemons market. The lemons
problem identified by Akerlof exists only if firms cannot convincingly
communicate to consumers the level of quality in their products308.
If firms can produce high quality products and convince consumers
that they are doing so, then the market failure disappears. In most
cases informational asymmetries can be corrected by the mechanism
of voluntary exchange and, as Hugh Collins notes, “[t]he absence of
any regulation of quality would therefore not lead to the widespread
supply of defective products and shoddy services”309. However,
whether this happens in relation to the security of software requires
a more detailed analysis.
There are several means by which vendors can convincingly
communicate the level of quality in their products and thus correct
the market failure by themselves. Typical examples are reputation,
advertising and other voluntary information provision by the vendor
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310 Guarantees, reputation and licensing were identified already in 1970 by
Akerlof in The Market for “Lemons”, p. 499-450, as institutions counteracting
the effect of quality uncertainty. Anthony Ogus in Regulation, p. 133, explain
these mechanisms in general terms in his extensive analysis of governmental
regulation from the economic perspective.
311 Noll, Comparing Quality Signals as Tools of Consumer Protection, p. 228.
312 The general argument about the false claims as a form of information failure
is made, e.g., by Beales et al. in The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, p. 505-6.
(e.g. in terms of test results), and warranties to guarantee the quality
of the product310. 
It has to be stressed that the means of vendors to communicate
the level of quality in their products (such as reputation, advertising,
warranties etc.), and thus to correct the informational market failure
voluntarily do not apply to credence characteristics of products and
are unnecessary for search goods311. This means that these measures
are necessary and effective only in relation to the experience
characteristics of software security. This already limits the applicability
of these remedies in relation to most security related vulnerabilities
that are at the core of this study, due to them being credence
characteristics of software.
Advertisements constitute the most obvious method of
communicating quality information but, as already discussed, under
the situation where customers lack the means to verify the correctness
of the claims as is the case in relation to software vulnerabilities to
a large degree especially due to credence characteristics of the
vulnerability information, the opportunity to disseminate false or
misleading information or withholding negative information seems
profitable in the short run312. Only when the quality and security
information is easily controllable, which is not the case with the quality
aspect of security as discussed above, can the customers expect to
get truthful quality and security information. Thus, advertising and
other general information sharing by industry is not a likely means
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313 Not even competitors might have sufficient incentive to intervene in unfair
marketing practices. This is especially so when they share the same negative
attribute (vulnerability of software) or are subject to externalities like the
benefits from corrected customer beliefs that have to be shared with other
competitors and are thus inadequately internalised by the intervening
competitor, or like the increased customer belief that a proportion of security
claims are false that harms the industry in general. (Beales et al., The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, p. 506)
314 Esther Gal-Or and Anindya Ghose make this argument in The Economic
Consequences of Sharing Security Information, p. 3.
315 Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, p. 527.
316 I.e, competition over vulnerability reduces the sale of the whole COTS
industry, instead of enhancing the sale of certain software brand inside it.
317 This argument in general is made, e.g., by Beales et al., The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, p. 503-4.
of correcting the informational asymmetries related to the quality
aspect of security313.
General voluntary disclosure of security information is further
hampered by the possible spillovers which result in positive
externalities for the industry as a whole. This is so especially in relation
to the customer confidence aspect; enhanced customer trust in
transacting with a particular firm also expands the overall market size
within the industry314. Seller-provided information creates externalities
that can lead to an undersupply of general information. In particular,
advertising that provides positive general information about all brands
in a product class benefits every brand, not simply the one generating
the information. In such as case, the disclosing firm’s competitors
will share in the benefits as free riders315.  Advertising that provides
negative general information about a product class is likely to reduce
the sales of each firm316 and possibly benefit the sales of substitute
products, thus reducing the incentive of any single seller to provide
this information.317
The willingness of a firm to spend money on advertising as such,
without necessarily offering information, can in itself also be a signal
of the quality of the product. The economic argument is that
advertising is worthwhile only if it leads to repeat sales for experience
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318 Advertising as a signal of product quality has been analysed in the law and
economics literature, e.g., by Paul H. Rubin in Information Regulation (incl.
Regulation of Advertising), p. 278-279, and Juergen Noll in Comparing Quality
Signals as Tools of Consumer Protection, p. 229.
319 This does not apply in relation to one-off transactions; but even here,
reputation may have a value when recommendations are made by friends or
relatives as noted by Anthony Ogus in Regulation, p. 133.
320 See Noll, Comparing Quality Signals as Tools of Consumer Protection, p.
229-230, for the general argument.
goods. Firms can expect repeat sales only if the product is of
sufficiently high quality. Therefore the investments in advertising
signal to the market that the firm expects repeat sales because it
believes that its products are of high quality. Same line of
argumentation applies also to investments in establishing trademarks
and brand names, and also in physical assets, such as signs and
décor.318
Reputation, which is largely connected to the above mentioned
investments on capital and advertising, that will be lost if the firm
goes out of business, as such can serve as an indicator of quality. A
firm selling low-quality products at high-quality prices will soon
acquire a bad reputation and be excluded from the market. Consumers
may, over time, also accumulate trust in the quality of a particular
firm’s output or a particular brand name. With the desire to preserve
goodwill, it will be in the interest of the supplier or brand
manufacturer to maintain quality319. But the reputation mechanism
is workable only if the product is an experience good, i.e. that buyers
can find out the quality and security of the product after buying it.
As has been argued, this is not the case with the credence
characteristics like quality aspect of security. Even when the buyers
can find out the quality and security of the product after buying it,
reputation adjustment only rewards quality upgrading with a time lag,
which means that firms will not provide so high quality as with under
perfect information. Therefore, despite being necessary in certain
surroundings, reputation is an unreliable indicator of the quality aspect
of security.320
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321 This argument is made, e.g., by Ogus in Regulation, p. 133 and Beales et al. in
The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,  p. 511.
322 Note that industrial buyers have at least a theoretical possibility to buy better
guarantees and to negotiate requirements for secure development into the
agreement with the consequence of needing to pay more for the software at
the same time. Without any empirical facts one can only assume that the price
charged for the software sold with security guarantees would be extensively
higher than its list price. Whether industrial buyers would be likely to buy
better guarantees if they do not perceive the vulnerability issue as an important
factor in purchasing decisions is a matter of empirical study that still, to my
knowledge, remains unanswered. In addition, high transaction costs in mass-
marketed COTS software products at least diminishes, if not prevents
altogether, also the possibility for industrial buyers to settle warranties
individually.
Contractual terms, such as product warranties or even money back
guarantees, maybe more reliable signal of quality. They partially
indemnify the buyer against the possibility that lack of information
leads to making a wrong choice. In addition to this insurance effect,
such contractual terms may as such signal of the quality of the product
since warranties and money back guarantees are cheaper to provide
if product failures seldom occur.321
However, warranties are almost inexistent in software markets.
Software vendors assume no liability and try to avoid giving any
warranties (not that even of merchantability, fitness for purpose or
any alike) by standard licensing provisions322. The justifications wary
but the essential point is that unlike traditional commodities, defects
in software are likely to exist in every copy sold, thus making the
compensation or repair especially expensive. Disclaimance is a routine
despite the threat of suspicion towards vendors lack of care of
software quality and security being fed and the confidence into the
quality of the software products possibly being eroded by disclaimers
of warranties with which the products may well comply. Even in cases
where warranties still exist despite of the software licences, the
incentives for their enforcement are still reduced since the likelihood
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323 It is worth pointing out that in cases where warranties are based on
extensively on law, as in consumer law, their informational value for the
customer and the signalling value for the producers are diminished (Noll 2003,
p. 219-231).
324 Even though this try-before-you-by characteristic makes software more
transparent, it also easily leads to users not paying for the software.
325 These information provision mechanisms have been analysed by J. Bradford
DeLong and A. Michael Froomkin in Speculative Microeconomics for
Tomorrow's Economy, heading “The Market for Software: Shareware, Public
Betas and More”. Newest development in the correction of the transparency
problem is open source that possibly can also be beneficial for security. Note
that its main function is not to provide information for users since only a
possibility to derive security information from the source code is enabled.
Instead it constitutes a method of developing software and ideological
approaches to software markets.
of successful litigation is decreased and the claims often cannot be
enforced because of the global nature of the market323.
In addition to trials, typically used in marketing of more traditional
goods, there are special ways for the vendors to provide information
about the functionalities of the program. The logic in shareware,
allowing interested persons to download the full program, is that if
they like it they would send its author some money, and perhaps in
return you get a manual, access to support, and/or an upgraded
version324. The public beta is a time-limited (or bug-ridden, or
otherwise restricted) version of the product. It allows users to
investigate the properties of the public beta version to figure out
whether the product is worthwhile. But to get the permanent (or the
less bug-ridden) version, they have to pay. A similar method is the
free provision of lesser version of programs and making advanced
version chargeable.325 
These methods enable the possible purchaser to familiarise with
the experience characteristics before purchase and lower the costs
of finding information about the software. Even though competition
through distribution of lesser versions of the ultimate product as such
is a relatively benign development, they are not providing information
about the security (excluding observable security features). In addition,
as argued above, the first-to-market competition (which partly explains
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326 This is a matter of controversy. People tend to assert that they are
concerned with privacy and security and are willing to even pay for it.
However, their behaviour does not always agree. For wider discussion, see the
analysis of Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags in Losses, Gains, and
Hyperbolic Discounting, from 2003. However, the general assumption goes in
favour of buyers’ readiness to pay for increased security and higher quality.
Many of the arguments by security professionals that consumers lack the
interest in investing into information security are explained by the asymmetry
in the information or the simple lack of it.
this development since these methods to provide information can
be ways to introduce products to the markets earlier) can mean that
the security of these lesser versions is not necessarily increasing. At
least, these methods to provide information do not correct the
informational asymmetries in relation to quality and security of the
‘final’ product. They are efficient only in separating the features that
the product contains – not their quality or security. In addition they
can possibly be detrimental for security since they not only provide
no incentive to develop secure and high quality software but can also
provide opposite incentives.
In sum, it would be irrational behaviour of customers to prefer
to buy more expensive software because vendor’s claims of higher
quality and security cannot be verified. The claims of quality and
security may be right when made, but the customer cannot judge them.
According to economic models of customer behaviour, they should
and will decide to buy the cheaper product that may or may not be
of lower quality and security. So, even though consumers would be
willing to pay higher prices for high quality and more secure systems
and components326, in lemons market only low quality items are sold.
Making purchasing decision for secure systems under imperfect
information increases the level of uncertainty regarding the benefits
of using more secure systems. This is a disincentive to invest in
security and distorts the market. Because it takes significant time and
energy to extract the information needed to permit rational decisions,
the buyer commonly faces a choice between new, unevaluated
products or systems that perform better, but have uncertain security
properties, and older products with better known properties but
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327 Schneider, Trust in Cyberspace, p. 184 and 251. Limited actual experience
with losses from security incidents also tends to discourage investments in
trustworthiness, even though there currently are more estimates on the actual
and potential losses available.
328 See footnote 238 and accompanying text.
329 On misperception in general, see MacKaay, Economics of Information and Law,
p. 166-169.
poorer performance. Due to the uncertainty, buyers prefer to purchase
greater functionality rather than to invest in improved security.327
In addition to the above provided historical explanations on why
buyers are so approving in relation to the vulnerabilities in software328,
a partial explanation is provided by an informational market failure
that affects the relevant commodity market called misperception329.
Security related vulnerabilities, typically a credence characteristic in
software (i.e. they cannot be appropriately assessed even after
consumption or only a long time after that when, e.g., an attack
occurs), and especially their exploitation or seriousness tend to be
misestimated due to the small probabilities involved. This results in
buyers believing they have made optimal choices, while objectively
by their own standards they have not. 
Due to this misperception the consumer demand is insufficient
to persuade the vendors to assume such an uncertain cost that might
be high due to vulnerabilities existing in every copy, even though the
vulnerabilities are a statistical fact to the vendors as they deal in large
numbers. As a consequence, the demand in the market, which reflects
the aggregate of individual preferences, will not represent the optimal
quality of the software. 
The reason why buyers as a group have not for long insisted on
having information on the problem or on shifting the risk to the
producer is that the experience feedback on which most purchasers
rely to decide whether risks are worth bothering with suggest that
they are not. The awareness of vulnerabilities and the subsequent costs
have for long not been high enough to warrant action. In addition,
the reason why the collected information on the disruptive
consequences and high costs of vulnerabilities, which there is
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330 As noted also at the policy level in Europe by the Commission in its
communication on the proposal for a European policy approach to network
and information security (COM(2001) 298 final, p. 14).
significant reluctance to report, has not lead to autonomous market
correction either through safer products or through independent
accident insurance is that the cases have been considered as risk of
doing e-business. This is especially so because protective action by
the purchaser, e.g. in terms of firewalls, virus-scanners or other
defensive or offensive information security products, significantly
can reduce the risk.
Partly consequently to these, software vendors have a higher
incentive to offer new features than greater security330. The benefits
of the new attractive features are visible to the purchasers, but the
risks are not due to the lack of information and the capability to
understand it. There is no need to compete on security grounds, since
the consumers do not know to demand it or do not know to evaluate
secure and vulnerable products. Since the buying public has no way
to differentiate real security from bad security, the way to win in this
marketplace, just lightly overstating, is to design software that is as
insecure as you can possibly get away with. Secure systems, that are
harder, slower, and more expensive, both to design and to implement,
do not have a chance. Not only are new features overriding increased
security and causing security stay at the same level, but also the quality
and security of products is not enhancing (especially due information
asymmetry) as the Akerlof’s theory of ‘lemons market’ suggests. 
It has to be stressed again in here that merely finding that buyers lack
certain information does not imply that governmental or any other
type of regulation is directly needed. Even though vulnerability
information is not readily available from another source and firms
do not have their own incentives to disclose whenever disclosure
would be useful, which means that the case for required disclosure
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331 The need for requiring disclosure in general, as explained by Howard Beales,
Richard Craswell and Steven C. Salop in The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, p. 527, in their comprehensive review of mandatory
disclosure from 1981, depends on the completeness of the total information
environment and seller’s incentives to disclose voluntarily.
332 This point is made more generally by Beales et al. in The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information,  p. 510
333 In situations where only the effectiveness or operating costs of the software
product depends upon quality, it is not clear that welfare is greatest in a regime
where consumers are informed before they purchase as argued more generally
in economic theory by Steven Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite in Quality
Testing and Disclosure, p. 330. Releasing quality information may only cause
the price of a product to be positively correlated with its quality. 
is strong331, the information might, however, be so expensive to
produce that it is not efficient to provide it or it might be of little value
to consumers332. 
Information about the security and quality of software is, however,
of high value not only for organisational buyers but also for
individuals. Lack of it can lead to serious hazards for safety and
produce significant economic losses as the virus incidents alone have
shown. The fact that software vulnerabilities make the whole
information infrastructure vulnerable and involve negative
externalities, thus eroding the trust required for the e-commerce and
e-administration to bloom, is enough to show the societal desirability
of more secure software. The social value of vulnerability information
exceeds the costs of information333.
Since it is socially desirable to have the information about the
quality aspects of security available in the markets despite the fact
that it might be expensive to produce this information, the relevant
question is which of the parties have better access to vulnerability
information by the means of testing and whether or not that party
is incited to acquire vulnerability information and not only to disclose
it. In the case of software security, there is no doubt that the vendors
have a better access to quality and security information by the means
of testing. Customers’ lack of experience and inability to perform
many of the testing procedures has already been shown above. And
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334 See, e.g., Ogus, Regulation, p. 133; Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, p. 511-512; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 43.
Regulatory theory explains that the case for disclosure regulation is weak
where, as a consequence of market competition, producers have an incentive
to disclose relevant information voluntarily. This is the case especially in
relation to ‘search goods’ or ‘search characteristics’ of goods, particularly if
there is a significant number of discriminating consumers purchasing at the
margin. In relation to ‘experience goods’ the incentive is weaker, but even here,
producers will often have large investments in a brand name and they will not
want to lose the goodwill attached to it. The protection of trademarks, for
example, is based largely on the belief that distinctive trademarks make it easier
for consumers to develop a body of information (largely from their own
experience) about individual brands, thus rewarding sellers whose brands
achieve a good reputation and penalizing those sellers whose brands do not as
argued by Beales et al. in The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
p. 493. Voluntary disclosure is least likely in relation to ‘credence goods’,
because for reasons of competition, sellers will not be motivated to refer to
negative qualities, particularly when the risk of injuries is so remote that
consumers will be unable to establish a tort claim for product liability. (Ogus,
Regulation, p. 134)
In relation to search characteristics, consumers can immediately determine if
the good possesses the advertised characteristic, and cannot be deceived.
Moreover, since this is so and firms understand that it is so, there is no
incentive for deceptive advertising with respect to these characteristics. For
inexpensive goods, there is little cost to deception with respect to experience
characteristics. The consumer will be deceived at most one time with respect to
such goods, and therefore in general losses will be small. This means that
regulators ought to concentrate on relatively expensive experience goods and
particularly on credence goods. (Rubin, Information Regulation (incl.
Regulation of Advertising), p. 278)
it is not just about access to source code. It is about access to the
scarce and expensive experts who can test for security and about the
shift of expertise in software development away from user
organisation. This makes the case for disclosure rules that also
encourage testing by the vendors favourable.
In short, severe informational asymmetries disrupt markets so
much that a social optimum in secure software development cannot
be achieved by voluntary exchange. In such a situation, an intervention
outside the market (e.g., by a government or by any other regulator)
might be an option as regulatory theory informed with the economic
analysis of the law suggests334.  
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335 A deeper analytic isolation of the ways regulation affects behaviour would
require one to make a detailed and systematic study into the wide discussions
in a variety of disciplines that have an interest in the ways regulation affects
behaviour. Much has been said about the influence mechanisms of regulation
or rules in general from the perspectives of economics, sociology, psychology,
philosophy and legal theory. Going through all this literature is, however,
outside the scope of this study and hopefully subject the forthcoming studies.
The approach is somewhat eclectic by necessity.
336 The uncertainty exists even for the guidance mechanisms of the most widely
studied tool of regulation, i.e., the law, as has been emphasised, for example, in
the Nordic discussion on legislative theory by Hellner, Lagstiftning inom
förmögenhetsrätten, p. 164.
3 The way regulation affects behaviour
In the earlier chapter, the point of view has been that of computer
and information system scientists, software engineers and practitioners
of information security and especially the secure software development
part of it. The main concern has been on what information security
is, how it operates and is affected by the business models and market
structures. Understanding of the business models, the ways software
and information systems are developed together with the environment
where it is done is crucial if we want to understand how it might be
possible to influence the behaviour of the actors.
Now we can turn to the issues how regulation guides behaviour.
The effort is to try to slightly open the veil covering the influence
mechanisms of regulation. The intention is not to give a
comprehensive overview of the ways regulation affects behaviour335.
The uncertainty in the guidance mechanisms largely remains336. In
order to understand the regulatory capability of an instrument one
needs to understand (at some level) the mechanisms by which the
instrument causes effects. Only the main ways regulation affects
behaviour are made explicit in here; not all of them. There might be,
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337 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 3.
338 At the same time this explains why lawyers tend to be overly optimistic in
their belief about the influence of the law on behaviour (of this optimism, see
Mathiesen, Rätten i samhället, p. 158). Claes Sandgren, Professor of Private law
at the Department of Law of the University of Stockholm, provides an
explanation in Om empiri och rättsvetenskap, p. 739-740 (with reference to
Torstein Eckhoff (1985) Empiriske metoder i rettsvitenskapen, in Rationalitet
och empiri, Juridiska fakulteten if Stockholm, Skriftserien nro. 6, p. 32-35): since
lawyers generally tend to overemphasise the norm-orientation of people and, as
a consequence, to build their analyses on unreliable premises and preconceived
impressions on the effects of laws on behaviour, they are keen to believing that
laws have their intended effects. In other words, traditional jurisprudence
concentrates on deliberate law-making and does not put emphasis on the
effects of laws that are not aimed at. In doing so it overestimates the power of
law as a means for social engineering as Mark Van Hoecke points out in Law as
Communication, p. 4, with reference to Summer RS (1977) Naïve
Instrumentalism and the Law, in Hacker PMS and Raz J (eds.) Law, Morality
and Society. Essays in Honour of HLA Hart, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 119-131.
and certainly are, a variety of other influence mechanisms and the
ones presented here could be conceptualised differently.
This normative analysis of the ways regulation affects behaviour
and of the instruments used is instrumental for the main purpose of
this study, i.e., the analysis of the capacities of two most widely called
for regulatory instruments for solving problems in  secure software
development. At the same time it is the second main line of
argumentation in this study. The heuristic devices for the analysis of
the ways regulation influences behaviour are provided in this section.
3.1  By providing reasons for action
According to the law and economic scholars’ correct criticism,
traditional legal analysis has little means beside intuition and available
facts to study the effects of laws337. This is partly because the doctrinal
legal education grounded in descriptive legal scholarship gives a limited
understanding of the ways the law influences behaviour338. Not even
the normative guidance provided by law is clear and interest in the
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339 The way the law influences behaviour of ordinary citizens has not been
subject to great interest even in legal theory. The concentration is typically on
judicial decision-making, especially by judges, and on the way regulation
influences their decision-making. Even though many of the consideration are
derived from general theory of action that is applicable more generally, legal
theory has mostly concentrated on applying it to judicial decision-making. Not
even the creation of law by the legislator has been of much  interest in legal
theory due to the separation of law and politics in the mainstream legal
thinking as Luc Wintgens, Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, p. 3,
argues in a recent effort to apply the tools of legal theory to legislative
problems. Extreme concentration on adjudication in legal scholarship has been
criticised already in the 1970s as Luc Wintgens points out in Legislation as an
Object of Study of Legal Theory: Legisprudence, p. 9.
The understanding of the ways regulation affect behaviour is crucial, however,
also for legal scholarship. According to the basic premise of the economic
approach to law, which is also shared by the scholars in other behavioural
sciences like sociology and political science, the nature of legal institutions
cannot be understood by limiting the consideration to the legal arguments
alone. It is essential to consider as well what effects those institutions have on
society and what reactions they will evoke from the citizens as result. This
argument has also been made in relation to the economics of information by
Ejan Mackaay in Economics of Information and Law, p. 4.
340 Even though this assumption of mechanical obedience of the law lies in the
background of many positivist approaches to the study of law, it has to be
noted that not all positivist general theories of the law presume this. As
pointed out by Ruth Gavison in Comment: Legal Theory and the Role of
Rules, footnote 103 and accompanying text, positivist legal theoreticians have
held a variety of positions on the obligation to obey the law. For example,
Joseph Raz in The Authority of Law, p. 233-250, argues that there is no general
obligation to obey the law.
issue is scarce outside legal theory339. This emphasises even further
in relation to the wider aspect of regulation.
The inadequacy of the hierarchical, top-down commanding model,
according to which the objects of regulation follow the orders of the
regulator (possibly backed by sanctions) in a uniform and predictable
way is obvious despite the fact that it is still widely used in the studies
on the effects of legislation and a general assumption made by legal
scholars when they consider the effects of laws340. Behaviour
modification that is associated with the activity of ensuring compliance
with rules through strategies of enforcement (i.e., being accompanied
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341 To treat the law as an incentive for changing behaviour (implicit prices) is
the core of law and economics and the most praised, and the least
contradictory, part of the economic analysis of the law. Similar analysis can be
applied, and have been applied, also to the regulation more widely. The
arguments developed in these studies, which are collected in scholarly books
on regulation, are used to analyse the effects of specific instruments when
available.
342 For example, the effects of sanctions and private law remedies on behaviour
are analysed like the effects of prices.
343 This is emphasised by Ejan Mackaay in his analysis of the economics of
information and law (Economics of Information and Law, p. 4 especially endnote 10
with references to Posner). The problems of sociological studies in providing
even a somewhat comprehensive model of the effects of laws has been
addressed by one of the most influential Nordic sociolegal scholars Vilhelm
Aubert in Rettens sosiale funksjon, p. 164.
with deterrent effects) goes a little further, but not much. A better
understanding is needed in order to study the effects of regulation.
But neither is economics the silver bullet that explains the ways
regulation affects behaviour. When analysing the effects of regulation
the standard economic principles and assumptions about human
behaviour used in the economic approach to law have to be lowered
to the same level with arguments from other disciplines. The argument
is not that the law and economic type of behaviour prediction is not
valid341. Empowered with the simple assumption that legal
consequences (e.g., sanctions, rewards, liability, remedies) affect the
implicit prices of actions342, and accompanied with the mathematically
precise theories (price theory and game theory) and empirically sound
methods of economics (statistics and econometrics), the law-and-
economics studies have been able to predict how people respond to
changes in laws. It might be true that the economics provides a single
best, even moderately comprehensive, theory of regulatory phenomena
(especially legal) and human behaviour from which verifiable
propositions can derived and that empirical studies tend to support343.
As a method it is the most advanced and tested way of predicting the
effects of regulation on behaviour and it has provided several
important insights about the ways regulation influences behaviour.
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344 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 7. This means that I do not tie myself down to
normative law-and-economics which holds that legal norms must be formed in
a way that maximum economic efficiency is fulfilled. The analysis of the effects
of regulation is not the sole factor from which behavioural norms or
justifications for their improvement are derived. However, in the descriptive
sense law-and-economics can produce information about the effects of
regulation that is useful in the evaluation of positive valid norms and different
regulatory choices. A leading Finnish private law scholar Mika Hemmo in
Vahingonkorvauksen sovittelu ja moderni korvausoikeus, p. 25-32, makes similar
considerations in analysing the reliability of the information provided by law-
and-economics research in revising tort doctrines.
345 Economics as a discipline has admitted its need to widen the basis for
analysing human behaviour. The typical account of the standard economic
principles according to which the economic approach to law analysis legal
rules, i.e., that all human behaviour can be viewed as involving participants
who maximise their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets, is
currently being modified under the banner of behavioural law and economics
in order to be able to “model and predict behaviour relevant to law with the
above mentioned tools of economic analysis, but with more accurate
assumptions about human behaviour, and more accurate predictions and
prescriptions about law” (Jolls et al., A Behavioural Approach to Law and
Economics, p. 1474 and 1476). With the insights from other disciplines about
actual human behaviour currently being internalised into the economic
approach, it is likely to be even a more useful tool for regulatory analysis.
But we are not concerned with the prediction of behaviour as such
in this study. The analysis concerns more widely the ways regulation
influences behaviour and the possibilities it has to guide behaviour
related to the specific topic of secure software development. The quest
for the ways regulation affects behaviour is even more interdisciplinary
than law and economics. Economics is just a heuristic device in
analysing the ways regulation affects behaviour, not a comprehensive
method, as Hugh Collins has emphasised in his regulatory analysis
of contracts and contracting344. In order to be able to comprehend
the efficacy of regulation on this specific topic, the disciplinary basis
has to be widened345. Overall, results and observations utilised in this
study come from disciplines like political science, sociology,
economics, policy analysis (especially implementation and evaluation
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346 The necessary multidisciplinary approach in regulatory studies in general is
emphasised by Baldwin and Cave in their basic study book Understanding
Regulation, p. 1. Despite the usage of interdisciplinary material in this study, i.e.,
the adoption of a more external point of view to regulation that is more
interested in the interaction between the regulation and the social practice that
it seeks to alter, the internal aspect of the law that the legal scholarship employs
plays an important role. The internal aspect to law and regulation is necessary
to see how those functioning inside the regulatory system think about the
social practices under regulation and how regulatory objectives are defined and
implemented. This dimension is important for any critical assessment of the
potential efficacy of regulation. The internal functioning of the regulatory
system and the considerations of those functioning inside centrally shapes the
effects regulation can have and influences its efficacy.
347 This has been presented as a starting point in studies about legislation or
theory of legislation such as Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 16 and 286, in basic
textbooks on sociolegal studies such as Mathiesen, Rätten i samhället, p. 30, and
in political studies and especially studies on policy tools such as Schneider and
Ingram, Behavioural Assumptions of Policy Tools, p. 513-514, or Daintith,
Law as Policy Instrument, p. 28. This is also the typical approach of legal
philosophy and legal theory as explicated, e.g., by MacCormick,On Legal
Decisions and their Consequences, p. 254, when he reminds us that “the law
and rulings in law … are grounds for choice by people, and how people will
choose to respond is always in some degree an open question”.
studies), legal theory, philosophy, management studies, software
engineering, and information systems science346.
However, the path taken in economic analysis is correct; the
concentration on the decision-making of small groups, such as
individuals and firms. But there is no reason to adhere solely to the
price theory or even to economics more generally. It is a widely
accepted assumption in societal studies in law and regulation, that
the effects are always caused by the actions of the objects of regulation
(individuals, corporations, associations, institutions) that make the
final decision to react (or not) to a specific regulation, or to redirect
their actions or beliefs in the intended way (intended by the
regulator)347. Regulation affects through the decisions and choices,
either conscious or unconscious, made by its objects.
This means that a regulator can try to alter the behaviour of the
addressees only by influencing their choices or desires in a decision-
making process, in their practical deliberation (reasoning) on what
to do or not to do. Regulation can only provide reasons for action
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348 Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. 128, makes this point in his philosophical
examination of rule-based decision-making, while analysing the means by
which prescriptive weight is added to the process of decision-making and how
much difference does it make. 
349 After all, calculated and negotiated non-compliance are common
phenomena as pointed out by Terence Daintith in Law as Policy Instrument, p.
29, in relation to the economic sphere in his introductory essay to a larger
collection of studies on the instruments used in the implementation of
economic policy and the role of law as an instrument for implementation. This
holds at least for the user perspective into the law explicated, e.g., by Hydén in
Rättsregler, p. 22-23, as separated from the perspective of the judges and
regulators more generally, the perspective used in legal education, whose
conduct might be more constrained by the law and the rulings in law. The user
of the law, i.e., the object of regulation, looks at the reality and her position in
it, and concentrates on what the valid law means for her economic or social
action. The focus is on the consequences that the law is expected to have on
the practiced area. The law is a strategic variable that sometimes leaves more or
less discretionary power. Basically, the law is seen a risk that has to be managed
on the basis of some type of more or less conscious cost-benefit calculation.
350 This has been explicated, e.g., by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, p. 124.
351 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 281.
or inaction (i.e., incentives); an individual can always choose not to
comply with the provision and to suffer the consequences. As
Frederick Schauer notes, “…the way in which and the extent to which,
if at all, rules become a part of a decisional process is ultimately
determined by the decision-maker alone”348. There are differences
in the level of discretion included in the regulation, but in the end,
the individual always makes the final decision349.
Philosophy of law provides an explanation of the way legal norms
guide behaviour. In the traditional understanding, legal norms guide
behaviour by providing and communicating a general standard of
conduct that makes it possible for the addressees to evaluate their
behaviour in a specific situation without further direction350. However,
as Raz points out, not even the recognition that standards provided
by regulation serve as basis for evaluation for individuals when they
make decisions on how to act clarifies the way the guiding function
is performed351. Neither does it distinguish between the various modes
in which the law can and does guide behaviour. According to Joseph
Raz the only way in which laws can guide behaviour is by adding to
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352 Raz in On the Functions of Law, p. 281-283, provides this explanation as an
adjustment and a clarification to the traditional legal theoretic view of how a
legal norms guide behaviour. 
353 As pointed out by Redondo in Reasons for Action and the Law, p. 1, in studying
on the various roles the notion of reason for action plays in jurisprudence,
some of the most prominent contributions to the concerns in contemporary
philosophy about the idea of law-imposed duty and its relevance for action,
such as Hart, Raz and von Wright, have their starting point the notion of
“reason for action”. According to them, the concept of reason is a necessary
element for understanding the relationship between norm and action. Note
that the very idea of a reason for action has generated an enormous literature
in philosophy as pointed out by Schauer in Playing by the Rules, p. 112, with
extensive references. By no means can I drawn on this literature in depth. This
is left for further studies.
354 As Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. 8, points out in a philosophical
examination of rule-based decision-making, the force of rules in pressuring
behaviour comes from the sanctions (positive or negative) that attach to
following or violating rules, or from attitudes about rules held by the objects of
regulation. Schauer concentrates not only on legal rules, but on regulative rules
in general, be they used by formal institutions like churches and associations,
or less formal social practices like morality and etiquette (Schauer, Playing by the
Rules, p. 12).
By concentrating on the consequences attached to actions by regulation, I take
a more restrictive approach than Schauer to the analysis of the ways in which
regulation provides reasons for action. Not only punishment and reward affect
the natural consequences of actions the additional consequences
provided by the law352. These additional consequences affect the
reasons for or against the performance of the actions353. 
By applying this approach to regulation more widely we can see
that regulation guides behaviour by communicating that consequences
follow upon the performance of certain actions. The regulation makes
the consideration of the consequences relevant to the desirability of
the actions bringing them about. Basically the regulation provides
additional reasons for performing or abstaining from certain actions
that, at the same time, are incentives for the object of regulation to
behave in a certain manner. When people make decisions to perform
or abstain from certain action they now not only have to consider
the natural consequences of their actions but also the additional
consequences provided by the regulation.354
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the reasons for action for Schauer, even though he does recognise their
importance for most decision-makers; also other prudential considerations, like
the role of rules as serving an important role in decisional simplification or the
role of rules as providing reasons for action by virtue of the decision-maker’s
distrust of her own capacities with respect to some family of decisions, and
moral considerations, like the arguments for taking a rule to be a reason for
action stemming from agreement with and willingness to cooperate in the
system from which the rule emanates (e.g., the solution of Prisoner’s Dilemma
or coordination problems), can influence individuals decision to treat an
applicable rule as a reason action (Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. 123-126).
However, as Schauer notes in Playing by the Rules, p. 123, by extending the
consideration above sanctions and rewards, he adopts the perspective of the
objects of regulation. Since these considerations are not provided by the rules
themselves, they are excluded from the normative analysis in order to be able
to see how normative guidance communicates itself into the behaviour of the
objects of regulation.
355 According to this incentive approach, which is often studied as the opposite
of traditional command-and-control regulation, the objects of regulation can
be induced to behave in accordance with the public interest by the regulator
imposing negative or positive taxes, or by deploying grants and subsidies from
the public purse. (Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 41-42)
356 Note the similarity to the economic analysis of the law. The mechanisms are
basically the same. Different consequences generate different reasons for
action similar to different prices providing different incentives for behaviour.
Only the consequences attached to action by regulation are widened.
Even though the conception of regulation (especially the law) as
an incentive for changing behaviour is used especially and most
forcefully in law and economics (implicit prices), and in regulatory
studies in relation to the instruments that provide economic
incentives355, it is applicable, and have for long been used, more widely.
Regulation (and especially law) as an instrument of public or private
policy is built in the conception of regulation causing an effect on
the behaviour of its addressees; regulation can be used to achieve
certain desired goals. When the effects are caused through the
decisions and choices of an object of regulation, what regulation can
do is to provide reasons for action or inaction (i.e., either negative
or positive incentives)356. It is not only economic incentives that the
law or regulation provides; they provide reasons for performing or
abstaining from a certain action in general.
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357 The argument that rules often function as a reason for a person to act in
some way is generally accepted in legal theory as pointed out by Mark Van
Hoecke in Law as Communication, p. 76.
358 Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 17-19, argues that mandatory rules generated by
authorities are protected reasons for action, that is, a combination of first-order
reasons for action that directly affect or refer to actions (i.e., claim that one
should act in conformity with them), and exclusionary second-order reasons
for not relying on considerations excluded by the rule. As Michael S. Moore
explicates in Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, p. 849, while discussing the
central presupposition of Raz’s theory of authority and law of the kinds of
reasons for action that authoritative legal norms give, second-order reasons are
reasons for acting for reasons, whereas first-order reasons are simply reasons
for acting.
359 In legal theory, as pointed out by Redondo in Reasons for Action and the Law,
p. 97, the way the law affects behaviour and especially the notion of reason for
action is subject to a debate that is the heart of the discussion of the three
central ideas of legal theory, i.e., the normativity of legal provisions that
regulate behaviour, acceptance as a condition for the existence of a legal
system, and the justification of legal decisions.
360 Similar to Schauer in Playing by the Rules, p. 112 footnote 1, I try to avoid
taking unnecessary positions with respect to the nature of reasons for action.
Since I widen the use of the notion of reason for action to the
regulation in general, I commit myself at this stage only to the least
restrictive understanding of this notion. I accept that regulations can
provide new reasons for action357. I say nothing about their capability
to exclude other reasons for action. I do understand that the difference
in whether rules in general and the law especial is conceived as
providing special reasons for action (protected reasons for action in
the sense made explicit by Joseph Raz358) or only as providing
additional first-order reasons for action, is genuine and important
for the theories that explain the central themes of legal theory359.
However, since my interest lies simply in the basic assumption these
theories hold, i.e., their starting point in that the law can influence
behaviour only by providing reasons for action, I do not go deeper
into the wide theoretical discussion of the role of reasons for action360.
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361 Raz in On the Functions of Law, p. 282, remarks that the legal
consequences attached to actions only by law as such are immensely varied.
The consequences attached to action by regulation can be, in addition to legal
consequences such as liability for a breach of duty, criminal and administrative
sanctions (e.g., deprivation of liberty or property, and fines), or the duty to
perform a contract resulting from having concluded it, also plain rewards such
as status, prestige or money, or even immaterial consequences such as social
pressure, feelings of guilt and proud. These non-legal consequences may be
imposed without invoking the legal process. Due to the huge variety of
possible consequences and the amount of overlap no overall list of different
consequences is useful.
362 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 282.
363 This is a term provided by an influential sociologist Amitai Etzioni,
university professor and director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy
Studies in George Washington University, in his effort to combine the
different perspectives that law-and-economics and law-and-society studies have
on social norms into a single approach called law-and-socioeconomics
(Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 161). Etzioni uses the term to refer to the directions
in which actors would channel their efforts if left to their own devices. These
predispositions reflect a combination of people’s biological urges and their
cultural imprinting. Specified predispositions are often referred to as
preferences (especially in economics). However, intrinsic predispositions
include preferences, but encompass other concepts as well and can be less
specified. According to Etzioni, the different understandings of social norms
Despite the huge variety in consequences attached to actions
provided by regulation361, two overall ways of how the additional
consequences determined by regulation influence the decision-making
can be recognised. When people consider the additional consequences
provided by regulation while making decisions to perform or abstain
from a certain action the consequences stipulated by regulation either
externally constrain the set of available options or influence the
intrinsic desirability of the actions. The reason for action can therefore
be expressed in both of these forms as noted in the philosophy of
law by Raz362. Thus, under the basic assumption that regulation
operates through the decision-making processes of the addressees
(actor always chooses whether or not to behave in a certain manner),
two basic ways regulation can influence behaviour can be separated;
either by externally constraining the set of available options or by
influencing the intrinsic predispositions363 of their targets. 
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(merely as a part of actors’ environment or also affecting their intrinsic
predispositions), is visible in the law-and-economics and law and
socioeconomics type of studies (Idem.).
364 See, e.g., Liska, Modelling the Relationships Between Macro Forms of Social
Control, p. 39-40
365 David Garland in Punishment and Modern Society, p. 252, points out that
penality, a term he uses to refer to the complex of laws, processes, discourses,
and institutions which are involved in the whole process of criminalizing and
penalizing (idem. p. 10), acts as a regulatory social mechanism in two distinct
respects: it regulates conduct directly through the physical medium of social
action, but it also regulates meaning, thought, attitude – and hence conduct –
through the expressive, symbolising function of penal practice that he calls
‘signifacation’.
366 This separation is used, e.g., by Horne, Sociological Perspectives on the
Emergence of Norms, p. 4-5, in providing a short overview of the approaches
of sociology to the enforcement of social norms in a recent collection critical
essays studying social norms from a variety of disciplines such as sociology,
economics, game theory and legal studies.
367 Evan in Law as an Instrument of Social Change, p. 555, separates between
two different but interrelated processes that the law entails as an instrument of
social change. Institutionalisation of a pattern of behaviour means the
establishment of a norm with provisions for its enforcement and
internalisation of a pattern of behaviour means the incorporation of the value
or values implicit in a law.
368 According to Parsons et al. in Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory
of Action, p. 20, note 26, institutionalisation of a norm means that the
members of a group reward conformity to the norm and punish deviation
This bears resemblance to the separation between external and
internal social control processes in social control studies as explicated
in sociology364 and in social theory365, to the separation of external
sanctioning and internalisation in the enforcement of social norms366
and to the two processes that the law has been seen to entail as an
instrument of social change367. With the former reference is typically
made to a social process whereby people conform to norms or rules
because they are rewarded with status, prestige, money and freedom
when they do adhere to them and are punished with the loss of them
when they do not. This process is sometimes called coercive, external,
or just social control. In the sociological studies of social norms, this
is sometimes referred to as institutionalisation368 or social enforcement.
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from it (Opp, The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms, p. 777). 
369 Opp, The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms, p. 777.
370 Postema, Positivism, I presume?, heading I.A. paragraph 3.
371 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 237-238, especially endnote 8 of
the Appendix. Lawrence Lessig, Professor of law at Stanford Law School and
the founder of the school’s Center for Internet and Society, is one of the most
influential person behind the change of the legal culture of IT professionals
towards the possibilities of regulation in cyberspace.
With the latter reference is made to a process where people adhere
to social norms because they believe in them, feeling good, self-
righteous, proud, when they do adhere to them and feeling bad, self-
critical, and guilty when they do not. Conformity to a norm becomes
a motive of its own369. This process is sometimes called socialisation
or internalisation.
Even though this dichotomy has been made in relation to social
norms and the law, as influence mechanisms these two can be
generalised to concern all regulation. Postema points out from the
perspective of the philosophy of the law the wider applicability of
this dichotomy to regulation more generally in discussing the way the
law influences the practical deliberation (reasoning) of a person and
thus his decision to act, i.e., how the law influences behaviour: “First,
something can influence practical deliberation externally by so shaping
the environment within which action can be taken that only some
alternatives appear feasible or reasonable. Second, something can
structure deliberation internally by providing directives about what
should or must or ought to be done. Whereas external devices put
obstacles in the way of rational agents choosing certain alternatives,
internal devices provide rational agents with reasons why they should
choose certain actions from the range of available actions.”370
This dichotomy has been picked up also in the discussion about
the possibilities to regulate behaviour in cyberspace. Lawrence Lessig
uses similar notions in his largely successful effort to shift the legal
culture of cyberspace from essential immunity from control (especially
government’s control) into the possibilities of regulation371. Lessig
develops his distinction between the subjective and the objective
Regulating Secure Software Development152
372 Lessig in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 237 separates between the
objective (that of someone observing when a constraint is imposed) and the
subjective (that of the person experiencing the constraint) perspectives in
considering the time a specific regulation imposes its constrain (or other effect)
on an individual. The objective perspective bears resemblance with that of the
decision-makers and the subjective perspective with the point of view of the
objects of regulation in the classification of perspectives into the study of
regulation made in section 1.5 above. From the objective perspective there is a
difference between regulatory tools that demand payment up front (e.g.
technology and market forces via payment) and constrains that let you play and
then pay (‘law’ and social norms). Even though this difference exists from the
objective perspective, it necessarily does not do so from the subjective point of
view; “a constraint may be objectively ex post, but experienced subjectively ex ante”
(Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 237, original italics). With this
separation Lessig also makes an argument about the need for subjectivity in
regulation: “Law and norms are more efficient the more subjective they are,
but they need some minimal subjectivity to be effective at all. …this is not the
case with architecture. Architecture can constrain without any subjectivity”
(Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 238-239). About the importance of
this distinction for social norms, see Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 161-165.
373 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 237-238, especially endnote 8 of
the Appendix. As we already noted, the conception of regulation that Lessig
uses has no requirement of intentionality or even actors that regulate. To
Lessig regulation is not just an activity, it is also an outcome. His conception of
regulation includes every meaning from the table of regulation provided by
Black above (Table 1-1). However, this does not diminish the value of the
argument of the mechanism of internalisation being applicable generally to
different forms of regulation.
perspectives372 further into a question of general applicability of the
process of internalisation; not just a mechanism of social norms but
also of other regulatory instruments: “Once internalized, norms no
longer need to be enforced to have force; their force has moved inside,
as it were, and continues within this subjective perspective. In my
view, we should see each constraint functioning in the same way: we
subjectively come to account for the constraint through a process
of internalization”373. 
For example, technology can be altered to allow or restrict certain
behaviours and thus affect externally. However, it does more. It can
also be used to facilitate and encourage or discourage certain
behaviours. A low fence may not keep a determined trespasser out
The way regulation affects behaviour 153
374 Levin, Student Note, p. 114.
375 This argument has been made by Christine Horne, Assistant Professor in of
Sociology at Brigham Young University who has doctoral decrees in sociology
and in law, in Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms, p.
21, in an effort to develop a framework with which to organise thinking about
norms in a recent collection critical essays studying social norms from a variety
of disciplines such as sociology, economics, game theory and legal studies.
376 Amitai Etzioni in Social Norms, p. 163-171, discusses the different
approaches to social norms, and especially the adherence to social norms, in
the fields of neoclassical economics (the foundation of law and economics)
and sociolegal studies or studies in law and society.
of a backyard, but it may deter trespassers by sending a message about
the wishes of the property owner of the acceptable sphere of
behaviour. The message that the external constraint on behaviour
transmits might also be contradictory to the purpose of the constraint.
For example, the purpose of bars or boards on windows is to prevent
entry. However, the expressive meaning of those bars is “I don’t trust
people” or “I believe this is a high crime area”374. The point is that
when technology is altered for regulatory purposes or another
regulatory instrument is used, not only the purpose of the regulation
should be kept in mind but the meaning it transmits as well.
3.2  As internal influence
Even thought it has been widely acknowledged that regulation can
influence behaviour internally, the explication of the way regulation
changes intrinsic predispositions has turned out to be problematic.
For example, even though it is widely agreed in sociology that
internalisation of norms has the potential to increase compliance, the
contribution of internalisation is still unclear. Even sociology still has
much to learn about the factors that contribute to the persistence of
internalised notions of oughtness375. Amitai Etzioni provides one
explanation while considering the ways in which compliance to social
norms that relies largely on external factors can be converted into
compliance that relies mainly on intrinsic forces376. 
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377 This point has been made, e.g., by McAdams in The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, paragraph 2. As Etzioni notes in Social Norms, p.
161-165, there is a separation between the external (the location of the factor
that induces compliance is external to the person experiencing the constraint –
the relevant society or group) understanding of social norms and the internal
viewpoint (the factor that induces compliance lies within the individual person)
among law and economics scholars. The former is represented, e.g., by Lessig
in The New Chicago School, p. 662, and in The Regulation of Social Meaning,
p. 1044, and by Ellickson in The Market for Social Norms, p. 3. The latter is
represented most visibly by Cooter with his long line of research developing
the theory of internalisation of social norms; people obey and enforce norms
because they internalise its normative element in a way that it becomes part of
their preferences. See, e.g., Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, p. 61-66.
378 As Adler, Expressive Theories of Law, heading III “Why Expressive
Theories are Unpersuasive: A General Argument”, notes with reference to
John R. Searle (1969) Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, p.
33 and idem. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality, p. 27-29, in his
criticism of expressive theories of law, this dichotomy is similar to the one
between regulative rules that govern antecedently or independently existing
behaviour and constitutive rules that create or define new forms of behaviour.
The distinction between social meaning and social norms made by Lessig in
The Regulation of Social Meaning, p. 957, is best understood as a distinction
between social norms and social forms.
379 Note that despite the importance of social norms to sociologists, there is
little consensus between the diverse disciplines of sociology even about the
whole notion of social norms (what they are, how they are enforced, and how
they emerge) as Christine Horne points out in Sociological Perspectives on the
Emergence of Social Norms, p. 3.
Social norms equate to the informal social control of the
community. Non-legal, non-market rules defined broadly under the
rubric of social norms profoundly affect human behaviour. Social
norms are a social practice by which activities (existing apart from
the practice) are controlled. Generally speaking, when legal scholars
refer to social norms they are referring to informal social rules that
individuals adhere to because of an internalized sense of duty, because
of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both377. Social forms, on
the other hand, are a social practice by which activities are (wholly
or partly) constituted378. An understanding of these rules, which mainly
comes from sociology, makes it possible to harness them for
regulatory purposes379.
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380 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 166-171.
381 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 167, takes this definition from the psychological
research of Lawrence Kohlberg on the cognitive development (of their moral
judgement as their mature intellectually) of all human beings through several
stages of development. Reference is made to Kohlberg L (1968) Moral
Development, in Sills D (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences.
382 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 169.
383 In dictionary terms, socialisation is the process whereby an individual learns
to adjust to a group (or society) and behave in a manner approved by the
group (or society) (“socialization.” Encycloædia Britannica from Encycloædia
Britannica Online, http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9103216 [28.2.2006,
requires authentication])
384 As Tapp and Levine note in Legal Socialization, p. 122 and 126, in
developing their theory of legal socialisation and the development of individual
reasoning towards the law, the socialisation strategies, whether moral, legal or
political, share common features regardless of their specific content or context.
I.e., there is considerable overlap despite the differences in emphasis among
Following Etzioni, the specific process by which social norms
influence peoples’ intrinsic predispositions, thus affecting compliance
with regulation, are internalisation and persuasion: preferences are
initially set by internalisation and thereafter they are subject to
persuasion380. In this conception, internalisation is an element of
socialisation whereby the actor learns to follow the rules of behaviour
in situations where there are impulses to transgress and no external
surveillance or sanctions381. This is accomplished through such non-
rational processes as identification with authority figures and affective
attachments. With persuasion Etzioni refers to non-rational processes
through which adult preferences are changed, such as identification
with authority figures, generation of group enthusiasm through rituals,
and relation of new forms of behaviour to values that the person
already holds in high regard382.
These elements of socialisation are applicable more widely than
just in relation to social norms383. The cognitive-structural-stage
theories of moral development have been utilised also in analysing
the development of the reasoning of the individual in relation to legal,
political and moral socialisation384. However, it is norms as guidelines
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the three areas in terms of socialising contexts, indicators of authority and
ethical concerns. Note that the legal levels theory has substantially been
influenced by the cognitive-structural-stage theories of moral developmental as
introduced by Jean Piaget and advanced by Lawrence Kohlberg and builds also
on jurisprudential frameworks of Lon L. Fuller and John Rawls (Tapp and
Levine, Legal Socialization, p. 123-126).
385 Hechter and Opp, What Have We Learned about the Emergence of Social
Norms, p. 395. Fine in Enacting Norms, p. 157, speaks of norms as narrated
when he refers to verbal exhortation as a way to achieve socialisation.
Normative narratives can be institutionalised obligations, i.e., behavioural
prescriptions accompanied with the possibility of invoking institutional
punishments, or narratives about the world that surrounds the actors, stories
that encourage or discourage forms of action.
386 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 166.
387 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 163.
388 That these processes are somewhat unconscious and nonrational does not
mean that the actors have no means to liberate themselves from the
constitutive influences of social norms. They can become more aware of the
forces that shape them, including social norms, and they can work with others
to change these forces. What it means is that there are considerable limits to
the actor’s ability to do so as Etzioni emphasises in Social Norms, p. 170.
389 I am not interested in the controversial expressive theories as such. Instead,
I am interested only in the obvious, but often overlooked issue that the
meaning of regulation has impact on behaviour as such. It should be noted, as
for action that are reported and transmitted in the process of
socialisation in these fields385. As Etzioni points out, social norms are
central to the internal influence of regulation: intrinsic predispositions
are formed in part by social norms and thus can change over time
as social norms are changed386. Even though social norms do not act
in isolation, they are a major factor among the elements that that shape
predispositions and are the basis of individual choices387.
But how can these somewhat unconscious and non-rational
processes be harnessed for regulatory purposes388? Is it possible to
influence the process of socialisation with the sustainable and focused
attempts involved in the process of regulation and into the direction
desired the regulator? 
This is currently being discussed especially in law and economics
research under the rubric of “expressive theories of law”389 and is the
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Dharmapala and McAdams point out in The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of the Law, p. 1., that the consequentialist claims being
discussed here can be distinguished from the various non-consequentialist
arguments that law has a moral value based on what it expresses, independent
of its effects. For a discussion of such theories, see, e.g., Adler, Expressive
Theories of Law, p. 1363-1502; Anderson and Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law, p. 1503-1576; Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic ‘Expression’ and
the Multiple Variants of Expressivism, p. 1577-1595.
390 This has been explicated in the Nordic doctrine, e.g., by Tuomas Pöysti in
Tehokkuus, informaatio ja Eurooppalainen oikeusalue, p. 133-135 with references to
Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1991, p. 6 and to Peter Blume, Ret Som Information,
in Ånd og Rett, p. 195-202, Oslo, 1997. In information law the guidance
provided by law is based on the force of expression and information – that
information and communication can constitute and alter social reality.
However, this type of research has not clarified how the provision of
information influences behaviour. The argument is more general. At the basic
level the law is formed of the communication to the norm addressees, i.e., of
information; law is a message and the communication of that message is at the
core. Information, by the means of communication, conveys a message of the
existence, meaning and objectives of the legal norm; it gives a standard for
behaviour for the addressees and a set of expectations for the behaviour of the
object of regulation. The legal system as a societal institution is seen to be
based on the processing, management, and communication of information.
391 For a short overview into some of the modelling done in law and
economics of these mechanisms see Dharmapala and McAdams, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of the Law, p. 1-3.
There is also preliminary empirical support for one of the models according to
which law influences behaviour expressively, by creating a focal point around
which individuals coordinate (McAdams and Nadler, A Third Model of Legal
Compliance). As McAdams and Nadler note, their work implies neither a
rejection of any external models nor any other expressive theories (McAdams
and Nadler, A Third Model of Legal Compliance, p. 5)
basic starting point of information law as understood at least in the
Nordic tradition390. The law can influence behaviour ‘expressively’,
by the message that it embodies. This can happen even independently
of the other non-expressive influences such as deterrence (included
in sanctions and their enforcement). Without going deeper into the
possible specific mechanisms by which meanings affect behaviour,
which are still disputed391, this mode of influence has been recognised
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392 This influence mechanism of expressions is not denied even by the critics of
expressive theories such as Adler, Expressive Theories of Law, heading
“Conclusions”. Adler notes that that the issue is not only uncontroversial, but
banal.
393 Cooter, Do good laws make good citizens?, p. 18-19. Also Black in
Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 69, has recognised the issue that the
process in which instruments (e.g. written norms) are produced and the
manner in which they are expressed can both affect behaviour.
394 The possibility for also other regulators than just the government to
influence social meaning has been recognised by Lessig in The Regulation of
Social Meaning, p. 957.
widely392. To the degree instruments are justified and their enactment
is somehow expressed (made public by providing information about
them) by the regulator or an intermediary acting on its behalf, they
also can influence behaviour expressively.
Robert Cooter has explained how the proclamation of a new
obligation and the explanations given about the reasons of the
enactment are related to the expressive effects of laws: “Promulgating
a law often involves proclaiming a new obligation, describing the
sanction attached to its violation, and explaining the reason for
enacting it. … These three parts of a law relate especially (but not
uniquely) to the three consequences of a law that I explained.
Proclaiming a legal obligation gives people instructions on what to
do, which especially promotes the coordination of behaviour.
Attaching a sanction to an obligation especially deters its violation.
Explaining the law ideally convinces citizens to follow it. In brief, the
three aspects of promulgating a law especially aim at expression,
deterrence, and internalization.”393 The way for regulation to shape
intrinsic predispositions is thus to express the meaning of the norm
(its content, the behaviour it expects from the addressees) and to
provide justifications for the norm (which by means of convincing
enhances internalisation). Accordingly to the decentring thesis also
other regulators than just the government can use these expressive
and justificatory (explanatory) means394.
Note that not only the expressive function of law shape intrinsic
predispositions. Interaction between law and preferences can occur
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395 Bar-Gill and Fershtman, Law and Preferences, p. 331-352. Acknowledging
that lawyers, philosophers and psychologists have for long recognised the role
of law in shaping norms and preferences (idem. p. 332), Oren Bar-Gill and
Chaim Fershtman for their part try to expand the boundaries of law-and-
economics by introducing an alternative (not exclusive) mechanism beside the
expressive or symbolic impact of the law through which the law influences the
formation of preferences as part of the analysis.
396 Bar-Gill and Fershtman, Law and Preferences, p. 333.
397 See Adler, Expressive Theories of Law, heading “Introduction”, paragraphs
18 and 27-28, last paragraph of heading II “Expressive Theories: The Main
Examples”, and paragraphs 3-7 of the heading “Conclusion”, citing the works
of most recent expressive theorists Cass R. Sunstein, Robert Cooter and Dan
Kahan.
also via a payoff-based evolutionary model as suggested and
preliminary tested by Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman395.
However, due to the overlap of both of these models, which is also
acknowledged by the writers396, and the problems in mobilising the
evolutionary model in the intentional action of regulation, this line
of inquiry is not taken further in this study. It is important to note,
however, that not all changes in preferences initiated by legal or more
widely regulatory rules can be explained only on expressive or
symbolic grounds.
What is important for our purposes is that expressive effect of
regulation (intrinsic predispositions shaping) is mediated primarily
by social norms or social forms; the meaning of a regulation has causal
effects on social norms or forms and it can be used to shape them397.
This means that when regulation attempts to change intrinsic
predispositions, the effects are mediated by social norms or forms.
The influence mechanism is not direct. Instead, the information a
regulation provides of itself (the justifications and the mere expression)
affects social norms or social forms that then influence behaviour.
Changes in intrinsic predispositions do not necessarily, or even
primarily, happen via rational models of decision-making. As Etzioni
points out in noting that while socioeconomics and studies in law and
society assume that intrinsic predispositions are formed in part by
social norms and thus can change over time as social norms are
Regulating Secure Software Development160
398 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 166.
399 Weiss, Public Information, p. 218-219 and 227-228.
400 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 168-169.
401 Sarat, Support for the Legal System, p. 181. However, the argument that
support for the legal system declines as knowledge of its actual operation
increases holds only for the satisfaction with the legal system as a part of
support for it. Willingness to comply does not decline in similar manner. In
cases where dissatisfaction persists over time, the willingness to comply may
also be eroded.
changed, they also assume that these changes can take place through
non-rational processes398. As pointed out by Janet Weiss in her analysis
of public information as a governance tool, information may affect
both the explicit and implicit cognition, i.e., people may still respond
to information in the world around them and connect it to their
subsequent behaviour even though they might not be making
deliberate, conscious calculations about what they do399.
As Etzioni points out, knowledge does not necessarily affect
intrinsic predispositions and increased knowledge together with the
developed capabilities for reasoning in terms of high level principles
(the most advanced type of individual reasoning in relation to morality
and law) does not necessarily mean that actual behaviour is changed:
“to know the good cannot be equated with doing the good”400.
Increased information does not necessarily lead to changes in
behavioural patterns. In relation to the values implicit in a regulation,
i.e., the norms to be internalised, increased knowledge can lead to
opposite direction. As research on the support for the legal system
in the United States indicates, support for the legal system declines
as knowledge of it increases, i.e., knowledge of the legal system and
support for it may be inversely related401.
As such this basic understanding of the intrinsic predisposition
shaping mechanism is sufficient for the purposes of this study. To
note that the publishing (proclaiming) a norm, the expression of its
meaning, and the justifications given all influence behaviour, gives
the possibility analyse the cause it can have on the regulatory capability
of different instrument. It makes it possible to see that the meaning
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402 As Davind Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, p. 251, notes in a
discussion of the major social theories of punishment, the analysis of penal
practice as a form of social signification (i.e., the expressive symbolizing
function of penal practice) inevitably involves interpretative statements backed
by illustrative examples rather than by solid evidence and that theoretical
arguments outrun the available data. This is still true in relation to the intrinsic
predisposition shaping mechanism of regulation, despite the efforts of many
disciplines of which the behavioural law-and-economics has been most active
recently. Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, p. 346-
347, also acknowledge the controversial nature of preference formation and
the role of law in it.
403 There is a huge variety of tools that different regulators can use to strive for
the desired objective by attempting to alter the behaviour of others. A
classification of instruments is provided below.
404 It is illustrative to separate between information as a policy instrument and
information on policy instruments. Information (together with education) as a
policy instrument is a distinctive and separate category as such. The tools used
in this category include, for example, the transfer of knowledge,
communication or reasoned argument, persuasion, advice, moral appeals etc.
However, in addition to information being a type of instrument in its own
right, it also is metainstrument in the sense that it is used to disseminate
knowledge of the existence, meaning, and availability of other regulatory
instruments. Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 48; Vedung, Public Policy and
Program Evaluation, p. 133-134. This is a clarification to the central notion made
in the sociology of law about the centrality of information about the content of
laws to the guiding function that a law can have, of which see, e.g., Mathiesen,
Rätten i samhället, p. 62-67.
a regulation conveys might be different from, or even contradictory
to, the objectives of the regulator or the substance of the norm.
However, the concept of intrinsic predisposition shaping mechanism
is still too underdeveloped theoretically to be used in any deeper
analysis of the influences mechanism of regulatory instruments402.
Its mechanism are simply too complex and unknown.
It needs to be acknowledged that these methods to shape intrinsic
predispositions can be used in relation to all regulation. Information
on instruments (understood as a metainstrument) can be used to affect
behaviour in relation to all of the different types of regulatory
instruments403, including the informative and pedagogic instruments
themselves (information as a policy instrument)404. For example, when
a new informative material has been developed, the regulator has to
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405 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 48-49; Vedung, Public Policy and Program
Evaluation, p. 134.
406 This is the traditional case of horizontal packaging, i.e., a process identified
in policy studies, where two of more instruments are directed simultaneously at
the same target. See, e.g., Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung, Conclusions, in
Carrots, Sticks & Sermons, p. 262. Compare to Vedung, Policy Instruments, p.
48, in the same book, who refers to this practice as vertical packaging.
However, the packaging is horizontal because both types of instruments
(information as a metainstrument and the instrument on which information is
provided of) are directed simultaneously at the same targets and one is not
used to entice some implementing actor to employ to other toward the objects
of regulation, as with vertical packaging. More about vertical packaging see
infra.
decide whether it should disseminate the material immediately to the
target group or whether the potential users of the information should
be informed about the availability of the material and its importance,
and that prospective addressees should order it.405
For analytical purposes the fact that regulation may influence
behaviour by the message is embodies and by its communication, i.e.,
as information on policy instruments (information as a
metainstrument) because it shapes intrinsic predispositions, needs
to be kept separate from the possibility that it may influence behaviour
also externally. Information can be provided merely in the purpose
of giving information about the specific instrument, its existence, and
the behaviour it expects from the addressees (the standard of conduct
provided); basically the way it operates as an external constraint406.
The information affects the considerations of the external
circumstances, the costs and benefits included. However, the
mechanisms considered here by which information as a
metainstrument affects behaviour is when information on instruments
is provided in the purpose of appealing to actors subconscious
motives, ranging from guilt to sexual desire, and thus to shape intrinsic
predispositions. 
A good example is advertising. Advertising is not strictly
informational and thus not only affects behaviour by affecting
considerations of costs and benefits (and, as a rule, do not shape
preferences; i.e., advertising is considered to affect as an external
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407 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 169-170.
408 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 161-162. Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 311, points
out similar influence mechanisms in relation to law. When regulation and
especially the legal variation of it (the law) is studied, the concentration
typically is on the external constraint aspect. Resent studies on social norms
have picked up the issue of how law and other instruments (especially
technology) can change social norms. However, many of the studies have still
treated social norms as external factors as pointed out, among others, by
Etzioni in Social Norms, p. 161-165.
409 The different types of regulatory tools, made explicit by classifying them on
different basis, are what can also be called regulatory strategies. Thus, strategies
are separated from the actual tools or instruments that the regulator uses in
mechanism) but also a means of subconsciously affecting people’s
preferences and thus a form of persuasion in the terms of Etzioni407.
3.3  As external constraint
As pointed out by Etzioni in relation to social norms, as external
constraints social norms and regulation in general either increase or
decrease the availability of choices, change the cost or benefits of
decision, change the resources the actor draws on, or physically change
the environment where the decisions are made in a way that restricts
or allows certain behavioural patterns408. When regulation affects
behaviour as an external constraint it is akin to the changes that take
place outside the actor, which the actor includes (perhaps even
unconsciously) in her calculations and choices. 
This does not provide much help in the use of the external
constraining mechanism as a heuristic device in analysing the ways
specific regulatory instruments affect behaviour. The influence
mechanism remains much too unspecified. Since there does not seem
be specific influence mechanisms or a set of mechanisms that apply
to all regulation as an external constraint, as is the case with the
intrinsic predisposition changing mechanisms, a way to deepen the
understanding is needed. One possible path is to look at the types
of regulatory instruments409.
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specific situations. Tools are concrete and specified operational forms of
attempting to influence behaviour. They are a specific way of making the
strategy concrete in a specific situation. Strategy is more general; it concerns
the regulators decision of the basic type of action it adopts and the general
form of the regulation. Somewhat similar use of the concepts is in Bemelmans-
Videc, Introduction: Policy Instruments Choice and Evaluation, p. 4 and in
Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 34-35. Tala uses the terms a bit
differently in separating also between regulatory strategies and different types
of tools in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 157.
410 This is the approach taken both in relation to State’s capacity to create and
control ‘self-regulation’ as well as the non-state centred regulators possibilities
to use different instruments already at the mid 1990's by Daintith in Law as
Policy Instrument, p. 32-33, and acknowledged also by Christopher Hood in
The Tools of Government, p. 120-121. This is repeated as a normative argument in
Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 139.
411 Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action, p. 21; Tala,
Lakien vaikutukset, p. 209-210.
412 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 22.
There is a wide array of instruments that can be used by different
regulators in attempting to alter the behaviour of others; the different
instruments may be used by the state, the community, associations,
networks, or individual actors (including firms) with the obvious
exception within constitutional democracy that the use of force and
imprisonment are confined to the state410. Actually there is not even
a consensus on the number of tools that exist for governmental use411.
Due to this huge variety the need to differentiate the issue for
analytical purposes has been recognised. As pointed out by Evert
Vedung, there are two fundamental approaches to the classification
of instruments: the maximalist and the minimalist412. The maximalist
approach makes long lists of possible instruments, but little effort
is made to arrange them into smaller or larger groups. Since the
maximalist approach just lists all the possible types without any
particular ordering, it does not provide a taxonomy that might be used
in considering the connection between the instrument and its effects.
The minimalist approach searches for few basic types under which all
specific kinds of individual policy instruments can be categorised.
According to this approach there are, in principle, few basic types
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413 This resembles the Weberian ideal-type methodology as depicted by Weber
in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 99-100. It is important to note that the
classifications do not reflect the interactions and the overlapping of regulatory
instruments. After all, they play several roles and influence behaviour in a
variety of ways. Thus specific regulatory instruments do not as such fit simply
to just one ideal regulatory instrument type. They might be categorised into
several models or placed somewhere in the between.
414 As Tala points out in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 156 and 343-344, in relation to
the legal instruments, the information collection has not been done
systematically and especially not always by using the same classification. This is
why the policy analysis and evaluation types of studies are useful in the
consideration of the influence mechanisms of specific types of regulation. That
is, to the degree they can be considered to have induced the mechanisms and
effects of different instruments.
415 As Tala in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 156, 179 and 210-211, notes, the
classifications of regulatory instruments do not provide much information
of tools that the regulator can use, even though they can be combined
and changed for different contexts.
In the minimalist approach followed here the instruments are
categorised into ideal types for analytical purposes. These ideal types
of instruments are only heuristic tools and not the aims of the
investigation. They do not represent the reality of what types of tools
regulators use. Instead, they are tools used in order to begin a process
of interpretation and evaluation of the tools used. The ideal instrument
types are mental constructs (not depictions of reality) to be used for
the analysis of the effects of the diverse set of instruments that can
be used in practice.413 
Different classifications of regulatory instruments have been used
to collect information on the ways different types of instruments affect
and what kinds of effects they generate414. The classification seems
to underlie a conception of the connection between the instruments
and their effects. By looking into types of regulatory tools and
strategies the relationship between the type of regulation and the
effects can be more easily seen; the classification of regulatory tools
makes it easier to compare the different instruments. The different
classifications of regulatory tools help to outline and to illustrate the
connection between the instrument and its effects.415
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about the way effects of regulation are generated or the relationship between
the instrument and its effects, despite them underlying a conception of the
connection between the instruments and their effects. The classifications do
note tell much about the actual or intended effects, i.e., about their social
functions. But they do tell about the normative guiding function; the different
ways regulation can guide behaviour are visible. This is why they are relevant in
the analysis of the influence mechanisms and need to be explicated in here. Cf.
Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 150, 208, 212-213 and 342.
416 This has been pointed out in policy studies by Vedung in Policy
Instruments, p. 22, and has been emphasised also by the OECD Working
Group on Regulatory Management and Reform in Regulatory Policies in OECD
Countries, p. 52. For examples of different classifications of tools of public
action see, e.g., Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 151-178; Baldwin and Cave,
Understanding Regulation, chapter 4; Ogus, Regulation, parts III and IV; Salamon,
The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action, p. 19-37; Breyer,
Regulation and its Reform, chapter 8; Gunningham and Grabosky, Smart Regulation,
chapter 2. There is even an overview of the classifications of the tools of
government provided in König K and Dose N (1989) Klassifizierungsansätze
staatlicher Handlungsformen, Speyerer Forschungsberichte 83, referred to in
Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 153.
There are a variety of different classifications of regulatory
instruments; even of those that are available to the state actors416.
Instruments have been identified and classified from a variety of
perspectives and for several purposes and these classifications separate
from one another on the basis of their explicatory force in relation
to the connection between the instruments and their intended effects.
Most basic classifications are made in order to see the alternative (to
statutory or case law) policy tools or regulatory strategies of
government or that of public action more generally. These
classifications provide ideas and holds for the analysis of the content
of regulation and their intended effects by making roughly explicit
the normative guidance mechanism involved.
By analysing several classifications the effort in the following
presentation is to illustrate the means by which different regulatory
instruments provide reasons for action (i.e., how they guide behaviour,
the way the effects are assumed to be generated at the normative level).
Such an analysis allows the use of the different analytical forces in
the classifications. A short presentation of the different classifications
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417 Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action, p. 24-37. 
418 This classificatory principle is used in the studies of regulation by Hood in
The Tools of Government, p. 4-7.
419 These classificatory principles have been used in sociologically minded legal
studies by Eckhoff in Statens Styrningsmuligheter, p. 29-45, and in political science
and especially studies on policy tools by Schneider and Ingram in Behavioural
Assumptions of Policy Tools, p. 510-530.
420 This is according to Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of
Public Action, p. 25 and 27.
421 As Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 34-35, points out, this is the degree of
constraint it sets for its objects or power the regulator has invested in the
attempt to regulate; the extent to which a tool restricts individual behaviour as
opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it.
together with their capability in linking the instruments with their
intended effects and the way these classifications combine is in order.
3.3.1  Different classifications
with a common background assumption
Classifications have been made, as noted in policy studies about the
tools of public action by Salamon from the perspective of political
science, e.g., on the basis of the degree of coerciveness, degree of
directness, degree of visibility in the budgeting and policy review
process, and extent to which a tool utilises existing administrative
structures to produce its effects (automacity)417. The resources required
for the operation of the tool418 and the way the instruments affect
their objects or the types of behaviours the instruments seek to modify
have also been used419.
1. One basic general classification of alternative policy tools from
the point of view of the state, by far the most common420, is made
in the policy studies on the basis of the degree of coercion or the extent
of authoritative force that each instrument involves421. This classifier
is used, as has been pointed out by a Working Group on Regulatory
Management and Reform of the OECD, especially in the economic
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422 OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, p. 52 and annex 2. This has
been pointed out also by Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of
Public Action, p. 25.
423 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 29-34; Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung,
Conclusions: Policy Instruments, Types, Packages, Choices and Evaluation, p.
250-257. These instruments have remained the same even in some of the
decentred understanding of regulatory strategies (regulation as indirect
intervention in the self-regulation of social and market actors). However, the
ways they are used have changed, especially in relation to legal rules; there is a
move from regulatory law (that sets substantive standards) to reflexive,
procedural or post-regulatory law (that sets procedures. This has been
emphasised by Black in Decentring Regulation, p. 126 with reference to Bruijin
J and Heuvelhof E (1991) Policy Instruments for Steering Autopoietic Actors,
in Veld et al (eds.) Autopoiesis and Configuration Theory: new Approaches to Societal
Steering, Dordrecht, p. 161.
424 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 31-32. Similarly in relation to legal norms,
e.g., in Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, p. 64.
studies because it measures the degree of intervention on the “free
market” (the extent to which a tool involves a deviation from the
reliance on the market as a mechanism to allocate resources and settle
social roles)422. In a basic form this classification involves three types
of tools: regulations, economics means and information (in popular
terms, carrots, sticks and sermons)423.
Regulations (sticks) are measures undertaken by governmental units
to influence people by means of formulated rules and directives which
mandate receivers to act in accordance with what is ordered in them;
the threat of negative sanctions might be involved but is not a defining
feature424. The authoritative relationship between the regulator and
the objects of regulation, in the sense that they are obligated to act
in the commanded way, defines regulation and separates it from other
instruments. Thus, the term regulation is used in the strictest of the
earlier mentioned three definitions; as agency regulation, ministerial
decrees or detailed parliamentary laws.
Economic instruments (carrots) involve either the handing out or the
taking away of material resources, in-kind as well as in cash. Their
intention is to make it cheaper or more expensive in terms of money,
time, effort, and other valuables to pursue certain actions. What
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425 It ought to be stressed that in this taxonomy economic instruments include
non-monetary as well as monetary material resources. According to Vedung “a
bumb in the road to prevent motorist from speeding is an economic
instrument just as a tax levied on gasoline is” (Vedung, Policy Instruments, p.
32-33).
426 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 33-34.
427 Hood, The Tools of Government, p. 4-7 and 21-91. 
separates economic instruments from regulation is a fact that the
objects of regulation are not obligated to take the measures involved;
they are just encouraged or discouraged to do so. The regulated
behaviour is neither prescribed nor prohibited, instead, it is made more
or less expensive or easier (or more difficult) by the adding or deprival
of material resources425. 
Information (sermons, also referred to as moral suasion, exhortation,
or public communication) covers attempts at influencing people
through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned
argument, and persuasion. No more than the plain transfer of
knowledge or persuasive reasoning is offered to influence people to
do what the government deems desirable; no government obligation
or coercion is involved. This absence of obligation separates
information from regulation and the lack of material resources handed
or taken away separates it from economic instruments.426
2. There also is a somewhat similar classification, made on the basis
of the resources available to the public authority427. In this scheme the
regulatory instruments that can be used to affect the objects of
regulation correspond to categories of government resources. The
resources and the subsequent instruments are conventionally classified
into four basic types. (1) Nodality refers to the central position of
government in society’s information flows and the consequent
information resources. The instruments exploit the ability to use the
information resource for different purposes, e.g., giving advice and
information or to persuade. (2) Treasures are the financial and other
material resources available to the state, in-cash or in-kind.
Instruments use this wealth or money (e.g., the ability to raise tax
finance and requisition of other resources such as land or the time
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428 In addition to these effectors (means by which the public authority can
influence its external environment) also detectors are used to collect
information required for the operation of public authority. Hood, The Tools of
Government, p. 3. Note that Christopher Hood uses the same resource based
classification also for the detectors.
429 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 38.
430 Hood, The Tools of Government, p. 7. See also Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 153-
154.
431 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 37-38.
of conscripted personnel). (3) Authority refers to the monopoly to give
binding legal rules and the ability to compel compliance. Basic
command and control instrument such as laws or regulations belong
to this group. (4) Organisation refers to the human labour, buildings
and devices and other physical assets the government possess and
is able to employ. The capability to set up and administer basic
bureaucratic organisations and employing them in direct action form
the class of instruments involved.428
Despite the different basis of classification, these taxonomies are
similar to a high degree. As Vedung also notes, nodality, treasure and
authority seem quite similar to the categories of information, economic
means, and regulation in the former threefold scheme429. Also the
coerciveness argument is applicable to this classification. The
instruments in this classification can be scaled on the basis of the
degree of restriction they pose for their objects; starting from the use
of informational resources and ending in the use of force by the
organisation of the public authority430.
The biggest difference is related to the organisational resource and
the related direct government instruments (e.g., direct provision of
goods and services). The former coerciveness-based taxonomy adopts
a view, according to which organisation is a prerequisite for the
application of instruments, not an instrument in itself431. Organisation
is necessary for the provision of regulatory, economic and informative
instruments; instruments cannot be applied if there is no government
organisation. Even though this is a strict state centred understanding,
it is applicable more widely. When a regulator uses its own
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432 Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 34-35.
433 This has been pointed out by Daintith, Law as Policy Instrument, p. 33, in
his introductory essay to a larger collection of studies on the instruments used
in the implementation of economic policy and the role of law as an instrument
for implementation. This is central to Black’s decentring thesis as she makes
explicit in Decentring Regulation, p. 139.
434 Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 73.
organisation to act directly with its own resources it is just making
a choice in the mode of implementation of the instrument (e.g.,
provision of material resources directly instead of using subsidy). Thus,
an employance or an implementation strategy should be separated
analytically from policy instruments. 
Several other classifications of resources and the subsequent
instruments have been made. For example, Baldwin and Cave in their
basic textbook on regulation separate following basic capacities and
resources that governments possess and which it can use to influence
industrial, economic or social activity: the ability to command ( legal
authority and the command of law is used to pursue policy
objectives), to  deploy of wealth (contracts, grants, loans, subsidies, or
other incentives are used to influence conduct), to harness markets
(governments channel competitive forces to particular ends), to inform
(information is deployed strategically, e.g., so as to empower
consumers), to act directly (state takes physical action itself), and to confer
protected rights (rights and liability rules are structured and allocated
so as to create desired incentives and constraints)432.
What these classifications of resources do not take into
consideration, and what is essential in the decentred understanding
of regulation, is that these resources are dispersed among a range of
actors; they are not confined to the state433. When the range of possible
regulators is expanded by removing the state from the centre, the
resources become more difficult to identify. Basically any assessment
of what resources are necessary for regulation is likely to vary at the
detailed level with the particular context434. However, Black has
identified six key resources that are critical to the performance of at
least one or more of the cybernetic regulatory functions (standard
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435 Idem.
436 Eckhoff, Statens Styrningsmuligheter, p. 29-45. See also Matthiessen, Rätten i
Samhället, p. 89 where this classification made by Eckhoff has been used.
437 The classification made in 1983 does not yet contain the changing of the
logical environment (the virtual space) with tools like software. However, it
could be included without further problems.
setting, information gathering and behaviour modification):
information, expertise, financial and economic resources, authority
and legitimacy, strategic position and organisational capacity435. But
these resources are so dispersed and interrelated in a way that it is
no longer possible to identify types of tools on the basis of them. The
resources in each context with its own variations become more related
to actors than to specific instruments. There might be a tendency to
use certain instrument by a regulator that possesses certain specific
resources (e.g., informational), but all of the different instrument can
be used by every regulator.
3. The classification made by Eckhoff in sociologically biased legal
scholarship on the basis of how the different types of tools influence
their objects bears resembles with the preceding taxonomies:
normative, economic, pedagogic and physical436. The economic
instruments in this classification refer to those mechanisms that are
used to affect the individual’s considerations of what kind of
behaviour is economically rational. Included are tools like taxing, or
regulation by contract. The normative tools are basic command and
control. Injunctions, permissions, indemnity rules etc. belong to this
group. Pedagogic tools contain information and attempt to affect the
attitudes of individuals. The physical tools are those that facilitate or
hamper certain operations in the actor’s environment. Examples are
buildings, devices, and other physical constructions437.
The difference to former coerciveness-based and the resource-
based classifications is that whereas they include both in-cash and
in-kind material resources into the economic/treasures subcategory,
the influence mechanism –based taxonomy separates physical
instruments into a separate category. Since the instruments seem
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438 Mayntz, The Conditions of Effective Public Policy, p. 127-129.
439 Mayntz, The Conditions of Effective Public Policy, p. 139.
440 Schneider and Ingram, Behavioural Assumptions of Policy Tools, 1990, p.
514-522.
different and affect in distinctive ways, as argued below, this separation
is useful.
Another classification made in policy studies on the basis of how
instruments influence their objects is provided by Mayntz438. In her
classification regulative norms, such as prohibitions supported by the
threat of sanctions, rules of market entry, conditional permissions,
produce direct effects. They shape behaviour according to a norm.
Financial transfers and incentives, such as grants, subventions and welfare
payments, instead work more indirectly. Procedural regulation is also
indirect in its influence. It sets rules for the cooperation and/or
resolution of conflicts between two or more parties without trying
to control the outcome of these processes directly439. Norms
establishing decision and conflict resolution procedures for private
parties are mentioned as examples of procedural regulation. Public
provision, such as technical and personal services and production of
goods, is also a separate type of instrument in this classification. The
final type of instrument is persuasion. It involves campaigns to inform
and to exhort.
4. A classification on the basis of how the objects of regulation
are expected to behave, and at the same time, how their behaviour
(or lack of action) can be influenced, has been provided in political
science and especially studies on policy tools by Ingram and
Schneier440. 
If the target population does not believe that the regulation directs
them or authorise them to take action, then tools providing authority
can be used. They are simple statements backed by the legitimate
authority of government that grant permission, prohibit, or require
action under designated circumstances. If the objects of regulation
lack incentives or capacities (e.g., information, skills, material
resources) to take actions needed, then tools providing incentives or
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441 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 31. See also Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 292.
capacity can be used. Incentive instruments include tools like
inducements (positive payoffs that encourage behaviour), charges
(monetary charges for those who do not meet the standards involved
or want to exceed their quota), sanctions, and the use of force in its
direct physical action sense. Capacity tools provide information,
training, education, and resources to enable decision making. 
If the objects of regulation disagree with the values implicit with
the instruments or their goals, then instruments using symbolic or
hortatory proclamations to influence perceptions of values can be used.
An example is the use of persuasive communications that seek to
change perceptions about the regulated behaviour through appeals
to intangible values (e.g., justice, fairness, equality) or through the use
of images, symbols and labels. If the regulated situation involves, in
turn, such high levels of uncertainty that the nature of the problem
is not known, and it is unclear what people should do, then the
promotion of learning to reduce uncertainty can be used. Included are,
for example, participatory tools such as hearings, advisory boards,
or citizen panels, and mediation and arbitration programs.
In principle, the basis of classification again is different in this
taxonomy. However, even the classification on the basis of
coerciveness includes similar considerations of how the instrument
types affect the behaviour of their intended objects as the taxonomies
of Eckhoff, Mayntz, and Ingram and Schneier. As noted earlier, the
regulatory tools in the scheme of Vedung imply an influence
mechanism of expected compliance which bears resemblance to
normative and authority tools: “the governee is obligated to do what
the governor tells her to do”441. Similar to pedagogic or certain capacity
tools, the informative instruments attempt to persuade and affect the
attitudes of individuals. In the case of economic tools the influence
mechanism concentrates on making the constrained behaviour more
or less expensive/difficult by the adding or deprival of material
resources similar to incentive tools.
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442 Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 3-7.
443 Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 3-4. Even though Black makes her classification in the
connection of trying to show the partial inadequacy of tools-based analysis of
decentred regulation and to suggest a new method of “enrolment analysis”, it is
worth noting especially because it bears resemblance to the analytical frame for
studying the potential for alternative (to law, i.e., regulation in the strict sense
or even as duty-imposing legal norms) forms of control in cyberspace
popularised by Lessig in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, chapter 7.
Note the difference in the reason for the use of the concept ‘regulation’. Lessig
wishes to see the possible forms of control, which leads him to adopt a wide-
ranging conception of regulation, covering every question from social and
3.3.2  Attaching specific external influence
mechanisms to instrument types
Acknowledging that every instrument can influence behaviour by
shaping intrinsic predisposition (mediated mainly by social norms
or forms) and associating it in relation to every instrument category,
specific external and normative influence mechanisms can be roughly
attached to every regulatory strategy on the basis of these different
classifications. This is not to suggest that the instruments absolutely
cannot influence or be used to alter behaviour in other ways. The
statement is that the types of regulatory instruments seem to differ
in their ways of influencing behaviour and that this forms the main
basis for the categorisation.
As a combination of the several classifications presented above,
the main types of regulatory tools are roughly classified in the
following way in this study: Prescriptive rules (legal or non-legal),
market-harnessing or economic, informative or pedagogic (social
norms harnessing), technology-harnessing, and process-based. Note
that this comes close to a general classification suggested by Black442.
Her general taxonomy involves five main types of regulatory tools:
written norms (legal and non-legal) and accompanying sanctions,
economic- or market-based instruments, social norms and
accompanying sanctions, technologies, and processes443. 
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political sciences and thus weakening the analytical resolution of the concept.
For Lessig also markets, social forces and technologies ‘regulate’; there is no
requirement of intentionality. See, e.g., Lessig, The New Chicago School, p.
662. Black, instead, concentrates on the intentional attempts to regulate. By
defining regulation as an intentional, systematic attempt at to alter the
behaviour of others the categories of market forces, social forces and
technologies are excluded. They do not regulate because there are no
recognisable ‘actors’ having intentions to affect behaviour or, as with market
forces, the outcome of the interactions of actors is not intentional in the sense
of affecting behaviour for some defined purpose or producing broadly
identified outcomes. The patterns of interaction of rational actors, or social
norms or cultural world views, or technologies are not considered to be
regulation as such. See Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 16 and 20.
444 See above heading 1.4.
445 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 20.
The names Black uses to refer to the types of instruments are rather
surprising, especially in the case of markets, social norms, and
technologies. As already noted above she has ruled them quite
correctly outside the definition of regulation as an intentional
process444. Then why are they classified as types of regulatory tools
in here? 
Even though the patterns of interaction of rational actors (market
forces), social norms or cultural world views, or technologies are not
in themselves considered as regulation, it does not mean that they
are irrelevant in the process of regulation. On the contrary, as Black
also notices, they are influential in how regulatory systems operate,
and the regulatory systems often seek to harness these or alter them
for their own purposes445. In short, they are something constraining
(setting the limits for) behaviour (including regulatory behaviour)
and are harnessed in the processes of regulation and for its purposes.
When they are harnessed into the process of regulation – regulators
intentionally use them to modify behaviour – then they become
regulation. Thus, they become part of the regulatory toolkit available
to the regulators, together with legal and other prescribed norms.
This is also the approach of Black and becomes evident in her analysis
of the different types of instruments.
The category of prescriptive rules, incorporates ‘regulations’ or sticks
from one of the basic forms of coerciveness-based taxonomies
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446 This is also noted by Vedung in Policy Instruments, p. 31.
447 Also precedents, to the degree they can be considered to communicate an
authoritative example to individuals which they are expected to follow and
obedience of which is backed by the threat of sanctions, belong to this group.
448 Even though Ingram and Schneier categorize sanctions and the use of force
into the incentive instrument class, they are not separate policy instruments as
such. The sanctions are just one type of the negative consequences attached to
actions by regulation that provide reasons for action. Even though this notion
does not do justice to the analyses of punishment in social theory, it manages
to explicate the larger influencing role of punishment. It must be stressed,
however, that punishment is not merely a technical task of specialised
institutions as David Garland in Punishment and Modern Society brilliantly
illuminates while discussing the major social theories of punishment.
proposed by Vedung446, both authority and parts of organisational
instruments from the resources-based taxonomy (those that
concentrate on the enforcement) of Hood, the normative tools from
Eckhoff’s classification, regulative norms from Mayntz classification,
and both authority and parts of incentive instruments (especially
subcategories of sanctions and the use of force) from the classification
of Ingram and Schneier. As is visible in many of the classifications,
this category includes only rules imposing duties or obligations. Only
prescribed rules that guide behaviour directly are included as noted
by Mayntz447. A characteristic form, and also its caricature, is the
command and control model: legal rules backed by civil, criminal and
administrative sanctions monitored and enforced by a government-
empowered body. 
The notion of the directness of the guidance makes visible the way
the category of prescriptive rules influence behaviour: by telling what
action is expected from the regulated and by stipulating that negative
consequences follow if the standard is not complied with. Basically
an authoritative order is made. Obedience is assumed, but backed
by the threat of negative consequences (not just physical or monetary
sanctions under criminal law, but also any type of negative
consequence attached) 448. It has to be noted that authority, together
with negative consequences, is the defining feature of directly
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449 In the widening of the sanctions (fines, imprisonment) to all negative
consequences lies the difference to those categorisations, such as that made by
Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 31, where authority is not necessarily
accompanied with sanctions at all. Sanctions become essential when keeping
external constraining analytically separate from the intrinsic predispositions
shaping mechanism, where authoritative arguments as such (without
consequences attached) can influence behaviour.
450 This separation has been made especially in relation to law. See, e.g., Raz,
On the Functions of Law, p. 283-287, who discusses the issue in terms of
determinate or indeterminate guidance. In the Finnish discussion this
separation has been raised, e.g., by Wikström in Ohjaaminen oikeusnormeilla,
p. 399-407 and in Oikeus ja talous, p. 5-6. Bear in mind that this is a pure
normative analysis where the effort is to find the reasons for action provided
by regulation as such. There are other, possibly even more important
motivational factors than the reasons for action (certain consequences)
provided by regulation, but they are excluded for analytical purposes.
451 Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 285.
452 Note that the communicated standard is general in two ways as H.L.A Hart
explains in The Concept of Law, p. 21: it indicates a general type of conduct and
applies to a general class of persons who are expected to see that it applies to
them and to comply with it.
influencing prescriptive rules when analysing the external influencing
mechanism449.
It is important here to keep separate the two ways in which
regulation can provide guidance for behaviour as an external
constraint; direct and indirect450. The legal norms are used as an
example. When the legal norms guide behaviour directly, the objects
of regulation are told (in the general standard for behaviour
communicated) how to behave or what action to abstain from and
that certain typically undesirable consequence might follow in the case
of non-compliance. In terms of Raz: “it guides action determinately
by expressing the intention that it shall be performed and stipulating
a generally undesirable consequence to follow when it is not
performed” or vice versa (with the consequences remaining
undesirable)451. Certain options that the object of regulation consider
in making the decision to alter her behaviour are prohibited,
commanded, or made subject to permission. This is how duty
imposing norms influence.452
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453 Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, 1999, p. 39; Black, Decentring
Regulation, p. 123.
454 There is a variety of forms prescribed norms may take. Even though the
classic stereotype is the detailed legal provision, written norms can vary across
different dimensions: scope (e.g., whether they cover certain functions or
market sectors), substance (e.g., whether they are specification, process, target,
or performance standards), status (legal or some other), whether sanctions are
attached, structure (precise or general, simple or complex, clear or opaque), and
place or origin (state and non-state actors on different levels in coordination or
in no formal integration). Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 67-
68.
455 Market actors can also use private law powers to create more limited private
rights, for example to demand collaterals, or require certain disclosures,
assuming they have the market power to do so (and the law will support their
efforts). Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 4.
In the light of the decentring thesis adopted in this study it is
obvious that the direct form of influencing is not something only a
state can use. Command and control is not only a typical form of
governmental prescriptive rules. Others also essentially use
authoritative norms to communicate general standards of conduct
and try to tell directly how to behave. The discussion of self-regulation
is illuminating. As pointed out in regulatory theory, self-regulation
is often just self-administrated command and control: in the simplest
form it involves an organisation or association (e.g., lawyers
association) developing a system of rules (e.g., lawyers ethics) that
it monitors and enforces against its own members or, in some cases,
a larger community453. Non-legal prescribed rules include instruments
such as guidance, industry codes of conduct and best practices which
are not legally binding.
However, not all norms are coercive orders. Even the legal rules
come in variety of forms454. In addition to guiding behaviour directly,
they can also be used, for example, to create or alter private rights455.
These power-conferring (constitutive) rules define and thereby
constitute activities that could not otherwise even exist. They do not
tell directly how to behave and attach certain negative consequences
to non-compliance. However, they still regulate (guide) behaviour
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456 This definition of constitutive rules is taken from Schauer, Playing by the
Rules, p. 6-7, who acknowledges the usefulness of the distinction between
regulative and constitutive rules for some purposes, but points out that the
distinction is also misleading. Many constitutive rules also regulate. They first
define the behaviour and then regulate it. Thus, regulative rules regulate
behaviour within the activities defined and thus constituted by the constitutive
rules just as they regulate behaviour within environments whose definition is
less rule-dependent. In terms of Schauer, idem, regulative rules not only govern
antecedently existing behaviour but also antecedentely defined (and thus
constituted) behaviour. 
457 Raz, On the Functions of Law, 1973, p. 283-284 uses the term
indeterminate guidance. The indirect guiding function is on the basis of the
reflexive or procedural law as a strategic model developed by Gunther Teubner
(of the long line of work, see, e.g., After Legal Instrumentalism?, p. 307) and is
emphasised in regulatory studies by Julia Black in Proceduralizing Regulation.
Part I, p. 598, and in Decentring Regulation, p. 125- 126. In the Finnish
discussion this has been pointed out by Wikström in Oikeus ja talous, p. 5-6 and
in Ohjaaminen oikeusnormeilla, p. 402-403. 
458 Naturally the object of regulation also has certain freedom of choice also in
relation to the direct influence mechanisms. The difference is that when the
law is used in a direct sense the regulator has made the choices on behalf of the
regulated. The object of regulation has only the freedom to choose whether or
not she complies with the law; if not, then she is a lawbreaker and certain legal
consequences might follow. The law directly interferes with the behaviour.
When the law is used in an indirect sense the desired behaviour is not directly
commanded or prohibited. Instead, the behaviour is incited and, despite of not
complying with the regulation, one still can be law-abiding. The difference is in
as has been noted in the philosophy of the law456. The mechanism
by which they guide behaviour is different, though.
Their influence mechanism is indirect457. Instead of telling persons
how to behave or not to behave and possibly threatening some sort
of punishment or some other negative consequence if they deviate
from the standard, the law can stipulate certain legal consequences
(desirable or undesirable) to follow upon the performance of or
abstinence from certain action with the intention that these legal
consequences will affect people’s decisions to perform the action that
is permitted as such. When this type of behaviour directing is used
the regulator does not interfere in the behaviour of a person or some
other actor directly; the behaviour is neither prohibited nor required.
There is wider choice left to the regulated agent458. The regulated
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the degree of constraint set for the objects of regulation or power the regulator
has invested in the attempt to regulate; the extent to which a tool restricts
individual behaviour as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it. The
separation follows the amount of legitimate or permitted alternatives (choices
in a decision-making situation), not the extent to which behaviour is prevented
in reality.
459 Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. 3-6
460 Schauer, Playing by the Rules, p. 4. Despite of this wider usage of the term
prescriptive rules, where also instructive rules or rules of thumb are covered, I
still prefer the term prescriptive rules over mandatory rules mainly because the
term prescriptive connotates also the presence of somebody prescribing as
emphasised by Raz in Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, p. 481. Thus,
it involves the intentionality element central to the conception of regulation in
this study. Note that while pointing out that ‘prescriptive’ is often used instead
of ‘mandatory’, Raz himself prefers the term mandatory over prescriptive for
the very same reason (idem.). It is these prescriptive/mandatory rules of which
moral, legal and political philosophers have been most concerned as Raz points
out in Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, p. 481.
action is allowed, but made conditional in the achievement or
avoidance of certain consequences. The law just makes the guided
action more or less desirable than it would otherwise be, i.e., without
the consequences attached to action in the regulation. Behaviour is
incited rather than commanded.
This is the distinction of prescriptive rules, i.e., rules that are used
to guide, control or change behaviour of agents with decision-making
capacities (as separated from descriptive rules that only describe or
explain the world), into instructions and mandatory rules made by
Frederick Schauer459. The prescriptive rules to which Schauer refer
to as instructive rules or rules of thumb,  provide only useful guides
for the routine case and are optional in the sense that they apply only
if an agent wishes to succeed in the pertinent task and considers that
it is likely that by following the rule of thumb the desired result will
be produced. As Schauer points out, mandatory rules that exert
normative pressure by their mere existence are not for the agent
wholly optional460.
 
What this means is that only those prescriptive rules that influence
behaviour directly belong to the category called prescriptive rules.
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461 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 111-112.
462 The regulator can influence the availability of choices (direct the decision-
making process), e.g., by changing the mental desirability of certain choices, or
by changing the physical or virtual environment to constrain the choices. Both
of these methods influence as external constraints in the sense noted above. In
addition, the regulator can influence behaviour by designing decision-making
procedures and institutional structures.
Prescribed rules that confer powers, set up or alter processes, define
roles or in any other way guide behaviour indirectly do not belong
to this category. They do not prohibit or command certain behaviour
directly. The regulated action is allowed, but made conditional in the
achievement or avoidance of certain consequences. They belong to
the other relevant instrument categories. 
At the same time this means that only prescriptive rules can
influence behaviour directly even though there are classes of
prescriptive rules that influence behaviour indirectly. All the other
types of instruments can influence behaviour only indirectly.
Prescriptive rules that provide indirect guidance are not the only
possible instruments that influence behaviour indirectly. There are
also classes of instruments that provide indirect guidance beside
prescriptive rules that do so.
If were not the direct forms of influencing purely at the use of the
state, neither are the indirect guidance methods confined to the state
as pointed out by Julia Black with her decentring thesis461. All those
attempting to regulate behaviour, whether state-centric or not, can
induce behaviour instead of ordering. A common theme is that the
regulator does not interfere in the behaviour of the regulated directly;
the regulators create the conditions in which firms, markets and
communities steer themselves, but into the direction that the regulator
wants them to go462. This is visible especially in the other types of
instruments that provide indirect guidance beside prescriptive rules
that do so.
With these other indirectly guiding instruments the reasons for
action provided by the regulation are especially mediated by the
context of the decision-making. The consequences attached to actions
are only partial and incomplete reasons for action (incentives) among
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463 As Raz, On the Functions of Law, p. 284, notes whether the consequences
are reasons for performing or refraining from the action depends on these
changing factors. In the case of direct influencing, the stipulated legal
consequences are independent reasons for action in themselves.
464 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 86-90 and appendix. The purpose
of my study is not to analyse the relationship between regulation and social
norms, market rules or even technologies. This mainly because they are
extensive research areas in their own and I do not have much to contribute in
those discussions. The interest is in the tools that can be used to harness them
for regulatory purposes. By noting that these forces can be harnessed in the
intentional process of attempting to alter the behaviour of others and looking
for the tools to do so, only the surface of the discussion concerning the
interaction of the different constraints on behaviour is scratched. A simple
understanding without deeper knowledge is enough to see the tools regulation
might use to harness them.
a wide variety of complementary factors in various circumstances even
from the objective perspective463. The mediators of the guiding
influence of the regulation are the constraints on individual behaviour
beside the formalised general standards of conduct like legal norms
made explicit, e.g., by Lawrence Lessig: market via prices, social norms
in the form of informal social control of the community or the inner
moral norms of the self, or technology that defines the set of possible
behaviours both in the physical and the virtual spaces464.
The economic or market-harnessing instruments include, similar to the
Black’s classification, incentive (excluding sanctions and the use of
force) and parts of capacity tools (those providing economic
resources) from the classification of Ingram and Schneier. Naturally
the economic instruments (carrots) from the classification of both
Eckhoff and Vedung, and the treasures using category of the resource
based classification are also included, with the exception of the in-kind
(physical) instruments being excluded and forming a separate category.
The economic instruments influence the considerations of what kind
of behaviour is economically rational. Their intention is to make it
cheaper or more expensive in terms of money, time, effort, and other
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465 Economic instruments affect by raising or lowering the costs of engaging in
a particular activity and thus provide powerful economic incentives to
undertake the desired behaviour or to avoid the undesirable behaviour as
pointed out by the OECD Working Group on Regulatory Management and
Reform in Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, p. 138.
466 The basic rules of markets outlined in microeconomic theory have an
important influence on human behaviour; markets create incentives for people
to behave in particular ways, especially via prices. This is what economics, with
its mathematically precise theories (price and game theory), tell us. The market
governs individual behaviour by setting the substance and constraints upon
individual choice. This theoretical construction makes it possible to alter the
included rules intentionally; economic theory makes it possible to harness
market rules in the process of regulation. Naturally the markets are not
’unregulated’ because they are essentially based on the private law rules,
application of the law in courts and the enforcement processes (e.g., of private
contracts). 
valuables to pursue certain actions465. The instruments either hand
out or take away resources conditionally (provide economic incentives
for behaviour), or harness markets for regulatory purposes (by
channelling competitive forces to particular ends)466. 
Included are tools like taxing, deployance of grants or subsidies,
tradable permits, charges and regulation by contract. An example can
be found from tax relieves for those acquiring broadband access to
the Internet. The relief is a legal consequence attached to the action
of acquiring the connection that provides reasons for taking that
action; it lowers the costs of acquiring the broadband connection.
The guiding (the legal consequence attached) is mediated by the
economic (price) incentive. The market mechanisms are harnessed
for regulatory purposes.
Even though the economic instruments might seem more
prohibitive (preventive) than regulation, for example in cases where
a sanction of breaking the regulation is relatively low but the excise
tax levied on the same line of action is enormous, in principle,
regulation is more constraining than economic instruments (however
expensive they make the behaviour) because one is not allowed to
take the action if it is prohibited (an offence or a breach of duty is
involved) but, in the case of economic instruments, the action is
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467 This differentiation is made by Vedung in Policy Instruments, p. 32-33. This
is also the approach in traditional legal theory. See, e.g., the differences
between a tax and a punishment for a crime such as a fine discussed by Hart in
The Concept of Law, p. 39.
468 OECD,  Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, p. 139
469 Note that the sanctions attached to social norms (from the outside, i.e.
others in that group) are not set by the regulator. However, the regulator can
try to alter the sanctions but it is just part of the issue of changing social
norms.
allowed although it will cost a considerable amount of money to
perform it467. The separation follows the amount of legitimate or
permitted alternatives, not the extent to which behaviour is prevented
in reality. The question is about the extent to which a tool restricts
individual behaviour as opposed to merely encouraging or
discouraging it as noted above.
Many of the informative or pedagogic (social norms harnessing)
instruments simply seek to inform and enhance consumer choice,
but some of them are more explicit in seeking to change behaviour.
They are based on attempts at “moral suasion” and are generally found
where the behaviours sought to be modified have substantial
externality effects468. The informative and pedagogic instruments
harness social norms for regulatory purposes by making symbolic
or hortatory proclamations to influence perceptions of values or
learning to reduce uncertainty. It combines the sermons, the pedagogic
and informative instruments, instruments utilising the nodality of
regulators and the social norms and sanctions from the above
classifications. The informative instruments contain information,
transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned argument,
persuasion and education and are often performed in the forms of
information or education campaigns.469 
Even though Black in her general taxonomy includes also legal
rules into the tools that can be use to alter social norms, in addition
to education and information, the use of peer pressure to ensure that
others act in accordance with certain standards of behaviour, and
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470 Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 7.
471 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 163.
472 Etzioni, Social Norms, p. 169-170.
simple blacklisting and their publication470, they do not do so in the
external constraining sense. They can be used to alter social norms, but
only as information on the rules, i.e., as a metainstrument by the means
of expression and justification. This was analytically separated above
from information as a policy instrument. The justifications given for
a written rule, or an economic, technology, process harnessing, or
even the informative instrument, and the way the rules are expressed
also involve persuasive element, but this should be separated from
the information as a separate externally constraining policy instrument.
It needs to be acknowledged that the informative or pedagogic
regulatory instruments (information as a policy instrument) can also
influence behaviour either as external constraints or by shaping
intrinsic predispositions. As pointed out by Etzioni, they both inform
about the costs, benefits and constraints involved in certain action
(e.g., of the harms of smoking) and empower the relevant social group
to direct pressure towards the deviator (e.g., shaming, shunning), and
thus affect the consideration of the content and intensity of numerous
particular predispositions in a decision-making situation, and help
people to form (and re-form) the self by profoundly influencing their
identities, their worldviews, their views of themselves471. A good
example is advertising. Advertising is not strictly informational and
thus not only affects behaviour by affecting considerations of costs
and benefits (and, as a rule, do not shape preferences; i.e., advertising
is considered to affect as an external mechanism) but also a means
of subconsciously affecting people’s preferences and thus a form of
persuasion in the terms of Etzioni472.
If were the intrinsic predispositions shaping as a way for the
regulation to influence behaviour mediated with the non-rational
process of internalisation and persuasion by which people adhere to
them, similar non-rationality can also be seen in relation to the external
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473 Weiss, Public Information, p. 218-219 and 227-228.
474 This is held also by Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 18.
475 This is what Etzioni labels as ‘law and socioeconomics’ in a longer line of
study. See, e.g., Etzioni, Social Norms, 2000, p. 158. Etzioni argues in Social
Norms, p. 157-179, that the common grounds are found by combining the
themes of (a) whether social norms affect individual behaviour merely as
external constraints or whether they also shape people’s intrinsic
predispositions, (b) whether preferences are considered predetermined or
assumed to be modifiable as a result of internalisation and persuasion, and (c)
the ways social norms are themselves formed (merely via rational choice or
influence mechanism of  informative and pedagogic instruments
(information as a policy instrument, social norms harnessing
instruments). As pointed out by Weiss in her analysis of public
information as a governance tool, while acknowledging that people
react to the information provided by the regulation, it is not necessary
to adhere to the rational choice model of decision-making473. Although
there is some truth, and strong explanatory force, in the simple view
that people make decisions by adjusting automatically and
continuously to information that bears on any consequences of their
actions, much of the time full information is not available to all or
feasible to gather, and all individuals are not perfectly responsive even
to the information that is available. In addition, the information may
affect both the explicit and implicit cognition, i.e., people may still
respond to information in the world around them and connect it to
their subsequent behaviour even though they might not be making
deliberate, conscious calculations about what they do.474
Social norms and markets are, to certain degree, clear objects to be
harnessed in the process of regulation. Their relation to regulation
and especially the law is not even questionable. There are established
research areas considering both of them: those leaning on sociology
(legal sociology, law and society, etc.), and those leaning on the
economics (law and economics with its different schools but a
common paradigm). There are even considerations of some sort of
a common ground between the study social norms in the disciplines
of law-and-society and law-and-economics475. 
Regulating Secure Software Development188
also through historical transmissions). It has to be noted that law and
economics scholars dominate the contemporary study of social norms in the
legal academia. The emerging discussion of the combined study of social
norms between the law-and-society and law-and-economics scholarship, and
the overall increasing interaction between these disciplines cannot be taken
further in this study. For overviews, see Law & Society Review, Vol. 38, No. 2,
2004
476 Economics (together with law and economics) based theories of regulation
do not see the role of technology. It is hard to combine the regulatory force of
technologies when preferences are considered as stable and exogenous.  But
social (or socio-legal) theories of regulation are no better. Even though they
consider preferences as endogenous, they miss the role of technology in
concentrating only on human behaviour. This means that when considering
the role of technology in the process of regulation, the focus needs to expand
from the interests and actions of humans (the main issue in regulation) to the
constraints and possibilities of the relevant technologies as such.
477 The definitions in their basic form are taken from MacKenzie and
Wajcman, Introductory Essay: The Social Shaping of Technology, p. 3-4. A
generalized speaking of ‘technology’ as a coherent and material thing with
homogeneous and undifferentiated characteristics, and not just about certain
technologies (techniques) is aligned with technological determinism (due to
reification, i.e., treating an abstraction as a material thing) that I am trying to
avoid and somewhat against to due to its role in mystifying and detaching
technology from the interaction of social forces. But it is very difficult to avoid
reification if one wants to use at least some kinds of generalizations. See
Chandler, Technological or Media Determinism, part ”Reification”.
This is not the case with technology. It is not a part of mainstream
regulatory literature and not typically considered even in the socio-legal
studies476. Thus, the situation is not even as clear as with the role of
social and market forces in the process of regulation, which is widely
acknowledge even though not widely known or deeply analysed. This
is why the role of technology has to be taken a little bit further, even
though the interest in here is not on how technology as such operates
similarly to treatment of market rules or social norms (the purpose
is to analyse intentional attempts to alter them).
Technology can be understood at least in three different ways477.
In the first, used by most legal professionals as well as regulationists,
technology is considered as something requiring knowledge of
technical details; it is just about machines and devices that have a really
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478 This is how expertise in copyright and patent law, the few areas of law that
directly deal with technology and from where legal professionals get their view
of the emergence of technology, has traditionally been seen by legal
professionals – marginal and requiring knowledge of technical details. The
informatisation of life, however, brings these disciplines into the forefront of
legal expertise and may require substantial changes to the system of intellectual
property rights as Annamari Turunen argues on the basis of an comprehensive
analysis of the legal architecture for innovations. 
479 The development of society is understood to consist of the evolution of and
interaction between these generalised systems of communication. See, e.g.,
Sand, A Future or a Demise for the Theory of the Sociology of Law, p. 56-60.
vague relation to the society. Technology is just a tool or a device.
This narrow definition of technology separates it from the sphere
of interest of legal or regulatory research and leaves the studying of
it to the technical professionals. It is something marginal outside the
disciplines of regulation and law478. In the second, people are brought
to the scope of the conception technology. Even a computer is not
meaningful without a user and the purpose of use. This increases the
interestingness of technology to legal and regulatory research because
people’s behaviour in various situations is the main target for (legal)
regulation. 
In addition to machines, devices, their users and the needs of these
users, there also is a third level in understanding technology. It includes
people’s knowledge and doings with relation to these machines and
devices. Technology is knowledge; the know-how to use them, repair
them, design them and make them. It is also about the holder of this
knowledge and the right to use it. This adds the organizations and
the institutions using this information as well as their architecture and
interdependence to the definition of technology. Technology, in this
sense, includes also the power over the economic and productional
processes as well as the consistent social circumstances of the
technological systems. In this sense, technology is knowledge and
transmission of information (communication); it is one of many
generalised systems of communication together with politics,
economy, science, art, law, religion etc. also known as social
functions479.
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480 This is how Black in Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial
Services Regulation, p. 6-7, refers to technologies: as specialist understandings
of and ability to employ, manipulate, calculate, measure or alter the physical,
economic or human environment and the products of that understanding. The
place of ‘technologies’ in regulation is thus that they are the understandings of
the world on which the design of both the problem that regulation seeks to
address and the solution to that problem are built, and it is suggested that they
form an important part of the strategies that are used in attempts to modify
behaviour. At their simplest they may be the design of the physical
environment or its virtual equivalent.
481 There are different approaches to the ways these actors operate. For an
overview to the wide discussion about the role of technology see, e.g., Hosein,
Regulating the Technological Actor, p. 55-68, with extensive references. Anti-
essentialists believe that researchers must listen to the social interpretations of
the technological; the technological actor does not speak. Social constructivists
argue that we must open the discourse and look at the granular details of the
construction of the technological to see that it is a social and technological
construction. Those who support the social shaping approach say that social
actors may affect the construction of the technological; although the
technological actor may also refuse to work. Technological momentum notices that
systems may radically change due to social and technological shifts in the
environment. Common argument in these approaches is that the technological
actor, in fact all actors, may resist interpretation, construction, and shaping; the
technological actor can also object to being spoken for, and can object to being
translated (Hosein, Regulating the Technological Actor, p. 66)
This third understanding is the way ‘technology’ is to be understood
in the regulatory arena; not just as machines and devices, not even
when combined with the users and different uses. It includes also
people’s knowledge and doings with relation to the machines and
devices and the holder of this knowledge and right to use it.
Technology is a product of understandings of the physical and human
environment together with the ability to employ, manipulate or alter
it480. 
Technology, in this sense, is neither deterministic (technology as
sufficient or, at least, necessary condition determining widespread
societal or behavioural changes) nor voluntaristic (individuals choose
the tools they use and have perfect control over them; the direction
of technological development is chosen by individuals). Technology
is a system where both technological and social actors operate481.
Technology is not deterministic because it requires human
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482 According to Bruno Latour technologies may disrupt human action through
objecting; technologies can force us to renegotiate our paths and goals and so
restructure our behaviour. Latour, When Things Strike Back, p. 115-117.
483 I refrain from using the ‘Lessigian’ term of architecture (the built
environment; the way the world is; the combined constraints of physics,
nature, and technology that in the aggregate define the contours of the places
where human behaviour occurs and the things through which it is expressed)
in this context. The message that is included in the term is by no means clear
or obvious; it is difficult to see what is referred to when speaking about
‘architecture’ since it has so many different usages. I do acknowledge that it
necessarily not always is technology, in any of its definitions, that constraints
behaviour when speaking about constraint of the built environment. There are
also non-man-made constraints, such as the examples used by Lessig in Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 236: gravity and the limit to the speed human
beings can travel. The nature and physics set the limits of our behaviour.
However, these constraints of nature and physics are present in the
technologies and technological systems; they are developed on the basis of
understanding or and ability to manipulate this physical and human
environment together with its virtual version. Technology is a product of this
understanding and ability to manipulate. In addition, these non-man-made
constraints are not all that important in the context of information security; we
build the physical and logical constraints of behaviour in relation to
information and information systems.
interpretations and action. Yet, neither is voluntarism the answer as
technology objects to human action482. Technology has a role to play,
but also represents the interests of its developers and is therefore
socially shaped.
Technology-harnessing instruments utilise the ability to shape the
physical or virtual environment. They facilitate or hamper certain
operations in the actor’s environment. Examples are buildings, devices,
and other physical constructions and virtual counterparts.
Technologies define the set of possible behaviours both in the
physical and the virtual spaces; they are part of the built environment
of the problem regulation seeks to address together with the solution
to it483. It is within the boundaries set by the technologies where social
norms and markets can be harnessed and where regulation operates.
Thus, technology sets the possible behaviours and regulation
determines which behaviours predominate. 
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484 Such systems are widely used by the ISPs in Europe on a voluntary basis
and often in a self-regulatory manner in cooperation with the police as the
recent report to the Ministry of Transport and Communications explicates.
The report titled as “Selvitys lainsäädännöllisistä esteistä ja muutostarpeista
rikollisen ja lapsille haitallisen sisällön estokeinojen velvoittavuuteen liittyen”,
LVM Hanke 42976, Dno. 1394/92/2005, is available in Finnish at
http://www.mintc.fi/oliver/upl973-Railaksen%20selvitys.pdf [19.12.2005]. It
is part of the consideration to implement similar voluntary self-regulatory
filtering system also in Finland.
485 There is no individual or a group enforcing the constraint; the enforcement
is embedded in the design. For example, bars over windows, once installed,
prevent entry without the continuing intervention of other individuals. For the
general argument see, e.g., Reidenberg.  Lex Informatica, p. 565 and Berman,
Cyberspace and the State-Action Debate, p. 5.
486 The constraints are enforced without the need to be internalised by the
individual experiencing the constraint. This is the argument of Lessig in Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Appendix, p. 236-239, especially endnote 8.
Different kind of rules can be embedded into technological
systems. In the virtual environment the decisions of programmers
about software design set the rules for behaviour just as the decisions
in the physical environment, e.g., of road planners and bridge builders,
control what can be done and where. Harnessing these rules and their
designers in the intentional process of regulation has become possible
with the developed understanding of this process. A clear example
of the kinds of rules that can be embedded into technological systems
is provided by the use of filters to block access to web sites containing
child pornography484.
Technology, as a constraint of behaviour, is as important as social
and economic forces in that it affects the activity of regulating (sets
the basic limits regulation can achieve) and can be deployed in that
activity (alteration of the technology for the purposes of the regulator).
But the technology harnessing instruments are different. Where there
are actors or forces setting up and enforcing (executing) the
constraints that harness social norms and markets, the constraint of
technology, even though often generated (build) by people, is self-
executing485 and is imposed without any requirement of subjectivity486.
Thus, the technology harnessing instruments are not only automatic,
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487 This is also noted by Vedung in Policy Instruments, p. 43, according to
whom “in-kind economic instruments are more constraining to recipients than
in-cash instruments“.
488 This is noted, e.g., by Boyle in Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and
Hard-Wired Censors, Heading “Conclusions” second paragraph, and by Lessig in
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Appendix, p. 236.
489 For example, when the efficacy of technological protection of copyrighted
works was demolished with the new circumvention means, other regulatory
instruments needed to be taken into use to protect the technology as the
famous cases of anti-circumvention regulation in the DMCA (Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, the EUCD (European Union Copyright Directive)
in the sense that they do not have to be separately enforced, but also
more effective, because technological constraints work whether or
not the subject knows they are working (for other instruments to
work, the objects of regulation need to know at least something about
them)487.
Regulators, whether state centric or not, need to understand the
role of technology because the possibilities provided by it help to drive
the rulemaking process. It is often a more efficient way to enforce
rules than sanctions (due to lack of subjectivity requirement; it
enforces without the need to be internalised) and even more
importantly, it is an invisible way of doing this; there is no political
risk involved because the regulation is being done via alteration of
physical environment. The regulatory function of technology is
normally not made explicit; it appears to be just the way things are488.
Beyond this, the technology harnessing regulatory approach does
not offer an easy tool for solving current and future problems. The
providers and administrators of the relevant technologies are
diversified; often there is no single party or a coherent group. Finally,
the regulatory effects of technology harnessing instruments are often
unintended, not least because the ways it affects is not general
knowledge. For technology typically is developed by technicians who
tend to be concerned by not much more than technical efficacy. Its
regulatory function has not been of much interest. In addition, the
regulatory mechanisms implemented in technology can be
circumvented, just as physical barriers can be broken through489.
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and the Conditional Access directive illustrate. For an excellent overview of the
regulatory background, see the analysis of Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite
in Information Feudalism, p. 184-186, drawing on data from interviews of key
informants of the rise of the TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Propery Rights).
490 The complexity of operational environment in information technology is
not restricted on mere entirety of software and hardware. The people, the
institutions and the organisations associated with it make the operational
environment even more complex. This extensive definition of technology –
technology as a system where software and hardware are united with people,
institutions and organisations to work as a seamless network – makes the
information infrastructure so comprehensive that it is really difficult to piece it
together.
491 More about the effects of the acceleration of technological development to
the law as communication see Sand, A Future or a Demise for the Theory of
the Sociology of Law, p. 57-59.
Combining regulation (especially law) and technology is not a
straightforward task. Normative expectations and legitimate decision-
making by law together with democracy and the rule of law are still
vital parts of the coordination of modern societies. However, together
with the complexity and flexibility of the ‘new’ technologies and their
rapid change, also the steering of technology as part of the
coordination of a society is at change. Possibilities for external
intervention seem to diminish. At a time of rapid and intensive change
it is difficult to give legal and other normative expectations that usually
are based on earlier experiences and require at least some degree of
stability. The complexity of systems and the speed of development
hinder the construction of adequate legal versions of reality (legal
visions of certain issues)490. Legal structures easily become inadequate
and insufficient.491 
The passing of normative expectations and legitimate decision-
making is further hindered when the technology is seen as machines,
devices, and software that require understanding of technical details,
thus alienating regulators from technology, especially those not
familiar with it. However, seeing both regulation and technology as
communication helps to connect their development. They are both
one of many generalised systems of communication together with
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492 The main mediator between the law and the technology is the market, but
also governments and participants of civil society (e.g., families, civic
organisations, workplaces, religions, communities, and etc.) are between law
and technology as Joseph H. Sommer points out in his critical analysis of the
technologically systematised bodies of law such as “cyberlaw”, Against Cyberlaw,
heading ”The Perils of Cyberlaw”.
politics, economy, science, art, and religion etc. also known as social
functions. Technology in the widest sense (as communication) helps
to master the complexity and to adapt to the flexibility, by showing
its relationships with and effect on society, law, economics, politics,
science, etc. This comprehensive definition of technology makes more
easily visible e.g. the possibilities of regulation to adapt to the changes
in society by reforming the regulation of institutions to favour certain
solutions.
Technology affects society, even profoundly. So does law and other
regulations. And society affects technology, law and regulation in
general. This is clear even for a legal professional. The relationship
between technology and regulation just seems to become distorted.
It is misleading to consider that relationship similarly direct as the
relationship between technology and human behaviour. There are
social practices and institutions mediating them492. This makes the
indirect regulation via technology difficult for the government because
technology is less and less in direct ownership or control of
government or some other party. With privatisation (increasing
contracting out government services and use of government
sponsored enterprises instead of government corporations or direct
government), general use of intermediaries in regulation and decentred
regulation in general, the indirection multiplies. Regulating behaviour
via changing technological habitat has been done, to increasing degree,
by using several mediating forces and actors. In relation to ‘new’ ICT
this is especially problematic due to the still existing basic starting
point of laissez-faire and heavy competition.
Process-based instruments are a bit of a special case. Procedures,
participation, and institutional design are the common solutions
advocated currently; the dominant call is to develop procedures and
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493 Black, Proceduralizing Regulation, p. 597.
494 Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 7. Note the similarity to above mentioned classification of
Mayntz in The Conditions of Effective Public Policy, p. 139, where procedural
rules are set for the cooperation and/or resolution of conflicts between two or
more parties without trying to control the outcome of these processes directly.
In addition, see also Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 176, who includes the
regulation of legal processes into his classification of legal regulations. The
process-based instruments are also similar to the procedural programs
(prozedurales programm) in the German classification of different political
programs made in implementation research. Reference is made on Tala, Lakien
vaikutukset, p. 159-165, because the originals are in German. The original
German text to which Tala refers to are Mayntz R (1983) Zur Einleitung:
Probleme der Theoriebildung in der Implementationsforschung, in Mayntz
(ed.) Implementation Politischer Programme II, Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 11-13 (7-
24), and König K and Dose N (1989) Klassifizierungsansätze staatlicher
Handlungsformen, Speyerer Forschungsberichte 83. Procedural regulation is
also defined as a form of state centred regulation by Jarass in Regulation as an
Instrument of Economic Policy, p. 79. 
495 As pointed out by Black in Mapping the Contours of Contemporary
Financial Services Regulation, p. 7, the institutional structure or procedure
might also be the goal in itself, in addition to being the means for achieving a
certain desired goal or policy objective. In addition to using processes to
achieve certain material decisions or the quality of products, they can be used
self-sufficiently (the goal being or that the process itself respects certain
values). Processes can also be used more explicitly; demanding that they are put
in place, but at the same time specifying the type of outcome that should be
institutional structures that will enhance deliberation and enable
participation493. These instruments are so named because they
structure or require the development of organisational or decision-
making processes in a way that attempts to ensure that appropriate
outcomes are reached even though the appropriate outcomes or the
decisions to be reached are not necessarily specified.494 
The procedural regulations, even though they do not typically
determine the results the participants in the procedures ought to
achieve (they are formed during the action of the participants of the
procedure), guide behaviour indirectly because the procedures are
being set in place, and for example, participation enabled or
deliberation enhanced, with the objective of achieving certain types
of results (even though they might not specified)495. For example,
The way regulation affects behaviour 197
reached and imposing liability if this does not happen. As Jarass notes in
Regulation as an Instrument of Economic Policy, p. 79-80, in most cases
procedural regulations are combined with substantive regulations which
prescribe desired conduct. Process-based regulation may also take the form
trying to balance opposing forces or to solve conflicts through the design of
processes. 
496 An example, of the law strengthening existing institutional structures, but
not constituting them is the relationship between law and markets; the market
economy needs at least private law to operate but it can exists in spite of the
legal system. In addition, one of the functions of law is to strengthen existing
social norms but social norms are seldom constituted by the law. An example
of the role of law in constituting institutional structures is taxing. Wikström,
Ohjaaminen oikeusnormeilla, p. 400.
497 Whereas the indirect guidance provided by other instruments is mediated by
the other constraints on individual behaviour (than formalised, duty imposing
rules), the influence mechanism of the process-based instruments is mediated
by the structures of the institutions that implement or enforce the constraints
(also the constraint of formalised rules), or their decision-making procedures.
when the law is used to affect behaviour structurally, by constituting
new institutional structures and by strengthening existing institutional
structures, the content of the behaviour typically is of less interest
and the desirability of certain choices is not increased or decreased
as such496.
Their influence is indirect in another sense. They guide behaviour
by demanding the objects of regulation to deliberate, to use a
systematic approach in doing things, to take notice of the interests
of certain parties (by enabling them to participate or by requiring them
to be heard), or to make the processes public and open. Whereas other
instruments add consequences to be considered, the process-based
instruments alter the context of the decision-making497. They concern
organisations and procedures, the redistribution of power and
competences; they create or alter procedures for the support of the
decision-making and rely on the decision-making and operational
systems together with their design. 
Examples are processes that ensure a systematic approach to
controlling and minimising productions risks (like development
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498 As the OECD Working Group on Regulatory Management and Reform
notes in its review of regulatory reform in OECD countries, procedural rules
can also be used in a manner where the regulator requires businesses to
develop processes that ensure a systematic approach to controlling and
minimising production risk. OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries, p.
136. The term process based instrument is also used in this report for this type
of regulation.
499 In the first comprehensive Finnish analysis of information security norms
Saarenpää and Pöysti, Data Security and Law, heading 13.4, classified them into
nine groups of which one is the norms regulating the functions and structure
of organisations whose task it is to promote and provide data security.
methods)498. Also the institutional or organisational forms used belong
to the process-based category499. An example could be a regulator
(e.g., state, industrial pressure group, labour market organisation,
consumer group) trying to enhance the public interest by requiring
corporate boards of directors to include a certain number of
representatives that are not dependent on the firm, in the hope that
the boards would then by themselves decide to act more consistently
with the public interest. This strategy could be used instead of
regulation directly requiring corporations to do certain things that
would benefit the public interest.
In order to make processes a distinctive category, they have to be
separated from the tools that can be used inside these processes. For
example, a party in a cooperative process (e.g., required negotiations)
may try to persuade the other party by threatening to use more
coercive means (e.g., direct action). Information is typically used inside
processes (especially in participatory) to influence others. The
regulation through the design of processes does not cover these (they
are distinctive tools in themselves). Instead, it concentrates on the
surrounding organisational and decision-making environment and
their structures.
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500 Regulatory strategies rarely employ just one of the tools. The buzz word in
regulation is a regulatory mix. In practice, alternative regulatory strategies are
often hybrids of two or more tools; e.g., self-regulation forms a hybrid of
social norms harnessing instruments and prescriptive rules (typically written
rules), and contractual governance resembles a hybrid of market-harnessing
instruments and prescriptive rules.
501 Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action, p. 26; Tala,
Lakien vaikutukset, p. 155. However, even information tools can involve
considerable coercion if information crosses the border into indoctrination.
But this coercion still is in another, more subtle level. Of this, see Weiss, Public
Information, p. 220-221.
502 Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung, Conclusions: Policy Instruments, Types,
Packages, Choices and Evaluation, p. 263-264; Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 155.
503 This is typical horizontal packaging as defined, e.g., by Bemelmans-Videc
and Vedung in Conclusions: Policy Instruments, Types, Packages, Choices and
3.4  Packaging influence mechanisms -
the interaction of instruments
Regulatory instruments are not used in isolation. They come in
packages and they interact in many ways500. A basic notion is that
regulatory instruments are chronologically sequenced, i.e., they are
selected in a certain time order. In addition, the above mentioned
classifications of instruments on the basis of coerciveness has an
implicit hypothesis according to which, other things being equal, the
more coercive the tool, the more effective it is likely to be501. The
object of regulation is expected to comply better with the more
coercive tools. From the point of view of the regulated this
classification coordinates with the level of restriction on the margin
left where to choose; the information provided by the regulator does
not limit the possible choices, where as the threat of enforcement
on imprisonment does. This is the degree of constraint the regulation
sets for individual behaviour. This classification also underlies the
notion of evaluation studies according to which problems are reacted
with escalation; starting from less coercive (like information provision
and education) and moving to more restrictive forms where needed.502
If the clear case of different instruments being used at the same
time towards the same objects of regulation is omitted503 then vertical
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Evaluation, p. 262-263. Note that this is clear only from the perspective of the
regulator. Horizontal packaging of different instruments with separate
influence mechanisms may shape the effects created, but in the current study
this is partly omitted. In an analysis of a specific implementation of certain
instruments it could be possible to analyse the effects of different horizontal
packages used, but it is not feasible to go through every possible kind of
package since there are so many.
504 See, e.g., Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung, Conclusions: Policy Instruments,
Types, Packages, Choices and Evaluation, p. 257-263.
packaging is something that has to be considered. As discussed in
relation to state-centred regulation, vertical packaging is the practice
of directing one instrument at the implementation of another
instrument504. The regulator uses several layers of actors to influence
the final addressees, and the higher-level actors are supposed to exert
influence over lower-level actors again through the use of policy
instruments. The instruments used at different levels can differ and
typically do. A typical example illustrated in picture 3.1 is mandatory
labelling where laws are used to force producers and distributors to
provide information to the consumers.
Government
Prescription to put on labels
(Prescriptive rule)
Sellers (implementing agents)
Labels
(Information instrument)
Consumers (Targets of Regulation)
Picture 3-1 Labelling as vertical packaging
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505 Salamon in The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action, p. 2 and
8, note this in relation to the United States. Salamon, idem, p. 5-6, and 597,
also notes the reliance on indirect tools in Europe as does Moran and Prosser
in Privatization and Regulatory Change in Europe, p. 10. Similar points have
been made also in the Nordic countries by Mathiesen in Rätten i samhället, p. 90,
and Niemivuo in Kansallinen lainvalmistelu, p. 10-12. Lessig in Code and Other
Laws of Cyberspace, p. 95 makes the same notion in relation to the regulation of
the cyberspace. 
506 Scandinavia is a bit of a special case in this relation. Even the central study
books, such as that of Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public
Action, p. 5-6, note that direct government is still central in Scandinavia. The
legal tradition in constitutional state especially in Finland has hindered the
development towards the use of more indirect regulatory mechanism and the
use of non-legal regulatory alternatives to parliamentary acts as pointed out by
Jyrki Tala in Lainsäädännön vaihtoehdot – tarve ja tehtävät, p. 6, but is not
non-existent as the privatizations of many governmental enterprises (former
governmental monopolies) already testify.
507 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 111-112. This is actually also noted by
Lessig in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, p. 99, but he does not elaborate it
and does not seem all that worried about the problems of indirection outside
the state actors.
The use of indirect strategies of regulation, in the sense that the
instruments used rely heavily on a wide assortment of third parties
(e.g., corporations, universities, other levels of government) and
employ other “forces” (markets, social forces and technologies) for
their purposes has increased. This has been widely recognized
especially in relation to law and other instruments typically used by
state actors505. There is nothing new in the delegation of governmental
powers and duties. However, governmental actions are being shared
with a wider array of third parties, and even the exercise of discretion
over the use of the public authority and the use of public funds are
shared506. However, in the light of the decentring thesis, also other
than state-centred actors utilise this practice507.
It is noteworthy that both the direct and indirect behaviour
influencing mechanism and every type of instrument can be used at
any of the vertical stages. The object of regulation, the party
considering the consequences attached to actions and whose actions
are either directly limited or made more or less desirable, just is the
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508 This has been pointed out by Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung in
Conclusions: Policy Instruments, Types, Packages, Choices and Evaluation, p.
260. Lessig also notes in The Law of the Horse, p. 511-512, that “architecture”,
similar to all of his modalities (law, markets, and norms), can operate at a level
of indirection (when using a more strict understanding of regulation: can be
employed to regulate other instruments). However he concentrates just on two:
the effect of law on the market, norms and architecture, and the effect of
architecture on law, market and norms.
509 The difference between contractual regulation and prescriptive rules is
twofold. Firstly, there is a freedom of choice in adhering to the contract. The
directions provided in the contracts are consequences attached to the action of
contracting and thus only provide an incentive – they tell what to do only
when the party has adhered to the contract. Secondly, when this adherence has
taken place, and the contracts authoritatively tell what to do and threat with
negative consequences (damages, end of contract, etc.), the standard for
behaviour provided does not apply to a general class of person. It applies only
to the parties of the contract.
510 Vedung, Policy Instruments, p. 37. It should be noted that the model of
vertical packaging is neither a depiction of empirical realities, nor a normative
ideal. Instead, it is a heuristic tool for analysis; an ideal type as pointed out by
Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung in Conclusions: Policy Instruments, Types,
actor at the upper lever of the vertical package instead of the final
target of the regulation. However, at the same time with the increased
use of third party government there has been a shift towards to use
of the more indirect and abstract guidance mechanisms referred to
above.
Thus, prescriptive rules (especially duty-imposing legal norms, but
also other legal norms) are not the only category of instruments that
can be, and typically are employed to regulate actors in mediating
levels and to control the use of other instruments in the lower level
of packaging508. The will of the original regulator can be enforced by
requiring implementation by third parties or other forces through
means (other than prescriptive rules) like government contracts509,
through state ownership position, by changing technology or by
harnessing social norms etc.
When categorising instruments and analysing their influence
mechanism it is important to keep in mind to which vertical stage
in the chain of implementation the instrument is directed510. It helps
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Packages, Choices and Evaluation, p. 258.
511 This is done, for example by Vedung in Policy Instruments, p. 37. 
to separate the different instrument from each other even though they
might seem to include similar parts. For example, legal and other
prescriptive rules are part of most packages. In the case of disclosure
rules, prescriptive rules require mandatory disclosure (oblige suppliers
of goods to provide information to consumers on price, composition,
quantity, or quality), or prohibit the supply of false or misleading
information. However, they belong to the prescriptive rule category
only in relation to sellers (who are required to provide or prevent the
disclosure of certain information). In relation to consumers, who are
supposed to get the information or not to be subjected with it, and,
as a consequence, perhaps act in some way or another, they are
informative instruments. 
For the sake of simplicity, the issue of vertical packaging is typically
disregarded in the categorisation of the instruments, and the
concentration is on the consumers and other final objects of regulation
in the chain511. The main function of the instrument is considered
to be the form of guidance it provides on the final targets (be they
end-users, consumers, or private or governmental  organisations).
Unnecessary complexity in the classification can be removed by
making this simplifying assumption. This is in line with the basic
starting point in the normative analysis of the ways regulation guides
behaviour; the effects of regulation are caused by the actions of the
final object of regulation. 
However, this is too simplifying for the needs of the analysis of
the regulatory capability of instruments. The heuristic tool of vertical
packaging cannot be disregarded when the capabilities to influence
are considered. The effects of regulation on the behaviour of the final
targets of regulation are influenced by the vertical stages as
implementation studies have clearly shown; implementation alters
the effects created. In addition, the effects on the institutions
implementing and enforcing the instruments, on their procedures
and practices are no less relevant than the effects on the behaviour
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512 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 70-74.
513 Note that this is not a defining feature because the direct/indirect guidance
provided by regulation and the issue of vertical packaging are analytically
separate.
514 DeLeon in The Stages Approach to the Policy Process, provides an
introduction and a critical evaluation of the stages approach to the policy
of the final targets512. This is why the vertical packages are considered
in the analysis of the influencing capabilities of instruments, even
though the classification disregards it.
As already noted, the instruments used in influencing behaviour
indirectly are essentially vertically packaged. They often are directed
at third parties that then address the final objects of regulation513.
In addition, the regulators with their different resources and use of
variety of instruments with different effects in the earlier stages of
the chain affect the ways the final addressees react. The upper levels
of vertical packages affect capacities the final regulators have and thus
become relevant for the effects regulation is likely to have on the final
addressees. This is especially important in the analysis of the
implementation of the instruments. 
Neither are the effects on the institutions implementing and
enforcing the instruments, or their procedures and practices less
relevant than the effects on the behaviour of the final targets. Under
consideration are then the tasks, authorities, means, responsibilities
and resources given in regulation to the implementing or supervisory
bodies, how regulation changes these and how it affects the operation
of the institutions. In addition to the considerations on the effects
of regulation on the implementing and supervising bodies, included
are also considerations of the effect on their procedures and practices
because they define the final objects ability to utilise the rights and
powers assigned to them.
Note that this study, similarly to the stages approaches in policy
analysis where policy process is divided into a series of stages such
as initiation, estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation,
termination514, still adopts a legalistic, top-down bias, in which the
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process.
515 This part of the criticism towards the stages heuristic has been made explicit
by Sabatier in The Need for Better Theories, p. 7. 
516 Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 174 and more generally in chapters 8 and 9.
focus is on the passage and implementation of a major piece of
legislation. When the analysis in this study concentrates on individual
instruments, this focus neglects the interaction of the implementation
and evaluation of numerous pieces of regulatory instruments – none
of them pre-eminent – within a given policy domain. The
concentration on one individual regulatory instrument, e.g., the
assumption of major piece of legislation, oversimplifies the usual
process of multiple, interactive instruments involving numerous
instruments at multiple levels (not even solely under government,
but also wider).515
3.5  Classifications of regulators and their objects
In order to be able to analyse the regulatory capabilities of different
instruments in its decentred form, a deeper understanding of who
is regulating the issue of secure software development is needed. This
depiction of the regulators, objects of regulation and other actors in
the regulatory system concerning secure software development is made
in order to be able to point out who is regulating and who is being
regulated with specific instruments. This is no trivial task. If the
regulators are desired to be identified, the roles they can play in
different regulatory contexts has to be identified. The question of who
is regulating, who is being regulated and what kind of an operational
environment they create is important for the shape of the effects of
regulation is going to have516. Different regulators have different
resources and regulatory capacities accompanied, and thus different
possibilities to influence behaviour.
The role of the regulated is not that obvious. It matters in relation
to what the effects are going to be through the reactions of the objects
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517 By limiting the study of regulation to intentional acts of directing behaviour,
the regulators become distinguishable. When regulation is something
intentionally used, there has to be recognisable actors having intentions. With a
broader definition of regulation this would not be possible.
518 This statement implies that legal authority is just one form of power.
Although the state may have a near monopoly of such power, other key
sources (information, expertise, financial resources, authority and legitimacy,
organizational capacities and strategic position) are widely dispersed as pointed
out by Black in Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 72-73. This
dispersion of regulatory resources is one of the key arguments of decentring.
The decentring thesis has emphasised that any of the regulatory tools may be
used by the state, the community, associations, networks, or individual actors
(including firms) with the obvious exception within constitutional democracy
that the use of force and imprisonment are confined to the state, and that
complex sets of relationships may exist between these actors. This makes the
categorisation of different forms of self-regulation, more or less, analytically
questionable; the same tools can be used by different actors and in many
combinations between the actors may occur and there no longer is a basis for
the black or white, state or self-regulation, debate. As Black notes in Mapping
the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services Regulation, p. 3 and 9, state
or self-regulation are just two examples of a far wider range of possible
configuration of relationships and roles. However, this study does not go deep
into these relationships and the regulators of secure software development
(also their cooperative forms) are depicted only in the purpose of being able to
identify the regulators and objects in relation to specific regulatory instruments
used in the context of secure software development.
and the way they can be expected the react depends on the type of
actor. The objects of regulation also have different informational
resources available, their expertise in the issues varies, they have
different levels of interests and they approach the issue from different
perspectives.
Adopting a decentred understanding of regulation widens the range
of actors that are in a position that enables them to intentionally
influence the behaviour of others for the purpose of developing secure
software and information systems (possible regulators)517. Regulators
no longer are just state institutions but can also include a range of
non-state institutions or actors (NSAs) and even individuals518.
State institutions include a wide range of governmental actors on
many levels. On national level there are parliaments, ministries,
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519 These intergovernmental organisations could also be considered to be non-
state actors (NSAs) due to their relative autonomy from states in making
decisions and policies, given their expertise, formal authority, independent
personnel and ties to non-governmental organisations. However, they are
established by states, formally ruled by states and instrumental to state
interests.
520 For varying definitions of international non-governmental organisations, see
Feld and Jordan, International Organizations, p. 21-24.
departments, regulatory agencies and governmental standard setting
bodies; on supra-national level there is, e.g., the EU with its many
parts. On international level bodies like the WTO, UN, OECD and
NATO are important forms of cooperation between state
institutions519. Also international governmental standard setting bodies,
such as ISO are relevant. Naturally, there are many others, but
recognising the different levels of state actors is sufficient because
they are quite well studied and widely known. The usual assumption
is that a hierarchically organised state or some hierarchical part of
it successfully engages in ordering society.
Non-state actors (NSAs) are not all that well acknowledged. In
the widest sense they include all those actors that are not
representatives of states. They can basically be separated on the basis
of their purpose; actors mainly aiming at producing financial wealth
and driven by the goal of profit maximisation (economic actors, e.g.
corporations, interest groups) and actors devoted to addressing public
issues that do not aim to produce monetary profit for their members
(societal actors e.g. voluntary organizations, social movements).
Economic actors are less concerned with solving common problems
or advancing a particular political agenda. At least four groups of
NSAs can be identified; non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
commercial pressure groups (business NGOs), corporations, and
epistemic communities.
NGOs are non-profit, non-violent organised group of people, not
established by governments, which are moreover not seeking
government office520. It includes a wide range of actors from
professional associations and international non-governmental standard
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521 http://www.ifip.or.at/  
522 http://www.ietf.org/ Since IETF is a large open international community
of network designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the
evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet
and  is open to any interested individual, it could also be seen as an epistemic
community.
523 http://www.w3.org/
524 http://www.privacyinternational.org/ 
525 http://www.epic.org/ 
526 http://www.bsa.org/ 
527 http://www.internetalliance.org/ 
528 https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home
setting bodies to single issue organisations like environmental and
human rights groups. Examples in the information security arena are
the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP)521,
non-governmental standard setting organisations such as the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF)522 and World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C)523, which typically are cooperative efforts between firms or
individuals where organisational buyers (also individual buyers and
other individuals such as researchers can participate) cooperate with
sellers, and human rights groups like Privacy International524 and
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)525.
Business NGOs are industrial interest (pressure) groups that,
besides pursuing private goals, also seek to influence international
politics. As such they are not-for-profit oriented, even though their
members (corporations and business alliances) are not. Despite the
similarity with NGOs they are separable due to their ideological and
functional differences. Examples relevant for information security
include commercial pressure groups like Business Software Alliance
(BSA)526 and Internet Alliance (IA)527. Even the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG)528 can be categorised under the business NGOs because
it seeks after wide industry participation and wide adoption of the
organisations specifications even though it is not-for-profit oriented.
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529 http://www.cpsr.org
530 Black in Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, p. 70-71, uses the term
gatekeeper to refer to actors who possess a key resource that a firm needs.
Often they, instead the usual regulated firm, are made the targets of regulation.
531 CERTs in their multiplicity of institutional background (some clearly
governmental, some purely internal to commercial enterprises, etc.) are a good
example.
Generally, corporations themselves do not participate in politics.
The industrial pressure groups (business NGOs) represent their
interests. Nonetheless, today, individual firms and other market actors
(notably actors who control key resources that firms need, i.e.,
“gatekeepers”) increasingly further their interests in international
arenas themselves. The difference is that corporations aim at
maximising their profit while commercial pressure groups aim at
furthering the private interest of their members (not necessarily
directly related to profit maximisation). The main corporate NSAs
are big international enterprises like IBM and Microsoft.
The last group, epistemic communities, is trans-national networks
of experts with shared causal beliefs in certain policy issues. Examples
relevant for information security are Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR)529.
A group of regulators that is difficult to fit into this category are
gatekeepers530. Their position and power in the regulatory system is
dependent on the situation and looks different on the basis of the
perspective; they are not regulators because of their status or authority,
but purely because of the resources they possess or otherwise control
access to. Internet service providers, software component producers,
different registrars and insurers are good examples. An example of
gatekeepers in the secure software development are the reporters of
vulnerabilities. In addition, the coordinators in the vulnerability
reporting that act as intermediaries between the reporters and receivers
of software vulnerability information can also be classified as
gatekeepers531.
Other relevant market actors are organisational buyers
(organisational customers), individual customers or users in general
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532 For an overview of the major actors in a typical software vulnerability
process, see Takanen et al., Agents of Responsibility in Software Vulnerability
Process, p. 99-102.
533 Although the final actors might be individuals (for example the developers
of software code in relation to regulation that harnesses technology or social
norms), they work within or are otherwise related to institutions. They are
subject to the rules and norms of these institutions, thus attenuating individual
preferences or desires. This does not mean individuals are irrelevant.
Moreover, the institutional values and preferences are a composite reflection of
the individuals compromising these institutions. And the effects of regulation
are always about the actions of individuals.
534 This term is also taken from Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems,
p. 71-72.
535 Many of the recent changes to improve security and privacy for the Internet
are the direct result of motivated individuals, rather than policymakers in
government.
(home/end user), manufacturers, developers and development
partners as stakeholders, intermediaries who are selling or distributing
the products manufactured by another seller in the market process
(e.g. retailers, service provider or integrator), and other stakeholders
like financiers, shareholders, subcontractors, suppliers and advisers
(e.g., legal, risk and IT consultants, accountants). Then there are also
evaluators of the products which can be external to the developing
organisation (e.g., under Common Criteria) or even totally non-
affiliated532.
Even though the analysis of the regulators is focused on
institutional actors and not on individuals because, in the aggregate,
it is the institutions that have the best resources to influence
behaviour, a class of individual actors has to be pointed out from the
regulators perspective533. Influential individuals are advocates of a
particular policy who, because of their reputation and institutional
position, are at least instrumental and can be critical in ensuring that
the particular policy is ultimately accepted534. These individuals are
respected for their experience and advice. They play an important,
though largely informal role in the regulatory process. In the young
art of information security such persons are quite common535. Often
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536 Even though networks have their own important characteristics as
regulators (involve a variety of actors each pursuing their own goals, between
whom there are relatively stable sets of inter-relationships, and who are
dependent on one another for resources) the seldom act alone. Typically they
combine contracts and associations. The analysis of the regulators could be
taken much further, but is not beneficial in considering the different tools of
regulation and especially law’s role in regulation. Any of the tools maybe used
by the different actors, with the self-evident limitation that the use of force and
imprisonment are confined to the state.
537 Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance, p. 18.
also individuals inside firms, such as executives, have possibilities to
influence behaviour just with they example and sayings. One only
needs to think about a few executives in major corporations.
These actors are, at the same time, both regulators and being
regulated at different levels. They can and do cooperate in different
ways, to the extent that different networks and hybrids combining
both state institutions and non-state institutions have been recognised
as qualitatively different forms of regulators. Thus, in addition to the
traditional regulatory models of hierarchies (typical to state institutions
and many organisational form NSAs, even though there is an internal
move towards network and hybrid forms in them), contracts (bi- or
multilateral) and organisation (associations), regulation often occurs
via network-like interlinkages of different actors536. Traditionally the
emphasis has been on hierarchy as an instrument of control, but
nowadays there is a shift towards other structures for control. But
as expressed by Scott, this change may be one of thinking rather than
underlying mechanisms, since it has long been clear that the period
of organised capitalism is characterised by a mixture of state, market,
community, and technology within social control processes537.
3.6  A methodological aside –
on the role of law in regulation
Even though this study is focused on regulation and not just on the
law, the role of law in regulation is naturally of interest already because
laws are the major ways in which western democracies structure
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538 Daintith, Law as Policy Instrument, p. 4-5.
539 This argument is made by Black, e.g., in Law and Regulation, p. 54, footnote
78.
540 For a recent discussion of what ‘law’ is from the point of view of
‘decentring’ or ‘pluralism’ see Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and
Society; idem., Realistic Socio-Legal Theory; Twining, A Post-Westphalian
Conception of Law, p. 199-259.
541 The classic is Hart, The Concept of Law.
themselves and they still are the major form of implementation of
policies and agreements at supra-national and international levels.
The role of law is taken further in the contextual considerations of
each specific instrument. Despite of this, a general description of the
role of the law is elicited.
My purpose is not to discuss about a generally applicable concept
of law in regulation. Neither do I try to make grand generalisations
about the problems with the law and policy relationship. As Terence
Daintith points out in his introductory essay to a larger collection of
studies on the instruments used in the implementation of economic
policy and the role of law as an instrument for implementation,
national difference in the discussions between the problems of the
law and/or policy relationship and the concerns about instrumental
approach to law suggests the futility of such arguments538. The way
the problem is perceived depends too much on where you come from.
In here the interest lies only on the ways the conception of the law
affects the way regulation is seen to influence behaviour.
There is no clear answer to the problem of the relationship between
law and regulation. At minimum, the answer is dependent on our
understanding of both; the way both the ‘law’ and ‘regulation’ are
defined is the first problem to overcome539. Above, regulation was
defined along the decentring thesis and was seen as an intentional
action. The question of what the ‘law’ is has troubled lawyers for ages
and there is no purpose in going too deep into this discussion540.
Suffice to say that the centred and decentred (pluralistic) conceptions
of law differ similarly to the conceptions of regulation. While there
is at least a sort of an agreement what law is in its centred form541,
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542 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 23. 
543 In agreeing that law or regulation does not solely emanate from state the
pluralistic and the decentred views leave basically only two possible options for
the conception of ‘law’ and ‘regulation’: to abandon any attempt to hold on to
a single coherent conception or to attempt to construct a minimalist core
concept. Twining, A Post-Westphalian Conception of Law, p. 206. My purpose
is not to argue for or against either of the strategies; the only thing I am
worried about in this the way the chosen strategy affects our understanding of
‘regulation’ and ‘law’.
544 As Mattei notes in relation to the usability of capture theory in different
legal systems, “[c]omparative law literature makes it quite clear that the
function served by civil codes is analogous to that served in America by the
common law rather than by statutes” (Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, p.
76). Civilian codes are much more products of the legal culture than of the
legislative process. Note, however, that growth of the civil law – and all of
public law – happens much more often by special legislation outside of the
code, which can be compared to statutes in the common law, or by case law
rather than by tampering with the language of the code.
545 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics, p. 102-103.
at the same time legal pluralists agree that ‘law’ does not solely emanate
from the state. What it is and how it is distinguished from other forms
of norm-based social ordering is still contested, as Black points out
together with extensive references542. What this means is that the
relationship between law and regulation is as complex and shifting
as the conceptualisations ascribed to each.543
The instrumental rationality behind most regulation (including
much public law) is quite different to the ideal of legal reasoning
presented in relation to much of civil law (especially when based on
civil codes) or the similar construction of judge made law544. The ideal
is internal coherence and autonomy from operational or outcome
considerations. As Ugo Mattei notes in developing comparative law
and economics as a discipline, this unitary theory of the law is not
just the common and unchallenged idea of the two major legal theories
in Western jurisprudence (naturalism and positivism) but also still
widely shared by the lawyers in both civil and common law systems545.
With regulation, by contrast, problems in widely diverse domains tend
to entail quite context specific goals and techniques. Instead of seeking
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546 This distinction is often made in regulatory studies. See, e.g., Smith, What is
Regulation?, p. 39; Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 79; Niemivuo, Kansallinen
lainvalmistelu, p. 10-13. In a more generalised version this develops into the
competitive relationship among sources of law as proposed, e.g., by Mattei in
Comparative Law and Economics, p. 101-122.
547 This implies a centred conception of law; it emanates from the state.
548 This dichotomy of legal scholarship into the internal and external
perspective is the basic approach of textbooks in legal theory. See, e.g., Rubin,
Legal Scholarship, p. 562, and Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, p. 54-56. This
dichotomy was originally developed and made famous by H.L.A. Hart who
elaborated it into a method of understanding legal and other human
institutions by reference to their meaning from insider’s or an internal point of
view (McCormick, H.L.A. Hart, preface).
549 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 26. 
coherence of principles, the policy maker or regulationist asks which
rules (or other techniques) work best546.
While considering regulation to be ‘more than law’ in that law is
only one of the techniques or instruments that may or may not be
involved in the practice of regulation547, regulationists are engaged
in the same practice as socio-legal scholars. They look at the ‘law’
(however defined) as an outsider of the legal arena. This external view
treats law as one component of social ordering, to be studied for the
ideas it embodies and the effects it produces548. 
There is, however, a critical difference between socio-legalists and
regulationists; even where each asks the same questions, they do so
for different reasons. Regulationists are not (and by implication socio-
legalists are) interested in how law sees itself, explains itself or
legitimises itself; “…not only is regulation not just law in that it extends
well beyond courts and legal instruments, regulationists are just not
concerned with law in that they are not concerned with whether or
not law is correct in seeing itself as characterised by unity, coherence
or particular modes of reasoning, or explaining itself in these or any
other terms”549. Thus, socio-legalists focus on, and the sociology of
law as a discipline or a methodology is devoted to, an inquiry into
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550 See, e.g., Rubin, Legal Scholarship, p. 562.
551 Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 25.
552 Legal reasoning is not and, as Collins in Regulating Contract Law, p. 18-19,
argues in relation to goal oriented regulation of contracts and contract law,
cannot be purely about coherence considerations. When it is accepted that
there is no coherent scheme of individual rights embedded in the social and
political institutions of a society according to which legal reasoning could
proceed, there necessarily is a need to employ also consequential or policy
arguments in order to reach determinate results.
the internal structure and meaning of the legal system and in doing
so become a part of the legal scholarship550. 
Regulationists, on the other hand, dissociate from legal scholarship
by refusing to give any significance to the internal view of law in the
regulatory scholarship. In terms of Black “…regulation, however it
is defined, has no claim to be unified, or coherent, or marked with
its one style of reason or argument, or based on consistent values or
principles. Nor does it invoke or lay claim to any mystique or even
legitimacy. … Regulationists, and others, do not expect regulation
to be internally rational or consistent; it might be, more likely it will
not. But no significance attaches to either conclusion (though
regulationists might worry about the impact of such inconsistencies
on regulation’s effectiveness). In contrast, such internal unity and
consistency is central to many understandings of law.”551
However, the instrumental approach is unavoidable even in the
internal views of law. Even the acceptance of the narrowest
conception of regulation, as a form of a legal rule or regulatory
(‘public’) law where it essentially is ‘less than law’, necessitates an
instrumentalist view of the law. Most legal scholars at least implicitly
accept that legal rules are adopted to promote some goal, be it equality,
justice, fairness, or efficiency552. This, in turn, poses a different set
of questions about the legal system; those of effectiveness rather than
coherency. It also demands a different task for law and legal theory.
This is troubling for legal scholars (sharing the internal view of law);
the pluralistic (decentred) views are fragmenting law internally and
making it difficult to hold the coherence thesis. 
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553 However, they may be encompassed by legal pluralism.
554 Smith, What is Regulation?, p. 39-40. However, this does not mean that it is
regulationists that threaten the unitary approach to law (the internal view of
law as a coherent system having value as such). The issue concerns only
whether or not regulatory studies can be considered as legal scholarship or is it
occupying an intermediate position as an interdisciplinary approach. The
instrumental approach to law together with the decline of state as the sole
authority of law (destruction of the traditional hierarchical system of law) and
the pluralism of legal sources is much more troubling for legal theory. Even
though I accept, to some degree, the point of view of a regulationist and an
instrumentalist, these considerations are not taken further in this study; despite
of their importance for legal scholarship.
555 The notion that regulation is ‘more than law’ is strongest when a decentred
conception of regulation is invoked and set in relation to a centred conception
of law. Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 25. According to Black,
idem, p. 25, lawyers see the lack of coherence requirement in regulation
meaning that regulation is ‘less than law’; it is a differentiating factor between
law and regulation. But from a regulationist point of view the situation is
reversed. The coherence requirement and the internal view to law restrict the
use of ‘law’ (legal norms and legal order, i.e., the collection of legal norms in
force at the specific moment) as a regulatory tool; ‘law’ is just one way of
regulating. This is acknowledged also by Black, idem, p. 25-6, by pointing out
that when regulationists look at legally based regulation they are not bothered
by the internal view of law; regulation is something else and something more
than law, however it is defined. 
Regulatory theory, similar to the social scientific analysis of the
law, once again questions the role of law in the steering of societies.
However, with decentred regulation the potential for fragmentation
is even greater. Decentred regulation is likely to adopt institutions
and practices which are not found at all in traditional accounts of
law553. At this point the borders between regulation, law and social
control become quite permeable if they do not disintegrate entirely
as pointed out by Smith554.
I agree with those regulationists that consider regulation as ‘more
than law’555. But their view of law is limited; the extreme instrumental
view prohibits the acceptance of law’s other functions. While they
dissociate from legal scholarship by refusing to give any significance
to the internal view of the law in the regulatory scholarship they, at
the same time, dismiss the value of the legal system. They get, at best,
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556 This is the classic argument of legal theory. See, e.g., Rubin, Legal
Scholarship, p. 563; Aarnio, Laintulkinnan teoria, p. 54-56.
557 Hunt, The Politics of Law and the Law of Politics, p. 68. As should be clear,
neither should the “forces” that are harnessed for the purposes of regulation,
i.e., social norms, markets and technology, be seen in this way.
558 Note that this deviation from the strict instrumental view of law still implies
a centred conception of law (emanates from the state).
only an inadequate understanding of the meaning that the law
possesses for its members (the actors of law; legislators, judges, legal
scholars). Because such meanings are components of a comprehensive
life world, they cannot be fully understood unless the observer
participates on the same terms as the members556. By dismissing legal
scholarship regulationists do not see the way the internal view of law
affects the regulators and other constrains (state institutions, non-state
institutions, market forces, social forces, technology).
As pointed out by Alan Hunt the law should not be seen as a mere
medium of regulatory intervention557. Law is not just one of the
techniques or instruments that may or may not be involved in the
practice of regulation; it is not just legal norms or legislation. The legal
order and the legal system is an internally coherent construction that
bears significance as such and provides information not attainable
by viewers external to its operation. When viewing law internally, as
legal scholarship does with its three basic methodologies (descriptive
scholarship, prescriptive scholarship, jurisprudence), it is a set of
significant normative statements that are intended to comprise a
meaningful system; as such, its provisions should be described in detail
and evaluated according to their moral or social value. Law can be
considered as an expression of grounding moral values, religious
beliefs, well-established custom, universal principles of human rights
or conceptions of justice that exist despite of political decisions or
changing objectives. What is common to all of these is the unitary
approach (the coherence of legal system); law is considered as a
coherent system that is based on consistent values and principles.558
As Kaarlo Tuori points out in discussing the positions of the
participant and the observer in the analysis of the law, approaching
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559 Tuori, Law, Power and Critique, p. 21.
560 This might be due to the economic analysis of the law, one of the main
scientific disciplines behind the new construct of regulation as a separate field
of scientific inquiry, mainly concentrating on legal sanctions as influencing
factors. As pointed out by Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 120-121, even
if the Chicago school type economic analysis of the law (hypothetical cost-
benefit analysis) would be widened to include also non-legal sanctions, it is still
flawed in its explanation of contractual relations and more widely as the way
regulation influences behaviour. It concentrates only on punishment and does
not analyse the law as a signal of credibility of the commitment etc., which for
Collins means that institutional economic would provide a better answer.
When the Chicago school type of economic analysis of the law adopts legal
sanctions as its central focus, and widely ignores non-legal sanctions, their
relationship is easily perceived as exclusive. When the forceful impact of non-
legal sanctions is compared to the relatively insignificant legal sanction in the
regulation of the markets, the law is easily seen to play a minor role. At the
same time their interrelationship is easily ignored. 
law as social practices may lead the social scientist from her position
of an outside observer into neglecting the inner mechanisms of the
legal field through which the inputs from the political, formative and
cultural symbolic dimensions are filtered. The social scientist maybe
sensitive to the symbolic normative side of the law only as one of the
motivational or communicational factors of legal practices, but less
so to the specific transformative legal work of interpretation and
systematisation producing and reproducing the law and to the power
relations between legal professionals linked to this work.559
As visible in the classification of regulatory instruments, much of
the role of the law is part of the prescriptive rules category. This is
the strict understanding of the state centred form of the law as
expressed in regulative law. Regulatory scholarship tends to restrict
its analysis of the law as a regulatory instrument to this perspective560.
At a cursory reading regulatory scholarship easily suggests that the
role of law is non-existent in regulation in general. However, this is
not the whole picture of the law. Not only duty imposing legal norms
are relevant in regulation. The law is in the background of much of
regulation and of most types of regulatory instruments; and not just
when the government is using these instruments.
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561 Black in Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 22-27, considers the issue
widely. She studies the relationship between law and regulation at the
conceptual level and considers both the possibilities for fragmentation and the
problem it faces especially to our understanding of law, but does not go deeper
into their interaction or to the influences of law to the different decentred
regulatory (in the wide sense) activities. Of course there are interactions
between the other forms of regulation too, as noted above in relation to
vertical packaging, but in here the interest is in how law is used to affects the
other instruments.
562 See, e.g., Scott,  Regulation in the Age of Governance, p. 21; Teubner, After
Legal Instrumentalism, p. 307; Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 104-105.
563 Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance, p. 21; Lessig, The New
Chicago School, p. 666-667. Naturally if other tools of regulation exist or can
be employed, they might be preferable to regulatory law because they may be
more effective or more efficient. In addition, if the incentives for acting within
competitive or community control structures are sufficiently aligned with
conceptions of public interest, there might not even be a need for the state law
underpinning. However, a strategy to delegate management of a certain issue
or a regime to non-state actors can also be a conscious state choice. In this
way, when it is done in a way that not only takes notice of the public interest
but also tries to guarantee its realisation, state-actors can be seen to retain
A central part of the understanding of regulation (at least for a legal
scholar) is the way law is used to affect other regulatory means561. The
conception of the vertical packaging of instruments is essential when
considering the role of the law in the decentred process of regulation.
Law, especially in its indirect sense, is at the top of vertical packages.
Legal norms are the main instruments still used to regulate the
influence mediating actors at the lower levels of packages and to
govern the instruments they use. Without that concept and the
accompanied regulatory strategies the role of law would be close to
inexistence when the state is taken away from the centre of regulatory
power. This legal underpinning for indirect control over other
ordering systems is the basis for consensus on the role of law in
regulation as suggested in the studies of the post-regulatory state562.
Thus, state institutions (at multiple levels) still retain legal control at
least in some residual form; e.g., goals and ends are ultimately set and
determined, even though not necessarily directly, by state-centric
actors563.
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control even in the global governance.
564 As Teubner argues, among others, the way the law regulates has changed
from regulatory law to reflexive, procedural or post-regulatory law. Where
regulatory law set substantive standards, reflexive and procedural law sets
procedures.
565 These types of studies in the area of economic analysis of the law are
playfully referred to as the ‘Old Chicago School’ by Lessig in The New
Chicago School, p. 665-666. 
566 In terms of Lessig “… in the view of the new school, law not only regulates
behaviour directly, but law also regulates behaviour indirectly, by regulating these
other modalities of regulation directly.” (Lessig, The New Chicago School, p.
666). While the old and new ‘Chicago schools’, as Lessig playfully calls them,
are united in their view of law as just one of the regulatory mechanisms, the
new school does not see these alternatives as displacing law but, instead, as
subject to law. Lessig, The New Chicago School, p. 661-667. Note that Lessig
does not separate between vertical packaging of instruments (the perspective
of the regulator) and the direct/indirect guidance provided by regulation (from
the perspective of the regulated). Even though they are highly related issues,
they still a separable and need to be distinguished. He seems to be primarily
speaking about vertical packaging on the basis of the examples he uses.
567 When the government uses these instruments, they typically are enacted in
laws. Regulators, not even the government by using the law, cannot harness
the other ordering systems perfectly, completely and especially not always
easily or in obvious ways, but it can be and is being done.
Much of the study of the other ordering systems (“forces”)
themselves (the market, social norms, technology, and even
processes564) that regulation as an intentional act is considered to be
harnessing in this study, argue against the dominance and centrality
of law; that these other ordering systems displace the significance of
the law565. From the decentred perspective the law is easily seen to
be displaced as the sole or even primary regulator of behaviour. But
the argument, inline with the Lessig’s New Chicago School argument,
is that instead of displacing the law they are subject to the law and
regulation more generally566. The ways the law affects behaviour just
need to be understood more widely. Thus, rather than diminishing
the role of law, these alternatives suggest a wider range of regulatory
means; different instruments can be used by a multiplicity of regulators
to harness these “forces” for their own purposes567. By combining
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568 Market actors can use private law powers to create more limited private
rights, for example to demand collaterals, or require certain disclosures,
assuming they have the market power to do so (and the law will support their
efforts). Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services
Regulation, p. 4. With powers conferred by private law even a private citizen
becomes a private legislator. By the possession of the powers she is made
competent to determine the course of the law within the sphere of his
contracts, trusts, wills, and other structures of rights and duties which she is
enabled to build as has been pointed out in legal theory already by Hart in The
Concept of Law, p. 40-41.
569 The case where the law is understood in a plural sense, which is a subject of
heated debate, is not taken further here because the relationship with
regulation becomes too blurred.
the New Chicago School and decentring theses, it can be stated that
while there is a reduction in the regulatory role of the state, it does
not mean that some other ordering system gets dominance. 
The importance of the legal norms is visible especially in relation
to the power conferring norm type. These are what constitute new
institutional structures or strengthen existing ones as is the case of
the market economy needing at least private law to operate even
though it can exists in spite of the legal system. And the ability to
regulate is essentially law based not just in the case of the
governmental actors (especially in constitutional democracies) but
also in the case of private regulators like that of the firm568.
In sum, the role of law depends on how it is understood. If
considered, as in here, to be state centred, its role is diminished but
not marginal. It is still a major part of the prescriptive rule category
in its regulatory sense and in the background of most of other
instruments especially when used by the state. The indirect strategies
are essential for the understanding of the role of the law. Even though
the regulation is decentred and the legal sources are plural, the law
is a central element shaping the other regulatory instrument and being
shaped by them. The law is at the same time both regulating behaviour
and being regulated by state and non-state actors using different
instruments. 569
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570 As pointed out, e.g., by Tala in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 323.
Transition. It must be kept in mind that there is no reliable knowledge
of the ways regulation affects behaviour in practice. Current
knowledge is not comprehensive. Regulation together with other
motivational factors determine in complex and still largely unknown
ways the individual choices to comply with regulation570. Armed with
a preliminary understanding of the types of instruments (classified
as formalised rules, market harnessing and economic, informative
and pedagogic, technology-harnessing, and process-based) and of
their normative guidance mechanisms that can be intentionally used
to influence behaviour, we can now, however, turn into studying the
specific instruments of secure software and information systems
development regulation, their types and the capabilities to influence
behaviour.
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571 See heading 2.8 above. A central feature of opportunistic behaviour is that a
party has a motive not to disclose certain information, or to make false or
misleading claims, if the difference in the level of knowledge between
contracting parties brings advantage. Note that not every vendor is behaving
opportunistically, but the mere number of those who do, together with the
impossibility to separate them from the non-opportunistic ones, and the extent
to which such motivation exist in market-driven development, makes the issue
important.
4Harnessing social norms: disclosure of vulnerability information
As discussed above, economic theory assumes that in perfect markets
vendors have an incentive to disclose all the relevant information,
also the negative information that might hamper the sales of the
product. However, due to the imperfections in the COTS software
markets, vendors do not have high incentives to disclose the negative
features such as vulnerability of their software voluntarily. 
By summarising the above discussion on the inadequacies and
asymmetries in the distribution of security related information, it can
be stated that in the situation where the customers have no easy and
cost-effective means to differentiate between vulnerable and secure
software and thus to verify the claims about quality and security made
by the vendors and, in addition, where the customers have limited
means to calculate the losses from vulnerabilities and thus tend to
underestimate the risks and not to demand more security, the vendors
have high incentives to behave opportunistically and to take advantage
of the informational misbalance571. Because of the inadequate
incentives for informing the consumers about the risk on the part
of vendors and the limited capacity of the consumers to process the
available information, unregulated market transactions will not result
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572 See heading 2.8 above.
573 Since credence characteristics of goods are qualities which the consumer
rarely discovers by her own personal search, in the absence of independent
additional information the consumer cannot discover whether an operation in
the software development was justified and the correct procedure for the fixing
vulnerabilities applied.
in optimum care by the firms and optimum consumption by the
consumers, when the latter are imperfectly informed about the risk.
There is a need for some way out of the loop where vendors do
not have sufficient incentive to produce secure software, especially
due to lack of customer demand, and the customers, even if their
acceptance of the defects might be diminishing, as it currently seems
to be doing, thus creating more demand, cannot separate high quality
and secure software from the vulnerable ones and thus make market
rational choices and to demand more secure software effectively. The
above analysis of informational asymmetries in the market for secure
software made explicit that the market forces themselves have certain
mechanism to correct the informational market failures by
communicating quality and security convincingly572. However, they
are only partial solutions accompanied with several inadequacies. 
In addition to the non-applicability of the self-corrective measures
to credence characteristics like the security related vulnerabilities that
require sophisticated technical assistance even for information system
developers in order to be determined, and the several limitations in
their applicability to experience characteristics, the inadequacies stem
from the basis that the information coming from the parties that
benefit financially as a result of the reaction to the information (e.g.,
from a decision to procure the advertised product) is biased and the
provider of the information can have a motive to hide certain negative
characteristics, or even mislead the customer. Customers need to find
more objective information than provided by those providing also
the commodity that the information concerns, especially of credence
features like security related vulnerabilities573. The role of informative
instruments that decrease the risk of deception and withholding of
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574 Note that despite of what motivates vendors to dismiss the security related
vulnerabilities, i.e. whether it is the fear of negative publicity or the lack of
understanding of the nature of the problem and risks involved in a situation
where vulnerabilities are easily considered to be un-exploitable or their
exploitation considered to be very unlikely, the disclosure rules bring relief for
the customers. The latter motivation is altered by making the disclosure
mandatory and the former by informing both the vendors and their customers
of the importance of vulnerability issue.
575 They have especially been identified in the new tools approach to
governance studies, for example, by Weiss in Public Information, p. 218-219,
and Vedung and van der Doelen in The Sermon, p. 106-107. Also regulatory
studies, such as Baldwin and Cave, Understanding Regulation, p. 49, and Ogus,
Regulation, p. 121, use this differentiation. Note them being in line with the
vertical packaging and increased use of third-party arguments already made.
576 As Collins notes in Regulating Contracts, p. 292, the requirements for the
manufacturers and retailers to supply detailed and reliable information about
the hidden costs and risks to users of the product is the most obvious and
widely used solution to the problem of quality and security created by
informational asymmetries. In other words, regulation involves extensive duties
negative information is crucial under these conditions574. 
Regulatory literature recognises two general types of informative
instruments575. The first involves direct supply of information to the
addressees by the regulator (by its own organisation). The second
involves the use of intermediaries to transmit the message to the public.
In the latter case the regulator itself does not possess the information;
it requires or enables other actors to generate or share the needed
information. Basically sets in motion a process of information
collection or learning. 
Enabling involves paying intermediaries to collect, package, and
disseminate the needed information and thus involves vertical
packaging with economic or market-harnessing instruments. An
example can be found from the funding of basic education of software
engineers and of others responsible for software development in issues
of secure development. Requiring involves the use of prescriptive rules
to promote dissemination of information. An obvious example is the
case of mandatory disclosure of certain product information (like
quality or safety) and the control (prohibition of the supply) of false
or misleading information576.
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of disclosure about such matters as safety risks, costs of repairs etc.
577 OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks,
Recommendation of the OECD Council at its 1037th Session on 25 July 2002.
Of the 21 OECD member states that answered the survey on the
implementation of the OECD guidelines for the security of information
systems and networks all, except one, report initiatives that aim at awareness
rising in 2004. Conference-type events, Web sites and publications are most
frequently mentioned. OECD, Summary of responses to the survey on the
implementation of the OECD guidelines for the security of information systems and
networks, p. 5. One of the main findings of the subsequent OECD report
analysing the responses, The Promotion of a Culture of Security for Information Systems
and Networks in OECD Countries, p. 3, is that awareness raising and education
initiatives still receive a high degree of attention. 
578 Vulnerability reporting has been defined, in the first empirical analysis of the
communication in the vulnerability reporting process by Tiina Havana and
Juha Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 2, as a
process that refers to the communication in which the knowledge of a
vulnerability is transmitted to the persons or organisations responsible for
fixing or distributing the knowledge of the vulnerability further to other
relevant parties, such as customers. A good resource into the various aspects
of, approaches to, and interests in vulnerability disclosure debate are the pages
of the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG) “Vulnerability
disclosure publications and discussion tracking” at http://www.ee.oulu.fi/
research/ ouspg/ sage/disclosure-tracking/ [22.2.2006].
Informative instruments are typically the first ones to which
regulators turn to when deciding to alter behaviour into certain
direction. The already discussed argument made in regulatory studies
of the escalation of instruments (starting from less coercive
instruments) and their chronological sequencing is clearly visible also
in information security. Informative instruments have been the first
areas of focus, for example, when governments have implemented
or are implementing the OECD Security Guidelines577.
In this study, only one informative instrument is analysed. It is
that of vulnerability reporting by external parties (external to the vendor
that developed the specific software where the vulnerability is found,
e.g., individual or organisational customers) both to the vendors
themselves and to the public578. This is a form of non-governmental
disclosure regulation which importance has unfolded in information
security in the past ten or so years. It carries the characteristics of both
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579 See e.g., Beales, Craswell and Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, p. 502. This is also the starting point in the above analysis
(heading 2.8) of the informational market failures in information security.
580 An example can be found from the obligations to disclose safety
information under product safety regulations such as the article 5 of the
Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3
December 2001 on general product safety, Official Journal L 011, 15/01/2002,
p. 4 – 17.
581 When accepting the regulatory role of private law, i.e., accepting that private
law even in its non-mandatory form is not just facilitative, the disclosure rules
become wider. This makes it possible to see that different liability rules under
doctrines in contract or damages (tort) law and even general marketing rules
create obligations to inform and to disclose vulnerabilities. However, since the
informative character of these rules is only one of the ways they can influence
behaviour, it is analysed in the prescriptive rule section together with its other
influence mechanisms in chapter 5.
general types of informative instruments; both the direct supply of
information and the use of intermediaries.
Several other, especially governmental types of disclosure rules
are omitted. A separate analysis of the rules controlling the supply
of false or misleading information, the negative duty not to misinform
the other party to a contract (not to lie), is not conducted because
these legal rules (e.g., basic provisions on fraud and misrepresentation
and its many variants for example in marketing regulation) are already
a prerequisite in the economic analysis of the producers incentives
to reveal negative attributes of products579. A variant of the disclosure
rules, the consumer protection oriented obligations to provide
information under the threat of sanctions (form of mandatory
disclosure)580, is non-existent in the context of the information
concerning the vulnerabilities of software products and omitted for
this reason. The third type of disclosure rules that in the traditional
state-centred approach to regulation involves only the direct supply
of information by a scrutinizing regulatory agency or a governmental
official is also non-existent in the software industry.581 
Vulnerability reporting is a disputed and controversial issue in
current information security discussion. Vulnerability management
in general and reporting especial have become hot topics quite recently
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582 This makes the study of the possibilities of this type of regulation to affect
secure software development difficult, but not impossible. However, due to
the rapidly evolving discussion the considerations of the possible influence on
secure software development can, at best, be only tentative.
583 The unresponsiveness of software vendors is one of the reasons the issue of
full disclosure and the threat of disclosure of vulnerabilities to the wider public
in general has been considered to become issues in the first place.
584 Others favour full, public and immediate disclosure whereas others partial
and limited public disclosure after a predefined time, or something in the
between. This is similar to the differences between the opinions of the
reporters and receivers of the reports, but less variable than between all the
stakeholders of the reporting process (the discovers of the vulnerabilities, the
vendors of the vulnerable software, the users of the software, and the
coordinators of the vulnerability reports) as reported by Havana and Röning in
Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 9. 
and the practices and procedures are just emerging and consensus
still being sought582. Because the regulatory function is not plainly
visible and has not been accepted by all, there is a need for further
justifications. 
The regulatory function of vulnerability reporting is best visible,
and has been most forcefully argued, in the full (and immediate)
disclosure movement that explicitly attempts to alter the behaviour
of major commercial vendors583. Vulnerability reporting can be seen
as a regulatory action since the objective is to alter the behaviour of
both the vendors (to correct the vulnerability and to issue a patch)
and the users (to take protective measures, e.g., by installing patches
or by reconfiguring the system to minimise the effects of the
vulnerability) of the specific software in order to achieve improved
information security. I.e., the process of vulnerability reporting
involves a sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of
two different stakeholders with the intention to improve the security
of software. 
Even though the approaches to the reporting of vulnerabilities
still vary significantly even among the external parties584, a rough
consensus among those involved in the reporting process is that
disclosure (in some form) is needed for the improvement of the
security of software. The customers and the public need to know
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585  This consensus becomes explicit in the first empirical analysis of the commu-
nication in the vulnerability reporting process conducted by Tiina Havana in 2002
and reported in her M.A. thesis for the Department of Communication at the
University of Jyväskylä in Finland, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting
Process, p. 45-46 and 56-58. In the final report of the Vulnerability Disclosure
Working Group of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, which was charged
with advising the President of the U.S. on information system security issues
important to preserving the integrity of the nation’s critical infrastructure, Chambers
and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 7-8, 16, and 26, conclude that
discoverers and vendors share the primary goal of improving the security of software
used in critical processes. Note that the report also refers to the research of Tiina
Havana and the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG).
586The consensus among the stakeholders in the vulnerability disclosure
process seems, as discussed below, to be in favour of disclosure of certain
amount of information after predetermined time. However, to the remaining
proponents of full and immediate disclosure it still appears as the only way to
force vendors to take vulnerabilities seriously.
about vulnerabilities and the available remedies, and the disclosure
is needed for reducing risks to information systems and for stopping
malicious activity; disagreement centres on how, when, and to whom
to disclose585. Thus, the enhancement of the security of software in
general is the expressed common objective of the different
vulnerability reporting schemes.
Even though both the importance and the media attention of full
and immediate disclosure may have diminished due to it partly
accomplishing its objectives (i.e., software vendors take the reports
by external agents more seriously and patch the disclosed
vulnerabilities) and being replaced by more mature versions like
responsible disclosure586, the regulatory value of vulnerability
disclosure has not vanished. It has just been reshaped. 
Whereas vulnerability reporting originally was only about the action
of the discoverers/reporters of vulnerabilities, now it can be seen as
a type of self-regulation where the various stakeholders of vulnerability
reporting adopt common guidelines amongst themselves and for
themselves. Not only has vulnerability reporting gained a central place
in software quality and security development in COTS software
development companies in the sense that also proprietary software
vendors increasingly rely on the disclosure process in their quality
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587 This change of policy among the software vendors is no surprise in market-
driven development since the vendors can lower the costs of testing by
harnessing users for that purpose. Thus, instead of pretending nothing is
wrong or that their customers do not care about security, the vendors have
become more and more responsive to vulnerability reports and are developing
more formal and mature processes for it. This change in the attitude of the
vendors is partly due to the regulatory action taken by the reporters and it is
part of the analysis done below.
588 In addition to the discoverers/reporters (individuals or organisations that
find the vulnerabilities), explicit policies for vulnerability reporting have been
presented also by the vendors (parties that develop or maintain software
products that may be vulnerable) and the coordinators of the communication.
Whereas policies and guidelines for vulnerability reporting have originally been
developed by the different actors separately, currently the trend is towards
common guidelines for all or almost all actors. Most prevalent of current
proposals are the OIS (Organization for Internet Safety) Guidelines for Security
Vulnerability Reporting and Response and the NIAC (National Infrastructure
Advisory Council of the U.S.) Guidelines that are presented in the final report
of its Vulnerability Disclosure Working Group drafted by Chambers and
Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework. For a deeper discussion, see
below heading 4.3.3.
589 OECD, Summary of responses to the survey on the implementation of the OECD
guidelines for the security of information systems and networks, p. 13. As the subsequent
OECD report, The Promotion of a Culture of Security for Information Systems and
Networks in OECD Countries, p. 3, states while analysing the responses as one of
its main findings, international cooperation is consolidated in this area.
and security testing (they have become amazingly responsive to
vulnerability reports)587, but also common policies and guidelines for
vulnerability reporting are under development588.
The importance of the regulatory function of vulnerability
disclosure is acknowledged even by governments. The wide
establishment of even governmental vulnerability coordination centres
together with policies and guidelines for the reporting process testify
this. As the OECD in its follow-up study on the implementation of
its 2002 Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and
Networks in member states emphasises, most countries responding
to the survey support the establishment and use of CERT-like sites.
Some already report the establishment of CERTs for government
or CERT initiatives targeting SMEs and/or the general public589. With
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590 With joint regulation I refer to the coexistence and combination of
endogenous ‘self-regulation’, i.e., the common guidelines adopted by the
economic actors, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or
associations amongst themselves and for themselves, and exogenous
governmental regulation. When the government has a deeper and a more direct
involvement, e.g., in the form of setting the essential legal framework and then
monitoring the outcome or even validating the more detailed rules filled in by
the stakeholders, reference is typically made to co-regulation. For a discussion
of the role of self-regulation and co-regulation in the European regulatory
policy, see Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in
European Law. As Philip Eijlander argues in Possibilities and Constraints in
the Use of Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in Legislative Policy, heading 5
“Concluding remarks”, first four paragraphs, both the concepts and the use of
the types of regulation differ in European and national levels due to the
different functions of national and European legislation. In the end, both self-
regulation and co-regulation are examples of a far wider range of possible
configuration of relationships and roles of different actors in a regulatory
setting and the separation between state and self-regulation is analytically
questionable in a deeper regulatory analysis. For references and a wider
discussion, see above footnote 518.
591 The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), the first organisation to
coordinate communication among experts during information security
emergencies, grew from a small computer security incident response team
formed at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA) established by DARPA (Defence Advanced
Research Projects Agency) in 1988. Currently CERT/CC
(http://www.cert.org) is a non-academic and non-governmental unit funded
mainly by the U.S. Department of Defence and the Department of Homeland
Security along with number of other federal civil agencies and private sector.
CERT/CC is a component of the larger CERT Program at the Software
Engineering Institute where other areas of work include education and
training, research and development, situational awareness, and global
relationships.  See the CERT FAQ, headings A1-A2, at the web pages of
CERT, http://www.cert.org/faq/cert_faq.html [updated 15.12.2005, visited
such governmental support we may even speak of some kind of a
joint regulation between government and the private sector590.
Even though the OECD speaks of CERT organisations, it is more
appropriate to speak of Computer Security Incidence Response
Teams (CSIRT). CERT together with CERT/CC is a registered
service mark (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) of the Carnegie
Mellon University591. CERT/CC has for its part helped to establish
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23.1.2006].
592 See the Computer Security Incidence Response Team (CSIRT) Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ) point 1 at http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt_faq.html
[last updated 1.2.2002, visited 23.1.2006]. CSIRTs come in a variety of forms.
There are, at least, national CSIRTs providing incident handling services to a
country or a large region such as the Aus-CERT (The Australian CERT,
http://www.auscert.org.au) and CERT-FI (The Finnish CERT,
http://www.cert.fi), dedicated internal teams in commercial, governmental or
academic organisations providing services to their parent organisation like the
DoD-CERT (U.S. Department of Defence CERT, http://www.cert.mil) and
the FUNET-CERT (Finnish University and Research Network – Computer
Emergency Response Team, http://www.cert.funet.fi), coordination centres
facilitating the handling of incidents across several CSIRTs such as the
CERT/CC and the US-CERT (U.S. governmental CERT, http://www.us-
cert.gov). Many of these teams are members of the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST, http://www.first.org), that has operated
as a coalition to exchange information and coordinate response activities
among the large variety of specialised groups since it was established 1990.
CERT/CC is even a founding member. See the Computer Security Incidence
Response Team (CSIRT) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) point 4 at
http://www.cert.org/csirts/csirt_faq.html [last updated 1.2.2002, visited
23.1.2006].
593 Of interest are only the benign discoverers. The malign ones may disclose
the existence of the vulnerability to the vendor, but typically there is no
many of CSIRT teams and coordinates with them for incident
response, but it remains independent of them in terms of
organisation. Organisations wishing to use “CERT” in their name
must request permission from the CERT. 
With CSIRT the reference is made to a service organisation that is
responsible for receiving, reviewing, and responding to computer
security incident reports and activity. Their services are usually
performed for a defined constituency that could be a parent entity
such as a corporation, governmental, or educational organisation,
a region or a country, a research network, or a paid client.592
4.1  Who regulates?
The regulators in the vulnerability disclosure scheme are the external
parties reporting the vulnerability information to the vendors and
disclosing them to the public593. Also coordinators of the vulnerability
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intention to improve the security of the software in question. Often they do
not publish the knowledge at all. They find vulnerabilities in the purpose of
abusing them in order to gain access to systems or to blackmail the vendors.
594 This is also acknowledged by Tiina Havana in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 66.
595 According to an empirical study over 80% of vulnerability reporters that
responded to the survey made by Havana, Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 31, told that they discovered the vulnerabilities
personally in the course of their own work and 60% heard about a vulnerability
from an internal testing group.
reporting process can function as regulators. Both the reporters and
the coordination centres act as gatekeepers. They control the message
flow and a central informational resource in the development of secure
software.594
The reporters are a relatively heterogeneous group. A clear source
of vulnerability information is found from the organisational
customers of the vendors that discover new vulnerabilities during
their testing of the fit of the software component for the needs of
their information systems. Another central source of vulnerability
information is formed by the knowledgeable individual customers
that discover vulnerabilities during beta-tests or in other situations
where they are probing the software to see how it functions595. Also
certain hacker groups, in the benign sense, are dedicated to discovering
and publishing vulnerabilities, together with other interested parties,
such as research institutions, security organisations and interested
individual. Even other software vendors that develop compatible
software can discover and disclose vulnerabilities. 
Central regulators are also the various types of coordinators of
the vulnerability reporting process. Certain CERT like institutions
even conduct their own vulnerability research and make discoveries
by themselves. But their core role is in disclosing the vulnerabilities
found by others. They are thus acting mainly as intermediaries and
are part of the vertical package of this type of informative regulatory
instrument. Thus they are mainly implementers and considered as
regulators only for their independent information provision activities.
As pure coordinators of vulnerability reporting process they are
implementers.
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596 For example, using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model with
incomplete information Timothy J. Feddersen and Thomas W. Gilligan in
Saints and Markets, p. 149-171, show that information-supplying activists can
alter the decisions of both firms and consumers on a market for credence
goods. Under certain restrictive assumptions, the presence of such informed
activists in the market can at least partially mitigate the adverse selection
problem and enhance social welfare. They consider the role of activists
providing information on a firm’s operating practices, such as whether or not it
harms the environment, promote employment discrimination, or embrace
controversial social or political positions. However, their theoretical
4.2  Influence mechanism
Vulnerability reporting as a regulatory instrument functions by
providing information about vulnerabilities. As a regulatory instrument
the disclosure of vulnerability information relies on informing vendors,
consumers, other users, and citizens more generally, about
vulnerabilities in software products and expecting them to act in ways
that advance the objective of secure software development. It consists
of the communication between different parties under the influence
of a specific vulnerability. This type of regulation is not at first hand
directed at the primary market activity of supplying goods, but rather
at the flow of information necessary for the market to function. 
In order to see how this regulatory instruments can influence secure
software development it is not enough to state that it, as an
informative instruments, covers attempts at influencing people
through transfer of knowledge, communication of reasoned argument,
and moral suasion in order to achieve a certain widely accepted goal
which in this case is the development of secure software. The
mechanisms by which the effects are created need to be analysed
further.
In relation to secure software development this informative
instrument can affect in two basic ways; either through decisions by
vendors to alter their products in ways that make them less vulnerable
due to the increased customer demand or through the decisions of the
users to alter their behaviour with respect to the risks involved (e.g.,
to install patches or to take other protective measures). These
influence mechanisms find support from the economically minded
signalling theory with credence goods596 and the more general theory
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explorations have a wider applicability. Especially the quality aspects of
security, i.e., the degree of vulnerability in a software product, bear exactly the
same credence characteristics.
597 David P. Baron in Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and
Integrated Strategy, p. 7-45 develops the influence mechanisms in economic
terms from a more general theoretical private politics perspective where
interest and activist groups attempt to influence economic activity directly
without reliance on public institutions or office holders. He draws especially on
the long tradition of research in corporate social responsibility. Note that there
is no market failure to correct in the basic model used by Baron and the
information is complete even though he also briefly considers situations with
incomplete information. However, as Baron notes in 2001 (Private Politics,
Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, p. 42), the study of
private politics is in its infancy. The implications for economic activity at the
firm, the industry, and the economy levels are largely unexplored. The model
Baron presents provides a number of predictions but the need for more
research is clear as he points out in a subsequent article presenting the research
agenda for private politics in 2003 (Baron, Private Politics, p. 47-53).
of private politics597. Both of them go either directly or indirectly
through the information provided to the users and potential buyers
of the software. A rough sketch of the influence mechanism is
presented in picture 4-1.
Picture 4-1. Vulnerability disclosure as vertical packaging
In this former case, the provision of information to the public,
of which the threat of doing so is a part, is assumed to alter the
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598 In addition to the enhancement of the market rational behaviour, and at the
same time with it, vulnerability reporting can also be seen as protecting the
informationally weaker party from entering into highly unfavourable and
possibly damaging transactions.
behaviour of the vendors indirectly by enabling customers to compare
software in terms of its vulnerability. The logic is that when the
vendors know that information about the vulnerability of their
software (and their competitors’ software) is provided (or likely to
be provided) to all potential buyers and users, the vendors are
motivated to put more secure software on the market and also to tell
about it. The increased customer possibilities to compare software
products on the basis of their vulnerability serves as an incentive for
the vendors to fix the vulnerabilities and to disclose the existing
vulnerabilities in order to show responsible behaviour or simply to
avoid negative publicity caused by non-action when facing a disclosed
vulnerability.
By informing the users and potential buyers of the risks involved
in the use of the products in question the potential buyers are enabled
to make optimal choices with closer to perfect information. With
closer to optimal information the buyers can operate as central
controllers of the prices and quality of products by striving rationally
after their own private preferences598. In relation to software,
vulnerability reporting as a regulatory instrument enables potential
buyers to assess the quality and security of the software in question
and the claims that vendors make about them, and to compare the
security of software to a certain degree. 
As customers and potential buyers become more aware of the
security issues and are better able to articulate their security needs
and to assess both the quality and security of the software in question,
and the claims that vendors make about them, vendors have to
compete to meet those needs. With increased knowledge of the
vulnerability of several products the customers can compel the vendor
issue patches more quickly and to demand initially secure software
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599 Increased customer demand for secure software is enabled by removing at
least some of the basic informational problems, i.e., the ability to compare
products on the basis of their security.
600 This obviously requires that alternative products exist in the market, i.e. that
buyers have something to compare to and alternatives to choose from. This
can as such be problematic due to the competitive structure of the COTS
software business characterised with networked effects favouring few solutions
and the security related vulnerabilities being an industry wide problem.
601 In the vertically packed model the capabilities of vendors are harnessed for
regulatory purposes. Note that vendors are still not considered as regulators.
Instead, they are implementing agents. Even though vendors conduct quality
assurance testing as part of the development process and, at least ought to be,
the main parties who discover and correct security related vulnerabilities,
report them inside their organisation, and also increasingly to the public
especially in the form of patches, this information provision as such is not
regulation. Their intention is not to achieve certain widely accepted policy goals
like more secure software by influencing the behaviour of others. Instead, the
intention is to increase the demand and sales of the product.
in the future599. Less vulnerabilities in released software and quick
patching become competitive advantages. Market forces will drive
security as a competitive issue due to increased customer demand
and software development is expected to start to take security
seriously.600
Vertical packaging in the sense that mainly software vendors and
retailers are used as intermediaries to transmit vulnerability
information is at the core of both of these influence mechanisms.
In the vulnerability reporting scheme the vendor’s information
dissemination is enabled by making her aware of the existence of the
vulnerability and an incentive to disclose is created by the external
discoverer/reporter threatening to disclose directly to the public if
the vendor does nothing. In the case of vulnerability reporting the
vertical packaging thus happens both by enabling and by requiring
the intermediaries to transmit the information further. The disclosure
of information by the vendors (acting as second level actors,
implementers) is either required or enabled by the regulators601.
The enabling happens simply by disclosing the existence of a
vulnerability to the vendor. The provision of information to the
vendor serves as an informational resource to which the vendors can
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602 Note that no specific info about the vulnerability or even its existence might
be disclosed when releasing a patch or a workaround. However, this typically is
done in order to show the importance of the fix to the affected parties.
603 Due to the conflicting objectives the substance of the policies, the rules and
procedures set, differ according to the party whose interest are represented.
However, rules on conflict resolution between the vendor and the finder are
typically included in the policies for vulnerability reporting. These rules differ,
but typically stipulate or at least imply the possibility to exit the process of
following the policy or the guideline and thus to publish the vulnerability or to
shut down communication. For example the OIS (Organization for Internet
Safety) Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response include rules on
exiting the process in the situation of irreconcilable disagreements. However
requirements of reasonable efforts to solve the problem and noticing other
parties before exiting are provided together with the possible use a third party
to solve the problems.
utilise. Thus, it plays a facilitative role in the testing for vulnerabilities
done by the vendors. The vendors are made aware, even with evidence
(e.g., test cases or proof of concept code), that vulnerabilities in their
software exist, and are thus enabled not just to fix them but also to
disclose the information further to their customers. 
The requiring happens by the external party threatening to disclose
the vulnerability directly to the public or more correctly, threatening
to do so in the case the vendor does not react to the report given to
it. Vulnerability is reported to the vendor and it is accompanied with
a threat of public disclosure if the vendor does not react accordingly.
This has the practical effect that the vendors have an incentive not
just to fix the vulnerability but also to disclose it (e.g., in the form
of a patch or a workaround)602. The threat does not have to be
explicitly made since it is enough that the vendors are aware that the
public disclosure is a possibility. In addition to case by case expression,
such an expectation is also made by the procedures followed by the
stakeholders in the vulnerability reporting process603.
The threat of public disclosure adds the additional non-legal
consequence of negative publicity to the inaction of the vendor in
the case of vulnerabilities existing in its software. The negative
information about products insecurity can damage the business
reputation of the vendor. If this negative information spreads among
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604 Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 124, notes, when discussing the role
of the courts of law in collecting and disseminating what participants in the
market regard as reliable information about trustworthiness of other
contracting parties, that “[t]his function of the legal process need not be
performed by an institution which possesses all the trappings and powers of a
modern court. What is required is rather a body that is respected by the trading
community as an impartial and reliable finder of fact or truth. … In particular,
the body does not require the power to impose effective sanctions itself. Its
influence upon contractual behaviour stems instead from the independent
reactions of participants in the market to its authoritative judgements about
business reputation”. Even though the external reporters in many cases cannot
be seen as impartial and reliable finders of fact or truth or as authoritative
parties to judge the issue, the fact that they get their message heard is enough
to influence in a similar, even though necessarily in a weaker, manner. In highly
competitive markets only a hint of such a sensitive subject as the possible
vulnerability of software might be enough to evoke an adverse reaction from
customers and potential buyers.
market actors, they can be discouraged from purchasing the insecure
product. Basically, the potential disclosure of vulnerabilities by external
parties serves the function of disseminating information about the
trustworthiness of the software product and facilitates the application
of non-legal sanctions like refusing to purchase604. The threat of
publication of the existence of a vulnerability in a specific software
attaches a non-legal sanction, with consequent loss of confidence and
trust, to the report made to the vendor by the external party. In the
COTS software markets this can be an influential mechanism since
there are not a lot of other sources of trustworthiness of the vendor
and the security of its software beside business reputation.
This is actually just another way of employing (implementing,
enforcing, carrying out) the public disclosure as an informative
regulatory instrument; it is not a separate type of instrument. However,
it is the threat that creates the vendors incentive to disclose. Even
though the direct disclosure to the public, without notifying the
vendor first and thus threatening her with the possibility of public
disclosure, can also provide incentives for the vendor both to patch
and to disclose the vulnerability together with the patch to the public
due to the possible customer outcry and negative publicity if the
Regulating Secure Software Development240
605 Compare to the logic of full and immediate disclosure. The full disclosure
movement is based on the assumption that when the disclosure is made
directly to the public (even before, or at the same time as to the vendors), the
vendors, in the fear of wider negative publicity if it does nothing, is compelled
to issue patches quickly. The rationale is that embarrassment pressures
software vendors into producing more secure software. There is also
preliminary empirical evidence that supports the assumption that vendors are
more likely to patch under instantaneous public disclosure and do it faster. See
Arora et al., Impact of Vulnerability Disclosure and Patch Availability, p. 2. However,
this empirical data does not directly speak in favour of such an embarrassment
effect. It simply shows the difference in the likelihood and speed of patching.
606 This is similar to the liability based duty to disclose where the threat of
liability has the practical effect that the vendors have a motivation to disclose
vulnerabilities in order to shield themselves from liability. See heading 5.2
below.
607 This is suggested by Havana and Röning in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Process, p. 7. This is also visible in the guidelines trying to
establish a common approach, of which the most prevalent, even though their
wide acceptance by the security community remains to be seen, are the OIS
(Organization for Internet Safety) Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting and
Response and the NIAC (National Infrastructure Advisory Council of the U.S.)
Vulnerability Disclosure Framework as presented by Chambers and Thompson.
However, there is no consensus on the time that should be given to the
vendor. The guidelines leave it to be agreed on a case by case bases between
the stakeholders (typically the finder and the vendor; a coordinator is taken
abroad when the problems occur). Certain stakeholders have adopted more
formal approaches. For example, CERT/CC typically notifies vendors first
vendor is unresponsive605, the consensus seems to be that the vendor
is first given the opportunity to issue a patch. Under this consensus
based responsible disclosure scheme, the incentive for the vendor
is created by the threat of public disclosure. The disclosure is a threat,
not a weapon. The reporting to the public by the external party after
the vendor has been unresponsive further strengthens this effect, but
it does not create it606.
Despite the differing interests that are discussed below and the
still somewhat varying approaches to vulnerability reporting, a
consensus seems to exist on giving the vendor first enough time to
develop a patch; the publication of some part of information (no
consensus on the amount) after a predefined time is seen to be the
ethically correct way to handle vulnerabilities607. The delaying of the
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after getting the vulnerability reports and provides vendors 45 days to patch
the vulnerability before making the vulnerabilities public. Further, in almost all
cases, CERT/CC discloses information about vulnerability only after vendors
issue patches fixing the vulnerability. CERT/CC does not release all technical
information about a vulnerability to the public.
608 See, for example, section 16 subsection 3 of The Constitution of Finland
(731/1999). For a discussion and a review of the constitutional doctrines of
other countries, see Miettinen, Tieteen vapaus.
609 This is what Ashish A, Telang R and Xu H (2004) Timing Disclosure of Software
Vulnerability for Optimal Social Welfare, Carnegie Mellon University working
paper, April 2004, suggest by using a game theoretic model (referred to in
Arora et al., Impact of Vulnerability Disclosure and Patch Availability, p. 2).
reporting to the wider public is considered necessary in order to
minimise the risk posed by also the increased possibilities for
exploitation before a patch correcting the vulnerability is available.
The consensus approach to vulnerability reporting favour the
publication of some information after a predetermined time
(responsible disclosure) in order to minimise the negative effects of
increased vulnerability of the customers and the increase in the
number of attacks. The immediate, full disclosure like, effect on the
user ability to protect oneself is postponed in order to minimise the
risk of exposure to attack due to the existence of the vulnerability
spreading before a patch is available. This is seen as a balance between
the dual natures of vulnerability disclosure both in helping protection
and easing attacks. At the same time it is a central limitation to the
scientist’s freedom to decide about the publication of research results,
which is a part of the freedom of science guaranteed in the
constitutions of many countries608, in the name of the security of the
information infrastructure. This consensus approach also seems to
be more optimal in societal terms609.
Vertical packaging, the use of vendors as intermediaries in the
information transmission, is only a part of the influence mechanism
of vulnerability disclosure concerning secure software development.
In addition to the use of intermediaries, vulnerability disclosure also
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involves direct supply of information to the users and to the public
at large. 
In this latter form of influence mechanism, the information
provided to users of the existence of a vulnerability in a software
product, its severity, etc. enables them to install patches or take other
protective measures to defend themselves when needed. The reporting
of vulnerabilities to the public is considered to encourage people to
make sure their software is up-to-date. It is assumed that when the
users are provided with the knowledge of the vulnerability they are
at least enabled to take protective measures. To the degree they do
so, the damage caused by the abuse of the defective software products
is diminished. This is clearly visible in the rhetoric’s of those favouring
the reporting of vulnerabilities by external parties. The purpose in
vulnerability reporting is considered to be to provide to the users of
the software what the attackers already are assumed to know (i.e., the
existence of the vulnerability), and thus to enable them to defend
themselves.
The direct provision of information to the public by the reporters,
together with the threat of doing so, not only attempts to alter the
behaviour of the vendors indirectly by enabling customers to compare
software in terms of its vulnerability. It also attempts to alter the
behaviour of the users and potential buyers of the software directly
without intermediaries. The users are enabled to alter their behaviour
with respect to the risks involved even without vendor influence. This
direct provision of information can circumvent the vendor
disincentives for disclosure and put the information available quickly
when needed.
Even though the external constraining depicted above is the main
type of influence, intrinsic predisposition shaping is also included.
In addition to the effort to alter the preferences of (potential) users
towards more security consciousness in the purchasing of COTS
software by informing them about vulnerabilities, similar efforts to
alter the intrinsic predispositions both of the vendors and their
customers are made when the public disclosure of vulnerability is
presented as an ideological argument of the freedom of information
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610 Havana, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 70.
611 To the reporters the communication process, and the reporting as such, is
for the benefit of the society. 
612 Havana and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process,
p. 7 and 11. The reporters also value more open information transmission.
and its positive relationship to security. This is most clearly visible
in the immediate public disclosure form, but is in the background
of the whole vulnerability disclosure scheme.
4.3  Factors shaping the influence
4.3.1  Objectives
As a regulatory mechanism, vulnerability disclosure serves the
objective of influencing secure software development. The disclosure
of vulnerabilities arose from the need to inform the vendors about
vulnerabilities in their software products. The need to inform the
public at large and to threaten the vendors with of disclosure of
vulnerabilities to the wider public has been considered to become
issues due to the unresponsiveness of the vendors. As such, the
improvement of the security of existing software is an explicit
regulatory objective.
Information on the objectives of the main regulators, the reporters
of vulnerabilities, is scarce. Preliminary research shows that the
vendors and the reporters tend to explicitly state, as they did in
answering to an questionnaire about the values and beliefs that guide
their decisions related to vulnerabilities, that security is the most
important value in the reporting process610. In the end, however, their
reasons for the interest in security are different. Whereas the reporters
seem to strive for a level of security that is beneficial for the general
public611, the vendors are interested in the level of security that fulfils
only their customers’ needs. This is what they are expected to do under
normal business logic. As the study of Tiina Havana and Juha Röning
suggest, the public benefit and the public’s right to know are valued
more by the reporters than the vendors612.
Regulating Secure Software Development244
This conclusion is based on higher support for full and immediate reporting
among the reporters than the vendors reported ibid, even though the
consensus seems to be on partial disclosure after a predefined time.
613 This is in line with the argument made in political studies concerning
information as a tool of government that due to the relative cheapness of the
use of informative instruments and their visibility politicians may be less
interested in results than they are in showing that they are doing something.
See, e.g., Weiss, Public Information, p. 234.
614 Of these political reasons especially for using public information as a tool of
government, see Weiss, Public Information, p. 235.
Still their objectives are not fully unselfish or purely altruistic. In
addition, the objective of the reporters might not be favourable to
the secure software development process. For example, they can lead
to disclosures that unnecessarily increase the risk caused by unfixed
vulnerabilities.
An objective of the reporters, according to anecdotal evidence
especially from the receiving organisation, is to gain reputation that
can be cashed later on as increased job opportunities. Recognition
and fame are relatively easily achieved due to the existing high media
interest and the admiration from an adoring and grateful public of
the unselfish geniuses that are seen to be spending their valuable time
in benefiting the public. The reporting might be used as marketing
to highlight the technical skills of the reporter. Thus, there is a
possibility that the reporters might be less interested in the results
of the disclosure to the public than in the visibility of their actions613.
Even thought this is pure speculation, as a possibility it cannot be
disregarded. Though, without further evidence it cannot be given
much significance.
The feasibility of this informative instrument can partly be
explained by the final influencing objective of information on secure
software development being largely hidden. It is politically easier to
give people better information about risks than to get companies to
stop putting people at risk directly. At the same time the regulators
commitment to educated choice and informed citizens is elicited.614
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615 The substance and the implementation of vulnerability disclosure are
difficult to separate. This is due to the reporters operating at both stages. Most
of the issues are considered as implementation and analysed below. In here,
only tentative points that relate to the margin of discretion of the reporters are
raised.
616 The threat of public disclosure that completes the disclosure requirement is
thus typically time limited; in the ethically correct way of first reporting to the
vendor, only a grace period is given, after which the disclosure to the public is
made even though the vendor already might have issued a patch. However, in
this way the vendors responsible behaviour is shown and negative publicity
downsized. By disclosing the vulnerability to the public in any case the
awareness of the existence of the vulnerability and of the possible patch is
increased and a way for the reporter to gain reputational credit is provided.
4.3.2  Substance615
The substance of vulnerability reporting is the provision of knowledge
of a vulnerability to the various affected parties. Vulnerabilities are
reported both to the persons or organisations responsible for fixing
or distributing the knowledge further to other relevant parties (i.e.,
to vendors or to mediators like the CERT), and to the public directly.
The consensus among stakeholders in the vulnerability reporting
process is that the report should initially be made to the vendor and
that the vendor should first be given enough time to develop a patch.
If the vendor fails to issue a patch or otherwise fix the vulnerability
after a sufficient timeframe, which may vary depending on the type
of vulnerability and be agreed upon case by case basis between the
reporter, receiver, and possible the coordinator, or be fixed 30-45
days, the reporter may go public with the vulnerability thus giving
users a possibility to defend themselves. As already discussed, the
publication of some part of information (no consensus on the amount)
after a predefined time is seen to be the ethically correct way to handle
vulnerabilities.
The disclosure to the public is either done by the vendor in a way
that shows her responsible behaviour, by the reporter directly, or
both616. The difference is that when the vendor is involved, her
responsible behaviour is a positive sign for the customers and further
negative publicity due to the vulnerability is diminished. The purpose
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617 The direct disclosure to the public by the external discoverers of the
vulnerability can happen even if the affected vendor has fixed the bug and
disclosed its existence to its customers. The emphasis on the reporters direct
information provision is visible especially in the procedural rules where the
reporters are given the possibility to publish vulnerabilities that are patched but
not made public by the vendor. Such a guideline for unannounced fixes is
given, as presented by Chambers and Thompson in Vulnerability Disclosure
Framework, p. 31, at least in the NIAC guidelines for the discoverers (reporters)
of the vulnerability.
618 The limitation has been pointed out, e.g., by Quirchmayr et al. in A Business
Process Engineering Based Approach towards Incorporating Security in the
Design of Global Information Systems, p. 1115. It should be noted that the
proponents of vulnerability disclosure does not, as a default, expect the
reporting be a cure for all. Instead, it is, as it should be, considered only as a
supportive instrument. Not even the vendors that increasingly rely on
vulnerability disclosure seem to expect it to be a cure for all.
is to get the knowledge of the existence of the vulnerability, and a
fix to it, to the affected parties so that they can take protective
measures. If the vendors do not do that voluntarily after they have
been notified of the existence of the vulnerability, then the reporters
do it any way617.
The coverage of vulnerability reporting is central to its effectiveness.
When the concern is only on disclosing vulnerabilities found after
the release of a software package to the public, the inherent limitation
of the substance of vulnerability disclosure becomes apparent. It
affects secure development only in terms of patching (i.e., post the
release of the software). Initial secure software development is not
the primary concern. What this means is that vulnerability disclosure
is just a supportive mechanism for initial secure software development;
it does not replace it and should not be used as an excuse to do so.
This is so even though in the current state of immaturity in secure
software development it has gained much attention and a central role
as a regulatory instrument. This limitation of the coverage of
vulnerability disclosure needs to be explicitly stated even though it
is obvious for those participating in the reporting process618.
There are, however, at least three ways in which vulnerability
reporting can influence initial secure software development in addition
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619 Whether or not it does so depends heavily on the ways the users and the
vendors utilise the provided information. This is why these issues are discussed
further in the implementation and reaction of objects sections. Only a short
sketch is provided here.
620 Only a little over half of the receivers of the reports answered in a survey
conducted by Havana, as reported in Havana and Röning, Communication in
the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 8, that they pass the information further
to their software developers with the intention of preventing similar
vulnerabilities occurring again. Of all the respondents to the survey only 15 per
cent do this, and when they do it, the information does not have an essential
role in the software development process. Thus, the information gathered
during the reporting process is not widely utilised for the benefit of secure
software development.
to post-release correction of software619. In the first, historical data
about the vulnerability of a specific software package and about the
responses its vendor has given to the reporters can be useful in
software acquisition. At least it can be useful in considering the switch
to competing products. To the degree the responsiveness of the
vendor to the reports become public, as they do when the disclosure
is made directly to the public if the vendor is not responding,
information about the trustworthiness of the vendor is also
disseminated. Even though this data does not fully reflect the security
of next release of the software package in question, it can be used
as indication of the seller’s attitude towards secure software
development in general.
In the second, vulnerability reporting can influence initial secure
software development more forcefully if the information provided
is internalised by the vendors. This would require the vendors to
distribute the information about discovered defects to their software
developers and to make that information an essential part in the
software development process. Currently this is not commonly
done620. 
In the third form, vulnerability reporting can influence initial secure
software development also when knowledge of a vulnerability, not
just of its existence but also of its details (like the specific coding or
implementation error that causes it) is used to train current, and
educate future, software developers more widely to avoid the causes
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621 See, e.g., Graff and van Wyk, Secure Coding, from 2003 and Viega and
McGraw, Building Secure Software, from 2002.
of the vulnerabilities. Due to the current lack of teaching material such
knowledge, especially if codified, could serve as an important
educational resource. For example, recent textbooks on secure
software development use known vulnerabilities especially as examples
to clarify and make things more concrete621.
Another issue in the substance of vulnerability reporting is the use
of public disclosure as a punishment for vendor misbehaviour. As
already shown, the threatening with public disclosure is a central part
of the effect mechanism of vulnerability reporting. Even though this
threat of punishment in the form of negative publicity essentially
makes the reporting effective in the final end by forcing the non-
cooperative vendors to comply with requirements of the reporter
about fixing the bug and disclosing its existence to the customers,
it can also have adverse effects.
When the substance is partly based on the assumption that the
vendors cannot be trusted, that they have to be threatened with
sanctions in order to correct vulnerabilities in their software, instead
of voluntary compliance, the juxtaposition of vendors and the
reporters with the general public is emphasised. This might hamper
cooperation especially between the vendors and the reporters. To
a certain degree it has already done so as the heated ideological
discussion of full and immediate disclosure described. The basis for
cooperative approaches took a while to be found. It still influences
the cooperation as the difficulties in finding a common cooperative
approach to the reporting process that all stakeholders could approve
show.
However, the use of coercive power by the reporter in the form
using public disclosure as a punishment for vendor misbehaviour is
not the only influence mechanism external reporters’ use. Neither
is it the mostly used, at least not anymore when full and immediate
disclosure has faded into margin. The use of less coercive and more
cooperative influencing mechanism like mere informing of the
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622 The necessary communication between the stakeholders of vulnerability
disclosure requires codified rules which all the parties can accept.
existence of the vulnerability and persuasion are used. The public
disclosure is only the last resort when cooperation and persuasion
no longer work.
A central question in the substance of vulnerability reporting is the
wide discretionary power of the reporters, of which the various
approaches to vulnerability disclosure even among the reporters is
an evidence (e.g., from full and immediate disclosure to non-
disclosure). As vulnerability reporting has matured and become more
clearly an established part of software development process, this
freedom has turned out to be a hindrance for the effectiveness of
reporting and for the codification and unification of the practices in
the reporting process622. 
The policies and guidelines for vulnerability reporting that codify
and unify the approaches and thus limit the freedom of the reporters,
the influence of which are analysed below in the section concerning
implementation, still leave considerable margin of discretion for the
reporters. The policies and guidelines set forth by various stakeholders
are not coercive even though the receivers of the reports are likely
to be more cooperative and even more responsive when their
reporting policies are followed.
What information is disclosed by the discoverer of a vulnerability and
the amount of it influences the effects vulnerability reporting can have.
While reporting to the vendor (instead of directly to the public),
possibly even via a coordinator, the amount of details affects first of
all vendor behaviour. More details not only increase the credibility
of the report but also ease the verification its accuracy. This makes
the vendors more likely to respond accordingly. At least all technical
information together with information of the discoverers environment
(e.g., hardware, configuration, other applications installed, relevant
details about the network topology, firewall rules) and the level of
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623 Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 29.
624 If, however, premature leaks occur, or the vulnerability otherwise becomes
under active exploitation, the guidelines typically recommend certain amount
of coordination between the discoverer and the vendor. At least in the form of
informing the other party and providing evidence that the information has
already been made public or that active exploitation is under way in order not
to worsen the situation. (OIS, Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting and
Response, p. 19, point 8.4; Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure
Framework, p. 30).
625 The direct reporting to the users happens mostly by mailing lists like the
Bugtrack or even popular media.
626 As Chambers and Thompson point out in Vulnerability Disclosure Framework,
p. 30, with full details it is relatively easy for fairly unskilled malicious
individuals to develop exploits thus increasing the immediate risk to end users.
patching are considered relevant for the vendor to be able to verify
the accuracy of the reports623. 
In order to prevent premature leaks of vulnerability information,
that imposes increased risks to users, the protection of the sensitive
information is important. However, with restricted reporter-vendor
relationship this can relatively easily be done624.
The amount details have much more varying effects when the
reporting goes directly from the discoverers to the users. The level
of detailed information made available to the wider public can have
conflicting consequences due to the information being useful both
in correcting and exploiting vulnerabilities. The details not only give
precise information for the vendor to verify the claim and to create
a patch, but also for the user of the software to verify that the
vulnerability exists in her systems and what actions could be taken
if the vendor has not offered a patch. However, if the details become
more widely known, e.g., in the case of disclosure via full disclosure
list like the Bugtrack625, also the attacker is helped at the same time
in the creation of exploits626, in the determination of vulnerable
systems, and in the launching of attacks. 
This is why, the disclosure of all details is not considered
appropriate even in situations where the vendor does not inform its
users of a fixed vulnerability or is otherwise unresponsive to the
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627 Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 30. In the
current consensus based policies the achievement of this balance is left to the
discoverer.
628 See Arbaugh et al., Windows of Vulnerability, p. 57.
629 For definitions and background, see above p. 162-163.
630 As Paul Slovic, one of the leading analyst of risk, risk perception and risk
management, emphasise in Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy, p. 318-319,
while discussing the importance of trust in risk management, trust towards the
manager of risk and into the source of risk information is fundamental for the
reports, and the formal vulnerability reporting process is aborted. The
consensus in reporting the vulnerability information directly to the
public as a last resort (when all attempts to work with a vendor directly
and through a coordinator fail) seems to be that full details are not
disclosed. Instead, a balance is considered more appropriate627.
Without going deeper in to the effects of explicit details (e.g., how
the publication of the proof of concept code at source level influences)
it can be stated on the basis of current research that automation of
a vulnerability, not just its disclosure, serves as the catalyst for
widespread intrusions628. While the explicit details serve both the
correcting of vulnerabilities, their exploitations and the defence of
information systems, the automation of vulnerability exploits seems
to serve only the exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Another issue in the substance of vulnerability reporting, which
influences the effects vulnerability disclosure can have, is the basic
choice in the use of different reporting channels; either directly to
the vendor (e.g., its security experts or product support), or through
a coordinator like the different CSIRT organisations or the CERTs629.
This is typically left to the discretion of the reporter in the policies
and guidelines. Only the requirement that the vendor is first given
sufficient time to issue a patch is seen as a common approach;
immediate and full disclosure is seen as unethical. 
The different levels of credibility these channels possess in the
eyes of the vendors receiving the reports affects the effectiveness of
reporting630. Software vendors with tight schedules quickly need to
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effectiveness of risk-communication. According to Slovic, idem, p. 318, the
limited effectiveness of risk-communication efforts can be attributed to the
lack of trust.
631 Research has identified certain mismatch in the channels used by the
reporters and the information sources utilised by the vendors. Whereas the
former seem to be relying on direct contact with the vendor (e.g., via email,
bug reporting forms), the latter utilise coordinators as their primary source of
vulnerability information instead of the direct reports. This is visible in the first
empirical study of the communication processes in vulnerability reporting
conducted by Tiina Havana, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting
Process, p. 42. One possible explanation for this mismatch is the credibility of
the information source in the eyes of the vendor.
632 See, e.g., Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 23-
24.
verify the existence and seriousness of the reported vulnerabilities
and thus seek for sources of vulnerability information that are both
reliable and credible. This is especially what established independent
third-party CERT like organisations offer. 
The reporters, instead, easily lack credibility in the eyes of the
vendor as a source of vulnerability information. Reports are often
perceived, especially by the vendors, as the private advertising of the
competence of the discoverer. Perceiving the competence advertising
and reputation gaining as primary reasons for the reporting might
affect the effectiveness of vulnerability disclosure seriously. Not only
are the vendors less likely to consider the reported information
credible, but also is their overall interest in the vulnerability disclosure
in general likely to decline. The assumption often made that the
reporters act on the basis of dislike of the vendor (e.g., it being the
“monopolist”, a major international operator) does not ease the
issue631. 
How common this kind of reporting in the private interest of the
discoverer of the vulnerability is, is an empirical question of which
no certainty currently exists. The objective of personal reputational
gains of the reporters overriding everything else is often raised
especially in the cases where a direct public disclosure is made without
any advance verification of its accuracy by the vendor (i.e., full and
immediate disclosure)632. However, there are important theoretical
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assumptions that speak in disfavour of the likelihood of inaccurate
reports. 
Since the reputation of a reporter, the primary asset asserted to
be sought by the reporters, is likely to be rather quickly loosed if the
disclosure is found to be groundless in later analysis, short term
reputational gain-seeking is not likely to lead to high amounts of
inaccurate reports. The huge amount of disclosed vulnerabilities
further diminishes both the possibilities to gain reputation and to get
caught of inaccurate reports. And if the reporters take seriously the
negative impact of large numbers of inaccurate reports and act
responsibly, the likelihood of inaccurate reports is further diminished.
The assumption thus would favour the reliability of reporters as
sources of vulnerability information. This is so despite the wide
unavailability of traditional legal disincentives for false or misleading
statements due to the anonymity of many of the reporters, whish
only increases with the use of unauthorised versions of the tested
software, and the reporters being located in different jurisdictions.
Still, the use of mediators in the reporting process can influence
the likelihood that the reports have the desired effects on the
behaviour of the vendors (i.e., they are taken seriously and corrective
action is taken). Reporting through an established mediator not only
can increase the credibility of the report in the eyes the vendor, and
thus become more likely to be taken seriously, but it also increases
the likelihood of the report to reach a wider number of the affected
users. Especially in the case of established and networked national
and international CERT or CSIRT organisations. The implementation
of vulnerability reporting as a regulatory measure further depends
on the channel used since the practices and procedures followed in
reporting differ between the actors. This will be discussed further
in the analysis of the implementation of vulnerability reporting.
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633 This possibility is left open also in the consensus seeking guidelines as has
been noted above.
634 Havana, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 70.
635 To the reporters the communication process, and the reporting as such, is
for the benefit of the society. 
4.3.3  Implementation
As noted, the disclosure rules are vertical packages where mainly the
threat of external public disclosure is used to incite and obligate the
vendors to disclose vulnerability information (upper level of package),
and then the vendors inform the users (lower level of package). Since
the implementation in the upper level of package is conducted by
separate institutions and focuses on different types of instruments
(written and informative), whereas in the lower level of package the
implementation is conducted by the vendor and concerns similar
informative instruments, it is useful to analyse the effects of
implementation at both levels separately. The upper vertical level is
analysed first. 
Upper vertical level. Publishing vulnerability information to the public,
enforcing the threat of public disclosure (the core of the effect
mechanism of vulnerability disclosure) is a central part of the
implementation of vulnerability reporting as a regulatory instrument.
Deterrence is a central, even though not the only part of the effect
mechanism. The actual disclosure of vulnerability information to the
public in cases where the vendor is not responsive is essential for the
effectiveness of the deterrence mechanism633.
Even though both the vendors and the reporters tend to explicitly
state, as they did in answering to an questionnaire about the values
and beliefs that guide their decisions related to vulnerabilities, that
security is the most important value in the reporting process634, the
role of the deterrent effect has been important. This is because, in
the end, their reasons for the interest in security are different. Whereas
the reporters seem to strive for a level of security that is beneficial
for the general public635, the vendors are interested in the level of
security that fulfils only their customers’ needs. This is what they are
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636 Havana and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process,
p. 7 and 11.
637 This is also suggested by Tiina Havana in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 70. This difference in objectives may partially
explain the difference in the use of formal policies pointed out by empirical
research. Whereas nearly half of the receiving organizations had some kind of a
reporting policy during an empirical study in 2002 reported by Havana in
Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 72, only one third of
the reporting organizations had one. Standardised procedures in terms of
policies and guidelines are more important to the vendors due to the high
economic interests involved.
638 Vendors are increasingly turning to their customers for help in finding
defects in their software by making early releases (pre-release or beta versions)
available to interested users and by distributing incremental updates (e.g.,
patches) often to the software. This applies especially to the open source
software vendors, but also the proprietary software developers understand just
as well the value and potential of users in testing. The principle of release early
and often makes economic sense also for the proprietary vendor. Proprietary
vendors desire to achieve more cost-effective testing by externalising part of
the costs of testing to the customers. The economic rationale for the increased
reliance on vulnerability management and patching is analysed, under the
assumption of the availability of full quality information for the customers, by
Ashish et al. in Sell First Fix Later.
expected to do under normal business logic. As the study of Tiina
Havana and Juha Röning suggest, the public benefit and the public’s
right to know are valued more by the reporters than the vendors636.
Instead of having the objective to gain a level of security that is
sufficient for the society as a whole, the vendors’ objective with
reporting policies seems to be formalisation and cost-effective
management combined with the private intention to increase the
predictability and control over the process. At best, the intention is
to achieve cost-effective help in security development from the
companies’ point of view and the preservation of the public image
of the company and its products. The vendors seek to fulfil the
expectations of their stakeholders about the products and the
company.637
Because users are increasingly enlisted in finding vulnerabilities638,
vendors have a need to manage the information that may damage
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639 The economic rationale for the increased reliance on vulnerability
management and patching is analysed, under the assumption of the availability
of full quality information for the customers, by Ashish et al. in Sell First Fix
Later.
640 Havana and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 10.
641 Havana, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 68-69.
More intensive dialog between the reporters and the vendors, instead of mere
one-way communication, has been deemed necessary to increase the validity of
the reports as noted by Tiina Havana in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 69.
642 Havana and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process,
p. 7.
643 This finds support from the empirical results reported by Havana and
Röning in Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 9, that the
the public image of the company, and at the same time make users
even more vulnerable. The vulnerability management and reporting
policies help in this by minimising the negative side effects (both in
terms of increased vulnerability of users and especially of negative
public image) and by speeding up the vulnerability management, and
thus decreasing the costs involved.639The vendors see the
communication in the software vulnerability reporting process as
a management tool and a resource for the development of secure
software; from their perspective the information transmission should
be codified and organised as pointed out by Tiina Havana and Juha
Röning640. Their objective in setting up the vulnerability reporting
policies is partly to improve their products by managing the flow of
information by codifying and making explicit the procedural
knowledge and by enhancing the dialogical communication between
the vendors and the reporters641.
Both the reporters and the vendors objective is to avoid harming
others (to minimise the users window of vulnerability and to avoid
the widespread abuses of the vulnerabilities that often follow a
premature disclosure), but the vendors are more concerned with
avoiding fear, uncertainty and doubt642. Even though this is in line
with the societal interest of enhancing e-commerce, and naturally
with the private interest of the companies, this may also be interpreted
as the vendor’s objective to avoid negative publicity by restricting
the amount of information published and the time of publication
by setting up policies for vulnerability reporting643. This objective
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vendors oppose full disclosure more than the reporters even when it is done
after a predetermined time, even though full and immediate disclosure is
opposed by both parties (vendors and reporters). Perhaps the condescending
attitude towards vulnerabilities is an attempt to hide the intentionally increased
reliance on patching and on other post-release quality improvement activities.
644 This is pointed out by Antunes and Hunt in The Impact of Certainty and
Severity of Punishment, p. 189-190, in their summary of conclusions from
empirical research on deterrence in the U.S. before 1980.
combines with the objective of avoiding possible legal actions on
the basis of liability of the vulnerabilities. Also the objective of gaining
favourable publicity by appearing to be a responsible actor can have
an effect, since the adoption of vulnerability reporting policies shows
that they are at least doing something and taking the reports seriously.
As a deterrent, however, the (threat of) public disclosure of
vulnerabilities faces serious hindrances. As empirical research on
deterrence suggest, it is certainty of punishment that is more important
for deterring crime rates for more ‘rational’ crimes (as opposed to
spontaneous emotional crimes) than the severity of punishment644.
Severity of punishment only has a deterrent effect when the certainty
level is high enough to make severity salient. In the case of threatening
with public disclosure of vulnerabilities the severity of the non-legal
sanctions might be enough as such to create a deterrent effect, but
due to randomness of the public disclosure of vulnerabilities, it
necessarily does not provide enough deterrence for software vendors
to take security seriously. However, with the increasing interest in
vulnerabilities the low certainty of punishment in the form of public
disclosure might be diminishing. 
This form of enforcement through deterrence can influence the
possibilities for cooperation between vendors and reporters, which
is crucial for the effectiveness of vulnerability reporting. When the
implementation is partly based on the assumption that the vendors
cannot be trusted, that they have to be threatened with sanctions in
order to correct vulnerabilities in their software, instead of voluntary
compliance, the juxtaposition of vendors and the reporters with the
general public is emphasised. This might hamper cooperation
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645 Of this weakness of the deterrence mode of enforcement in general, see
Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, p. 25.
646 This is visible especially in the consensus based approaches to vulnerability
reporting, such as the NIAC guidelines. See Chambers and Thompson,
Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 30. This is inline with the argument in the
theory of private politics emphasised by David P. Baron in Private Politics, p.
36, that many firms attempt to avoid private political actions by proactively
adopting policies that reduce the likelihood that they become a target. Even
though some of these attempts are little more than public relations, many of
them represent real commitments to changes in policies and practices. This is
also why the number of public disclosures or other observed conflicts do not
tell the truth about the influence of vulnerability disclosure.
647 The requirements for effective cooperative regulatory enforcement are
informally adapted from those presented in the context of agency based
implementation. See, e.g., Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and
the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, p. 115-136.
especially of those vendors that voluntarily would correct the
vulnerabilities, issue patches and inform their customers645. To a
certain degree it might have already done so, as the heated ideological
discussion of full and immediate disclosure described. The room for
cooperative approaches was lost for a while. 
Currently the implementation of vulnerability disclosure has turned
from sanction based full disclosure towards forms of responsible
disclosure where negotiated solutions and cooperative correction of
security related bugs are primary. This is what the agreed consensus-
based formal processes codified into the policies and guidelines are
signs of. The public disclosure of a vulnerability is currently a result
of cooperative remedying by the vendor, reporter and, when needed,
the coordinator. The threat of public disclosure if the vendor does
not issue a patch is enforced only as a last resort; when all attempts
to work with a vendor directly and through a coordinator fail646.
This cooperative mode of implementation is likely to be efficacious
in the case of vulnerability disclosure because the information
reporters provide to vendors bring mutual benefits647. The vendors
get low cost assistance in testing security and the reporters get more
secure software together with fame and possible future benefits. The
cooperative implementation also appeals to the motives of vendors
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648 Many security reporters, like Ed Felten, have reported having withdrawn
from reporting a vulnerability to the public due to the legal risks and threats of
legal action by the vendors. A general concern has also been reported in 2004
by John T. Chambers and John W. Thompson in the final report for the U.S.
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), Vulnerability Disclosure
Framework, p. 25.
649 Even though this is questionable in the current situation where responsible
behaviour is expected from all the parties and initial contact with the vendor is
considered appropriate, the reporters still would get more chances to show
their capability; at least outside the professional community.
to act socially responsibly in the case security related vulnerabilities
occur. They get a chance to show to be acting responsibly by reacting
quickly to the reports without necessarily actually changing the initial
secure development practices.
Vendor unresponsiveness to vulnerability reports and reluctance
to take them seriously, which was one of the arguments used to justify
immediate public disclosure, is still a serious problem for this
cooperative implementation strategy; even so when mutual benefits
can be gained. For example, a fear of legal actions under U.S Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, EU Copyright Directive or similar national
laws has led independent security researchers (i.e., those not in direct
cont(r)act with the vendor in question) to withdraw from reporting648.
The consequences of this possible legal threat to the security
research and vulnerability disclosure are real despite of the suspicion
of the validity of the liability claims under many circumstances. Just
that the legal rules are written in a manner that makes them really hard
to understand and open to interpretations provide sufficient basis
for this fear. It is no wonder that security researchers are cautious,
when the rules have already been used to threaten certain researchers.
The problem is that only long-term benefits are involved and
require longer term objectives than currently exists in the market
driven software development practice characteristic of COTS software.
In the short run, both the vendors and the reporters would be better
of with not cooperating. The reporter would get, e.g., immediate and
wide media attention due to the public disclosure649 and the vendors
would not have to consume resources like labour and time to fixing
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650 Economics explain the argument in more general terms. While developing a
model where reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the
current period results in the loss of all surplus, Ely and Välimäki, Bad
reputation, p. 785-814, show that in models where all parties have long-run
objectives, such losses can be avoided.
651 There already are technological solutions in the software tools that are used
to manage vulnerability reporting process that make this information easily
available. 
the vulnerabilities and could concentrate on getting the next version
to market quickly.
A long-term relationship between the reporters and vendors
mitigate this problem650. When cooperation around a vulnerability
between reporters and vendors possibly together with other vendors
and coordinators is repetitive, parties become sufficiently concerned
with future encounters to resist the short-term temptation to shirk.
Even though the encounter might not be with exactly the same actors,
the publicity of shirking in the current high media interest atmosphere
alone is sufficient to transmit the information to other reporters and
vendors651.
Due to its dual nature as an informative instrument, i.e., there is
an element of the direct supply of information to the users of the
software by the reporters themselves and elements of the use of
intermediaries to transmit the information both by requiring (threat
of public disclosure) and by enabling (by giving vulnerability
information to the vendors) the vendors to disclose the vulnerability
information, several actors participate the implementation process.
The implementation of vulnerability reporting, the actual process of
reporting and its management, is thus only partially at the hands of
the discoverers who do the reporting. 
The actual process of vulnerability reporting is a combined action
of several stakeholders where the procedures, practices and institutions
adopted especially by the coordinators between reporters and the
vendors (e.g., various CSIRT organisations) play a significant role.
The effects of reporting are altered significantly by the different
approaches to the reporting process. 
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652 The communication and its problems have been analysed by Tiina Havana
in an empirical study. The results are reported in Havana, Communication in the
Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, and Havana and Röning, Communication
in the Software Vulnerability Process. These communication problems are the
actual reasons for the need for the codification of the practices and procedures
followed by organisations into the form explicit policies.
653 Their purpose is to ease the cooperation of and communication between
the different stakeholders (discoverers/reporters, vendors, coordinators, and
users) in the process of reporting and, in the end, fixing of security
vulnerabilities. This is visible especially in the guidelines searching for a
common solution, such as the OIS Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting
and Response, p. 4. Note however, that The OIS guidelines concentrate on the
relationship between the discoverer/reporter and the vendor. No claim of
universal applicability to all stakeholders is made.
654 The disclosure policies and especially the guidelines and best-practices that
try to find common ground can also be seen as a separate process-based
regulatory instrument as such and could be analysed on the basis of their
objectives, substance, implementation and reactions similar to any other
instrument. However, since their main purpose is to formalise and ease the
communication between the actors in the vulnerability reporting process, in
The approaches of specific organisations and its stakeholders have
been codified and made explicit in the policies and guidelines put
forward. In addition to the discoverers/reporters (individuals or
organisations that find the vulnerabilities), such explicit policies have
been presented also by the vendors (parties that develop or maintain
software products that may be vulnerable) and the coordinators of
the communication. Without going deeper into the recognised
communication problems between the actors in vulnerability
reporting652, the influence of the implementation of vulnerability
reporting on the effects it can produce and the possibilities that it has
for affecting secure software development can best be analysed by
concentrating on the disclosure policies and guidelines that try to
formalise the process653. From them the different approaches to
vulnerability reporting can be seen. In addition to the influence of
the differing approaches, the influence of the common and similar
points in the implementation of vulnerability reporting can be analysed
especially from guidelines and best practices that try to find common
ground654.
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this study they are only considered from the implementation perspective of the
reporting as such. A separate regulatory analysis is left for further study.
655 The policies are typically drafted from the perspective of different
organisations as noted by Laakso et al. in Introducing Constructive
Vulnerability Disclosures. A list of different policies and guidelines can be
found from the web pages of the Oulu University Secure Programming Group
(OUSPG) http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/sage/disclosure-tracking/
#h-ref10 [updated 10.5.2005, visited 22.2.2006].
656 For example, the main function of CERT-FI is to promote security of the
information society by assisting its clients (every Finnish private individual,
company or representative of the government) in preventive actions for
computer security incident and the minimisation of the risk of vulnerability.
CERT-FI also receives the telecommunications operators' reports on
information security incidents and threats demanded by Section 21 titled
”information security notifications” of the Finnish Act on the Protection of
Privacy in Electronic Communications (516/2004). An unofficial translation of
the Act made 1.1.2005 is available via Finlex at http://www.finlex.fi/fi/
laki/kaannokset/2004/20040516 [22.2.2006]. See version 1.1 of the charter of
The reason for various approaches adopted in the policies, the rules
and procedures set, is that when the policies are drafted from only
one perspective (be that the vendors, the discoverers, the
coordinators), the interests represented differ655. As already noted,
even though both vendors and reporters state that security is the most
important value in the reporting process, the reasons for the interest
in security are still different. Whereas the reporters seem to strive
for a level of security that is beneficial for the general public, the
vendors are interested in the level of security that fulfils only their
customers’ needs.
The practices and processes adopted and formalised into policies
by the coordinators represent the objectives of the respective
organisation and typically serve their internal needs. For example,
CSIRT teams in big companies or in academic networks typically
coordinate action only inside the member organisations and the public
interest is not their main concern. Naturally other teams do not
explicitly oppose to this, but they seem to serve more limited purposes
and interests.
Of the policies set up by coordinators, the objective of enhancing
the public interest in information security and to aid to reach a level
of security that is sufficient for the whole society is most clearly
protected by the national governmental teams656. National security
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the CERT-FI headings 3.1-3.4, published 7.6.2004, available in pdf -format at,
http://www.ficora.fi/suomi/tietoturva/certtoiminta.htm (in Finnish) [updated
26.10.2004, visited 22.2.2006]. The charter is based on Internet Engineering
Task Force’s best practice as presented by Brownlee and Guttman, Expectations
of Computer Security Incident Response, in RFC 2350.
657 See, for example, the web pages of the US-CERT, http://www.uscert.gov/
aboutus.html [updated 21.2.2006, visited 22.2.2006].
658 Due to their role in enhancing the public interest, the national coordinating
teams are in an especially good situation to develop disclosure policies that
minimize total social costs, and not just private costs of a specific stakeholder.
Cooperation at an international level is a minimum requirement for this to
happen. The priority of governmental funded coordination under welfare
economic considerations is shown by Kannan and Telang in An Economic
Analysis of Market for Software Vulnerabilities.
659 The need for codified and explicit practices and processes is clear. The
failures in the reporting process, which typically result from failures in the
communication between the stakeholders, pose risks for the information
security of individuals and organizations. For example, if a publication of a
vulnerability is mistimed or information leaks from the parties, the users face
increased vulnerability. The same happens if vulnerabilities are not being fixed
due to misplaced or –handled reports. The positive effects on secure software
development that vulnerability reporting can produce depend heavily on the
success of the communication process. This requires clear and explicit rules
and procedures in order to be able to balance the differing interests and
objectives, and, at the same time, to capture to benefits of reporting and
minimizing the risks posed. Even though reporting policies in general try to do
this, the consensus seeking guidelines are more effective due to the rules and
procedures being standardised and accepted by the majority of stakeholders.
interests, such as the protection the critical infrastructure, are also
high in the list of objectives of national teams657. This raises the
importance of the disclosure policies advocated by national
coordinators (like US-CERT, Aus-Cert, etc.), since they posses the
ability to use the policy as a leverage to modify the incentives other
stakeholders face for the benefit of the society at large658.
Conflicting objectives and consequent differing approaches has
been proposed to be standardised in order to make the reporting more
efficient and effective659. One of the first proposals was a draft
Internet standard published in the form of a request for comment
(RFC) in the auspice of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
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660 This explanation is provided at the web pages of the Organisation for
Internet Safety (OIS), http://www.oisafety.org/about.html#14 [updated 17.9.
2004, visited 22.2.2005].
661 The OIS guidelines received support from the U.S. National Cyber Security
Partnership (NCSP) in 2004, whose task force on the Security Across the
Software Development Life Cycle recommended its usage in its report on
Improving Security Across the Software Development LifeCycle.
662 See Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework.
663 Note that the acceptance of both the OIS and NIAC guidelines by the
security community remains to be seen due to their relatively recent
proposition.
The proposed responsible disclosure draft got rejected due to IETF
not considering itself as proper venue for non-technical procedural
standards660. Most prevalent of current proposals are the OIS
(Organization for Internet Safety) Guidelines for Security Vulnerability
Reporting and Response661 and the NIAC (National Infrastructure
Advisory Council of the U.S.) Guidelines that are presented in the
final report of its Vulnerability Disclosure Working Group drafted
by Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework662.
The effort is to bring the different actors in vulnerability reporting
together to form a common approach that would be applicable to
all stakeholders. For example, the goal of the OIS Guidelines and
the NIAC Framework is to achieve a common understanding and
to develop standard practices for vulnerability reporting663. They are
designed to eliminate confusion among all stakeholders and the public
regarding managing and resolving security vulnerabilities. The
coordinating guidelines have the objective of finding solutions that
are best possible for all of the stakeholders and that could be accepted
by all.
The NIAC guidelines stated objective is to develop a framework
for the management of vulnerability reporting in the purpose of
advancing national interests. NIAC is a component of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and it functions as an advisor of
the president of the U.S. in issues relating to the security of
information systems for critical infrastructure. However, the guidelines
are intended to be non-US-centric with global applicability to all
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664 Voluntary implementation of the guidelines worldwide is deemed to help in
minimising also risks the vulnerabilities pose to the US. Chambers and
Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 12-13.
665 As visible in the report drafted by Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability
Disclosure Framework, p. 12, the sources (literary and personal combined)
represent all of the stakeholders in vulnerability reporting; the discovers of the
vulnerabilities, the vendors of the vulnerable software, the users of the
software, and the coordinators of the vulnerability reports. 
666 See the web pages of the OIS, http://www.oisafety.org/about.html#4
[updated 17.9.2004, visited 22.2.2005]. The wide adoption and effectiveness of
the guidelines is considered to be dependent on their alignment with the
consensus of the security community.
667 Only big software development and security companies are represented in
the OIS at the time of writing. See http://www.oisafety.org/about.html
[updated 17.9.2004, visited 22.2.2005] and the list of adopters at
http://www.oisafety.org/adopters.html [updated 17.9.2004, visited 22.2.2005].
668 The OIS is forming an advisory board that would represent the interest of
computer users. Recognized security experts have been asked to join. See the
web pages of the OIS, http://www.oisafety.org/about.html#15 [updated
17.9.2004, visited 22.2.2005].
stakeholders664. In addition, the NIAC guidelines build on existing
practices and policies and uses input from industry, government, and
academia in the form of literary sources and personal contributions665.
However, the U.S. concentricity of the guidelines and the emphasis
of the national security interests of the U.S. may hinder their
worldwide acceptance.
The OIS is explicitly seeking for the public benefit and commit
to the public review and commenting process666. However, this public
interest statement may be diluted by narrow representation only of
key commercial software development and security companies667  and
the concentration only on the relationship between the
discoverer/reporter and the vendor. No claim of universal applicability
to all stakeholders is made. Neither the customers nor the coordinators
are represented in OIS668. At least there is a threat of other
stakeholders trust to the guidelines commitment to solving social
problems outside the private interests of the companies being lower
due to the representative structure and the concentration being purely
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669 Suspicion of the bias towards vendor preferences is clearly visible in the
public comments of the first version of the OIS guidelines. See comments
from public review http://www.oisafety.org/reference/comments.pdf [22.2.
2006].
670 Finding the right contact has been reported to be difficult especially for the
reporters by Havana and Röning in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Process, p. 7.
on vendor-discoverer relationship669. However, the OIS represents
such an influential group that can act as gatekeepers for the
vulnerability reporting process. The processes that the big software
development and security companies adopt are likely to affect the
opinions and possibilities of others also.
It is not possible to go into the practical implementation of all the
rules and procedures that these policies and guidelines contain and
all their possible influences to the reporting process. Only certain
central questions and solutions to the main communication problems
can be raised.
One of the crucial issues for the effectiveness of vulnerability
reporting and a central demand in the policies and guidelines is the
establishment of a clear point of contact for vulnerability reports (e.g.,
a single dedicated email address) by all the stakeholders. This is
especially important for the vendors since the reporters seem to have
the biggest problems in finding the right persons to contact670.
Another issue that centrally increases the effectiveness and speed of
reporting is that stakeholders provide and clearly indicate (e.g., in web
pages) consistent formats for reporting and displaying security
vulnerability information, make explicit all the procedures for handling
security vulnerabilities including the policy, and that the vendors
clearly indicate a list of supported products and their versions. 
Proper measure to protect the sensitive vulnerability data (to keep
its integrity and confidentiality) and to verify the authenticity and non-
repudiation of participants of the communication is also an essential
part of implementation. Not only for the purpose of encouraging
finders of vulnerabilities to communicate vulnerabilities to software
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671 As reported by Tiina Havana in Communication in the Software Vulnerability
Reporting Process, p. 41-42, the communication channel most commonly used at
both ends is email. Due to the sensitivity of the information reported,
encryption is increasingly used especially by the reporters. The use of both
encryption to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of message contents,
and digital signatures for authentication of the reporters and the non-
repudiation of the reports helps the reporter to increase the credibility of the
claim. The vendors are more likely to be responsive since they can at least
know the identity of the reporter and the integrity of the report.
672 This is emphasised especially in the wide consensus based NIAC guidelines,
where the protection of information is an essential part of the guidelines for all
the stakeholders.
673 As pointed out by Chambers and Thompson in Vulnerability Disclosure
Framework, p. 34, for vulnerability coordination to be effective, vendors,
reporters and users must be aware of the existence and legitimacy of
coordinators. 
vendors671 but also in order to gain legitimacy and trust in the eyes
of the stakeholders in the reporting process. Due to premature leaks
of vulnerability information imposing increasing risks to users, the
protection of the information, by all the relevant parties to the
vulnerability communication process, is deemed necessary672. Clear
indication of how the sensitive data is protected is also needed in order
to increase the trust of other parties and the public in general. This
is especially important for the national coordinators since they operate
on the basis of trust from the stakeholders and the public in general673.
However advisable the use of encryption, for example, PGP and
equivalent open source version like Open PGP, and other protection
measure is, it can also have a negative effect on the possibility for
vulnerability reporting to influence the behaviour of the vendor. Many
encryption and digital signature products still do not interoperate well
and the costs of maintaining several systems with the same purpose
are high. This may lead major actors (mainly vendors or coordinators
that handle vast amounts of vulnerability data) attempting to sign on
only to a single product. However, this would limit the pool of
participants, force them to use other, more inconvenient and costly
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674 This is noted Chambers and Thompson in Vulnerability Disclosure Framework,
p. 22, which codifies the standpoints of the vulnerability disclosure community
at large.
675 A security advisory provides information to the general public about the
security vulnerability, the products and versions it affects, and the steps that
can be taken to defend affected systems and networks against it. However,
there is no clear consensus on the amount of information that should be
provided and when to do so.
(like traditional mail), secure communications methods, or lead them
to stop using secure communications methods altogether674.
Other rules and procedures that the reporting policies and
guidelines typically include concern, for example, what the finder
should do before reporting (e.g., check whether the issue has
previously been publicly identified and remedied), rules on the vendor
notification confirming it has received the report (timeline, usually
7 business days, and what the reporter should do if no confirmation
is sent; e.g., send a request for confirmation and turn to conflict
resolution), obligations to give status updates to the reporter. Also
further rules on giving security advisories are typically involved675
together with standard forms for the different stages of reporting.
Due to the codification, the information regarding the procedures
and practices of vulnerability reporting can be more easily taught and
transferred inside organisations. There is no need for everyone to learn
the practices and procedures by doing. This alone positively influences
the efficacy of vulnerability reporting. When the policies and guidelines
are sufficiently clearly made available to the stakeholders, they are
made more aware of what others expect from them and understand
the role and importance of reporting in the organisation of other
stakeholders. This increased understanding of the behaviour of others
can further decrease the possibilities for conflicts between the
stakeholders. 
Note that the implementers of vulnerability reporting, those
adapting practices and procedures necessary for the effective
functioning of the reporting, have a considerable discretionary power.
Not even the guidelines and the policies are coercive. In addition there
is no other monitoring than the negative or positive publicity of those
Harnessing social norms: disclosure of vulnerability information 269
676 Rules on conflict resolution between the vendor and the finder are typically
also included in the policies. These rules differ, but typically stipulate to
possibility to exit the process of following the rules and practices of the
policies or the guidelines. For example, the OIS guidelines include rules on
exiting the process in the situation of irreconcilable disagreements. However
requirements of reasonable efforts to solve the problem and noticing other
parties before exiting are provided together with the possible use a third party
to solve the problems before exiting.
677 The guidelines do not even require this. The OIS guidelines require that
when adopting the guidelines as the basis of the organisational vulnerability
reporting policy, the policy should note that it is based on the guidelines
provided by OIS and clearly note every deviation from them (OIS, Guidelines for
Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response, p. 2). The NIAC guidelines state that
stakeholders need to choose whatever actions are appropriate for their
circumstances and environments (Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability
Disclosure Framework, p. 27).
678 OIS publishes a document that helps to implement the guidelines for
security vulnerability reporting and response. Current version 2.0 is available at
http://www.oisafety.org/reference/implement.pdf [22.2.2006]. 
either complying with them or not. There neither is external
enforcement of the rules outside the ability to turn to third parties
like the coordinators or to exit the process and to publish the
vulnerability or shut down communication676. Actually, the desired
commitment to rules and procedures is based on voluntary acceptance
due to them providing effective ways to manage and response to
vulnerabilities in software. Coercing stakeholders to obey the rules
does not belong to this scheme and the non-coercive approach seems
effective at least as long as the stakeholders remain motivated to
comply with them.
Even if the implementation of vulnerability reporting is based on
the consensus seeking guidelines, it does not necessarily lead to similar
practical implementations in different organisations677. This might
be the case despite the separate implementation assistance provided678.
Implementation may vary on the basis of the different needs and
objectives of the organisation. This may partially dilute the objectives
of enhanced communication between stakeholders and better
vulnerability response sought by the guidelines and necessary for
vulnerability reporting as an effective regulatory instrument, especially
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679 This has been pointed out in the comments for the first version of the OIS
guidelines. See OIS web pages; section Summary of Changes from Public
Review, http://www.oisafety.org/changes.html [updated 17.9.2004, visited
22.2.2006].
680 Typically the policies and the guidelines expect the name of the reporter to
be published, if not denied by the reporter, in the advisories provided to the
public.
681 However, this is not likely to be a large population since most of the
reputational rewards are important only inside the professional group. Wide
media attention in public press is not needed for reputation to increase.
if the policy maker considers only its own objectives and interests
while deviating from the guidelines.
The formalisation of the procedures for vulnerability reporting
can also have negative effects. The complexity, length and excessive
formality of the guidelines and the consequent policies might expel
those reporters that do not have large enough resources to
vulnerability research. Persons that are not deeply involved with the
reporting are not likely to study and comply with the complicated and
lengthy policies, especially if they are not likely to find many
vulnerabilities in their life-time. This means that these vulnerabilities
are not reported at all, or reported by using other, more endangering
or less effective channels. The length and complexity of the policies
might diminish their effectiveness.679
A similar negative effect can be caused by the policies and
guidelines bias in favour of the vendors. If the reporters do not
consider their interests being represented by the policies, they are less
likely to comply with them and report accordingly. There still are
significant areas of dispute in the guidelines.
It is not clear whether the reporters are going to be less active or
even more active than currently with the wider usage of policies,
especially those basing on common guidelines. The guidelines do not,
similar to the existing policies, provide other than reputational rewards
for the reporters680. If media attention fades due to the reporting
becoming part of normal development work and seeming a less radical
action, at least part of the attention and career enhancement
possibilities seeking reporters are likely to report less681.
Harnessing social norms: disclosure of vulnerability information 271
682 Since the lawmaker or the court in this type of standard setting relies on the
community of people who created the norm or the industry that engages in the
practice to balance costs and benefits, it ought to be made ascertain whether
the balancing is actually done. This is discussed by Cooter and Ulen in Law and
Economics, p. 315-316. Enforcing community standards where all the
stakeholders are not even represented could turn out to be counter-productive.
If the consensus based guidelines are taken into wide use, they can
provide a standard of care in some jurisdictions. Enforcing social
customs or best practices in an industry is one of the ways legal
standards can be set. It can develop into a metrics towards which the
actions of the stakeholders are compared against. It can become the
basis for the analysis of liability under tort law – no further evidence
of the basis for action is needed; either the vendor or the reporter
could be held negligent due to the failure to adhere to the consensus
showing practices and procedures in a specific case (assuming
occurred damage and causation are proved). Doing this in an early
stage of best practice development without the court actually balancing
marginal costs and benefits can lead to inefficient norms being upheld
and the vulnerability management being hampered682. However, this
has not been done and it is not clear, and by no means obvious, that
courts will do so. If it is done, it would raise the implementation of
vulnerability reporting a level higher and set a legal liability for proper
management of vulnerability reports.
A severe hindrance for cooperation in the vulnerability reporting
process and especially for efficient communication between the
different stakeholders is posed by differing understandings of the
severity of the threat posed by a vulnerability. When a vulnerability
is reported it typically is scored, i.e., assigned a metric that
communicates a sense of the severity of the vulnerability. This score
is used as a basis for assigning importance to the remediation efforts
and it influences also research and publishing efforts of stakeholders.
For example, if the reporter sees the threat posed by a vulnerability
as more severe than the vendor does, this disagreement might lead
to vendor being reluctant to issue patches or to provide information
of the vulnerability to the users and, at least, problems in establishing
a common timeframe for patch and information release between the
Regulating Secure Software Development272
683 This is a result of the evaluation of the Vulnerability Disclosure Working
Group of several alternative scoring methods actively employed by
stakeholders to categorize reported vulnerabilities. They claimed to have run
several past worms, viruses, and software vulnerabilities through existing
scoring methods and the results are stated to differ wildly. See the Meeting
Minutes of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) meeting for
14 October 2003, p. 18, at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
NIAC_Final_Minutes_101403.pdf [22.2.2006].
684 Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 21-22. The
need for a common vulnerability scoring method has been raised and the
NIAC is addressing this problem in a specific scoring subgroup of the
Vulnerability Disclosure Working Group that is supposed to publish a separate
report. See NIAC Vulnerability Disclosure Framework Report, p. 8.
685 The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), the first organisation to
coordinate communication among experts during information security
emergencies, grew from a small computer security incident response team
formed at the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA) established by DARPA (Defence Advanced
Research Projects Agency) in 1988. Currently CERT/CC http://www.
cert.org) is a non-academic and non-governmental unit funded mainly by the
U.S. Department of Defence and the Department of Homeland Security along
vendor and the reporter are created. Then it might be necessary to
bring in a coordinator to assess the risk posed and the communication
might even collapse altogether.
Currently there are several ways of scoring the severity of a threat
that a vulnerability poses in use and disparate methods seem to yield
different results683. This negatively influences the resolving of a
vulnerability because, to the extent different scoring methods are
adopted by the stakeholders, a basis for disagreement is created. As
noted in the Chambers and Thompson “[t]he weaknesses or dangers
associated with a vulnerability may be exacerbated by those
disagreements, and provide malicious actors increased time to exploit
the vulnerability or increase the damages resulting from existing
exploitative situations”684. 
A central question in the implementation of vulnerability reporting
is the establishment of specific organisations for vulnerability
management and coordination of reporting685. The coordination
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with number of other federal civil agencies and private sector. It was followed
by several other teams that serve as coordinators for various regimes; in
addition to governmental teams such as the US-CERT (U.S. governmental
CERT, http://www.us-cert.gov), DoD-CERT (U.S. Department of Defence
CERT, http://www.cert.mil), Aus-CERT (The Australian CERT, http://
www.auscert.org.au), CERT-FI (The Finnish CERT, http://www.cert.fi) set up
by government representatives, there are also dedicated teams in commercial
and academic organisations like the FUNET-CERT (Finnish University and
Research Network – Computer Emergency Response Team, http://
www.cert.funet.fi)) and many internal teams in large enterprises,  set up by the
organisations themselves. CERT/CC has for its part helped to establish these
other teams and coordinates with these other teams for incident response, but
it remains independent of them in terms of organisation. Many of these teams
are members of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST,
http://www.first.org), that has operated as a coalition to exchange information
and coordinate response activities among the large variety of specialised groups
since it was established 1990. CERT/CC is even a founding member.
686 This fear has been raised by the European Commission in its communi-
cation on network and information security, COM(2001)298, p. 21.
687 The establishment of the European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA, http://www.enisa.eu.int/) is part of this. See Regulation (EC)
No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March
2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency,
Official Journal L 077, 13/03/2004, p. 1–11.
centres, also the national CERT/CSIRT teams, operate differently
in each organisation and member state. There is a variety of
institutional forms and backgrounds even though the procedures and
practices are based on similar principles and guidelines. This makes
the cooperation complex and inevitable decreases the effectiveness
of the coordination centres against international problems. A special
fear in Europe has been that worldwide coordination is done through
partly U.S. government funded CERT/CC and that CERTs in Europe
are dependent on its information release policy686. As a response, EU
is studying ways to strengthen cooperation between EU member state
CERTs and CSIRT teams and other similar organisation687.
A special problem in the implementation of coordination centres,
especially at the national level, has been the assignment of sufficient
resources. Especially the national teams play such an important
function in society (computer emergency response and coordination
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688 This is visible in the widely used basis for the ground rules both for CERT
and CSIRT teams IETF RFC 2350, Brownlee and Guttman, Expectations for
Computer Security Incident Response, p. 11.
689 Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, Appendix B, p.
44-45. Research institutions may establish vulnerability coordination activities with
the objective of supporting or promoting their research agenda and findings. A
common subcategory of this type is that a research group may engage in
vulnerability coordination for issues it discovers. Government organisations
objective in establishing vulnerability coordination centres is to serve the public
interest and to protect the critical infrastructure and national security. This
objective is typically visible also in the policies of the national coordinators.
The objective of commercial organisations in establishing vulnerability coordination
activities is to help in corporate governance and information security. The
objective is to serve the internal needs of the company and to internally
in addition to vulnerability coordination) that they should be
adequately equipped. For example, in Finland the tasks and
responsibilities of the CERT-FI group operating in the Finnish
Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) have been widened
several times, but the resources directed have not increased with
similar speed. Perhaps this speaks about the importance given to the
problem of vulnerability reporting and incident response in the
government. At least it means that the possibilities of CERT-FI group
are still not fully taken into action and it has for long largely remained
as a filter of vulnerability information coming from other coordination
organisations.
Note that when establishing a computer emergency response team
(CERT) or a computer security incident response team (CSIRT), the
objective typically is not solely on vulnerability reporting. The main
purpose served by these teams, no matter what organisation
establishes them, is to help in responding in situations of attacks and
other incidents on computer systems. Vulnerability management and
coordination of reporting is typically only a secondary objective, even
though an important one688. According to the common approach of
the stakeholders in the vulnerability reporting process, even when
established for vulnerability management and coordination purposes,
the coordinating organisations serve several objectives depending on
the organisation and its needs689.
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manage the communication on vulnerabilities. These organisations typically do
not provide coordination services between and among vendors and are usually
not involved in predisclosure activity. However, they may serve as the vehicle
by which specific corporate security concerns are addressed with software
vendors. In many cases, these organizations have an assessment and
compliance role as well. Security solution providers objective in establishing
vulnerability coordination activities often is to create a way to ensure their
products are up to date.
690 According to Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework,
Appendix B, p. 44, coordinator acting for a small constituency may be in the
best position to evaluate threats to that constituency and provide installation-
specific advice and guidance. Coordinator acting on behalf of a larger
constituency often has the ability to draw a great deal of attention to problems
affecting a large number of users.
Despite the secondary role of the coordination of vulnerability
reporting in the activities of these organisations, they centrally
influence the reporting process. Their role as a coordinator is to
supervise the work related to vulnerabilities by assisting other
participators and gathering knowledge in one place. They assist in
the disclosure and response to new vulnerabilities. Basically the
coordinator forms a communication link between the reporter and
the vendor. They provide contacts; function as a wide known contact
point, and as an additional medium through which to communicate
with the public or with multiple vendors690. Coordinators also provide
major source of vulnerability information for the vendors. Also a
dispute resolution in the form of independent evaluations of both
vendor and reporter claims can be part of their repertoire.
Coordinators main function in vulnerability reporting is to help
in the communication between the reporters and the vendors. In
addition, some of CERT like organisations conduct vulnerability
analysis themselves and verify of the accuracy vulnerability reports.
However, this is not common. As visible in the guidelines for
vulnerability reporting, mediators are typically called into action only
when the reporter and the vendor cannot reach a consensus. 
Coordinators are often also vested with functions that benefit pre-
release secure software development more directly. They can study
relationships between vulnerabilities and their reasons, and recognize
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691 This has been pointed out by Chambers and Thompson in Vulnerability
Disclosure Framework, Appendix B, p. 44.
692 Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, Appendix B, p. 45.
larger trends in vulnerabilities. The research into the nature and causes
of vulnerabilities that may be shared with leading research groups can
help in the education of secure development methods and practices
outside the affected parties.691
Coordinators generally do not act with direct authority over a
product, not even teams that serve purely internal organisational
purposes, and in most cases do not act with legal authority to compel
a vendor or discoverer toward any particular behaviour. Not even
the national coordination teams typically posses such powers.
However, this lack of coercive power does not limit their effectiveness,
quite to the contrary. Their effectiveness is based on the trust placed
on them by the different stakeholders. Most groups acting as
coordinators today have achieved their legitimacy through
demonstrated effectiveness, having established a broad audience of
system administrators and end users, and by having established
productive working relationships with software vendors. In many
cases, they have demonstrated their effectiveness for their audience
and gained legitimization.692
However, the different institutional backgrounds and purposes
served by coordinators, even of national teams, highlight the need
to implement the correct organisational structures, checks and
balances, and decision-making rules in order to establish a sufficient
amount of independence from the organisation in question or the
government and the customers. The legitimacy and trust needed for
the coordinators to work effectively require that. The problem of
capture, a situation in which the coordinator is embedded in such
close relationships with a specific stakeholder that it sees its functions
as that of safeguarding the interest of that stakeholder above all might
exists in teams that serve only the interest of a specific stakeholder
(e.g., a research group or a vendor). 
This typically is not a widespread problem. It could be if a strong
enough stakeholder could compel others to follow its policies and
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693 The public interest is sought by means of informing and assistance, not by
developing socially optimal reporting policies. Even though the national teams
are in the best position to enforce socially optimal reporting policies due to
their role in advancing the public interest, it is not clear that they could or even
should do so. Since they act as mediators in the process, their policies would
only be complied widely (assuming that the socially optimal reporting policy is
not the one that gains wide acceptance by all stakeholders) if there would be an
obligation to invoke a coordinator in the reporting process. Since the role of
national CSIRT teams is just to assist and advance the communication and
cooperation between the main actors (the vendors and the reporters), this
might be desirable only if the vendors and the reporters could not cooperate in
a socially optimal way.
practices. In the case of national teams, serving the public interest,
the threat of capture is relieved by them not only regulating one
industry or interest group (e.g., the vendors) but, instead, acting as
a mediator between different stakeholders. They need to gain the
legitimacy of all stakeholders in order to effective.
National governmental teams acting as coordinators and being
funded by the government are in a unique position to compel others
to follow their policies that typically are more biased on the public
interest than other policies. However, this is not typically done and
the policies for vulnerability reporting concern only those who utilise
the national coordinating teams in their reporting. National CERTs
and alike do not use their regulatory capacity in the public interest
at the level of policies693. Usually there is no obligation to invoke a
coordinator in a reporting process; direct contact between the vendor,
the discoverer, and the users of the product is also widely used.
Lower level of package. The way the vendors notify their customers about
vulnerabilities change the final effects of vulnerability reporting can
have on the behaviour of the users and the general public. The first
issue in the implementation by the vendors is their expertise and
interest in handling vulnerability reports. Previously, as already
discussed, the vendors as receivers of the vulnerability reports have
had a negative attitude and responded accordingly. They have
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694 Lack of expertise and interest especially on the side of the vendors was one
of the reasons why the vulnerability disclosure became such a heated debate in
the information security discussion at the turn of the century.
695 The possibility of negative effects on vendor behaviour has also been raised
by Chambers and Thompson in Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 24.
696 Vast majority of the receivers of the reports (about 70%) stated in 2002,
when asked about their general opinion on the importance of bug reports in a
quantitative survey conducted by Tiina Havana, Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 45-46, that there probably are security bugs in
their products, and they are important to be repaired for which reason bug
reports are of great importance. Almost 90% see that the security bugs existing
in their software are important to be identified and that bug reports are
important in this (not marginal).
697 See Havana and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability
Process, p. 8.
understated the problems or denied them altogether, tried to keep
things secret, tried to deny liability or to shift blame694. 
However, categorical denials of the existence of a problem or the
threats of legal attacks against reporters have become damaging to
the vendors reputation. This is due to the increased likelihood of the
problems being confirmed later on and threats of legal attacks reaching
high media attention and public outcries695. Research, awareness and
interest in security vulnerability issues simply has raised and the media
is especially attentive to these issues. 
The manner in which commercial software product development
companies respond to security issues and especially to vulnerability
reports has evolved due to the threat of public disclosure accompanied
with the increased awareness and a greater concern for vulnerabilities
among customers and other stakeholders696. Formal processes to
discover, evaluate and fix vulnerabilities when they arise are put in
place. The policies are useful in this by codifying information and
as a way to improve procedural knowledge in an organisation697.
The speed at which patches are issued or vulnerabilities otherwise
resolved (e.g., by issuing workarounds, recognising that no
vulnerability exists or has already been fixed) after vulnerabilities are
reported also alters the effects of disclosure. The quicker a patch is
issued, the sooner the users are enabled to patch their systems and
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698 According to the first empirical analysis of the communication in the
vulnerability reporting process conducted by Tiina Havana, Communication in the
Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 74, majority of vendors seem to put
priority into vulnerability correction. They at least state, the possibility of
reputation management by the vendors is raised, to interrupt other work
immediately when they receive a report and concentrate on the repairing
process, or have formed a specific schedule within which the reports are
supposed to be handled. Note that those answering questionnaires on their
vulnerability reporting processes are likely to be more knowledgeable of the
issue and likely to be more responsive.
699 This result has been reported by Arora et al. in Impact of Vulnerability
Disclosure and Patch Availability, p. 18. This can be due both to the higher
awareness among larger vendors and higher customer demand accompanied
with possibilities to direct resources to handle reports. Negative effects on
reputation, as proposed in the empirical analysis (idem p. 18), can be higher to
the larger vendors but they are also in a better position to cope from it and are
less likely to lose the whole business due to the larger and varying customer
base. Negative publicity can be devastating for a small start-up company trying
to establish its products into the market. 
to minimise the window of vulnerability. This has improved
dramatically. At least those vendors who are aware of the vulnerability
discussion have become very responsive698. Preliminary empirical
evidence shows, however, that the size and market share of the
vendors influence their responsiveness; large vendors patch faster
then smaller ones699. 
The medium by which patches are released also has a potential
to alter the effects of vulnerability disclosure. Disclosure by the
vendor, typically to the customers in the form of putting the patches
available to the web pages or mailing them to the registered users (who
have consented to such mailings), might not reach all users. Making
information available on the Internet and mailing patches to the users
who have consented to such postings may be an easy way to reach
certain segments of the users, but not at all promising for reaching
people with less familiarity with the vulnerability issues or even with
the use of computers like in the case of many home users.
Also the information accompanied with the release of a patch or
a workaround can alter the effects. Mere patch release neither might
sufficiently raise the interest of all users as such nor encourage users
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700 Note that security advisories can be published also by other actors in the
vulnerability reporting process than vendors. Especially if the vendor does not
do this for what ever purposes, the reporter’s possibility to publish their own
advisories has been recognised. Also the coordinators can publish their own
advisories, even though they typically just adjust the already published
advisories to their own contexts and republish them. This has been
acknowledged by Chambers and Thompson in  Vulnerability Disclosure
Framework, p. 30-31 and 36, and in the OIS Guidelines for Security Vulnerability
Reporting and Response, p. 20-23.
701 See Arora et al., Impact of Vulnerability Disclosure and Patch Availability, p. 19. 
to install patches to their own systems. Installing a patch into a users
system typically involves costs and requires time, for example, in terms
of testing and re-configuration. The users need to know the
seriousness of the vulnerability, its possible consequences, whether
is affects their systems, and the possibilities to fix them, in order to
determine whether and which patches to install and when. In short,
they need to know why they should install the patches. Provision of
security advisories that provide information to the general public about
the security vulnerability, the products and versions it affects, and
the steps that can be taken to defend affected systems and networks
against it play an important role in this700.
Also the manner in which the information is provided may shape
the effects. When vulnerability information is not disclosed in clear
and usable form, it may actually make people less knowledgeable than
they were before. This may produce over-reactions or under-reactions,
based on an inability to understand what the information actually
means. This emphasises the importance of enhancing the disclosure
process.
Same problem with the publication exist as with the direct reporting
from the discoverers to the users; in addition to the positive effects
of increased awareness of security issues and the possibility to decrease
risks by installing the patches, the publication can also increase the
risk of attack. Preliminary empirical evidence speaks in favour of
increased attack frequency due to the disclosure of a vulnerability,
even when a patch is available701. The release of a patch for a known
vulnerability decreases the number of attacks but the release of a patch
for a hitherto unknown vulnerability increases the number of attacks.
A suggested explanation to this is that attackers believe that not all
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702 This will be discussed below in heading 4.3.4 concerning the reactions of
objects.
703 This has been pointed out, e.g., by Lundvall in Understanding the Role of
Education in the Learning Economy, p. 18-21.
users will patch in time. The installation of patches into the user
systems is one of the pressing issues since majority of attacks take
place after the patch has been issued by the vendor but has not yet
been widely installed by the users702.
A crucial issue for the effects on secure software development outside
post-release vulnerability correction is whether the information
gathered about discovered bugs is used to prevent similar bugs in the
future. Most direct influence vulnerability reporting can have on initial
security development depends on vendors internalising the knowledge
of vulnerabilities, their causes and fixes, gathered in the reporting
process and the fixes. Knowledge of a vulnerability, not just of its
existence but also of its details (like the specific coding or
implementation error that causes it) can be used to train current and
educate future software developers more widely to avoid the causes
of the vulnerabilities.
The problem is that secure software development practices still
largely are tacit know-how that is difficult to transfer703. It has to be
learnt in contact with the possessor of the knowledge. Only to the
degree the knowledge is codified can it be taught. Codification of
vulnerability information could serve as an important educational
resource and ease the current lack of teaching material. For example,
recent textbooks on secure software development, such as Viega and
McGraw, Building Secure Software or Graff and van Wyk, Secure Coding,
use known vulnerabilities especially as examples to clarify and make
things more concrete
However, the gathered vulnerability information is rarely used in
practice for the benefit of building secure software from the beginning
(i.e., prior to release). Only about a half of receivers of the reports
(vendors) stated in 2002 that they distribute the information about
discovered defects to their software developers and make that
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704 Havana, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 69-70.
Whereas little over half of the receivers of the reports answered that they pass
the information further to their software developers with the intention of
preventing similar vulnerabilities occurring again and only 15 per cent of all the
respondents to the questionnaire do this, and when they do it, the information
does not have an essential role in the software development process. Havana
and Röning, Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 8.
705 The formal life-cycle model of vulnerabilities presented both in the OIS
Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response, p. 2-3, and in the
recommendation for NIAC guidelines presented by Chambers and Thompson
in Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 13-16, begins with discovery. However,
the NIAC guideline at least acknowledges the introduction of the vulnerability
into the product and then starts with the resolution of the vulnerability. Even
though this could be explained by the shorter writing style of the OIS
guidelines, it still represents the differences in attitudes and objectives. The
major software vendors and security companies behind the OIS guidelines may
not want to admit the existence of their liability for the vulnerabilities found
from their software. This could be interpreted as a desire of the vendors to use
vulnerability handling guidelines to express in a subtle manner not only the
inevitability of vulnerabilities but also the limited responsibility of the vendor
to develop initially secure software products. At least, this is the image that the
guidelines easily gives to outsiders.
information an essential part in the software development process704.
The gathered knowledge is not widely used in the purpose of
correcting the pressing problems of information security; the
avoidance of similar, perhaps even widely known vulnerabilities
appearing over and over again.
Neither do the policies and guidelines typically address this issue.
The policies and the guidelines for vulnerability reporting do not
provide any rules, practices, procedures, or demands for the
information communicated to be used for the benefit of initial secure
software development. For example, there typically are no demands
for the vendors to pass the information about discovered
vulnerabilities to their software developers in order to prevent similar
vulnerabilities in the future. Actually the guidelines do not even
emphasise the introduction of a vulnerability into a product and the
life-cycle of a vulnerability depicted in them begins with discovery
of the existence of the it in a specific software product705.
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706 This is made explicit in the OIS Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting
and Response, p. 1.
Basically the reporting of vulnerability information could also
contribute to improving the engineering quality of software products,
by supporting the academic and research communities’ ongoing efforts
to identify common security vulnerabilities, the conditions under
which they occur, and methods to avoid them706. However, the policies
and the guidelines provide no procedural support for this and the
concentration is purely on fixing the problems that occur after release.
This further diminishes the possibilities of vulnerability reporting
to affect initial secure software development and shows an issue that
ought to be altered in order to reach more effective influence. If
vulnerability reporting does not shift from customer management
to an essential source of information for software development in
the developing organisations, the effects of vulnerability reporting
on initial secure software development is minimal.
4.3.4  Reactions of objects
As discussed above, vulnerability disclosure as a regulatory
instrument may influence behaviour in two ways; through decisions
by users to alter their behaviour with respect to the risks involved
(install patches or take other protective measures) or through decisions
by vendors to alter their products in ways that make them less
vulnerable. Knowledge of the vulnerability of a software product not
only enables the protection measures to be taken in order to shield
oneself from the harms or to make more rational purchasing decisions,
but also incites software vendors to increase the level of security in
their products. Basically both of these influence mechanisms are
affected by the reactions of the objects of regulation, i.e., the
(potential) users of software. 
Basically, an assumption of a self-interested and fully-informed
rational actor that can react to the information provided to him
underlays the influence mechanism. In reality, however, the users
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especially have limited time, energy, and attention, and therefore, may
have limited ability or willingness to properly process and act upon
information, even assuming perfect accuracy and effective
dissemination. Moreover, the inherent complexity and significant
uncertainty that often characterise vulnerability information
substantially impedes the ability to communicate information
accurately, effectively, and in a manner that does not lend itself to
distortion. Even if such communication problems can be overcome,
there is little empirical evidence available to allow more than
theoretical speculation on how individuals will act upon information
conveyed and how such action specifically influences market and social
behaviour. Due to the lack of evidence, which calls for further study,
only few speculations can be made.
The effects depend to a degree on the expertise and level of
knowledge of the objects of regulation. This can vary significantly
between home users and organisational users that can be end-users
(i.e., individuals using software in an organisation) or those purchasing
and implementing the software product into the organisations
information system. In cases where the users are traditional consumers
that are not knowledgeable of the vulnerability issues and do not see
the importance of vulnerabilities outside their own system (e.g., when
a consumer’s system is involuntarily and even unknowingly used to
launch a DDoS attacks or to send spam) they are likely to dismiss
the information provided by the reporters, vendors, or coordinators,
as irrelevant. Due to their relative lack of interest in security issues,
the likelihood of patches being installed in a timely manner is low.
Knowledge of the vulnerabilities, even when combined with the
above mentioned information of their severity and of the affected
systems in the form of security advisories as such does not necessarily
lead to patches being installed or other protective measures being
taken even by the organisational actors. For example, due to the
current high amount of fixes being issued to single widely used
software product, which there can be several inside an organisation’s
information system, in an increasingly rapid pace means that keeping
updated is a highly cumbersome and resource consuming task. If patch
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707 Patch automation at the implementation level, i.e., automation of the
installation of the issued patches by the vendor, is one of the methods to make
their management easier for the users. However, there is some reluctance to its
use due to the consequent problems after patch installation. The least of these
problems are not the side-effects produced by patch installation to the
operation of the whole information system. The testing needed to see the
compatibility problems to the specific circumstances of large information
systems often prevent automated patch installation. However, this is something
that can be enhanced at the implementation level and will probably diminish
when the automation matures and the operators of large systems continue to
test for themselves.
708 Viega and McGraw, Building Secure Software, p. 16.
709 According to Arbaugh et al., Windows of Vulnerability, p. 52-59, there are
at least three reasons why not all users patch the minute the patch is released.
First, it takes time to disseminate the patching information to all users. Second,
some customers lack the requisite computer skills. Third, some users are aware
of the patch, but would wait to be sure that the patch is more likely to prevent
damage than it may cause.
710 In Windows of Vulnerability Arbaugh et al., p. 58,  in discussing a life-cycle
model for system vulnerabilities, made the conclusion that almost all reported
intrusions could have been prevented had the systems been actively managed,
with all security-relevant corrections installed. However, because the
installation takes time, exploits continue to occur even after a patch is issued
(sometimes years after). In their model, intrusions increase once a vulnerability
is discovered, the rate of intrusions continues to increase until the vendor
releases a patch, but the exploits continue to occur in slowly diminishing rate
even after the patch is issued.
installation and management is not sufficiently addressed to and made
easier, the users are likely to be overwhelmed by the mere number
of patches to install into various products707.
In addition, as anecdotal evidence from practitioners explicate,
most people upgrade for newer functionality, the hope of more robust
software, or better performance, and not just because they know of
a real vulnerability708. This is why it takes a long time before most
people upgrade to patched versions709. Users are subject to prolonged
risk due to this, since the window of vulnerability stays open710.
The influence of the reliability of the information source for the
actions taken by the vendors was already pointed out above. Similar
effects can be seen also in the reactions of the final objects of
Regulating Secure Software Development286
711 According to the participants in the software vulnerability reporting process,
with full details it is relatively easy for fairly unskilled malicious individuals to
develop exploits thus increasing the immediate risk to end-users. See,
Chambers and Thompson, Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 30.
712 Script Kiddies are also using the information and this greatly increases the
number of potential attackers. Note that more advanced crackers can misuse
an unknown defect longer when others do not know to protect from that
vulnerability. When a good guy finds the defect and publishes it she, at the
same time, increases the number of potential attackers with less skills (and less
remarkable effects; is it then just an annoyance?) but also makes it possible for
the system operators to fix their machines.
regulation, the users. With more reliable sources of vulnerability
information, the users are more likely to react accordingly and to install
the patches provided or to take other protective measures.
Vulnerability information is distributed by several sources, the original
source being the reporter. However, in the eyes of the users they are
likely to be less reliable sources than the vendors that have verified
the existence of a vulnerability and provide an accompanying patch.
Vendors are more likely to be seen as reliable source of information
in the eyes of the customers because the information source is known
and additional measures like signatures can be used to authenticate
the disclosure. Even more reliable sources of vulnerability information,
at least in the eyes of individual users, are the national CSIRT teams
or other official public coordinators like the CERT/CC.
The level of details of the vulnerability published has effects on
the objects of regulation. Making detailed information explicitly
available to the wider public has conflicting consequences because
the information is useful both in correcting and exploiting
vulnerabilities. The details give precise information for the vendor
to verify the claim and to create a patch, and for the user of the
software to verify that the vulnerability exists in her systems and that
a patch is efficacious. However, if the details become more widely
known, e.g., in the case of disclosure via full disclosure list like the
Bugtrack, also the attacker is helped at the same time in the creation
of exploits711, in the determination of vulnerable systems, and in the
launching of attacks712.
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713 Arbaugh et al., Windows of Vulnerability, p. 57.
714 There is a strong bias disfavouring widely used software products. The
amount of vulnerability reports is likely to be much larger simply because of
the wider user base. This can easily lead to the users believing that the most
widely used software components are the most vulnerable ones. Even though
there is no evidence of this, there is no reason to believe that the software that
is in wider usage has more security related defects. This highlights the
importance of understanding the nature of vulnerability reports in making
comparisons between software products.
Without going deeper in to the effects of explicit details (e.g., proof
of concept code at source level) it can be stated that automation of
a vulnerability (creation of an exploit), not just its disclosure, serves
as the catalyst for widespread intrusions713. While the explicit details
serve both the correction vulnerabilities, their exploitation and the
defence of information systems, the automation of vulnerability
exploits seems to serve only the exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Even though the inherent limitation of the substance of
vulnerability reporting, i.e., that it concerns secure software
development issues only after the release of the product (not with
initial secure software development), was recognised above, it was
also noted that external reporting can also influence initial secure
software development. In theory, the reported vulnerability
information enable potential buyers to make a quick and preliminary
check of the security of a software product (component) they are
purchasing.
However, the number of vulnerabilities reported to the public does
not directly tell whether current version of the software is vulnerable
or not. It only makes certain statements that hint about the issue.
Especially the issue of how quickly the vulnerabilities are patched and
how well does the vendor respond to the reports tells something about
the seriousness of security in the development process of the specific
software. When comparing software products that are both widely
used, and thus presumably subject to relatively similar amount of
vulnerability analysis, the number of reported vulnerabilities does tell
something about the quality (and quality aspect of security) of the
software714.
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715 This argument is made by Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 284 and 292, with
reference to Schwartz A and Wilde L (1979) Intervening in Markets on the
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 127, p. 630.
716 Of the general argument, see Ogus, Regulation, p. 123.
Even though historical data about the vulnerability of a software
package and the responses the vendor gives to the reporters does not
tell the whole story about the security of next release, it can be used
as indication of the seller’s attitude towards to secure software
development. Thus this information can be useful in software
acquisition. At least it can be useful in considering the switch to
competing products. This makes the information influential for the
vendor behaviour. With increased possibilities to compare the security
of software products the demand for more secure software can
increase.
However correct the above speculations about the capabilities and
likelihoods of the users of a software product to familiarize with and
to understand all this vulnerability information are, combining the
limited use of the provided vulnerability information with the expenses
of searching for alternatives in the market, leads to the conclusion
that the benefits the increased vulnerability information provides for
the competition in the software product market are likely to be low.
Disclosure of vulnerability information may reduce the costs of
acquiring information, but the substantial transaction costs for most
customers to assimilate and use this information remain. Thus, the
impact on the operation of markets may be insignificant.
This pessimistic conclusion can be resisted with the argument that
if a certain informed proportion of customers use the information,
then the benefits of competition will be extended to all users because
vendors will not wish to lose the informed segment of its customer
base715. In other words, it is not necessary that all users utilise the
information to compare the security of different software products.
Not all even have to understand or reach the information, because
at the margin it is sufficient that a large enough group of influential
users do716. Suppliers will respond if at the margin a significant
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717 At least the users can be expected to change their basic starting point in
relation to the security of software products from lack of interest into
assumption of vulnerabilities existing.
proportion of all purchasers engage in comparison shopping. When,
for example, a group of big companies engage in comparing software
components in terms of their vulnerability, this provides a signal to
the sellers to change their products or lower their prices.
Currently only large enterprises can be assumed to be able to use
the general existing scattered vulnerability knowledge. If not the
vulnerability issue is separately raised in the actual purchase situation
or provided in a more easily accessible form, the high search costs
might hamper the more widespread use of this information. In this,
the mediators like various CSIRT teams are especially helpful since
they gather information about vulnerabilities on single sources that
are relatively easy to access.
The already discussed lack of common metrics (scoring methods)
and definitions of vulnerabilities also restricts the possibilities to
compare software products on the basis of their security. When even
the definitions differ and scoring varies, vulnerability information is
difficult to utilise to compare different products. In addition to
definitions and metrics, the comparison of software products on the
basis of their vulnerability is also hampered by vulnerability
information being scattered and provided in non-easily-accessible
form.
In addition to the limited ability of reported vulnerabilities to enable
comparison shopping, public knowledge of security related
vulnerabilities can also be expected increase the likelihood of
customers (including potential ones) starting to demand more secure
software in general717. Calls for customers to rise to barricades have
already been made in the sense that they should participate and
campaign in favour of more secure software in different contexts.
With the current high media interest the information on security
related vulnerabilities increase the overall awareness of the public of
the vulnerability issue and the quality and security of software; i.e.,
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of the real state of secure software development in general and of
the security risks involved with the use of COTS software especial.
By increasing the awareness of the lack of security in software
products, the disclosure of vulnerability information can also influence
initial secure software development. The users are empowered to
participate in the societal efforts in achieving more secure software
(such as standard setting) and to target social pressure, or to participate
in civil action or in public interest organisations. The increased
awareness can help in the mobilisation of social support and social
pressure more widely.
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719 Customary practice in an industry is often persuasive evidence of what is
considered to be the reasonable standard of care. Conformity with the custom
usually suggests that sufficient effort to address security is given. However, as
has been argued above, the current practice is not optimal and, to the degree
improvements are cost-justified, current practice might not reflect a reasonable
level of care in software development. This is pointed out also by Chandler,
Improving Software Security, p. 21-22, in relation to tort liability for unreasonably
insecure mass-market software in the U.S. 
5 Using prescriptive rules: software product liability
As it seems, the market practice in COTS software business is ‘release-
early-and-patch-later’. Security is added after the release of the
product. Vulnerabilities that could pose a risk to security are addressed
only when a breach or an external report occurs (the “penetrate-and-
patch” approach) and the security requirements (features) are added
as an afterthought to the standard (functional) requirements. In
addition, everyone is thought to understand and expect that complex
modern software will contain bugs and that this just is the way the
world is. 
In an ideal world of perfectly competitive market, fully informed
buyers would purchase only products that provide an efficient level
of quality and security. However, the substantial impediments
discussed above, such as systematic misperception of accident risks,
externalities and informational problems, prevent efficient operation
and market outcomes are not optimal. The argument made in this
study is that this industry practice for COTS software leaves significant
room for improvement719.
There are a variety of prescribed rules that are used to ease the
problems in markets with physical goods (e.g., food, toys, etc.) and
could be used to tackle the problems in software development that
prevents it from achieving a more secure state and to minimise the
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720 A call for accountability through liability in the wide sense has been backed
especially by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. In an assembly of
existing reports on computer and communications security from 2002 the
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board of the National Research
Council of the U.S. proposed, Cyber-security Today and Tomorrow, p. 15, that
“[p]olicy makers should consider legislative responses to the failure of existing
incentives to cause the market to respond adequately to the security challenge.
Possible options include steps that would increase the exposure of software
and system vendors and system operators to liability for system breaches and
mandated reporting of security breaches that could threaten critical societal
functions”. This is by no means a new phenomenon; Peter Seipel already in
1977, Computing Law, p. 86, referred to a discussion on liability for “computer
errors” and pointed out the differing opinions about both negligence and strict
liability under tort law.
721 According to an OECD survey from 2004 on the implementation of its
widely accepted and appreciated 2002 OECD Guidelines for the Security of
Information Systems and Networks, Summary of responses to the survey on the
implementation of the OECD guidelines for the security of information systems and
risks posed by the security related vulnerabilities. Liability law is one
of the most widely called for remedies to tackle with the problems
with security related vulnerabilities in software720. As a regulatory
instrument it crosses several legal fields. In addition to tort law it
covers also areas from contract, administrative and criminal law. 
The application of different liability provisions depend on the party
whose liabilities are considered. The analysis stems from the potential
liable parties because they are in different positions to prevent harms
and consequently subject to varying requirements for the level of care
required from them. In a situation where a software vulnerability has
been misused to attack a system, the potential liable parties are the
perpetrators who have misused the vulnerabilities, system or network
administrator (including also service providers) who control either
the insecure systems or the network, vendors of the vulnerable
software components, or the publishers of the vulnerabilities
(reporters that make vulnerabilities available to the wider public).
Criminal liability of those misusing the vulnerabilities to attack systems is an
obvious starting point in liability law and has been taken in use by
most countries721. However, this is only a preliminary strategy that
Using prescriptive rules: software product liability 293
networks, p. 5, most of the 21 OECD member countries that responded had
enacted a comprehensive set of measures to combat cybercrime.
targets the intentional misuses of vulnerabilities. As recognised in
information security research, also unintentional acts and involuntary
accidents can threaten information security without any presence of
intentionality. 
Criminal law has also proven to be inherently insufficient to shield
the information systems and their users from attack. In an
environment where anonymity and covering ones tracks is easy and
the costs of searching, apprehending and prosecuting are high, the
enforcement of the criminal laws has proven to be difficult. The
differences in the regulatory standards and the varying practices in
the pre-trial phase of the criminal process in relation to electronic
evidence does not ease the situation. Coupling criminal liability with
the liability for damages of the harms caused does not provide much
relief since the perpetrators are often insolvent even when they are
captured.
In addition, liability of the crackers only reacts to the symptoms
of the underlying problem, i.e., the insecurity of software. It does not
provide cure for the original problem. It can even be speculated to
have negative consequences for secure software development.
Extensive reliance on criminalisation can lull the users into believing
that the perpetrators are deterred and no attacks occur. This false
sense of security can mean that no preventive measures are taken by
the users of the software. However, due to the widely recognised
problems in apprehension and prosecution of computer criminals
combined with the increasing awareness of insecurity of the electronic
environment, such false sense of security is unlikely.
Due to the extensive research on criminal law and its wide
application, there is no need to go deeper into the analysis of its
capabilities to influence secure software development in this study.
I am not suggesting that further work on the criminal law arena is
in vain. The ongoing work on the harmonisation of the substantive
and procedural computer-crime related criminal laws, like in the case
of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, together with the
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722 Article 17 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L
281, 23.11.1995, p. 31-50 (Personal Data Directive), establishes liability for the
security of their information systems to those who process personal. Those
processing personal data in Finland face strict liability according to the section
47 of the Finnish implementation of the Personal Data Directive (Data
Protection Act 523/1999). An enhanced duty of care standard for the
information security of banking services was established in the Finnish
Supreme Court cases 1993:3 and 1994:80 (control liability instead of negligence
and liability also for the damages of third parties).
723 In Finland the Act on the Openness of Government Activities 621/1999
section 18 establishes a liability for the information security of governmental
information processing.
724 Article 4 of the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on
privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37-47, set
specific liabilities for the communications providers to secure their processing
of personal data.
enhancement of information provision in the form of Europol and
national CERTs are important. But criminal law still remains only
as a bedrock strategy.
Parties that have increasingly been established with higher liability
are the users of COTS software as components in their information
systems. Current law of information security can be said to concentrate
on those who are responsible of the functioning of information
systems. Most of regulation on information security is found from
the area of liability for information security of those processing
personal data722, governmental agencies723 and electronic
communication operators and other providers of information
infrastructure724. They are in a position to handle much of the
consequences stemming from the misuse of security related
vulnerabilities. For example, they can limit the damages and minimize
the exposure to risk posed by security related vulnerabilities by
updating their systems and by taking protective measures like installing
firewalls and virus scanners.
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725 Western societies are highly dependent on growth based on new
technologies (employment and prosperity depend on innovation). At the same
time the possibilities and risks of new technologies are more and more clearly
associated with human decision making which raises the responsibility of the
decision-makers. However, decisions on the introduction of new technologies
are increasingly made under conditions of uncertainty (cost calculations fail
where decisions are taken under uncertainty: neither the extent of damage nor
prevention costs can be monetarised ex ante; the damage potential itself is
unknown). This makes technological innovation inevitably risky (the
advantages and chances of innovation are inseparable form the inherent risks)
and there is no alternative to appliers and consumers than learning by using.
This argument is made by Gert Brüggemeier in The Control of Corporate
Conduct and Reduction of Uncertainty by Tort Law, p. 63-65, with EU wide
Despite them being in a position to take preventive measures
against the harm occurring from software vulnerabilities, system and
network administrators and other users of software components
cannot directly address the causes of vulnerabilities. They can
indirectly demand higher standards of quality and security from the
COTS software component providers via contracting and otherwise
issue pressure on COTS software vendors, e.g., by reporting
discovered vulnerabilities, but the diminishing of the initial
vulnerabilities in the components are typically out of their direct reach
to the degree source code is not available and no rights to change it
are given. And even if they would have these rights, the users of the
components often lack the expertise to do this. They also face the
problem of multiple version and consequent need for extensive testing
of the “shirked” version when the component is updated by its
vendor.
Even though criminal law liability targets also the users of COTS
software components, it is private law liability under contract and tort
law that primarily applies. Private law liability has especially recently
been raised as one of the possible remedies for the risk posed by high
technologies. Under conditions of increasing uncertainty private law
liability is called for to control the risks of human decision-making
in the introduction of new technologies. Reduction of uncertainty
becomes one of the purposes of liability law and the control of
developmental risks is central.725
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considerations. A leading Finnish private law scholar Thomas Wilhelmsson,
Professor of Civil and Commercial Law at the Faculty of Law of the University
of Helsinki who recently has been involved in the development of the
European private law, in Korvausvastuu uutena sääntelyvälineenä, p. 239-265,
and in Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 66-103, continues on similar lines in the Finnish
legal doctrine and widens the perspective to the whole liability law instead of
pure tort law.
726 In Europe these are present at least in the Article 6 of EU Copyright in the
Information Society Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 of May 2001 on the harmonisation of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society) and
similar provisions in the Article 7 of the Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14
May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122, 17.5.1991,
p. 42-46 (as amended by Directive 93/98/EEC), which are not affected by the
harmonised legal protection against circumvention of effective technological
measures as noted in the Preamble 50 of EU Copyright in the Information
Society Directive meaning that the protection of technological measures used
in connection with computer programs is exclusively addressed to in Software
Directive 91/250/EEC. In addition, the Conditional Access Directive
(Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of,
conditional access, OJ L 320. 28.11.1998, p. 54-57) also comes into question. 
The legal basis in Finland is scattered and complex. At least the amended
Copyright Act (404/1961) finally implementing the Copyright Directive into
Finnish legislation, Penal Code of Finland (39/1989) chapter 38 section 8a, L
eräiden suojauksen purkujärjestelmien kieltämisestä (1117/2001), and the
renewed Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications
516/2004, aka Lex Sonera, (same rules were also in the previous act from
A new potential liable party in the case of a software vulnerability
causing harm has been found from those making the misused
vulnerability public knowledge. These public reporters of vulnerabilities
analysed in the previous chapter have been threatened with liability
and have been taken to courts especially by the vendors of the
vulnerable software. The argument for their liability is that increased
vulnerability reporting to the public has increased the possibilities
for automation of attacks and has provided means for an increased
number of potential attackers to misuse the vulnerabilities. 
The basis for liability is diverse. At least basic doctrines of
negligence in tort law, rules against the circumvention of technological
protection measures726 and criminal law rules against viruses come
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1999) come into question.
727 For example, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime CETS No.:
185 and the Finnish Penal Code chapter 34 section 9a on criminal computer
mischief.
728 Public Law No. 105-304, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
signed to law in 28th October 1998, codified in section 1201 of the United
States Code title 17 on Copyrights. The problems that have appeared in
practice have been described especially by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) in Unintended Consequences: Five Years under the DMCA, v. 3,
September 24, 2003, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
?f=unintended_consequences.html [14.2.2006]. EFF is a non-profit civil
liberties advocacy and legal organisation for the networked world based in the
U.S.
into question727. Even though these regulations typically allow
legitimate research on vulnerabilities and the publication of results,
and in theory do not hamper with information security research, the
vagueness of the standards together with their openness to
interpretations leaves the security researches uncertain about the legal
status of their work. Due to the vagueness’s, these provision and
especially similar provision in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) has been used to threaten information security research
with litigation if they publish their results728.
The dual nature of the vulnerability reports analysed in the previous
chapter sets this type of liability into questionable light. Even though
the reporting of vulnerabilities to the public increases possibilities
for attack, the same information is crucial for the correction of the
underlying bugs and for the minimization of risks. The information
is also needed for the functioning of the markets for secure software.
The effects of this type of liability on secure software development
was considered in the previous chapter in relation to the analysis of
vulnerability reporting as a regulatory instrument and is not taken
further in here.
Of the different potential liable parties the concentration in here is
on the currently less widely regulated COTS software vendors. The liability
of other possible parties, like the vulnerability abusers, the users of
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729 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of
laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member States concerning
liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33, amended by
directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21
730 It is “mainly” about product liability, i.e., liability for damages to persons or
other property than the defective product itself resulting from the use or
possession of defective (insecure) products, since also damages to the defective
product itself, which are covered by the general contract law rules for defective
products, are considered. Actually my use of the term product liability covers
damages to all property, including the damages to the defective product itself. 
the vulnerable software components, and the reporters of
vulnerabilities is analysed only to the degree they affect the liability
of the software vendor (criminal liability of the vulnerability abuser
as an intervening factor, potential liability of the user etc.).
Liability of the software vendors can base on several grounds. In
this study, not all of the possible liabilities of software vendors are
analysed. The analysis concentrates on the liability of the vendor
towards customers. It is mainly about product liability where consumer
protection laws like those deriving from the EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC)729 combine with both liability for damages
under contract law or tort law (delictual liability)730. Not even liabilities
of the vendors towards third parties under other doctrines of tort
law beside product liability are further dealt with. Not to even speak
about the possible criminal liability of the vendors, the natural persons
behind them or their employees.
Product liability is a peculiar legal construct. It can come into
question both in contractual relations and outside them. It is mainly
about non-contractual liability under tort law and specific product
liability rules such as those implementing the EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC). At the same time, it can also come into
question under the rules of liability for damages in the case of breach
of contract rules for defective products. This is so especially in
commercial relations, but even though specific product liability rules
have traditionally been systematised as part of delictual (non-
contractual) rules, also contract law rules and general tort law rules
still play a role even in consumer product liability cases. 
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731 The goods can be delivered through a long line of intermediaries like the
final seller, wholesale dealer and importer, of which the user typically has a
direct contractual relation only towards the seller.
732 As we will see later on, the use of these alternative legal avenues are
relatively limited in practice due to several reason. The purpose of this analysis
is partly to see the real effectiveness of these possible bases for liability in
influencing secure software development. In this, the factors that hamper the
use of the alternative legal avenues are central.
733 According to article 9 of the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/ EEC)
only damages to “any item of property other than the defective product itself
which is ordinarily intended for private use or consumption and is used by the
injured person mainly for his own private use or consumption” are
compensated.
The concurrence, i.e., the right of the plaintiff to choose the legal
category which will give the most advantageous outcome, of both
contractual and non-contractual (delictual) basis for liability in the
case of vulnerable software is of importance in the software context.
Even though in the product liability cases involving more traditional
goods than software (e.g., toys) there typically is no contractual relation
between the manufacturer and the user731, in the case of software such
direct contractual relation between the software house that developed
the software in question and its user is at least sough for by the use
of software licenses. Thus the possible legal avenues for the user of
defective software are open to choose in theory732.
When compensation for product related damages is sought in non-
contractual (delictual) relations the focus is mainly on negligence on
the part of the injurer when the damage has occurred to the property
of an enterprise. Breach of the duties of care established in the legal
system can constitute negligence and lead to liability for damages
resulting also from defective products. In non-contractual relations
the focus is on the standards of care established for the producers,
the security requirements of the products and the liability for damages
from the breach of these requirements. 
Strict liability considerations especially in the case of damages to
persons or property intended for private consumption733 have been
given a central role in the liability for product related damages.
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734 See article 9 of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the
approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member
States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33,
amended by directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21. As Mathias
Reimann in Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 137-138, points out in an
analysis of product liability rules worldwide in 2003, the U.S. approach is
different from this European approach widely followed by other countries
even outside Europe. In the U.S. and also in the Japan all property (other than
the defective product itself), including commercial property, is covered.
735 The importance of this in relation to software has been raised, e.g., by
Stuurman in Product Liability for Software in Europe, p. 144, and in The EC
Directive on Product Liability and its Application to Information Technology,
p. 202.
736 For example, in Finland all the damages to persons caused by defective
products are covered by the Finnish Product Liability Act (694/1990). Thus
also personal injuries of the enterpriser and her employees are covered by the
Product Liability Act. However, as Doctor of Laws Marko Mononen who
currently is associate in a private law firm and Docent of Civil Law at the
University of Helsinki, notes in 2004, Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 134, the
injured person has a freedom to choose the most favourable legal basis for her
claim. 
However, since the consumer product liability rules based on the EC
Directive (85/374/EEC) are limited only to death, personal injuries,
or damages to property (other than the defective product itself) that
is intended and mainly used for private use or consumption734,
damages to other (non-consumer use) property and pure economic
losses that have no relation to damages to person or property are not
covered735. This means that in other cases than personal injuries, where
special strict product liability rules apply even to the liability between
enterprises736, liability of an enterpriser against another enterprise in
a non-contractual relation essentially relies on general tort law rules.
When a defect in a product has caused damage, the injured party
has also the right the demand compensation from the party from
which it bought the product. In contractual relations product liability
concentrates on the defectiveness of products, i.e., their conformity
to the contract. Breach of contract is also a requirement in the case
of product liability under the default defectiveness rules in contract
law. When a product is considered defective it constitutes a breach
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737 Bruce Schneier has been one of the most active advocates. Of the many
occasions where he arguments in favour of legal liability for software vendors
see, Schneier B (2002) Liability and Security, Grypto-Gram Newsletter, April
15, 2002, at http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6 [23.2. 2006].
See also Declan McCullagh, A Legal Fix for Software Flaws, CNET News.com,
August 26, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1002_3-5067873. html
[23.2.2006] (quoting computer experts calling for software publisher liability
and legal experts who are more doubtful).
of contract and can lead, among other remedies like repair of defective
good, reduction of price, withdrawal of a contract, which are primary
in most of breach of contract cases, also to liability to pay damages.
When compensation for product related damages is sought under
contract law, it is the contract that forms the primary legal basis.
Liability for defective products, especially when considered in a
relationship between enterprises, is considered on the basis of the
contract between the parties. In the case of damages to persons or
property (other than the defective product itself) ordinarily intended
for private consumption, the indispositive rules in the Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC) and implementing legislation together with
the national consumer contract law rules, that cannot be agreed in
the disfavour of the consumer (i.e., they are indispositive), provide
the primary legal source.
Even though software vendors currently are not subject to much
liability regulation, attention on the issue has increased and demands
for software vendor liability has been made on several occasions in
recent years. Especially practitioners of computer security have been
active in calling for increased liability737. Software vendor liability has
not only been called for in the U.S where the role of private law
liability in general and product liability especially is higher than in
Europe in general due to the different social insurance systems. Also
in Europe, for example, the Economic and Social Committee of the
European Communities, a European level forum for reflection of
civil society organisations and associations, in its opinion on the
European Commission Communication on Network and Information
Security stated that “[b]usinesses and private individuals must
therefore be given more effective legal means to make software
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738 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Network and
Information Security: Proposal for a European Policy Approach, COM(2001)
298 final, TEN/083, Brussels, November 28, 2001, section 3.1.11, available at
the home pages of the EESC at http:// www.esc.eu.int/ index_en.asp
[23.2.2006]
739 The analysis of the law will concentrate on EU level law and take examples
from one member state (where deemed appropriate). The EU law seeks to
harmonise the differences between national laws of Member States. Even
though national law and EU law are mutually dependent, EU law takes
precedence over national law.
operators and manufacturers financially liable for serious security and
data protection lapses ascribable to them under product liability
legislation”738.
It must be stressed that the analysis of software vendor liability
concentrates on the function and structure of liability law as an
incentive mechanism to promote product safety and security. This
is not a search for certain interpretations of the valid (positive) law
in the sense it is done in prescriptive legal scholarship as such. The
details of the various rules are not analysed and the statements apply
both to EU and Member State levels, even though the emphasis is
on the Nordic perspective due to the author’s background in Finnish
legal system739. Instead, the focus is on analysing the capabilities of
liability rules to influence secure software development. 
At best, this is an analysis of the interpretative space of valid
product liability rules in order to see if the positive law could be used
to enhance secure software development. The normative argument
that product liability provision ought to be either interpreted or
amended in a way that promotes the security of software is just one
practical argument among several competing and possibly even
stronger arguments for the interpretation of the rules and for their
amendment.
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740 Specifying the regulators even at the level of state actors is tricky since much
of product liability regulation outside consumer protection in Europe is a
construct of legal scholarship and case law rather than of specific state-centred
regulatory action.
741 According to the conventional view, the law of contracts facilitates market
transactions as, e.g., Professor of English Law at the London School of
Economics and Political Science Hugh Collins points out in Regulating
Contract Law, p. 13, in which he continues on the inspiring analyses of
contract law combining fine contractual scholarship with empirical studies and
social theory, thus forming a model of the type of scholarship that combines
regulatory and doctrinal research. According to the economic explanation, as
made explicit in basic textbook on law and economics like that of Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 199-202, the dispositive
general contract law rules function in the background as a collection of the
rules of liability that are applied when the contracts or the contractual practices
in the line of business are silent or otherwise give no guidance on the issue.
They provide a default allocation of risks between the contracting parties that
5.1  Who regulates ?
In the case of product liability based on special laws or general
contract and tort law rules the regulators are diversified. There are
state-centric regulators using legislation and case-law, legal scholarship
constructing systematic arguments, market actors constructing
contractual practices for the specific line of business and the
contracting parties as such altering and choosing the laws applicable
to their relation740.
The strongest form in which the state actors regulate is when
mandatory (indispositive) rules that disregard or change the terms
of contracts are used. This is the case typically when a weaker party,
such as a consumer or a SME, needs protection. A central example
is the consumer protective product liability regulation, where contracts
for less security than the regulation allows are deemed invalid.
However, state-actors can be seen as regulators even when only
dispositive liability rules are used. 
Even though dispositive private law rules especially in the area
of contract law are conventionally seen as having mainly a facilitative
role, i.e., they permit citizens to make legally enforceable contracts
and thus lowers transaction costs741, the purpose of private law is
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fill gaps left to the contracts. This reduces transaction costs in situations where
the default terms provided by law are preferred by both parties, since they can
omit these terms from the contract.
742 The regulatory function of contract law has been argued especialyl by Hugh
Collins in Regulating Contract Law, p. 17, and by Jan Hellner in Lagstiftning
inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 162-164.
743 This has been pointed out by Jane Stapleton, Professor of Law in the
Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University and
Ernest E. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law, in
a critical evaluation of the susceptibility of tort law to regulatory analysis,
Regulating Torts, p. 130-134. See also Schuck, Tort Liability, p. 466. Even
those tort scholars that reject the deterrence arguments as valid explanations of
tort doctrines and favour corrective justice arguments (i.e., reject the argument
that deterrence is a valid purpose of tort law), accept that tort law can influence
behaviour and can be used to do so as a recognised U.S. tort law scholar Gary
T. Schwartz argues in Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1827, an article where he
reconciles the doctrinal and the economics-based theories of tort liability.
744 As radical is this may seem at the first hand for doctrinal lawyers outside
contract law and for those who perceive regulation as a state-centric activity,
there actually is nothing new in this statement. Legal theory has for long
recognised that also private individuals regulate and that even ordinary people
can produce legal norms. For example, HLA Hart in a classic of legal
philosophy and jurisprudence, The Concept of Law, p. 41, holds that human
agents have the capacity to become private legislators.
745 This ability is based on the private power-conferring (constitutive) rules;
secondary rules of change in the Hartian conception, that confer power on
individuals to vary their initial legal positions (Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 95-
96). These power conferring rules also regulate; inside the behaviour they have
constituted they also guide behaviour. Even though they are rules of the game,
e.g., how to make a contract, they also regulate behaviour by showing how the
increasingly being seen to control behaviour by reference to
enforceable standards in the pursuit of a particular goal.
This is relatively widely acknowledged in relation to contract law742.
Considerable controversy exists over the goals that tort liability should
serve and doctrines in tort law do not seem to have a definitive stated
purpose, which hinders the analysis of tort law as a regulatory
mechanism. However, its regulatory role has been widely accepted743..
At the same time also the contracting parties are acting as
regulators744. The private actors can determine through their agreement
what legal regulation, if any, will apply to their transaction745. To the
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society wishes the game to be played.
746 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contract Law, p. 16, develops this argument in
relation to contract law into a form where the private law of contracts in using
dispositive norms, and respecting the private autonomy of the parties,
delegates to the parties the power to fix the rules that will govern the relations
between the participants in the market.
747 Collins, Regulating Contract Law, p. 16-17.
748 As noted by Juhani Warsta in an analysis of contract processes and
relationships in software business from 2001, Contracting in Software Business, p.
53, standard contracts in software business are used because it is considered to
have its own characteristics that require special rules to address them. They are
used to replace the default rules provided by law that serve as background rules
to which the contracting parties can rely on and leave matters open, and thus
save transaction cots.
749 Thomas Wilhelmsson in Vakiosopimus, p. 31-32, applies this argument
generally to all standard form contracts.  Agne Lindberg and Daniel Westman
in Praktisk IT-rätt, p. 278, show that both uni- and multilaterally drafted
standard terms are used also in IT-contracts in Sweden.
extent that legal regulation is comprised of default or supplementary
(dispositive) rules, the parties are permitted through express terms
to prefer their own standards over those supplied by the dispositive
legal norms746. As argued by Hugh Collins, it is possible for the
contracting parties to structure their relationship in ways that avoid
the application of such traditional regulation of contractual terms even
when mandatory rules are used747. Thus the regulatory capability of
contracting parties is wide.
Software business in general and COTS business especial widely
use their own contract templates to facilitate the contracting procedure
and to reduce transaction costs748. The drafters of these standard
templates are central regulators. They can be drafted unilaterally by
one of the contracting parties or by an industrial organisation
representing only one the parties. A typical example is a seller or an
organisation representing the sellers. Bilaterally or multilaterally drafted
contract templates, agreed documents, are the product of the
representatives of both of the contracting parties.749
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750 Basically, product liability rules prescribe a body of substantive legal
doctrine (i.e., rules and principles) that define the legally enforceable duties that
an individual or an entity owes to others and the circumstances in which she
may violate those duties (i.e., the standard of care). Note that strict liability
differs in the sense that no standard of conduct is provided. Liability results
from all activity that causes harm despite the level of care taken by the injurer.
Liability is based on damaging conduct. However, product liability regulation in
the consumer protection side (e.g., EC product liability directive 85/374/EEC)
is not strict in this sense. Liability is qualified in the sense that it does not cover
all the damages caused by the product. Liability is non-fault based, i.e., not
focused on the conduct of the producer, but it is tied to the product
characteristics. Liability arises from the damage caused by a defect in the
product, i.e., when it does not provide the safety that a person is entitled to
expect. This brings the standard of conduct into the European product liability
regulation.
5.2  Influence mechanism
The mechanisms by which liability rules, especially product liability,
influences secure software development and behaviour in general are
manifold and highly speculative. Certain basic conceptualisation can,
however, be made. Of the basic mechanism by which regulation
influences behaviour, both external constraining and intrinsic
predispositions shaping can be identified.
Internal influence. Liability rules for defective and insecure products,
i.e., product liability rules understood widely to include doctrines also
from contract and tort law in addition to the consumer oriented strict
product liability laws, are authoritative norms that provide general
standards of conduct that communicate of the desired behaviour for
the objects of regulation750. They communicate in general concepts,
which are specified in concrete liability court cases or contracts, what
kind of behaviour and level of activity is expected from the objects
of regulation. Especially the clarification, restatement or even the
promulgation of a totally new standard for conduct in a product
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751 Recent argumentation in liability law also in the Nordic doctrine, especially
by Thomas Wilhelmsson in Senmodern ansvarsrätt, increasingly recognises the
possibility of constructing new standards (norms) via litigation as a regulatory
mechanism. Preventive effect of liability litigation is not related solely to the
breach of rules explicitly set elsewhere, but litigation can also create altogether
new rules (Wilhelmsson, Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 53). However, as Wilhelmsson
in Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 186, points out, liability litigation used as a tool for
micro politics in this new rule generating form involves numerically marginal
cases since majority of tort litigations involve small damage cases with more
common issues. It must be noted that in this case it is not the litigators, be they
private individuals, NGOs or others having standing in court, that create the
new rules. Instead, it is the court that formulates the new rule and acts as a
regulator.
752 The learning process that occurs between the parties in a court case does
not necessarily involve a wider moral discourse. Litigation, at the latest, forces
also the injurer to consider its behaviour in comparison with the legal rules
and, if the case is not settled, the court then restates the standard and makes
explicit the related costs. This can lead to changes in future behaviour in the
form of higher precaution or even lead to the internalisation of the rules as
liability lawsuit751 and the subsequent publicity given to it could induce
software vendors to re-examine their development practices.
These standards for conduct as such, without sanctions necessarily
being attached to them, can prevent defective products from entering
markets and causing harm. This is the expressive influence where
information on liability rules influences intrinsic predispositions via
the change of social norms or social forms. Promulgation of a law
or a new rule established in a court case give people instructions on
what to do (i.e., the meaning of the norm, the behaviour it expects
from the addressees, is expressed), their justification enhances
legitimisation and by means of convincing enhances internalisation.
In the legal analysis of tort law this type of prevention is especially
attached to the moral building or up-keeping of social or moral norms
inside the class of regulatory objects. New promulgated liability
provisions that set standards for conduct affirm the blamefulness of
the regulated behaviour. They can also represent, when made
according to democratic principles, society’s moral norms, and, in
the case of rules created via litigation, serve to alter the behaviour
of also other parties752 than those represented in the litigated case
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part of the intrinsic predispositions of the objects of regulation. This is special
prevention in the sense as it is used in criminal law but its influence mechanism
is the same as standard economic prevention. This usage of the terms is
different from the occasional identification of economic prevention with
special prevention at least in the Finnish doctrinal tort law analyses as noted by
Antti Kivivuori in Vahingonkorvausvastuun tarkoitusperät, p. 170.
753 The learning process in the form of moral education through litigation,
depicted in the Finnish doctrine especially by Thomas Wilhelmsson in
Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 103-134, can also happen without much publicity
through the system of precedents or through information provision to the
legislators and other regulators (idem., p. 161-162). In addition to these
influence mechanisms, the ability of tort law to affirm and reinforce society’s
essential norms is also explained especially in the common law countries by its
reliance on the jury system, through which tort law can track society’s basic
beliefs about right and wrong conduct (Schuck, Tort Liability, p. 477-478).
754 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 32-34. The
respondents to the survey consisted of consumer representatives (i.e.,
consumer associations both at national and EU levels), producers and suppliers
of products together with trade associations, insurers and their associations,
and representatives of the legal field (both claimants’ and defendants’ lawyers,
regulators and other governmental agencies, and legal scholars) from all
Member States (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 6-7).
especially when the rules are created in high media profile court
cases753.
Suggestive empirical evidence of such expressive effect can be
found from the considerations of the various parties in product
liability claims. For example, in an EU study on product liability from
2003 John Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thompson report that
the most important factors behind the increase in the number of
consumer product liability claims are considered to be increased
consumer awareness of rights, increased consumer access to
information, and media activity754. They all point to the same direction;
increase in the information about the possibilities for consumers to
receive compensation for product related accidents. Whether this is
through increased information provision on product liability regulation
(especially information on Product Liability Directive and
implementing national laws) by the regulator or higher media attention
in product liability cases was not explicitly examined in the EU
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755 Due to the difficulties in the formulation of empirically testable hypothesis
about the expressive influence, it is not surprising that no further research on
these issues were made. Meltzer, Freeman, and Thompson do, however, in
their study Product Liability in the European Union, p. 32, recognise the possibility
that the implementation of the Directive may have contributed to an increased
consumer awareness of rights, and that media activity would be expected to
play a role in providing consumers with access to information.
756 Even though this necessarily does not directly apply to the secure software
development context due to the several contradictory messages on the
applicability of product liability rules on software defects in general and
security related defects especial, which will be discussed later on, it shows the
existence and possibilities of such influence mechanism.
757 Note that the costs do not necessarily result from the enforcement of legal
sanctions. As Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 123-5, explains in relation
to the role of the adjudication process in the construction of markets and in
the regulation of contracts, regulation through adjudication can influence
behaviour even when no sanctions are provided, when the court serves the
function of collecting and disseminating what participants in the market regard
as reliable information about trustworthiness. This enables the use of non-legal
sanctions such as damage to reputation. However, because these costs can
incur over businesses even without actual legal liability, they cannot be
considered as part of the costs that belong to the influence mechanism of the
liability rules as such. In trying to clean out the influence that the law as such
has on behaviour (the normative restriction made in the analysis of the effects
of laws), considerations of several costs related to the marketing of defective
products need to be bypassed. They are not attributable to the liability rules as
such in the form the analysis of normative guidance mechanism requires. They
study755, but both of them belong to the expressive influence
mechanism used in this study.756 
External constraint. Various sanctions (remedies for the injured party)
are typically attached to the product liability rules either under tort
and contract law. These remedies, such as monetary damages, and
specific performances like repair of defective good, reduction of price,
withdrawal of a contract, which are primary in many breach of
contract cases, function as additional incentives for the producers
in achieving the standard of conduct for the development of high
quality and secure products prescribed in the liability rule. They have
an additional preventive effect on harms caused by defective (insecure)
products. This is the external constraining provided by liability rules757.
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can be reasons for action even without the existence of the liability rules. They
will be, however, picked up later on in the analysis of the factors shaping the
influence of product liability rules.
758 Because the probability for private individuals to face significant losses due
to security related defects in software is relatively low, they might mistakenly
assume that the probability of an accident is zero (will never happen) and take
very little precaution, as suggested by academic literature (Cooter and Ulen,
Law and Economics, p. 330, with reference to Kahneman D and Tversky A (eds.,
1981) Judgement Under Uncertainty: Biases and Heuristics). That fact, if established,
could make this a situation of unilateral, rather than bilateral, precaution, i.e.,
only vendors and implementers could realistically be expected to take steps to
reduce the probability and severity of accidents as pointed out by Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen in Law and Economics, p. 331. However, the
precaution can be seen as bilateral even in consumer-enterprise relations
despite these possible errors of private individuals in making calculations about
risks and consequent preventive actions. The probability is increasing and
several widely published cases of damage due to viruses, worms, trojans and
crackers make such issues seem even more likely. Note that for well-publicised,
potentially catastrophic outcomes, most people systematically exaggerate the
probability of an accident occurring regardless of the objective information to
the contrary (Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 330, with reference to
Kahneman D and Tversky A (eds., 1981) Judgement Under Uncertainty: Biases and
Heuristics).
Note that the users of the goods can typically also take measures
to prevent accidents; this is called bilateral or joint precaution.
Especially so in cases involving misuse of security related bugs in
software, e.g., by taking protective measures like firewalls and virus-
scanners and keeping their software updated. Also their behaviour
depends on the level of liability. However, the regulatory analysis
concentrates on the vendors of the software who are the main objects
of regulation in the case of product liability rules. The possibility for
bilateral precaution is reflected in the defences against product liability
present in the regulation.758
Whereas the former type of prevention is attributable to the mere
content of the rules, their promulgation and justification, together
with other forms of information provision about the standards of
conduct, this latter form of prevention is typically modelled in
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759 Naturally information is necessary also for the economic prevention side of
liability rules as pointed out by Göran Skogh in Priser, skadestånd och straff, p. 48.
760 It is the foresight of being held liable ex post that induces parties in the
accident setting to take preventive measures. Actual litigation is not necessary
for liability costs to influence decision-making as noted by Daughety and
Reinganum in Product safety, p. 1188. Gary T. Schwartz in Mixed Theories of
Tort Law, p. 1816-1817, has formulated this preventive effect in relation to
tort law in the following manner: “So long as the defendant can anticipate
bearing liability for the range of injuries his tortious conduct foreseeably can
produce, this prospect can induce in him an appropriate deterrence response”.
In the COTS software context, this deterrence approach can be considered as
appropriate since the regulation is directed at commercial enterprises that, at
least, ought to be cost calculating organisations. They come closer to the
central assumption in economic theory about the rational self-interestedness of
decision-makers, which is vital for the tort liability system to be able to send
signals to potential victims and injurers about the desired behaviour. The
vitality of the connection between the assumption of rationality and the
economic model of tort liability is discussed, e.g., by Robert Cooter and
Thomas Ulen in Law and Economics, p. 330-331.
761 The underlying assumption is that businesses observe the regulation as a
cost which needs to be minimised by cost-effective adjustments to their
operations.
762 The assumption still is that non-defective products cannot be made. This
cannot even be the goal of regulation. Instead, optimal deterrence is the
objective. Defective products continue to be produced, but only to a certain
acceptable threshold communicated in the liability rule.
economic terms and is attributable to the additional costs incurred
by the sanctions attached to the breach of the rules759. 
Modelling of behaviour done especially in law-and-economics
suggests prevention in the economic form where the threat of civil
litigation forces the producer to consider the expected social costs
caused by defective products760. When potential producers of defective
goods internalise the costs of the harm they cause in this way, they
have incentives to invest in preventive measures at the socially efficient
level. The possible costs incurred by liability in the case of defective
products causing harm function as incentives for the software vendors
to make software that is as secure as the communicated standard
requires761. This deters them from making excessively defective
products762.
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763 Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p 1802 and 1831-1832.
764 When accepting the perception of corrective justice scholars that it is unjust
or unfair for defendants to inflict harm on plaintiffs through their negligent
behaviour, which is used to explain why the goal of correction is achieved by
allowing the plaintiff to secure compensation ex-post from the defendant
(Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1831), it becomes evident that tort
law can, by requiring potential defendants to consider the prospect of liability,
deter those defendants from engaging in negligent behaviour and hence
bringing about an unjust result. In particular, tort liability can properly be seen
as a practice designed to deter defendants from violating the moral rights of
potential victims. If the goal of liability rules is to strike a balance between the
vendors liberty of action and the users right to security, then, certainly,
preventing accidents from happening does a better job in affording security
than merely offering compensation once an injury has occurred.
765 According to Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1831, this
deterrence-as-justice rationale does not fully apply to rules of strict liability.
They cover cases in which the act of the defendant that results in injury is not
necessarily improper. However, in product liability it is likely to be so, since the
liability is based on the expectation of security by the users of the product (i.e.,
a standard of care).
766 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. iii and ix. Note that
Note that there are, as Gary T. Schwartz explains, both economic
and non-economic ways of understanding deterrence763. The
deterrence that product liability rules provide can itself be understood
not just as a maximiser of utility but also as a device for achieving
justice or, at least, as a device for reducing injustice764. However, this
does not alter the influence mechanism. Only the final objective of
regulation is understood differently. While serving as an instrument
of deterrence, product liability rules ultimate objective becomes the
achievement of justice or, at least, the prevention of injustice, instead
of maximisation of utility765.
Empirical evidence from product liability regulation also verifies
this latter form of influence. Most participants in an EU study on the
practical operation of the systems of law under which product liability
claims may be brought in the Member States, for example, thought
that the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), since its adoption
in 1985, had moderately increased the prospects of product liability
claims being brought, and of their success766. Most participants also
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data about the reality of product liability, i.e., about claim numbers, litigation
rates, win-lose-ratios, and actual awards, are scarce and hard to come by with
regard to most countries in the world. Thus, assessments of the law in action
are only indicative.
767 Even though most of those who expressed their view on whether or not the
Product Liability Directive had contributed to increasing the level of safety of
products marketed in the EU considered that it had done so only a little, it is
noteworthy that approximately one third thought that it had not contributed at
all. Majority of the producers considered that the Directive had not contributed
at all (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 25 and 26). This is
also emphasised by Mathias Reimann in Product Liability in a Global Context,
p. 145, on the basis of existing studies combined with national reports received
for the compilation of the General Report I represented at the XVIth
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in Brisbane,
Australia, on 18 July 2001. The evidence about the reality of product liability,
i.e., law in action, despite of its deficiency and imprecision, creates a
noteworthy overall impression: in most countries in and outside Europe, the
influence of the EC Directive has not really made much of a difference in
practice.
768 Mark Geistfeld in Products Liability, p. 360-362, provides an overview and
analysis of several such studies. As John Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan
Thompson in Product Liability in the European Union, p. 54, note the evidence of
practical experience of the Product Liability Directive still remains limited,
even after almost 20 years since it was first implemented by a Member State.
Only some clear trends can be identified together with a number of general
conclusions concerning the operation of the Directive.
thought that the Directive had contributed to an increase in the level
of safety of products in the EU, even though only to a limited
degree767. Similar findings have also been presented in empirical studies
using a variety data sources on the effects of product liability for the
safety of products in other countries768.
Duty to disclose. The preventive measures to which the liability
provisions incite to by the threat of liability (additional costs) are not
restricted to the improvement of the security and quality of the
product as such. Even though it is the main assumption made by the
regulators, research on liability regulation and risk management show
a variety of preventive measures that are taken by the objects of
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769 Mika Hemmo in Tuotevastuuriskit, p. 31-49, provides a short overview of
the many possibilities by which companies can manage their product liability
risks. Marko Mononen, Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 321-338, does the same in
relation to business product liability, and Thomas Wilhelmsson and Matti
Rudanko, Tuotevastuu, p. 265-301, in relation to consumer product liability.
770 The fact that product liability rules together with marketing laws create
duties to disclose safety and security information is the reason why vendors’
information provision is treated separately from other possible risk
management techniques. Information provision is explicitly incited to in the
rules, even though the scale of preventive measures to which the product
liability rules incite to in general is much wider.
771  Also users can take precautions to reduce the probability and severity of
accidents resulting from vulnerabilities in software, for example, by keeping
their software updated, installing the latest patches, running anti-virus software
and setting a firewall. This situation is called bilateral precaution.
772 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 358.
regulation in order to manage product liability risks769. Without going
deeper into the ways the objects of regulation can actually react to
the liability risk in here, which will be discussed later in relation to
the reactions of the objects of regulation, another main way in which
the regulators seem to expect liability rules to influence behaviour
can be identified. In addition to the above mentioned influence
mechanism, product liability rules influence secure software
development by setting duties to disclose security information770. 
In products liability, information provision has a special role. Since
both the vendors and the users can take preventive measures against
the accidents occurring due to software vulnerabilities771, the party
who posses this information is obligated to inform. It is the vendors
in market-driven development, like all product manufacturers as
argued in economics theory by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen772,
who are in control of the design of the products and their
development process, and who are most likely to be aware of any
special dangers their products present and, therefore, can most
efficiently convey information about those dangers through warnings.
The purpose of product liability rules can be seen to establish strong
incentives to the producers not only to reduce their liability for
accidental harm by making their products safer in normal use, but
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773 Burrows, Products Liability and the Control of Product Risk in the
European Community, p. 79.
774 Burrows, Products Liability and the Control of Product Risk in the
European Community, p. 80.
775 As the economic analysis of the law suggests (Cooter and Ulen, Law and
Economics, p. 358) strict liability with the defence of assumption of the risk and
product misuse (defence of comparative/contributory negligence) is an
efficient standard for minimizing the social costs of product-related injuries.
also to inform users of the increase in the risk that would result from
various forms and degrees of carelessness by the user and of the
inherent risks of their products in proper use.
Both types of information are essential inputs into efficient
decisions on product safety by the users as noted by Paul Burrows773.
However, in the case of software security, information on the
product’s inherent susceptibility to risk when it is properly used is
the more relevant type of input into efficient decisions on product
safety by users. As noted by Burrows, in the case of risks attached
to the improper use of products, duties to disclose play only a residual
role, i.e., to provide producers with the appropriate incentive to warn
for products not covered by statutory warning requirements774.
However, since there are no statutory hazard warning requirements
established for the vendors of COTS software, the general duties to
disclose are especially important. 
Of course information on the increase to the risk that would result
from various forms and degrees of carelessness by the user is also
central, like in the case of using COTS products for high security
purposes or putting input that is not intended into the program
(remember the black-box testing where various forms of input is used
to analyse when the product crashes). Failure of the user to head to
warning or to follow the instructions provides a basis for the defence
of contributory negligence for the vendor. The information provided
is of a kind to enable the user to reduce the accident risk by taking
care in an efficient ways.775
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776 Note that the provided information can also be a ground for discharge from
liability. It affects users’ knowledge of risks and the level of care required from
them. Failure of the user to head to warning or to follow the instructions
provides a basis for the defence of contributory negligence for the vendor.
This has been given less significance in tort law as Marko Mononen, Yritysten
välinen tuotevastuu, p. 173-174, points out in relation to the Finnish doctrine. See
also the renewed textbook on Finnish product liability law of Thomas
Wilhelmsson and Matti Rudanko, Tuotevastuu, p. 276-281.
777 Similar disclosure requirements are set also in general marketing rules
against unfair advertising or marketing both in consumer and commercial
contexts. In the Finnish legal doctrine Thomas Wilhelmsson and Matti
Rudanko in Tuotevastuu, p. 266, classify marketing regulation as a part of the
preventive regulation of hazardous products together with product liability and
product safety regulations. 
The disclosure requirements set by product liability rules come
up at many points in such questions as whether one must inform the
opposite party in a negotiation so as to avoid him contracting under
the spell of an error (otherwise the contract is not enforced) or
whether the seller must disclose apparent defects in his products (or
assume liability when accidents occur)776. The duty to disclose safety
information is most clearly visible in consumer product liability laws.
For example, according to article 6 of the EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC)  a product is considered to be defective
“when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect”. In the consideration of the expectations the presentation
of the product, including instructions for use and warnings are
relevant. When sufficient instructions and warnings are provided, the
product is not considered defective. Thus a duty to disclose safety
information is created. 
Duty to disclose safety information is present also in commercial
product liability law under general contract and tort law777. For
example, the contractual liability rules for defects in products are based
on the assumption that the buyer can seek for contract law remedies
for defects in products only if she did not know about the existence
of such defects. Under tort law, the duty to disclose is present
especially in the failure to warn doctrine; failure to warn of the
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778 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2
December 2001 on general product safety, OJ L 011, 15.1.2002, p. 4-17. These
informative instruments need to be separated from the duties to disclose in
contract, tort and specific product liability laws. The division of regulatory
tools that stimulate information supply into duties of disclosure and statutory
hazard-warnings is presented by Paul Burrows in Products Liability and the
Control of Product Risk in the European Community, p. 79. The difference is
that the statutory warning requirements established in general and sectoral
product safety regulations are backed up by an administrative control system
and the threat of criminal law sanctions (fines) in the final-end. These
regulatory instruments are not taken further in this study. They essentially
belong to the informative category and play a marginal role in relation to
software security. The administrative control system of product safety
regulations is currently not capable of dealing with security issues in COTS
software. And is not likely to do so due to the marginal role COTS software
accident risks present in released products is considered to be
negligent behaviour. 
In relation to secure software the disclosure requirements concern
especially vulnerability information. In the case of software
vulnerabilities, the legal duties to disclose are derived mainly from
the same product liability regulations, general contractual and delictual
(non-contractual) liability rules for defects in products that set
standards for conduct in relation to security of products in general.
In addition, duties to disclose are created by doctrines of pre-
contractual liability (like culpa in contrahendo) and general marketing
rules. Under these general rules on defects in products, negligence,
and marketing regulation both in consumer and commercial relations,
and especially in product liability laws, the vendor must provide safety
information concerning their products or assume liability when
accidents occur. The informing of the defectiveness of products and
the risks involved is for the vendor a way to minimize or even avoid
liability.
The rules that allocate information in general stem mainly from
regulatory law. They have an especially central role in consumer
protection laws. In relation to safety and security information, the
rules stem especially from the statutory hazard-warning requirements
under general and sectoral product safety regulations such as Directive
2001/95/EC on General Product Safety778. However, there are no
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plays in the physical safety of consumers and the general lack of knowledge in
software security issues that hampers the possibilities of the administrative
control system to handle them.
779 Note that especially in electronic communications the system operators
have obligations to inform their subscribers of particular risks of a breach of a
security of a network under the article 4 and especially subsection 2 of the
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and
electronic communications) OJ L 201 , 31/07/2002, p. 37-47. See also the
preamble 20 of the Directive. This duty to inform concerns only risks in the
systems of the service providers and thus does not apply to software vendors
as such (assuming they do not provide such electronic communication
services). However, since the particular risks to be disclosed can be due to the
vulnerabilities in the components of the systems, such as a standard off-the-
self firewall, the service providers have a limited obligation to inform also of
such risks. This not only makes the existence of the vulnerability in the system
widely known (negative information) but also increases the costs of managing
the disclosure.
780 Saarenpää and Pöysti, Tietoturvallisuus ja laki [Data Security and Law], p. 462-
463. This is also the approach of the Finnish Consumer Agency. They advice
the providers of broadband connections to inform their customers of the need
for security measures such as firewalls, anti-virus software and updated
operating systems in the open networks. Of the previous recommendation see
the Press Release 24.11.2004 of the Finnish Consumer Agency at
http://www.kuluttajavirasto.fi [23.2.2006]
clearly stated statutory hazard-warning requirements for software
vendors, i.e., mandatory disclosure rules of standardised information,
in relation to software vulnerabilities779. This is why the general liability
rules for defective products both in consumer and commercial
contracts, and especially product liability regulations, together with
general marketing rules are central. This is also the approach taken
in the first Finnish study on information security and law from 1997,
where the normative argument was made that the trader of digital
products have on obligation to inform about the information security
risks related both to the operational environment and the marketed
product, even without the support of specific disclosure rules780.
In Finland, the obligation to know the marketed product and the
duty to inform of the risks of which the seller knows or should have
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781 This has been explicitly stated in the Finnish Supreme Court tobacco case
2001:58.
782 Wilhelmsson, Suomen kuluttajansuojajärjestelmä, p. 126-128.
783 Hemmo, Kuluttajamainonnan informatiivisuusvaatimuksista, p. 368-371.
784 This grouping of types of information to be disclosed presented in the
economics of contract law (see, Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 273-
275) is also illustrative in relation to tort law. Only relevant information
category in relation to the duties to disclose for tort law is safety information.
Note that this type of substantive approach to the disclosure problem where
the permissibility of nondisclosure is decided on the basis of the character of
the information is by no means to only one. As Melvin A. Eisenberg points
out in Disclosure in Contract Law, p. 1664, the stage setting work on the
disclosure problem, Anthony T. Kronman’s Mistake, Disclosure, Information,
and the Law of Contracts, in the Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1): 1-35, 1978,
utilised a process approach where the process through which the information
known do not have to based on specific legislation. However, the
general rule developed in legal practice has been expressed in addition
to the product liability rules also in special consumer marketing
provision781. 
The consumer marketing provision in the Finnish Consumer
Protection Act (38/1978) chapter 2 section 1 subsection 2 indirectly
obligates traders to convey information necessary in respect of the
health or economic security of consumers. However, also the general
clauses on unfair marketing in the first subsection of the above
mentioned rule and similar rule in the Finnish Unfair Business
Practices Act 1978 section 1 have relevance also in relation to
disclosure of safety information; keeping a vulnerability secret might
constitute unfair marketing or business practice. They provide an
indirect obligation because it based on a conditional injunction; the
trader is forbidden to market a good unless she gives such necessary
information. These provisions are from time before specific consumer
safety or product liability regulations; they have now been re-stipulated
in them as pointed out by Thomas Wilhelmsson782 and Mika
Hemmo783.
In the case of duties to disclose under contract law it is important
to differentiate between the types of information required to be
disclosed784. Market exchanges are often motivated by differences
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has been acquired is decisive: if the information has been acquired by a
deliberative process, disclosure is not required; if the information has been
acquired by a casual or an adventitious process, disclosure is required. The
process approach works for casual or adventitious acquisition, but as
Eisenberg in Disclosure in Contract Law, p. 1663, it is too broad when it
comes to deliberative acquisition. The substantive approach becomes relevant
in the cases of deliberative acquisition. For a deeper discussion of the
economic discussion on the substantive approach, see Eisenberg, Disclosure in
Contract Law, heading III.
785 As Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 271, in their basic textbook on
law and economics argue, this difference is often solved by private bargaining,
e.g., by offering to buy the information or the resource in the use of which the
information is needed.
786 Wilhelmsson, Social Contract Law and European Integration, p. 211.
787 The Nordic contract law doctrine under fair dealing and good faith in
contract has been moving from the free utilization of information towards
wider obligations to inform the contracting party as pointed out by Mika
Hemmo Sopimusoikeus I, p. 278-279. These obligations naturally differ between
contract types (e.g., in relational contracting where the contracting parties
cooperate extendedly and in consumer contracts the obligations to inform are
in the contracting parties’ private information785. As a general starting
point the gathering of productive information, that can be used to produce
more wealth, is incited by allowing its free utilisation. An example
of productive information could be a discovery of new way to avoid
vulnerabilities in software development. The treatment of redistributive
information, that creates a bargaining advantage that can be used to
redistribute wealth in favour of the informed party, is different. As
a general rule, the deliberate discovering of such information is
discouraged. A typical example of the latter is insider information
in stock trading. Even though most information is both productive
and redistributive, contracts based on difference in such mixed
information are also typically enforced and the investment in
discovering such information is thus rewarded. Under the liberalistic
standard contract doctrine in EU, which somewhat differs from the
more socially oriented Nordic doctrines in that it is has a more market-
rational basic approach as argued by Thomas Wilhelmsson786, the
obligations to inform are exceptions and there is no general duty to
disclose information to the uninformed party787. However, safety
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stronger), the relationships between contracting parties (e.g. there typically are
more duties to inform under consumer contract law) and regulated issues (e.g.,
insurance markets are typically subject to heavy duties to inform) but the
tendency is clear. This is also acknowledged by Marko Mononen, Yritysten
välinen tuotevastuu, p. 212, in relation to the duties to disclose safety information
under Finnish contractual product liability rules.
788 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 275-276. As noted by Janet Weiss
in Public Information, p. 241-242, disclosure policies are designed to promote
informed choices under conditions of some risk. The risk may be that of
imperfect information as such, but usually addressed in health and safety. The
disclosure rules help to mitigate risks associated with products that are legal but
dangerous in some respects.
789 Mackaay, The Public’s Right to Information, p. 172; Riesenhuber, Party
Autonomy and Information in the Sales Directive, p. 353.
information, that helps people to avoid harm, is different and the law
typically requires informed people to disclose it as Robert Cooter and
Thomas Ulen point out788. 
These rules do not establish an obligation for the vendors to
provide the customers with safety information in the strict sense; i.e.,
the buyer has no right enforceable in a court to demand the vendor
to inform her. There is no right to the vulnerability information
(private information) from vendors in the sense they have a right to
governmental information. The vendors must supply safety
information in order to shield themselves from liability for hazardous
products. Liability rules and competitive pressures in practice give
the public access to much information, but without a formal right
to it. The practical effect that the buyer will receive safety information
related to the goods is created, e.g., in contract law by setting default
rules of defectiveness of products which define the “normal” standard
which the buyer can expect the goods to conform. Thus the seller
has an incentive to inform the buyer of the defectiveness of the
product, or face liability.789
This influence mechanism resembles the vertically packaged
informative instrument of vulnerability reporting analysed in the
previous section. Both instruments are, at the final end, directed at
providing information to the users and potential purchasers of
software and, by enabling them to make rational choices under fuller
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790 The potential of legal sanctions is an additional force towards better
informing by the vendors. This holds the potential for stronger influencing
capability than in the case of vulnerability reporting. However, as will be
discussed below, it does not necessarily lead to stronger influence.
791 If taken to the extreme, such classification would lead to the conclusion that
liability rules are, basically, either informative instruments in encouraging
information, at influencing the development of more secure software.
However, the structure of the influence mechanism of both the legal
duties to disclose and the vulnerability reporting by external parties
is the same only to a degree.
Unlike in vulnerability reporting, the requirement to disclose in
the case of legal duties to disclose comes from the state-actors and
is based on the threat of contractual or delictual (tortious, non-
contractual) liability when failing to disclose vulnerability information;
vendors are liable for the non-acceptable defects in their products
that the customers did not know about. Note the difference in vertical
packaging. Whereas in the case of vulnerability reporting the vendor’s
duty to disclose in based on a threat of disclosure of information
directly to the final objects of regulation (the users and the public at
large), in the case legal rules the vendor’s duty to disclose is based
on the threat of liability790. 
Recalling the definition of regulation above where the threat of using
a regulatory instrument is just another way of employing it
(implementing) and not a separate type of instrument, we can see
that the former threat is an informative instrument (threat to disclose
directly to the public) and the latter threat is a prescribed/written
norm (threat of liability). Thus the vertical packaging in the former
case is informative instruments at both levels (reporter-vendor and
vendor-user) and in the latter case of prescribed norm with
informative instrument.
Both packages could thus be categorised as informative instruments
in the classification used in this study. The instruments influencing
the behaviour of the final objects of regulation (the users of the
software) are informative in both of them. However, in the case of
product liability rules, the classification according the lower level of
the vertical package of regulatory instruments proves inapplicable791.
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information provision, or technology-harnessing instruments in inciting the
offering of more secure software for users. And when considering other ways
in which companies can manage their product liability risks, e.g., insurance and
contracting, product liability rules would have to be categorised into all of the
instrument types (possibly excluding procedural).
792 The combined analysis can be further justified by both of the influence
mechanism deriving from the same rules and being subject to the same
influence shaping factors. The combined analysis of the influence mechanism
as written norms reduces overlap and avoids same issues from being repeated
in roughly similar contexts. Another reason for combined analysis is that
product liability rules do more than just provide the practical effect that
software vendors have a motivation to disclose vulnerabilities in order to shield
themselves from liability. Their primary objective is not to increase information
provision. Instead, the intention behind these rules is to improve the incentives
for enhancing the security of the goods. Thus, their primary object of
regulation is the vendor and not the user. This makes the regulation different
from such statutory warning and disclosure requirements that obligate vendors
to provide certain standardised information to their customers (e.g., the
obligation to inform about the identity of the business in e-commerce under
article 5 of the Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce). The product
liability rules analysed here provide only the practical effect that information is
provided.
793 This is depicted in picture 5-1 below.
This is why this feature of product liability rules is analysed in here
as part of the written norms category, even though it so much
resembles the influence mechanism of informative instruments792.
Whereas vulnerability disclosure employed both vertical packaging
and direct provision of information to the final objects of regulation,
liability based duty to disclose is purely vertical packaging. No direct
information provision by the regulator through its own organisation
can be possible since the regulators do not posses such information.
This highlights the central difference between these “informative
instruments” concerning vulnerability disclosure. The regulators in
the case of liability based duty to disclose do not posses the
information themselves and for this reason only encourage the
vendors as intermediaries to disclose and merely expect them to gather
the vulnerability information793. In the case of vulnerability reporting
the external reporters possess the information about the vulnerabilities
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794 See picture 4-1 above at page 233.
795 This market rationality of the obligations to give information especially
under EC consumer law is emphasized, e.g., by Thomas Wilhelmsson in Social
Contract Law and European Integration, p. 128. Wilhelmsson also highlights the
differences in Nordic countries. According to Wilhelmsson, market rationality
is in the background of the EC consumer contract law more widely than just in
the obligations to give information (idem., p. 126-148).
(act even as gatekeepers for the vulnerability information), and even
though they also utilize the vendors resources not just to fix the
vulnerability but also to distribute the knowledge of the vulnerability
further, they also do it themselves794.
Government
Prescription to inform of vulnerabilities
(Prescriptive rule)
Vendors
Pre-release Information or Patch +Advisory
(Information instrument)
Users
Picture 5-1 Duty to disclose as vertical packaging
By forcing vendors to inform the users and potential buyers of
the risks involved in the use of the products in question, the potential
buyers are enabled to make optimal choices with closer to perfect
information. The role of disclosure rules is central in the rational actor
model accepted in the EU. They improve the possibilities of rational
users to make right choices in the market795. With optimal information
the buyers can operate as central controllers of the prices and quality
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796 Note that the stricter consumer protection rules inciting vulnerability
disclosure can have significance also in relation industrial purchasing as noted
by Risto Väntsi in “Varoitanko kuluttajaa tuotteen vaaroista?” p. 49, with reference
to Jenkins JRG (1990) Consumer media as an information source for industrial
products: A study, Industrial Marketing Management, p. 81-. Since the professional
buyers are also private consumers, they also receive information directed at
consumers and can be influenced by it.
797 In other terms these instruments both reduce various forms of transaction
costs (especially those stemming from the search of product characteristics)
and diminish the possibilities for opportunistic (strategic) behaviour by the
vendor where the misbalance of information is misused to gain undue
(excessive) advantage. The transaction costs reduction is in line with the
market-rationality and the diminution of possibilities for overly opportunistic
behaviour resembles weaker party protection. Mackaay and Leblanc in The Law
and Economics of Good Faith in the Civil Law of Contract, even raise the reduction of
transaction costs and avoidance of opportunism as general objectives of
contract law.
798 In the Finnish doctrine the possibility of the duty to inform of the correct
use the object of the contract or of risks discovered post-release is
acknowledged, e.g., by Mika Hemmo in Sopimusoikeus I , p. 276, and in relation
to consumers contracts by Väntsi in “Varoitanko kuluttajaa tuotteen vaaroista?”, p.
152-158 and 214-216. In Finland this influence is strengthened by the
obligations to inform set for electronic communications operators in section
21 of the Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications
of products by striving rationally after their own private preferences.
Potential buyers are enabled to assess the quality and security of the
software in question and the claims that vendors make about them796.
In addition to the enhancement of the market rational behaviour, and
at the same time with it, disclosure rules can also be seen as protecting
the informationally weaker party from entering into highly
unfavourable and possibly damaging transactions797.
At the same time, in encouraging increased vulnerability disclosure
the product liability rules hold the potential for enabling the users
of the software to take protective measures. For example,
vulnerabilities to which users knowingly consent to while purchasing
the software enable them to take protective measures against them.
In the case of legal duties to disclose this applies especially to the
degree duties to disclose vulnerabilities found after the release of the
software are also created798.
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516/2004, aka Lex Sonera, according to which also special information security
risks, those that are not feasible to remove, must be disclosed to the users.
799 The preamble of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) states even
that the established liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole
means of adequately solving the problem of fair apportionment of the risks
inherent in modern technological production.
800 Government bill 119/1989 for Product Liability Act, p. 16. Available in
Finnish at the web pages of the Finnish Parliament, http://www.eduskunta.fi/
[23.2.2006]. It is important to note that when drafting the bill, the legislator did
not take information technology into consideration.
801 As noted by Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 79, this absence of
explicit policy justifications is both strength and a weakness of private law
5.3  Factors shaping the influence
5.3.1  Objectives
In the case of consumer product liability rules, the objectives of
regulation are relatively clear. As made explicit in the drafting material
of the Finnish Product Liability Act (694/1990) there are three
primary objectives. The first is to improve the right of the injured
party, i.e., consumers at large, to receive compensation from product
accidents. When the consumer is provided with better means to get
compensation, the economic burdens of product related accidents
are distributed more fairly799. The second objective is to prevent product
related accidents. The legislators considered that when the threat of
liability to pay compensation is heightened, product manufacturers
and importers would improve their quality assurance and monitoring
mechanisms which would lead to the decrease in the number of
defective products in markets. The third objective related to the EU
wide harmonisation and to the improvement of the internal market
(especially movement of goods) together with the provision of equal
possibilities for competition for all member states.800
Whereas parliamentary acts typically state their objectives either
as a preamble, in a specific rule about the objectives of the act, or as
a direction in legislative drafting material, doctrines in contract or tort
law in many cases cannot be said to have definite stated objectives801.
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regulation. The vagueness and ambiguity leaves potential for each generation to
reinterpret the rules of private law in accordance with contemporary policy
objectives. The weakness is that private law persistently evades criticism about
its efficiency and efficacy as a regulatory system. 
802 Marko Mononen in Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 40-47 and 63, identifies
both compensatory and preventive objectives in the Finnish legal doctrine
under contractual and non-contractual (delictual) product liability rules. Juha
Häyhä in Ankara vastuu ja vahingonkorvausoikeuden järjestelmä, p. 139, and
Timo Kaisanlahti in Riskin pulverointi vahingonkorvausoikeuden tehtävänä, p.
85-105, discuss the roles of these objectives under Finnish tort law and the
economic analysis of the law. Gary T. Schwartz in Mixed Theories of Tort Law
discusses the role of these objectives under the common law tort doctrine.
803 Main Finnish laws in relation to liability for damages under contract and tort
law are the Tort Liability Act (412/1974) and the Sale of Goods Act
(355/1987). In the drafting material of the Tort Liability Act (Government bill
187/1973, p. 8) the compensatory objective is explicitly stated. Even though
the preventive objective is not made as explicit, several justifications of specific
rules (e.g., liability of officials and employees) clearly imply its presence as also
noted by Antti Kivivuori in Vahingonkorvausvastuun tarkoitusperät, p. 166. 
804 As Gary T. Schwartz in Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1802-1811,
discusses in relation to the U.S. tort law scholarship, corrective justice tends to
prevail among traditional legal scholarships and the economically minded tend
The formulation of principles in private law doctrines describes a
deontic order rather than a set of instrumental goals. 
The analysis of the objectives shaping the influence of a regulatory
instrument on certain societal phenomenon (in this study the context
of secure software development) is naturally more fit to those
instruments that are explicitly intended to alter certain behaviour or
to correct specific problems (be that legal on non-legal type of
regulation) than those that are drafted to apply to a variety of
situations. However, certain higher level objectives can be made
explicit also in these situations. At least both compensatory and
preventive objectives are present also in the contractual and non-
contractual liability rules802. The objectives are typically made explicit
when the private liability law rules are drafted in the form of
parliamentary acts as is the case in Finland803. 
To the degree doctrines in torts conceptualizes purely in terms
of corrective justice804, i.e., tort law scholars largely consider the
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to favour deterrence explanations.
805 As Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1834, concludes his
comparison between the roles of deterrence and corrective justice or
retributive arguments in tort law and criminal law, “[a]s tort objectives, then,
corrective justice and deterrence can be recognised as collaborators rather than
competitors”. As suggested by Schwartz the combination of deterrence and
corrective justice can provide a better or fuller explanation of tort doctrines
than can either theory standing on its own (idem., p. 1801).
806 As Schwartz in Mixed Theories of Tort Law, p. 1815-1816, notes in
developing a mixed theory of tort that acknowledges both correction and
prevention as objectives of tort law, the very structure of a tort action is rooted
in corrective justice. This is visible from the structural features of tort action
according which liability is imposed only on those particular negligent actors
whose conduct fortuitously produces injury and not on all actors that operate
tortuously, and the amount of liability is the size of the particular injury rather
than the value of expected risk. This complies with the logic of corrective
justice but departs from the logic of deterrence. 
Schwartz develops the potential for a mixed theory of tort law, i.e., the
coexistence of both corrective and preventive objectives, partly on the
argument that the rationality behind them is different (whereas corrective
justice is concentrates on the burden of liability ex post, preventive arguments
primary objective of tort law being correction instead of deterrence
and the theories of tort law doctrines are explained under the concepts
of corrective justice, this internal argument can become a hindrance
for the regulatory capacity of product liability rules, and especially
of their modification to better regulate secure software development.
If the concentration is purely of reparation and corrective justice
arguments in the enactment, and especially interpretation, of product
liability rules, there is a risk that deterrence objectives are not fulfilled
and the problems of product liability rules in relation to its preventive
effect are not taken seriously. Fortunately, recent argumentation
especially in tort law recognises both of these objectives as relevant
and considers that they can coexist and be complimentary805. 
However, the risk of over-reliance on corrective objectives still
exists especially in relation to the interpretation of the vague
provisions and doctrines in courts. The problem is created when court
argumentation concentrates solely on facts and on issuing the burden
of liability ex post806. If the court does not take notice of the effects
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concentrate on the prospect of liability ex ante). I have no quarrel with that. I
am not arguing against the coexistence of both objectives. Instead, my
argument concentrates on the use of both corrective and preventive arguments
in courts. If courts do not anticipate the preventive measures taken by the
defendant group, correct incentives are not given.
807 Even though this idealized argument does not fully depict the reality of
court argumentation in tort cases, there is certain truth behind it. As Jane
Stapleton, Regulating Torts, p. 125, notes in discussing Hugh Collins’
arguments favouring regulatory analysis of the effectiveness of private law in
common law, many of the legal concerns confronted with courts in tort cases
cannot be described in terms of consequentialist policy (a regulatory goal).
Consequential concerns do play a role in court argumentation, but the
emphasis is on doctrinal arguments.
808 An example of such situation can be found from the Finnish
implementation of the Product Liability Directive. Even though deterrence
objective was made explicit in the implementation of the Product Liability
Directive in Finland, compensation was considered to be the primary objective.
However, the Finnish Product Liability Act concentrated only on enhancing
the right of the injured party to get compensation. As Thomas Wilhelmsson
and Matti Rudanko in Tuotevastuu, p. 35, point out, no such arrangements that
would have guaranteed the compensation in practice were established. For
example, Finnish legislator followed the lines of the Directive and did not
make product liability insurance obligatory. The inexistence of mandatory
product liability insurance has continued to be raised by consumer
representatives as a reason why the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC)
does not adequately protect consumers (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the
European Union, p. 42). 
liability rules have on prospect of liability ex ante in the decision-
making of the objects of regulation, then preventive considerations
and the whole objective of prevention is overlooked. This continues
at least as long as corrective justice explanations are the sole means
used to bring the coherence and consistency sought in legal
argumentation.807
A severe hindrance to the regulatory capacity of product liability
rules, and especially their development towards better regulation of
secure software development, arises also from the conflicting interest
surrounding the issue. Whereas the objectives of the representatives
of consumers are towards enhancing the possibilities to get
compensation in practice and not just the right to compensation808,
the objectives of the producers are towards maintaining status quo,
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809 This is visible in the opinions of both consumers and producers in relation
to the balance stroke by the Product Liability Directive. Even though 66% of
all those participants who expressed their view in an EU-study (Meltzer et al.,
Product Liability in the European Union, p. 42) on the need to reform the Directive
thought that the Directive did strike an appropriate balance, only 20% of the
consumer representatives thought so. 80% of them though that the Directive
did not adequately protect the needs of the consumer, whereas 26% of the
producers though that the Directive does not adequately protect them. A
similar pattern of responses emerged in relation to the product liability system
as a whole, defined as the combination of the Directive, national laws and
procedural rules (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 43). The
conflicting interest are present especially in the discussion about the need to
reform the Product Liability Directive as the study of John Meltzer, Rod
Freeman, and Siobhan Thompson, Product Liability in the European Union, p. 46-
52, testify especially in relation to the burden of proof and the development
risk defence.
810 Objectives are formed when the doctrines are applied to specific factual
situations in court cases. The policy objective of liability rules can then be
found from the purposes to which the liability doctrines are used. Thus, they
could be used to influence secure software development. Since the court cases
are lacking, no specific context based policy objective have formulated in
limiting the right to liability, and minimizing possibilities to actually
receive compensation809. This conflict of interest hindered the
approval of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) and its
implementation in Member States, and still continues to hinder the
development of product liability rules towards more effective
regulation. 
The objectives of correction and deterrence are common to
objectives of liability rules in general. They concern the variety of cases
to which the liability provisions apply. Of the laws and doctrines
themselves, no specific objectives in relation to specific policy areas
such as secure software development can be identified. The goal that
product liability regulation under special, contract or tort law pursues
naturally is not directly secure software development. However, due
to wide application of the rules to multiple occasions, it can be used
to tackle also the societal problem of insecure software. The above
mentioned strength of private law regulation in relation to the absence
of explicit policy justification enables the rules to be interpreted in
accordance with the objective of secure software development810. 
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relation to secure software development and the discussion in here is pure
speculation of the writer.
811 Warsta, Contracting in Software Business, p. 182.
812 This might be the case in many of the end-user license agreements directed
at consumers, even though no generalization can be made. Whether or not
behaviour is opportunistic and against good faith doctrines depends on case by
case decision-making. However, when either side of the contracting parties is
drafting the terms alone, it should be kept in mind that the expectation of
opportunistic behaviour is more easily made.
One of the goals of these general private law liability rules can be
formulated to achieve a situation where citizens, consumers, and
organisation can use non-damaging products and know the possible
risks involved in the use of the products that contain acceptable
vulnerabilities that are not feasible to remove (e.g., in the case where
the user is in a more cost-efficient situation to take precaution). In
this way it also contributes to the general quality and safety of
products. Thus, also the security of software could be formulated into
the background of product liability rules even though their objective
is more general (i.e., related to the overall quality of all products and
safety of users).
The objectives of those drafting the software contract templates
become essential due to the extensive dispositive nature of the legal
duties to disclose, i.e., the rules establishing the duties to disclose can
be contracted otherwise. Fixed standard software templates are widely
used in COTS business, instead of widely negotiable templates
characterising tailored and MOTS software businesses, especially in
the end-user licensing811. These fixed templates used reflect a major
legal source according to which the standards for product liability
are evaluated. The contractual practices visible in them override the
dispositive default private law rules as legal sources.
When the templates are drafted by one of the contracting parties,
they typically represent the objectives of the enterprise that drafted
them812. This raises the opportunity to strive for better legal status
compared to the weaker contracting party who basically faces the
option of accepting the terms or not making the contract. The
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813 Wilhelmsson, Vakiosopimus, p. 31-32.
814 Even though industrial buyers are in a better informational position to
evaluate the products and vendors claims than consumers, they still are at the
mercy of the vendor largely due to the lack the means (not only are white-box
methods largely unavailable, but also the tools for testing even on the
situation might be the same even when the standard terms are drafted
by an industrial organisation representing only either of the contracting
parties, with the nuance of meaning that the branch, instead the single
firm, might strive for a better legal status. Even when agreed
documents are used that are drafted bilaterally by the representatives
of both contracting parties or even by all representatives of the
industry multilaterally, it does not necessarily mean that the interests
of both parties are considered. The power relations and expertise of
parties define the content of the agreed documents to a degree.813
Disparity of wealth especially in the case of consumers and the
possible strong market position of the COTS software vendor also
partly explain the use of such clauses. This can influence the license
terms in ways that make them less favourable for the users; especially
when the customers do not have the capacity (information and
expertise) to negotiate above the standard contracts. However, this
unequal bargaining power argument does not fully explain the use
of standard form contracts with extensive liability disclaimers and
exclusion clauses in the COTS software business. Standard form
contracts are used more widely in software business than the theory
of inequality of bargaining power suggests. Similar standard form
contracts are also used between businesses with relatively equal
bargaining power.
The normal legal presumptions of approximate equality of bargaining
power and comparable sophistication in evaluating benefits and risks
might not be correct in the context of software security. A typical
purchaser (even industrial), excluding only the largest industrial buyers
that have the resources to use the expensive and scarce expertise,
is only slightly more experienced than a consumer and should not
thus be treated as having sufficient information for rational decision-
making on costs of software vulnerabilities814. The unequal bargaining
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developer side are relatively undeveloped and not in wide use) and financial
resources to evaluate the products security (high costs involved).
815 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 232.
816 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 232.
power argument explains the use of extensive liability disclaimers
and exclusion clauses in standard form contracts only partially. It
might be correct in relation to software security and other credence
characteristics of software, but not in relation to other quality aspects.
In addition to the superior bargaining power, also the potential
to exploit the market failure for contract terms raises the opportunity
to strive for better legal status from that provided by the default terms.
Consumers are unlikely to extend their search for goods beyond price
and quality comparisons. In most cases buyers are unlikely to analyse
standard form contracts in order to make comparisons. Instead, the
software contract (titled typically as a license) is approved together
with the installation of the software product without further
consideration of the meaning of the contract terms (outside possible
anecdotal knowledge of their total exclusion of liability). Vendors can
then take advantage of this market failure by promulgating a standard
form containing small print exclusions and disclaimers of liability,
which, if interpreted literally, almost relieve them of any obligations
under the contract. Even though this can happen even between
businesses when there is no time to analyse the meaning of contractual
clauses in detail, not even the software business as a whole is likely
to be that hasty.
As Hugh Collins notes, standard form contracts certainly reduce
transaction costs and are useful in permitting organisations to regulate
their business relations in ways that take into account the peculiarities
of the business815. The transaction cost reducing explanation combined
with the efficient governance structure argument is the most pervasive
reason why standard form contracts are used. However, it has to be
kept in mind that it is only one of the reasons. 
Following Collins, mass contracts provide an efficient governance
structure816. They permit organisations to regulate their business
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817 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 232.
818 Actually most of the contract and tort law rules could be applied to liability
for software defects as the year 2000 problem showed (Hemmo, Vuoden 2000
ongelma ja siviilioikeus [The year 2000 problem and civil law], p. 18).
relations in ways which economize on transaction costs. Even though
standard form contracts also might be an expression of exploitation
of market failures for contract terms or unequal bargaining power,
the starting point is that there are valid reasons for their use. They
become objectionable only when in the context of the absence of a
market for contract terms and the absence of competition for fair
complaint mechanism817. In these instances, it becomes objectionable,
because the standard form is used to redistribute power relations in
ways which permit oppressive post-breach bargaining situations.
5.3.2  Substance
Due to the variety of norms on which product liability rules derive
from, the substance of product liability regulation can be manifold.
The various laws and court cases in contract, tort or specific product
liability rules that establish quality and security standards in law are
primarily voluntary and supplement standards in contracts. These
model set of rules provide the detail of the regulation in the absence
of express contractual terms. Mandatory standards define the
substance of product liability in consumer protection legislation.
Due to the huge variety of rules that set the substance of product
liability rules818 and their large contextual variation under different
types of contracts, the influence of the different standards are not
analysed in detail. However, the centrality of the different standards
for the influence that the product liability rules can provide for the
behaviour of the software developers and the users of the software
in question must be acknowledged. Different bases for liability under
the various rules (negligence or strict liability with several differing
excuses and defences), which differ even in the partially harmonised
EU products liability regime, can produce a huge variety of possible
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819 A short overview on the incentives for precaution and for the amount of
doing the potentially harmful activity created under various bases of liability
under tort law is provided by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen in Law and
Economics, p. 300-313. A short overview of the wide U.S. literature is provided
by Daughety and Reinganum in Product safety, p. 1191-1193.
820 White, An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence
Rules in Accident Law, p. 308-309. Such an analysis would be too complicated
and heavy since a detailed analysis would require going through all the various
rules and their associated excuses and defences together with their damage
calculations rules. Such an analysis would be feasible only if we were searching
for the most efficient rules. Since this is not the purpose of this research, the
analysis concentrates on the capabilities of liability rules to influence secure
software development, the detailed analysis of the ways various liability rules
influence behaviour can be left for further studies. Only the possibility of
liability rules to influence secure software development is analysed. A basic
understanding of the ways liability rules influence behaviour is sufficient
without a deep analysis of all the possible variants. Analysis concentrates on
liability law as a system.
821 As Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 226, note in relation to contract
law, different remedies create different incentives for the parties to a contract.
822 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 226.
effects as economic analysis of the law has shown819. However, when
even the mass of theoretical economic research cannot fully agree
on the effects of various liability rules and empirical evidence on them
is scarce, as Michelle J. White points out while trying to empirically
test both comparative and contributory negligence rules in U.S.
accident law, a detailed analysis of several liability rules simultaneously
would become too laborious for a study where the purpose is not
to analyse the effects of liability rules as such820.
For the same reasons the varying remedies available for plaintiffs
in tort and contract law actions, such as monetary damages, and
specific performances like repair of defective good, reduction of price,
withdrawal of a contract, are not analysed separately even though
their use influences behaviour in different ways as economic theory
has shown821. Of the different remedies available in product liability
cases, the emphasis in here is primarily on the liability for damages
also in the case of a breach of a contract. The differences between
alternative legal traditions might be greater in theory than in practice
due to different legal systems of law responding to the same economic
logic as Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen suggest822, but variations
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823 The openness of the interpretations of the applicability of sale of goods and
specific consumer product liability rules, the confusion about the relationship
between license contracts and contracts of sale and the differences in the
treatment of COTS, MOTS and tailored software, are still present in many
jurisdictions even though some progress has been made even in Finland since
1999 when Mika Hemmo in Vuoden 2000 ongelma ja siviilioikeus [The year
2000 problem and civil law], p. 17, emphasized the confusion in relation to the
Y2K problem.
are still so large that simultaneous analysis in a study concentrating
on the capabilities to influence rather than on effects and efficiency
alone is overly burdensome and would require reliance on original
application of economic research methods to a non-feasible degree.
Contracts make explicit in most detailed way the substance of the
product liability rules. They are the primary legal source in relation
to COTS software. However, a regulatory analysis has to start from
the dispositive default rules. In order to understand the efficacy of
regulation by liability rules it is not possible to bypass the initial legal
positions and default rules of liability made explicit by legislators and
long line of court praxis. It is these default rules that the contracts
typically strive to alter. Understanding the role of the standards set
in contracts is not possible without first analysing the capabilities of
default allocation of risks in typically dispositive default contractual
or tortious liability rules in regulating behaviour.
Applicability to software. The default rules that form the background
of product liability contain several uncertainties823. Already the
coverage of product liability rules is problematic in relation to
software. There is no certainty of whether especially the liability rules
for defective products in general contract and specific product liability
laws as such apply to any type of software. Without going deeper into
the several and widely discussed uncertainties, that still remain largely
unsolved in many jurisdictions, like whether and which kind of
software is a good/product as defined under these norms, and whether
the contract for software purchases is a license for use or sale where
the ownership is transferred (critical for the applicability of the sale
of good provision), a basic starting-point that they do apply to COTS
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824 For wider discussions about the complexities of applying liability rules in the
information technology sector in general see, e.g., the analyses of Mats Bryde
Andersen in IT-retten, especially chapter 18, and in Edb og ansvar.
825 The applicability has been typically accepted also in cases where the
software is sold as part of hardware (e.g., in a cd-rom), is necessary for the
functioning of the hardware (e.g., operating systems), or used to control some
other product (embedded software).
826 For a recent and a wider overview of these issues see, Lloyd, Information
Technology Law, chapters 26-27 (concentrating on the law of United Kingdom).
827 Mononen, Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 104–105 and 107; Wilhelmsson and
Rudanko, Tuotevastuu, p. 79–81.
software is accepted824. 
Of the types of market driven embedded and COTS software that
are the subject of this study, the applicability of product liability rules
is unquestionable in relation to embedded software825. In relation to
COTS software in general and especially other software than operating
systems (application software) there still are open questions especially
in relation to the license for use and contract for sale distinction that
is considered necessary for the application of contractual and specific
product liability rules. However, the tendency seems to be towards
wider application of both the sale of goods and product liability rules.
COTS software is increasingly being considered as a good. Traditional
reluctance of accepting the provision of software as a sale of goods
by stating that it actually is a supply of service or license for use, which
are not covered by product liability rules in general contract and
specific product liability rules, is vanishing in relation to COTS
software.826
Note that in Finland, recent commentaries on product liability still
seem to favour the interpretation that the rules in the Finnish Product
Liability Act (694/1990) apply to software that is delivered in a cd-
or a dvd-rom, or is bought together with the computer containing
the software, but do not apply to software that is delivered over
networks or is installed by the supplier during a visit in the customer’s
premises827. Such an interpretation leads to a spurious division in the
liability for software defects. The mode of delivery of software ought
not to be the decisive factor in considering the standard by which
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828 In consumer contracts for tangible items it typically is not possible, whereas
for contracts concerning the supply of service the exclusion of liability is more
easily allowed.
829 This has been pointed out in 2005 by two practitioners of UK law, Dominic
Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan in Who Should Bear the Cost of Software
Bugs?, p. 56.
the software will be judged (e.g., whether it is some type of a
satisfactory quality/fitness for purpose test in contractual liability law
for tangible items, or some type of a statutory requirement on the
supplier to use reasonable skill and care as in the contractual liability
for the supply of services). Neither should the mode of delivery impact
the possibility of excluding liability for failing to meet that standard828.
At least it ought not to weigh more than the business model in use
or the way development is done. However, this peculiar situation exists
in the private law of a number of European countries (e.g., Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Spain and the UK) beside Finland and even more
generally than just in product liability law829.
It is not necessary to go deeper into this extensive and still largely
unresolved discussion about the final applicability of sale of goods
and product liability rules on software. For the purposes of this study
the important thing is the influence of this uncertainty in the
application of the rules to software to the incentives these rules
provide. This is discussed later on.
When the basic starting point that product liability rules both in
consumer and enterprise relationships apply to the COTS software
vendors in general similar to producers of every types of goods is
accepted, it becomes feasible to study the liability as regulatory
instruments in relation to secure software. You do not even need to
accept this basic starting point, i.e., that definitions of a defect in sale
of goods and product liability laws directly apply to software, in order
see the usefulness of such a regulatory study. There is a strong
argument that these rules provide analogical value when considering
the qualitative requirements of software. For example, the rules on
sale of goods are considered as basic general principles of all types
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830 Of such argumentation in Finland, see Takki, Vuosi 2000 –tietojärjestelmät
ja vastuut yrityksen näkökulmasta, p. 37, footnote 10; and in Sweden, see
Lindberg and Westman, Praktisk IT-rätt, p. 271. Similarly also in Bradgate,
Beyond the Millennium, heading 4, first paragraph, in relation to the laws of
the United Kingdom.
831 See page 298 above.
832 As Mathias Reimann notes in Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 150-151,
pure economic loss is not available in strict product liability in most countries.
833 When only damages to consumer property are covered, the importance of
the Product Liability Directive and implementing legislation is typically limited
only to damages to persons. For example, if embedded software (in a medical
device or a complex tool) causes physical damage to an employee, which in
turn results in costs for the employer, can the Directive be applicable also in
commercial relations. However, these cases are typically covered by accident
insurances and compensation is sought from them instead of product liability.
In these cases the regulatory capacity of specific product liability laws are of
course stronger. But this does not change the situation for the main stream
COTS software vendor whose products are not used in such critical functions
that can lead to damages to persons.
of contracts and thus provide guidance830.
Damages covered. Even when the application of product liability rules
to COTS software is accepted, the scope of the rules still limit the
regulatory capability of these rules towards secure software
development. As already pointed out, the consumer product liability
rules based on the EC Directive (85/374/EEC) are limited only to
death, personal injuries, or damages to property (other than the
defective product itself) that is intended and mainly used for private
use or consumption831. Thus damages to other (non-consumer use)
property and pure economic losses that have no relation to damages
to person or property are not covered832. When the largest damages
that result from vulnerabilities are typically economic in nature (e.g.,
loss of income due to downtime in service caused by an attack abusing
vulnerability in the software used) and are directed towards economic
property such as computer equipment, most cases of damages
resulting from misuse of security-related vulnerabilities are excluded
under the directive833. However, under tort and contract law also
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834 The rules and presumptions of the conformity of consumer goods with the
contracts has been minimum-harmonised by Directive 1999/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 7.7.1999, pp.
12-16.
835 Note that damage to files and data inside a computer does not fall into the
property damages category without difficulties. However, damage to data
inside a computer has been compensated as property damage for example in
Denmark, as reported by Egeskov and Christensen in Behovet for forsikring af
softwareproducentens mulige erstatningansvar, p. 59, in 2003. This is noted
also by Thomas Wilhelmsson and Matti Rudanko in Tuotevastuu, p. 231.
836 At least in the Finnish doctrine, the division between direct and
consequential damages has less significance in tortious (non-contractual)
relations. As pointed out by Wilhelmsson and Rudanko in Tuotevastuu, p. 214,
consequential damages are compensated with similar conditions as direct
damages as long as they have a relation to damage to persons or property.
damages to commercial property are typically covered, excluding the
sale of consumer goods laws834, and in contract law also the economic
losses are compensated relatively widely with extensive national
differences even in Europe.
It is important to note that not all damages resulting from defective
(insecure) software are purely financial in nature and thus have limited
recoverability especially under the Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC). To the degree COTS software and data as such are
accepted to be products also under the Directive, the damages more
easily have a relation to property; also to other property than the
defective software itself835. This is the case, for example, when
defective software allows a virus or a worm to erase the user’s hard
drive. 
In these cases the division between direct and consequential
(indirect) damages becomes relevant in contractual relations836, since
the economic damages resulting from the defective software typically
have a relation to property (i.e., the software and the data in the hard
drive). Direct damages like the value of the lost data, costs of restoring
from a backup copy or otherwise replacing it, the decrease in the value
of the data (e.g. due to its lost reliability) or the time directly related
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837 In Finland, for example, the liability for direct damages in contractual
situations is typically based on control liability, which is a non-negligence based
liability where the vendor has the burden of proof in relation exemptions of
liability; i.e., the vendor has to show that the cause for the defect was outside
its sphere of influence and that it could not have been required to consider the
defect when drafting the contract within reasonable limits, or that it could not
have avoided or overcame the consequences, in order to be exempted from
liability. Liability for indirect (consequential) damages is, instead, typically negligent
based. There are, however, in the Finnish contractual liability doctrine rules on
the burden of proof that bring the liability for indirect damages close to the
control liability applied to direct damages. For example, presumptive liability,
which is culpability (liability based on negligence) based on reversed burden of
proof is common in contractual relations; in order to be exempted from
liability the vendor has to show that it has acted diligently or, alternatively, that
it has not been negligent. The vendor can under presumptive liability rule also
plead to certain causes of defects that are in its sphere of influence, but the
results of court decision rarely differ.
838 Even though such losses can be recoverable under general law of torts, it is
important to note that under the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EC) they
are not. When the Directive allows the recovery only for damages to consumer
use property (damages to other property than the defective product itself that
is intended and mainly used for private use or consumption) the losses from
downtime of business activity caused by damage to business assets do not fall
under the scope of the directive. Under the Directive, relevant pure financial
losses could appear, e.g., when an existing vulnerability that not yet has caused
any damage has to be repaired. Similarly in Wilhelmsson and Rudanko,
Tuotevastuu, p. 212.
to the error correction are more easily recoverable837. However, they
are typically relatively insignificant when compared to the loss of
income due to the downtime of the service or other consequential
damages like poor performance due to IT trouble and loss of
confidence towards the IT system, loss of image or the reduction of
the stock price of the company due to the loss of personal data being
published838.
Vague standard. In the formulation of standards for guiding participants
in markets, private law regulation in general suffers from the structural
weakness of setting standards with an adequate degree of specificity
in order to provide effective guidance. As is typical for private law
regulation, the default rules and compulsory terms about product
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839 This is emphasised by Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 293-294, in
relation the contractual regulation of quality. Of the benefits and disadvantages
of openly formulated rules in general, see Tala, Lakien vaikutukset [The Effects
of Legislation], p. 188-196.
840 As Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 49, note in
discussing the possibility of more precise definition of the concept of “defect”
in EC Product Liability Directive “it is better not to attempt to define the
concept with too much precision, not least because this could restrict the
ability of judges to deal with matters on a case-by-case basis.”
841 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of
laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member States concerning
liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33, amended by
directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21.
842 This is not the only way to define defectiveness. The external test used to
decide whether or not a product is safe enough that prevails in the United
States is called risk-utility analysis. It renders a product defective if its risks
outweigh its utilities. The question then is whether the product could have
been made safer without unduly impairing its utility. The feasibility of a safer
alternative design thus becomes crucial. As Mathias Reimann in Product
Liability in a Global Context, p. 139-140, notes, the vast majority of
liability describe open-textured and general standards. These cannot
inform participants in market of what is required, so they prove an
inapt tool of guidance839. This is so especially in relation to the required
security level of products.
Even though the lack of specificity diminishes the directive force
of private law rules, it must be noted that their open-textured
formulation is a necessity. This is due to the application of private
law rules to various and changing circumstances. The use of abstract
and general rules enables private law to persist over long periods of
time without major changes. Via interpretation the rules can be applied
to changing policy objectives.840
The standard is made most explicit in specific product liability rules
such as the EC Directive on Product Liability (85/374/EEC)841.
According to article 6 of the Directive a product is considered to be
defective “when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect”. The basis for liability is thus insufficient safety
and security which are defined according to objective expectations
test where all circumstances are taken into account842. More specificity
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jurisdictions with a special product liability regime are in line with the
European model and thus rely on reasonable consumer expectations rather
than employ a cost-benefit analysis. According to Reimann, Product Liability in
a Global Context, p. 140-141, most jurisdictions in the world have followed
the approach that once dominated in the United States (consumer expectations
test under the Second Restatement of Torts in 1966 which was later changed
into a more differentiated cost-benefit like approach due to the influence of
the Law and Economics schools in the Third Restatement) and is now an
crucial element of the European model. 
This refinement to the definition of defectiveness in the U.S. doctrine has not,
however, gone unnoticed in Europe. Questions concerning whether or not it is
appropriate for the courts to undertake a risk/benefit analysis when assessing
what a person is entitled to expect, and the extent to which the actual conduct
of a producer (such as the degree of care taken, or not taken) is relevant in this
context, have arisen in case law but have not yet been finally resolved by the
courts in any EU Member State (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European
Union, p. 48). As Wilhelmsson and Rudanko, Tuotevastuu, p. 158, point with
references to U.K. and German legal literature, these tests might differ only in
style rather than in content.
843This became evident also in relation to the Millennium Bug as is visible in
the many articles and presentation. See, e.g., Geraint Howells, The Millennium
Bug and Product Liability, p. 300-3001. Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the
European Union, p. 48, also refer to the incapability of precisely defining
“defectiveness” under the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) and
note the similar problems in relation to the concepts of "negligence" and
"fault" that have always escaped precise definition under national liability
systems.
844 This clarification is made explicit in the preamble of the Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC).
is provided by the examples of the circumstances that, among other
things, have to be considered. These include also the presentation
of the product, which brings the duties to disclose explicitly into the
standard as noted above, its expected usage, and the time when it was
put into circulation. However, the standard still remains relatively
vague and open to interpretations843.
The criterion for defectiveness in the Directive (“lack of safety”)
differs substantially from the “lack of fitness for purpose or use” and
other similar formulation that play a role in determining a breach of
contractual obligations in the case of defective products844. Whereas
the criterion of fitness for purpose and other similar constructions
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845 According to the article 12 the liability arising from the Directive may not,
in relation to the injured party, be limited or excluded by contract. Of this see
Wilhelmsson, Social Contract Law and European Integration, p. 57.
846 This “maximal harmonisation” approach has been confirmed in recent ECJ
cases Mariá Victoria Gonzáles Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA, Case C-
183/00 [2002]; Commission v France, Case C-52/00 [2002]; and Commission
rely heavily on the terms of the contract between parties, in product
liability law the lack of safety is considered on objective grounds. This
means that even if a product lacks in safety or security, it necessarily
is not defective under contractual rules. Defectiveness in contract
law neither necessarily means that a product is insecure or not safe.
Liability is based on whether or not it is fit for purpose and insecurity
of a product does not necessarily mean that fitness for purpose is
lacking. Security and safety is not given a similar role in contractual
liability as it is in delictual product liability. 
This emphasises the importance of the safety expectations of the
consumers in relation to the possible personal injuries or damages
to private property resulting from defective products. It does not,
however, mean that the criterion of fitness for use in the default rules
on sale of goods could not establish expectations for the safety of
the products. There still are in member state laws doctrines in contract
that create possibilities for injured parties to claim damages in similar
situation than those covered by the EC Product Liability Directive
(1985/374/EC).
Even though the European Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC) primarily relates to tort law, it affects contract law
to the extent that national law has previously dealt with product
liability problems as part of contract law, and the rules of the directive
are mandatory under contract law845. However, the directive
harmonises the national rules only to a certain degree. The option
of using other liability systems beside the Directive is explicitly stated
in article 13. The Directive does not seek full harmonisation and
national systems are allowed to the degree they do not depart from
the terms of the directive by imposing higher obligations for vendors
or by creating higher levels of protection for consumers846. 
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v Greece, Case C-154/00 [2002].
847 This has been pointed out by Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European
Union, p. 15-16.
848 These situations will be discussed later on in relation to the contractual
practice in the COTS software business.
849 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 16-18.
Under these considerations it is not surprising that, despite the
harmonisation by the Product Liability directive, there still are in each
member state systems of extra-contractual liability for the recovery
of compensation by injured persons. In almost all member states the
law of contract plays a role, with significant national variations, in
the contractual remedies available and types of damages recoverable
in product liability cases.847
General contractual liability doctrines for defective products
especially in consumer contracts, but also in commercial contracts,
at least implicitly also assume the criterion of safety. Even when
overlooking the relatively obvious cases where the contracts explicitly
or by interpretation provide that the software must be free from
security related defects to a certain degree, or where information on
the security (especially quality aspect) of the software is given in the
marketing or other pre-purchase information848, when the breach of
contract can be analysed in relation to these explicit stipulations and
information provided, the default rules on defectiveness in contract
law apply to vulnerable products to the degree users in general can
expect certain quality and security from them. However, the basis
for liability, circumstances in which contractual remedies are available
even for the consumer, and the types of damages recoverable, vary
significantly between Member States849.
As Meltzer, Freeman, and Thomson summarise in gathering the
reports of national experts in product liability, in most Member States
there is generally a requirement of fault or an element of “bad faith”
that gives rise to contractual liability, but in countries like UK and
Ireland the basis for contractual liability is strict in the sense that there
is no requirement that the breach be attributable to the fault of the
Regulating Secure Software Development346
850 Meltzer, Freeman, and Thomson, Product Liability in the European Union, p.
17-18.
851 This has been shown by Thomas Wilhelmsson in Köprätten och
produktansvaret, p. 627-642, and is noted also in a recent EU-study on product
liability by Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 16.
852 This has been noted also by Meltzer et al. in Product Liability in the European
Union, p. 18.
853 Almost all EU Member States provide a mechanism under a system of non-
contractual (tort) liability by which injured persons, who can prove that they
were injured as a result of the neglect of the producer, may be able to recover
most or all of their material damages and, in most cases, recover non-material
damages as well (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 19). The
defendant850. 
In most civil law jurisdictions in the EU, the seller will be liable only
where she knew, or should have known, that the product was not
in conformity with the contract. Even the extent of knowledge
expected from a seller does vary between Member States. For
example, courts in France and Luxembourg usually expect a
professional seller to be aware of all defects, while a seller in Austria
or Germany is not necessarily under a general obligation to examine,
and thus be aware of any defects in the products she sells. In Nordic
countries the liability for unsafe products has evolved firstly through
legal usage and mainly through non-contractual (tort) law rules and
later through special product liability acts. However, the contractual
liability rules still are applicable to product liability cases, even though
their role is limited in the Nordic countries and subject to significant
national differences even in the relatively homogenous Nordic private
law doctrines851. 
Even though in most EU countries consumers can generally recover
damages for personal injury or harm to property other than to the
product itself,  in Denmark, for example, compensation for damage
to property other than to the product itself, or to a product in which
it is incorporated, is usually not recoverable under contract law. In
Finland and Sweden, such compensation is recoverable only in limited
circumstances852.
In non-contractual (tortious) liability rules where the standard for
conduct is often explicated in the form of a negligence rule the
vagueness is even larger853. For example, when the required level of
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extra-contractual liability rules define the liability for damages in cases where
there is no contract between the injurer and the injured party. As the EU study
conducted by John Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thomson, Product
Liability in the European Union, p. 19, show, in most Member States tort law
requires that the defendant is at fault, or in breach of some general duty to the
claimant. In some jurisdictions, this element is described in terms of
unlawfulness or culpability. In others, it is understood in terms of a breach of a
duty of care.
854 The importance of this distinction has been raised by Meltzer et al. in Product
Liability in the European Union, p. 48. Even though this difference might seem
large at first, when the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) refers to
the expectations of a person and allows development risk defence, negligence
like considerations creep in and the directive only purports to impose true
strict liability in principle as Mathias Reimann notes in Product Liability in a
Global Context, p. 141-142, on the basis of an analysis of product liability rules
worldwide published in 2003.
855 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 59.
care is explicated in such vague terms as in the Finnish Tort Liability
Act (412/1974) chapter 2 section 1 subsection 1 (“A person who
deliberately or negligently causes injury or damage to another shall
be liable for damages, unless otherwise follows from the provisions
of this Act”) the factors that need to be considered in order to define
the level of care are even less explicit and wider than in general
contract or consumer contract law or in consumer product liability
laws. Whereas the traditional fault-based principles of liability in most
jurisdictions focus on the conduct of the defendant, the principle of
liability under the Product Liability Directive and typically also under
contract law focuses on the characteristics of the product, and
specifically whether the product contained a defect that caused the
damage854. 
As Collins points out in relation to contract law, the standards
provided by private law regulation can become more specific when
applied by private ordering (contracting) and adjudication855. For
example, guidance to the interpretation of the concept of “defect”
in the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) could be
provided by increasing experience of use of the Directive in litigation
and consequent emerging body of case law as expected by John
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856 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 49. They also expect
that some aspects of the concept of "defect" will come to be clarified in due
course by the European Court of Justice.
857 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 81. This is especially due to the self-
perception of private law adjudication being that it concerns the resolution of a
dispute rather than the regulation of a market by setting a standard (Collins,
Regulating Contracts, p 81). Other cases with slightly different facts cannot be
directly considered to receive the same treatment in a court of law.
858 There is also the danger that the general formulation of a rule can lead to
dissimilar interpretations in courts and in the practice of the objects of
regulation. This causes further problems in analysing the standard of care
required under the law. A further hindrance for the guiding function of the
private law standards has been stated to result from the incapacity of private
law to publicise its standards. According to Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p.
81, “[t]he detailed regulatory standards produces by private law can only be
gleaned from the reports of court’s decisions, which are seldom complete.
These decisions are then only disseminated by uncoordinated private publicity
in the form of books and articles about the law”. However, this analysis
neglects one of the basic arguments made in legal informatics; the use of
information networks has already changed the publication of standards also in
private law. The relative number of cases which come to the attention of the
legal professional through legal dogmatics (i.e., description and prescription of
the law) is diminishing due to the use data systems as Ahti Saarenpää, Court
Decisions as the Focus of Study, p. 128, pointed out at the dawn of legal
informatics in Finland in 1984. For Saarenpää this is a regrettable development
because the only information available in the networks is a bulletin formulated
by the court itself or some other similar brief commentary. As Saarenpää puts
it Court Decisions as the Focus of Study, p. 150: “Researchers who use such
Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thomson in their report for the
European Commission on the updating of the Directive in 2003856.
Even if such court practice would evolve, it could not serve as a
sufficient guide for the market actors. As Collins notes, the standards
produced by case-law tend to be tied so closely to the facts of a
particular case that it is difficult to generalise their application to other
cases857. The standard now becomes so detailed in its application, as
is also the case with specific product related contracts that they cannot
serve as a guide to behaviour in general. Even though it could be
possible to obtain guidance by analogical reasoning from decided
cases, this typically would require the use of an expensive expert
lawyer.858
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cases easily depart from following rules – instead, they only follow cases. The
essential element in legal activity is bypassed”. [Emphasis in the original] 
859 For general contract and tort law rules the preparatory materials can be
relatively uninformative for specific cases, even if they exist, due to their
generality and age.
860 Wilhelmsson and Rudanko, Tuotevastuu, p. 157.
861 Relevant factors can include, in addition to the expected usage of the
products and the information provided in combination with the product and
its use, issues like the expectations of the users, the level of security in the
relevant markets, applicable governmental orders and relevant standards.
862 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 81, emphasises this in the UK national
context and in relation to the contract law.
Further specificity for these general standards in contract, tort and
specific product liability rules is provided in the existing preparatory
materials859, follow-up studies and academic research. As Wilhelmsson
and Rudanko point out in relation to the Product Liability Directive
(1985/374/EC) and its Finnish implementation (Product Liability
Act 694/1990), this material gives relatively detailed guidelines for
the consideration of the security level required by the law860. However,
the guidelines for the consideration of the variety of factors relevant
to the specification of the security standard are so diversified and
complex, and the material to be analysed so extensive, that utilising
them in the security considerations of a specific product still requires
the use of scarce and expensive legal experts that understand the
specificities of the software industry861.
This means that even though the product liability rules inform both
the vendors and the users that the good must be as secure as the users
in general can expect (reasonable secure in their ordinary uses) or alike,
any further detail requires the use of expensive advice of expert
lawyers from the specific national jurisdictions in question to gather
any useful guide about the requirements of the standard862. And still,
the meaning of this requirement in practice remains for the courts
in isolated decisions to specify in the final end. The objects of
regulation have difficulties in recognising and anticipating the
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863 These problems are somewhat eased by the tendency to attach the
consideration of the standard of care to cost-benefit analysis. Instead of
negligence consideration being purely based on written norms and deriving its
substance from the considerations of relevant laws and other regulations, court
cases (especially precedents), instructions and recommendations given by
officials, market practices and internal guides of firms etc., the standard of care
is increasingly being established on the basis of some sort of a cost-benefit
analysis. This is so even under the EC Product Liability Directive that explicitly
establishes a consumer expectations approach to the analysis of the required
safety level. As Thomas Wilhelmsson and Matti Rudanko note in Tuotevastuu, p.
158, with references to studies on UK and European product liability, any
liability test short of absolute liability could be perceived as ultimately cost-
benefit based. Under this approach, a well performed and documented cost-
benefit analysis for each possible vulnerability and threat could inform the
vendors of the appropriate behaviour. However, there is among the legal
experts certain reluctance to accept such a cost-benefit approach that strives
for economic efficiency and, at minimum it typically is combined with moral
considerations. Of this reluctance in the Finnish tort law doctrine, see the
analysis of Mika Viljanen in Ihmisen identiteetti ja tuottamusarviointi, p. 440-6.
864 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union.
requirements set for their behaviour863. 
The specificity of the guidance provided by liability rules is further
hindered by the various legal categories with differing backgrounds
that form the basis for liability. When the liability can be based on
contract, tort and specific product liability laws, and their content and
interpretation varies even between relatively homogenous and partially
harmonised EU product liability laws as the EU study on product
liability conducted by John Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan
Thomson in 2003 make explicit864, the effectiveness of liability rules
in steering behaviour is seriously hampered. When delivering software
to a multitude of jurisdictions, few companies can afford to buy
expertise from such a high number of lawyers as the ex ante analysis
of the standard of care and the extent of liability would require.
Impoverished sanctions. The expressive effect of product liability rules
is seriously hampered by the vagueness of the standard. But neither
does the external constraining, which is attributable to the additional
costs incurred by the sanctions attached to the breach of the product
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865 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 90-91.
liability rules survive without serious impediments from the substance
of the rules. The effects that the threat of legal sanctions can cause,
depends in part upon their strength. As Hugh Collins explains in
relation to the regulation of contracts, the private law system of
regulation in general suffers from the structural weakness of
impoverishment with respect to penalties for violations of the rules865.
This seriously hampers the external influence mechanism that product
liability rules have in theory.
“Liability to pay damages in order to compensate for losses caused
by breach of mandatory rules and contractual provisions imposes
a cost on businesses for breach of the rules, and therefore provide
an incentive for compliance. The strength of the incentive depends
upon the measure of liability. Under the traditional perspective of
private law, the measure of damages has almost invariably been
restricted to one of restoration or compensation for provable losses.
This corrective justice measure regards the purpose of the remedy
as one of restoring the balance of the wealth of parties, either as
considered prior to the formation of the contract or damaging action,
or as it would have been after proper performance of the contract.
This narrow policy objective excludes the possibility of setting the
measure of liability at a level designed to achieve an optimum level
of compliance with the regulatory standard.” (Collins, Regulating
Contracts, p. 90-91)
The threats offered by the private law system of liability to pay
compensation for the costs of cure of defects appear minimal. The
sanction imposed by a court in the form of a liability rule provides
little incentive to manufacturers and retailers to reduce defects in
quality and security. However, private law can produce interesting
alternative sanctions to the compensatory liability rule. E.g., the law
can enhance the non-legal sanction of rejection of goods by lowering
the threshold of quality defects that permit rejection. A compulsory
duty to repair faulty goods might also improve the incentives for
compliance. An obligation might be placed upon the manufacturer
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866 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 299. Although private law has the capacity to
alter its remedial sanctions, courts have been reluctant to depart from the
tradition of compensatory damages, as Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 92,
demonstrates in relation to English law. This reluctance derives in part form
tradition, in part from the conception of private law as a system of principles
of corrective justice rather than one of regulation, but also in part form a more
justifiable concern that damages in excess of compensation might produce
overly cumbersome difficulties for conducting business in the form of overly
harsh and unforeseeable liabilities, resulting bankruptcies and huge problems
for the insurance system (i.e., the floodgate argument against the expansion of
liability).
867 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 118.
to repair or replace any defective goods for a period of time after
purchase, with this obligation enforceable by a court order of
compulsory performance backed up by the threat of deterrent
sanctions such as fines.866
In some jurisdictions, penal regulation, particularly in relation to
consumer contracts, provides a more substantial deterrent against
misleading trade practices. Similarly, some jurisdictions such as in
Finland, as discussed above, employ administrative agencies to
monitor and deter unfair contractual practices committed against
consumers. These types of measures seem to be effective on the whole
in deterring the kinds of abuses at which they are directed no doubt
because they address the twin problems of access to justice and the
weakness of sanctions. They control behaviour in the market to a
degree which the ordinary private law compensatory measures of
damages awarded by a court cannot. However, they operate only at
the fringes of markets, deterring overly abusive practices.867
This poverty of legal sanctions and their consequent disability to
influence the decision-making of the software vendors vanishes when
widening the perspective of the costs of legal liability from pure legal
sanctions to cover also non-legal sanctions such as refusal to do
business and damage to reputation. Legal doctrine recognises that
product liability risk is often wider than mere damages or costs due
to specific performances and litigation costs. The economic
consequences of product recall and/or repair and the negative
publicity together with possible shunning by buyers caused by
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868 Mark Geistfeld in Products Liability, p. 362, refers to several studies
examining the impact of prominent product liability lawsuits on stock prices
from more traditional goods than software. They indicate that news stories
reporting on products liability suits significantly decrease a firm’s stock value
and that safety-related administrative actions like product recalls substantially
reduce stock prices. In all of the summarised studies, adverse publicity
concerning product safety costs the firm more due to the reduced stock value
than does the associated liability or recall costs. Similar findings have been
presented also in relation to information system security of organisations by
Cambell et al. in The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced Information
Security Breaches in 2003. They provide evidence of significant negative stock
market reaction for published information security breaches involving
unauthorised access to confidential data, especially personal data and consumer
electronics. Information security concerns have already led to product recalls in
consumer electronics. In Japan 3rd generation mobile phones have been
recalled due to a software flaw enabling third parties to see private information
stored in the devices. According to Yurie Ito from Japanese Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center JPCERT/CC
http://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/ [23.2.2006] the reason for the costly recall
has been the foresight of even more expensive product liability litigation. Yurie
Ito (2005) Vulnerability Trends in Consumer Electronics, unpublished
presentation in Midnight Sun Vulnerability and Security Workshop Retreat, 21st
of June 2005 in Hailuoto, Finland (on file of the author).
869 Note that the non-legal sanctions are, as Hugh Collins emphasises in
Regulating Contracts, p. 114-117, related to the possibilities of market actors
themselves to solve some of the problems related to market failures. But even
though these mechanisms (investment in brand names and other sunk costs,
guarantees etc.) are not enough to solve the market failures, the non-legal
sanctions (provision of negative info etc.) that target the reputation and trust
sought by the self-corrective actions, create central incentives for the vendors.
damaging products can be orders of magnitude larger than mere
damages. These costs, such as the consequent loss in stock value868,
give firms an additional incentive to avoid products liability litigation.
This provides another reason to believe that seller liability would
increase software security.869
Even though these additional costs resulting from the use of non-legal
sanctions are not attributable to the liability rules as such in the form
the normative restriction made in the analysis of the influence
mechanisms required, they cannot be and should not be omitted
altogether in a regulatory analysis. In fact, their influence ought to
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870 As Collins notes in Regulating Contracts, p. 174, legal sanctions for breach of
contract are rarely as important as other informal sanctions such as damage to
reputation. There is also preliminary empirical evidence (e.g., Irlenbusch,
Relying on a man’s word?, and the works cited therein) from experimental
studies that indicate the role of social norms in contracting and that trust,
together with non-legal sanctions, plays a more central role than legal
sanctions. The legal process or any other institution that is respected by the
trading community as an impartial and reliable finder of fact or truth (e.g.,
consumer ombudsman, committee of a trading association or an arbitrator)
does, however, contribute to the imposition of informal sanction. They
function as an organised reputation mechanism collecting and disseminating
what participants in the market regard as reliable information about
trustworthiness. This type of contribution can happen even without ever
invoking the power to impose legal sanctions. The influence upon contractual
behaviour stems instead from the independent reactions of participants in the
market to the authoritative judgements about business reputation issued by
these respected bodies. (Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 123-125)
be considered before legal regulation is introduced. When they are
considered, the role of law diminished in proportion. The direct costs
of legal liability can be marginal in the considerations of producing
secure software compared to these other costs870. This is so despite
the fact that the costs of liability in the case of information goods
like software can be extensive due to the defects existing in every
copy and the liability thus concerning every user.
Currently, these costs have not been foreseeable enough to provide
sufficient incentives for secure software development from the societal
point of view. Patching provides a reasonably low costs alternative
to product recall and repair as has been argued above. Customers have
also tolerated the vulnerabilities due to several historical reasons and
for their lack of capability and information to compare products in
terms of security. Consequently, shunning has not been a real risk
for software vendors, even though the climate is changing. Customer
tolerance of insecurity might be vanishing over time. It remains to
be seen whether this is sufficient to improve the security of software
in a sufficient manner but, as the theoretical considerations presented
above predict, it is not likely to do so to the level sufficient to the
networked society as a whole.
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871 Wilhelmsson, Contribution to a Green Sales Law, p. 282.
872 Even though industrial buyers are in a better informational position to
evaluate the products and vendors claims than consumers, they still are at the
mercy of the vendor largely due to the lack the means (not only are white-box
methods largely unavailable, but also the tools for testing even on the
Of duties to disclose. These considerations of the substance of the wide
legal basis for product liability apply, in addition to the security
standard setting function, similarly also to the effectiveness of these
rules in setting duties to disclose and influencing behaviour by
informative means. However, there are certain specific duty-to-disclose
issues that have to be considered separately. 
Default rules on defectiveness (conformity) essentially are signs
of the market-compliant character of sales-laws measures in the sense
that they provide obligations to inform about the harmfulness of a
product871. However, the duties to inform of safety critical issues are
most forcefully visible in consumer protection rules for the protection
of the weaker party, especially in the consumer product liability rules.
Despite the increase in the duties to disclose under the doctrines of
good faith all over Europe, the duties to disclose even safety
information are still exceptions. The need for the protection of the
informationally weaker party has to be justified separately; no direct
generalisations of the informational market failures in the market
economy can be made.
In consumer protection cases the weaker informational position
is clear. However, also a general obligation to inform about security
related vulnerabilities also in enterprise relations can be supported
as a measure protecting the informationally weaker party. The normal
legal presumptions of approximate equality of bargaining power and
comparable sophistication in evaluating benefits and risks are simply
not correct in the context of software security. A typically purchaser
(even industrial), excluding only the largest industrial buyers that have
the resources to use the expensive and scarce expertise, is only slightly
more experienced than a consumer and should not thus be treated
as having sufficient information for rational decision-making on costs
of software vulnerabilities872.
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developer side are relatively undeveloped and not in wide use) and financial
resources to evaluate the products security (high costs involved).
873 Exceptions are buyers with special needs for security, such as many mission-
critical governmental systems. Many of the big established COTS vendors have
also started to license their source code for security purposes for these
customers.
Buyers’ (including industrial buyers’) possibilities to assess the
vulnerability of the software and to conduct security testing are
reduced. This is not just due to the access to source code issues, but
also due to the diminishing expertise of software development among
information system developers (increased use of components and
outsourcing instead of in-house development). All but the largest and
most capable buyer organizations lack the resources or expertise to
evaluate the security of a software product. Even though the higher
stakes involved for industrial buyers justify measures to avoid the
common information-deficiency problems that consumers face, the
outright unavailability of information on the quality aspects of security
together with the high costs of acquiring it due to the lack of methods
to gather such information, and the underdeveloped state of metrics
in the quality aspect of security, means that not even industrial buyers
have sufficient information for sound decision-making. 
More importantly, no reasonable and knowledgeable person would
expect them to be able to do so. Buyers that search for information
only as much as it is justified on cost-benefit basis and especially in
the case of consumers, where the information acquisition is even more
constrained, cannot be expected to use scarce and expensive experts
to gather information that the COTS software vendors could much
more easily deal with873.
Despite the general duties to disclose vulnerability information
even in enterprise relations on the basis of liability rules, there are
differences in the wide legal basis for products liability in their
obligations for the vendor to find out the harmfulness of the product
and to inform correspondingly. Product liability rules under the EC
Directive (85/374/EEC) not only obligate to provide safety
information that the vendor happens to posses when concluding the
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874 This obligation is most clearly visible in the state of the art –defence
(development risk defence) offered for the vendors as a way of escaping
liability (art. 7(e) of the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC). The vendor
thus has to prove that she under the state of current (at the time of releasing
the product) scientific and technical knowledge was not able to discover the
defect. The degree to which the vendors have to find out the harmfulness of
the product can thus be relatively high in cases where the public at large can be
considered to expect high level of safety. Note that in Finland and
Luxembourg, no such defence is even offered for the vendor, and the
obligation to find out the harmfulness of the product is even higher, i.e.,
product liability is also for those defects that the vendor could not anticipate or
take into consideration at the time of releasing the product.
875 This can be sufficient for the whole industry to start providing complete
information as the basic hypotheses of economic theory predicts. When at
least those above the minimum quality or security disclose, others in the
market also have an incentive to disclose since consumers will rationally
assume that critical piece of information such as its quality will be omitted only
if the value of that attribute for that product is low. Note that the many
informational market failures discussed hinder this as has been argued above.
contract, but also to disclose the information that the vendor ought
to have known (i.e., not just what she knew). The vendor is expected
to know the characteristics of her products and has an obligation to
find out the quality and security of the marketed products874. The
obligation to find out the risks involved with the use of the product
(such as its vulnerability) and to inform correspondingly is less clear
and weaker in general contractual and non-contractual liability rules.
The dispositive nature of general contract and tort law rules affect
the incentives to provide information. Since the buyer cannot claim
as a defect something she was informed about prior to completion
of the contract, the vendor is incited to inform only of the sub-normal
quality or security; i.e., if she does not inform, the buyer can expect
“normal” quality and security from the software under the default
conformity rules875. However, not even sub-normal quality or security
has to be disclosed in order for the vendor to avoid liability under
dispositive default contract law rules on the defectiveness of products.
The vendor can merely state that she does not know whether the
goods are of normal (generally expected quality or security as defined
by the default rules on sales of goods) and if the customer accepts
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876 As Steven Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite in Quality Testing and
Disclosure, p. 334, note with references to similar results made by others, the
announcements of ignorance can be credible if testing or disclosing is costly; in
such cases the vendors are allowed to continue not the test and not to inform
without fear of negative inference by the customers. In the software security
this can be the case due to the high costs involved in the testing for security.
877 Note that this can be socially suboptimal in terms of injurers incentives to
obtain information about risks that she may have engendered. See Shavell,
Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, p. 268.
878 For example, as Riesenhuber argues in Party Autonomy and Information in
the Sales Directive, p. 353, the Sale of Consumer Goods Directive
1999/44/EC (Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 7.7.1999, pp. 12-16) does not impose an
obligation on the seller to examine the goods or have them examined by
competent person before the sale. The seller merely has to tell the consumer
what she knows and what she does not know about the goods. No obligation
to inform about risks that could not be anticipated when releasing the product
considering the state of the art (development risks) is given. Not even risks that
result from the sub-normal safety (is not designed according to the general
safety knowledge of the branch) has to be disclosed; the vendor can merely
state that she does not know whether the goods are of normal quality and
safety and if the buyer accepts this, then this lower standard is accepted even in
EC sales of consumer goods. These default rules are similar to the general
dispositive contract law rules on defective products in national laws.
879 Finnish Sale of Goods Act 355/1987 section 19; Finnish Consumer
Protection Act 38/1978 chapter 5 section 14.
this, then the agreed lower standard is applied876. Thus, no incentive
to acquire information is created; only incentives to disclose the
information she actually or customarily possesses are created877. In
the EU law, this applies even to the sale of consumer goods878. 
The situation is different when, like in the Nordic contract law
doctrine, the general disclaims of application of default defectiveness
(conformity) rules without expressive contractual specifications leads
to the application of the “as is” rules present both in commercial and
consumer contracts879. According to these rules if the goods have been
sold subject to an “as is” clause or similar general reservation on their
quality, the goods shall, nevertheless, be considered defective if the
goods are in essentially poorer condition than the buyer reasonably
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880 Note that the seller’s liability for defectiveness in cases where she failed to
disclose to the buyer facts relating to the properties or the use of goods is
explicitly stated in these provisions (subsections 2 point 2). Additional
conditions for the liability are that the seller could not have been unaware of
the facts (can be expected to know), that the buyer could reasonably expect to
be informed about them, and that the failure to disclose can be presumed to
have had an effect on the contract. These conditions are currently fulfilled at
least in relation to the widely known security related vulnerabilities (like buffer
overflows).
881 Hemmo, Vuoden 2000 ongelma ja siviilioikeus [The year 2000 problem and
civil law], p. 30-31, footnote 46. This is generally accepted at least in the
Finnish and Swedish doctrines as noted by Mika Hemmo in Sopimusoikeus II, p.
123.
882 Since the duty to warn developed in legal practice in Finland covers not only
the information the vendors know, but also what they should have known, the
incentives for vulnerability information acquisitions are optimal in the form
explicated by Steven Shavell in Liability and the Incentive to Obtain
Information about Risk, p. 265 and 268. They provide incentives only in those
cases where the social value of information exceeds the costs of information.
883 Note that information that is provided prior to purchase is more effective
since it allows users to compare products before any lock-in, due to switching
costs, happens.
could expect880. There is even no requirement of essentiality in the
considerations of the poorer quality in consumer contracts. Thus,
in order for the liability for defectiveness to be limited from this “as
is” level, the accepted defects must be explicitly stated881. No general
disclaimer is thus valid and the vendor is incited to acquire information
on the defects to the degree customers can reasonably expect882.
Despite of these vagueness’s in the information gathering and
disclosure inciting provision prior to concluding a contract, all of the
above mentioned rules create duties to inform about the safety of
the product when new relevant information is gained post-sale883. Thus,
the seller has to try to inform the users of the changed harmfulness
of the product, e.g. when someone brings the existence of a
vulnerability to the knowledge of the vendor. However, whether or
not such duty exists when research provides new insights that becomes
known among the professionals in the field depends on whether the
product liability rules, indispositive consumer contract law rules, or
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884 Note that research on the contractual practices and negotiation strategies in
security related issues is scarce. This is why these considerations can be only
tentative at best. The lack of research concerns the contractual practices and
use of contract terms in the software business in general. This could provide an
interesting research area to be taken further.
885  In non-contractual (delictual) relations such disposition are not possible
due to the lack of cooperation part of which the liability could be agreed upon
differently from the default allocations. However, warnings and information
provided about the safety of the product and about the extent of the liability of
the manufacturer can function like contractual liability limitation clauses. For
example, information given about the security of the product and its proper
use can be considered to alter the risk awareness of the user and thus the care
required from her. If the user behaves contrary to the given information, tort
liability can be limited on the basis of contributory negligence or neglect of the
duty to limit the resulting losses. Of this in relation to Finnish law see Hemmo,
Sopimus ja delikti, p. 188-191, and Mononen, Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 173-
174.
dispositive (commercial or consumer) contract law rules apply. There
are also differences in national doctrines.
Contractual practice. The default defectiveness rules in contract and
product liability together with marketing rules and tort law rules seem
to provide incentives both for developing more secure software and
disclosing vulnerability information to the customers. There are
limitations and vagueness’s but by making the assumption that these
rules are applied and effective they seem to provide effects that are
overall beneficial for secure software development. 
However, as already emphasised above, the substance of product
liability especially in the software context is formed in the contracts
and contracting practices of the software business884. Contracting
parties, especially outside specific consumer product liability
regulations such as the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/ EEC)
and national consumer protection acts, are free to agree differently
from the default liability rules established in contract law885. Due to
the dispositive nature of majority of the product liability rules
especially in enterprise relationships, the substance is primarily
determined in contracts. The main norm source for the quality and
security levels that the buyer and user of software has a right to expect
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886 Above, reference was made to the agreement of a lower quality standard
than provided by the default rules in the sales of goods laws. In here,
concentration is on a higher agreed standard which as such provides
information of the quality and security of the product that the buyer can
expect. The vendor is liable if she does not conform to this higher agreed
standard. Such dispositions of the higher standards are possible also under the
EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) even though it prohibits
dispositions about the liability which is lower than what the directive provides.
See article 12 of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the
approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member
States concerning liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33.
887 Note that COTS software typically does not include a detailed specification,
if a written specification of requirements even exists. This is why it may be
difficult to judge whether a bug is in fact a defect entitling the customer to
damages solely by reference to the specification.
888 According to the defect (conformity) rules of Nordic Sale of Goods Acts
(section 18) and similar provision in consumer protection legislation, a product
is defective if it does not correspond with particulars given during its
marketing. Similar provision are present also in the article 2, paragraph 2(a,d)
of the Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 7.7.1999, pp. 12-16 (Sale of Consumer Goods
Directive).
stem from the contracts and complementary marketing information.
The business practice is a secondary source, and the default rules in
sales of contracts regulations apply only if these legal sources are silent
or unclear886.
The problem is that contracts for COTS software are typically silent
about the security level to which the software should conform to and
have for long lacked specific clauses concerning quality
requirements887. Such clauses are not present in typical license
agreements and standard form contracts that emphasise the
disclaiming of all liabilities or at least exclusion of most of them.
Especially in consumer contracts such provisions are close to non-
existent and still rare even in commercial contracts for COTS
software. Neither is information on the (quality aspect of) security
of the software typically given in the marketing or other pre-purchase
information888. This is so despite the rising demand for secure
software.
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889 This is the case for example, in the multilaterally drafted Finnish contract
template IT2000 Terms and Conditions for IT Procurement, YSE General
Terms and Conditions, where section 9 disclaims all liability for any indirect or
For long, customers did not see the need to negotiate such terms
or expect marketing information to raise security issues. Currently,
other than sufficiently big influential actors such as governments and
large international companies do not have the leverage to negotiate
such terms into the standard contracts separately. Even in such
contracts the security related vulnerabilities as credence characteristics
(i.e. they cannot be appropriately assessed even after consumption
or only a long time after that when, e.g., an attack occurs) are likely
to be such defects that fall outside the specifications.
The disposition of the quality and security demands of the products
as such must be separated from the disposition of the liability rules.
In the former case the purpose is to alter the standard to which the
software must conform to. In the liability disclaimers and limiting
clauses the purpose is to shift liability to the contracting party (in the
COTS software context typically to the buyer or user) and to alter
the extent of the liability from that what it could be under the default
rules.
The degree to which liability issues are contracted differently affects
the substance of the product liability rules and changes their regulatory
effects. Here we come back to the above mentioned starting-point
that the default defectiveness rules apply also to COTS software
vendors.
The extensive uncertainty of the applicability of liability rules and
especially their possible extent has led software vendors to use
restrictive liability clauses and disclaimers. Agreeing on liability
differently from the default rules provided especially in contract law
is a central part of contracting particularly in the COTS software
business. The liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses typical in the
software business at minimum restrict liability for consequential
damages (indirect losses) that result from losses of income or
production, losses of processed data etc. and often also limit the
liability to the price of the software or certain ratio bound to it in all
circumstances889.
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consequential damages, and limits the liability for direct damages to 15 percent
of the price of the software. Similar rules are applied to the sale, licensing or
other assignment of rights of use of standard software products under the
section 10 of the IT2000 PTE Terms and Conditions for Small Scale deliveries.
The latter types of disclaimers are especially beneficial for the vendors since
the liability risk cannot expand uncontrollably and the confines of the liability
are known right after the contract has been made. However, the practice of
limiting liability extensively is not special to the software business. As Hugh
Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 228, notes in relation to the standard form
contracts in general: “A closer inspection of the terms of the standard form
contracts usually reveals a pattern in which the risks are allocated routinely to
the buyer by extensive use of disclaimers and exclusion clauses. The effect of
such clauses is that the business retains a discretion under the contract over the
level of quality and security which it will provide, whereas the buyer is bound
to make payment, expect perhaps in the event of complete failure of
performance by the business”.
890 The contractual characteristics of COTS software business have been
empirically studied by Juhani Warsta in 2001, Contracting in Software Business. See
especially page 182 where these characteristics are gathered in a table format.
It is a form of risk management for the vendors. The strategy of
software vendors is to avoid contractual, tortious or specific products
liability by shifting the burden set by default rules to their customers
or to the injured parties. By disclaiming liability the risk of liability
for software defects is managed relatively easily and with low costs
in an international context with large customer base.
The use of clauses limiting the liability of the vendor has been
justified by the peculiarity of the line of business890. The COTS
software business has been considered to have such peculiar
characteristics that it needs special rules of liability.
The reasons for the almost universal use of contractual liability
disclaimers are diverse. First of all, software producers may be
exposed to a greater degree of liability risk than the producers of more
traditional goods. A defect in a software product is likely to exist in
every copy of the software made, dissimilar to traditional industries
where a defect done during manufacture is likely to exist only in some
of the products made. This increases the possible liability costs of
software vendors since they have to answer to every user instead of
just few. 
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891 As Warsta (2001, p. 134, 138 and 212) shows in analysing the contract
process and relationships in the software business, customers (end-users or
system developers) may stay totally unknown to the software company
especially when the application is procured either from the retailer or directly
downloaded from the Internet. The software can be just bought and installed
for use without further cooperation needs. This is the case in other than
delivery channel operations, where relationship especially with the distributors
is closer.
892 Even if the vendor could estimate the risk of such losses, it would have to
charge higher prices from all customers to cover the risk of unusual
consequential losses. The better possibilities of the customers or other injured
parties to limit the risk of consequential damages by setting up firewalls and
using virus-scanners etc. (bilateral precaution) is an argument favouring the
acceptability of contractual provisions excluding liability for consequential
damages in the Finnish doctrine (Hemmo, Vuoden 2000 ongelma ja
siviilioikeus [The year 2000 problem and civil law], p. 18-19).
893 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 291.
The use of liability disclaimers in COTS software business is further
justified by the fact that there are numerous customers and the
relationship with the customer is weak891. This means that the vendor
has little means to evaluate the potential risks especially from
consequential damages due to the variety of unpredictable ways the
product may be used, and the capabilities to avert or limit and insure
against such damages in any cost-efficient manner lies at the
customer892. However, this argument seems unconvincing as noted
by Hugh Collins893. Since the default terms provided only apply to
ordinary uses of the goods, unforeseeable losses are not therefore
recoverable under the liability rule on the ground of remoteness. To
exclude the default terms on satisfactory quality on these grounds
is therefore to protect the vendor against non-existent liability. It is
especially for such reasons mandatory regulation, that sets the quality
provisions as compulsory terms of the contract, requiring the supply
of goods of satisfactory quality in consumer standard form contracts,
has been imposed.
Also the uncertainty of the extent, and difficulties in quantification
and insurance of the typical financial losses resulting from a
vulnerability increase the vendors’ fear of exposure to crippling legal
actions. Especially in the case of distribution of software through
the Internet, where relatively inexpensive products are offered, the
liability disclaimers have been considered to be especially important
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894 Warsta, Contracting in Software Business, p. 187. Note that the price of the
software provided is not just a justification for the use of the limitations of
liability in general, i.e. that risks of relatively cheap but business critical
products causing wide damages are too big for many companies to take. It can
also be an indication for the buyer of the expectations that she can place on
the coverage of liability. This can be seen to limit the liability of the vendor as
such, without explicit liability disclaimers as Mika Hemmo, Vuoden 2000
ongelma ja siviilioikeus [The year 2000 problem and civil law], p. 47, points out
in relation to the Finnish legal system in 1999. The attachment of the
expectation of the buyer partly with the price of the software (i.e., the quality
you can expect depends partly on the price that you pay for the software) also
mitigates the concern expressed about the application of the same liability rules
to the volunteer contributors of open source software who do not get
compensated and do not receive a stream of income with which to purchase
liability insurance. When no fee is required in any form from the use of open
source software, the potential liability of the developers of open source
software is much more limited than the liability of the COTS software vendors.
What this means is that increased liability for security flaws may improve the
security of COTS software, but it may not improve open source security as
pointed out by Fred B. Schneider in Open Source in Security, p. 126-127.
895 We will come back to this liability and innovation discussion in the section
concerning the reactions of objects.
and are typically limited to the price of the software or certain ratio
bound to it in all circumstances894.
The main theme behind these arguments, which is at the same time
one of the most compelling justifications for the use of extensive
liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses, is that they enable
innovation in young markets. Fear of crippling legal actions is
considered to cause vendors not to sell new products that could prove
to be widely useful but also imply significant risks. When new
innovative firms can efficiently minimise the liability risk, they are
more likely to bring new products to the market quicker. Customers
that are willing to take the risk of using possibly unfinished products
can do so and take the possibly highly useful piece of software into
use earlier.895
The liability standards that deviate from the default allocation
provided by law are sometimes drafted separately by the contracting
parties for each transaction, but in the case of COTS software they
have typically been codified into standard contract templates in order
to facilitate the contracting procedure and to save transaction costs.
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896 This is no specialty of the software business. As Collins, Regulating Contracts,
p. 63, explains in relation to regulation of contracting: “Most detailed standards
governing a particular transaction are set by the parties themselves and
described as the terms of the contract. In some instances these standards will
be the result of negotiation, but more typically they will be set by one of the
parties and contained in a standard form contract”.
897 This has recently been pointed out also by two practitioners of UK law,
Dominic Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan in their article on the liability for
software errors from the beginning of year 2005, Who Should Bear the Cost of
Software Bugs?, p. 57, in relation to the legal systems of most EU countries. 
898 Migdal, Shrinkwrap Licenses Abroad, p. 751-753. The different approaches
among the legal systems of EU Member States to the validity of liability
exclusion clauses in general has been pointed out by Christian von Bar and
Ulrich Drobning, Study on Property Law and Non-contractual Liability Law as they
relate to Contract Law, p. 177-178, in their study on the problems and obstacles
for the smooth running of the internal market resulting from differences in
property law, non-contractual (tortious) liability law and contract law in most
of the legal systems of the European Union. The approaches differ both in the
validity of the exclusion of contractual liability and the exclusion of non-
contractual liability.
899 This principle is repeated in basic study books about contractual liability.
For example, Mika Hemmo notes in Vahingonkorvausoikeuden oppikirja, p. 206-
207, the internationality of the principle that the party who has a duty to
perform under a contract cannot receive protection from liability disclaimers
and exclusion clauses from the liabilities resulting from grossly negligent or
It is these fixed software contract templates, characteristic for software
business, which define in most detailed way the substance of product
liability rules896.
The enforceability of these liability disclaimers and exclusion
clauses in shrink- or click-wrap or similar types of standard form
contracts typically used in the software business is a still matter of
dispute897. As the study of Andrea Migdal from 1999 about the
enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses in several jurisdictions show,
jurisdictions have differed substantially on these matters; some
expressly have forbidden liability disclaimers in standard form
contracts, others have generally enforced such licenses, and some with
limitations898. Similarity exist only in that typically the disclaiming of
liability is accepted in courts only to the degree the breach of contract
or duty is not intentional or consequent to gross negligence899.
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intentionally damaging behaviour.
900 This has been pointed out by Trompenaars and Hugenholtz in Formation and
validity of On-Line Contracts, p. 45, with reference mainly to U.S. legal literature
on online-contracts. Such formal requirements include the users awareness of
the existence of the license and that the transaction is subject to it, the users
possibility at minimum to read the license terms before ordering or executing
any download commands and, especially in relation to online licenses, that the
user takes affirmative steps to signify agreement, e.g., by hitting “I Accept”
button or similar.
901 Chandler, Improving Software Security, p. 10.
902 Dominic Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan in their article on the liability for
software errors from the beginning of year 2005, Who Should Bear the Cost of
Software Bugs?, p. 58, point out that at least in IT contracts between two
commercial parties, the Courts in the U.K. have been more reluctant to
invalidate clauses limiting or excluding liability. The Courts’ view is that such
commercial parties will have negotiated a price which reflects the allocation of
risk that has been achieved by the exclusion or capping of liability. Note that in
the case of allocation of security risk this might not be the case primarily due to
the inadequacy of information about the quality aspects of security. For the
reasons presented in section 2.8 above, all but the largest and most capable
buyer organisations lack the resources or expertise to evaluate the security
claims made of a software product. We will come back to this. Callaghan and
O’Sullivan concentrate on the quality aspects and only briefly refer to the
security aspects of software bugs; they do not deal with the special issues of
secure software development and especially not the quality aspects of security.
Internationally the development has for long been leading to wider
acceptance of the standard form terms as part of the contractual
agreement also in the software business, i.e., that the formal
requirements for the inclusion of the standard terms are fulfilled900.
As Jennifer Chandler points out in relation to U.S. and Canadian law
in 2005, “[t]he software purchaser is likely to be bound by these
contractual terms [authors note: disclaiming warranties and conditions,
and clauses either limiting or excluding liability for consequential
damages in end-user license agreements EULAs], and may face a
significant hurdle in convincing a court to set them aside”901. Similar
development has been reported also from the United Kingdom that
has been considered one of the European countries in which the
supplier has been least likely to be able to enforce any clause which
limits or excludes liability902.
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903 Another development is that the unclear standard terms are interpreted to
the detriment of the party who drafted them. Also perfectly valid liability
disclaimers and exclusions clauses in standard form contracts are interpreted
narrowly, i.e., in a way that limits the liability as little as possible. (Hemmo,
Vahingonkorvausoikeuden oppikirja, p. 206; Hemmo, Sopimusoikeus II, p. 75;
Wilhelmsson, Vakiosopimus, p. 55 and thenceforth)
904 See, e.g., Wilhelmsson, Vakiosopimus, p. 88 and thenceforth.
905 The idea behind such “semi-compulsoriness” of dispositive default
contractual rules is that when the legislator or other regulator in the case of
contractual rules (e.g., a court or development through contractual practices in
the market in question) has after thorough preparation enacted statutory rules
to govern certain activity, those rules include an evaluation of what constitutes
equal treatment of the parties in the relations in question. Deviating form such
default allocations that may have significant policy choices behind them by
contractual means is only possible with good justifications. One-sided benefit
at the other party’s expense is not held to constitute appropriate grounds. This
established approach is explained even in the basic introductory texts on
Finnish law like the one written by Juha Pöyhönen in English, The Law of
Obligations, p. 91-92. See also the recent basic textbook on Finnish contract
law written by Mika Hemmo, Sopimusoikeus II, p. 293. Jan Hellner in Lagstiftning
inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 160 explains this approach in relation to the Swedish
contract law.
This is the case also in Finland. However, the legal doctrine in
Finland has reacted to the wider validity of standard form contracts
in general in order to protect the weaker party. One such reaction
is the emphasis of content-based considerations in the conditions
according to which the standard terms become part of the contract903.
In this approach towards the binding force of standard form contract
terms, comprehensive considerations taking into account the
characteristic features and requirements of the type of contract and
the economic activity in question are used instead of formal criteria
such as the manner or form in which the terms are presented904. This
content-based approach is visible especially in the doctrine of
surprising and severe standard terms according to which terms that
significantly increase one party’s obligations in comparison to default
rules in indispositive law or to what is normal and ordinary for the
type of contracts in question have to fulfil more stringent criteria in
order to become binding905.
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906 Main provisions can be found from the EC Directive 93/13/EEC of April
1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Official Journal L 095, 21.4.1993,
p. 29-34.
907 This requires that the court take an explicit consumer protection approach.
Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 35, sets out the influence of doctrinal
coherence as an obstacle in the way of occasional judicial attempts to help
consumers by deleting unfair exclusion clauses. If the courts favour free
markets and the classic principle of the freedom of contract according to
which parties should be free to select the terms of their transactions over
consumer protection considerations, courts would reject the possibility of
striking down exclusions clauses on the ground of unfairness.
908 The wider applicability of provisions that permit judges to invalidate unfair,
unreasonable or unconscionable terms is noted in relation to software also by
Elizabeth MacDonald in Y2K and Contractual Exemption Clauses published
in 1999 in a special feature of the Journal of Information, Law and Technology
concentrating on the Year 2000 problem.
Even though there is a rough consensus that the clauses disclaiming
or excluding liability in software licenses are valid in business relations
due to the reliance on the principle of freedom of contract in most
western countries, their validity in relation to private consumers is
a heavily disputed and controversial issue. A dominant pattern in the
European regulation of standard form contracts issued to consumers
is to employ provisions that permit judges to invalidate unfair,
unreasonable, or unconscionable terms906. This means that if a dispute
with a consumer reaches court, there exists a strong chance that the
fierce exclusion clauses will be declared invalid and not binding on
the consumer. The license terms in shrink- or click-wrap or similar
types of standard form contracts might not be enforced in courts in
relation to private consumers even if they are considered to become
parts of the contracts in a correct way907. 
In certain jurisdictions, such as the Finnish, this applies even to
enterprise relations908. Whereas the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Directive (93/13/EEC) is limited only to standard form
contracts (article 3 of the directive limits application only to
“contractual terms which has not been individually negotiated”) and
applies only to contracts concluded between a consumer and an
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909 Provision on the regulation of contract terms both in the Finnish Consumer
Protection Act (38/1978) chapter 3 and Act on the Regulation of Contract
Terms Between Enterprises (1062/1993) [L elinkeinonharjoittajien välisten
sopimusehtojen sääntelystä] make it possible for the Market Court or even for
the Consumer Ombudsman to forbid enterprises, accompanied with a threat
of a fine, to use contract terms that are considered unfair. Even though the
injunction issued by Market Court does not directly influence the validity of
the unfair terms already in use by the enterprise, neither do the use of such
terms in the future become invalid as such (i.e., the breach of the injunction
leads only to the enforcement of the conditional fine attached to it), it creates a
strong cause for adjusting the forbidden term(s) in individual disputes between
contracting parties. Adjustment of unreasonable contract terms is possible in
individual disputes both in the relationships between a consumer and an
enterprise under Consumer Protection Act (38/1978) chapter 4 section 1 and
in enterprise relationships under general Contracts Act (228/1929) section 36
§. These provisions on adjustment of contract terms allow general courts of
first instance and the Consumer Complaints Board in individual cases initiated
by one of the contracting parties to adjust, to interpret or even to disregard
unreasonable terms
enterprise, in Finland there are laws that apply both to individually
negotiated terms and to enterprise relationships909.
Despite of the doubtfulness of the validity of these terms in
standard form contracts especially in consumer relations in many
countries, they are widely used especially in the software business.
Even though the validity of extensive liability disclaimers and
exclusions clauses in standard software licenses, especially in end-use
license agreements (EULAs), depends on the legal system and varies
between them with differing lines of argument and emphasis used,
the standard software contract templates disclaiming and excluding
liability are used as if they were universally valid contracts. The highly
complex array of different legal standards that set varying requirements
for the validity of liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses and the
unpleasant surprises when the national requirements are not satisfied,
are overlooked. The substantial costs in ascertaining what the legal
position is, even if it could be ascertained with anything like certainty,
certainly are one explanation for this practice. But it is not a sufficient
explanation and certainly does not hint anything on why the
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910 It is interesting to note that similar liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses
can be found both from proprietary and Open Source licenses as noted also by
Miko Välimäki in The Rise of Open Source Licensing, p. 170. The inclusion of such
clauses appears to be standard practice in both despite the questionability of
the validity of these clauses. The use of potentially unfair terms in standard-
form contracts is not, however, specific only for the software industry. Their
ubiquity has been demonstrated, as emphasised by European Commission in
its report on the implementation of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Directive (COM(2000)248 final, p. 9), in several studies conducted by the
Commission analysing certain types of standard-term contracts proposed to
consumers in different Member States (e.g.,  contracts of sale, car rental
contracts, insurance contracts, contracts in the field of air transport, contracts
concerning certain banking services, tourist services and the provision of
general interest services). For a short overview of these studies see Annex II of
Commission report (COM(2000)248 final).
911 By stating in their most strict form that the vendor is not prepared to take
any responsibility for her product, the restrictive license terms might give a
negative signal to the potential buyer about the quality and security of the
software in question and could, if the customers become serious enough for
security, harm the sales of the software. However, as long as the liability
disclaimers are effectively explained in terms of the special features of the
software business and consequent risk allocation, the signal is not considered
negative. Only in situations where these explanations would not be considered
valid, could the signal possibly be considered negative. This remains to be seen
when, and if, the liability disclaimers become seriously questioned on security
grounds either via widely published court practices or other public discussion.
912 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 229.
disclaimers and exclusions clauses are not contested in the software
business.910
The reason for this practice, which might give negative signals to
the users about the quality and security of the software911, becomes
understandable when realising, as Hugh Collins explains, that the real
force of these contractual clauses arises in the event of dispute912. By
the combination of liability exclusion clauses and restrictions on
possible avenues for legal redress (e.g., choice of jurisdiction clauses
or arbitration clauses), the standard form grants the vendor a strong
bargaining power in post-breach negotiations. When a complaint is
made, the vendor can point to clauses that exculpate or greatly
diminish the responsibility of the business, which serve to discourage
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913 Contract terms stipulating that the compensation in any case is limited to
the price of the software, for example, can in the case of COTS software being
used as a component in an information system be an effective psychological
barrier for claiming any damages.
914 Maybe the argument made by Yates in his survey study about the use of
exclusion clauses in contracts in the U.K in 1974-1976 [Yates D (1982)
Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, p. 29. The
study is reported in Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 229)], about the reasons for
companies lack of sanguineous to enforce exclusion clauses in consumer
related mass contracts and about their use in situations where they are likely to
be void and possibly even subject to minor criminal offences could be
generalised similarly to Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 229. As Yates explains
“[w]hile they [exclusion clauses] would, as a matter of policy, always be relied
upon, their insertion seemed to be largely a question of psychology” [quoted in
Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 229]. I.e., they leave the customer with the
possible erroneous view that she had few enforceable contractual rights against
the vendor or no feasible legal avenues to demand them. This psychological
effect can even prevent the consumer from expressing her dissatisfaction with
the product to the vendor and demanding compensation, not to even speak
about taking the issue to court.
915 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 233.
the pursuit of the complaint913. Even if the terms are of doubtful
validity, there is in fact good reason for leaving them in as a source
of bargaining strength in post-breach negotiations. Since the consumer
is most unlikely to litigate the issue before a court, as will be discussed
later on in the analysis of the implementation, the objectionable clauses
will never be formally invalidated, and so they can be relied upon at
least for the purpose of negotiating or imposing a settlement on the
consumer.914
This argument about the post-breach negotiation bargaining power
increasing function of the liability exclusion clauses in standard form
contracts emphasised by Hugh Collins915 also explains why the rare
existing invalidations of the terms in standard form contracts by courts
in individual disputes between parties have not been, and even if they
would increase, are unlikely to be effective against the use oppressive
license terms in software contracts. Their use continues even after
they have been considered by courts as void. As Collins explains, the
type of regulation which permits judges to invalidate unfair contract
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916 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 233. The somewhat sad conclusion of the
Commission Report on the Implementation of Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) was that “[d]espite the legal mechanisms
created to encourage the elimination of unfair terms in consumer contracts,
such terms continue to be used on a wide scale” (COM(2000)248 final, p. 35).
917 This problem is due to the results of the enforcement of a decision
enjoining the elimination of an unfair term under Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts Directive (93/13/EEC) being limited to the actual wording of the
term itself. The effects of the term, i.e., the imbalance it creates between the
enterprise and the consumer, that underlies the court’s decision, lie outside the
scope of the enforcement. This contradiction between the goal of the
legislation on unfair terms and the results of its enforcement is emphasised in
Commission report on the implementation of Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts (COM(2000)248 final, p. 22-23). The possibility to
deviate from default allocations of rules and to circumvent the possible
invalidations of the rules in standard form contracts explains why the
dispositive rules that do not conform to the real market practices and widely
used mechanism have a weak influence on behaviour. Indispositive rules are
not strong tools to change established market practices. This has been
explained, e.g., by Jan Hellner in Lagstiftning inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 162, who
at the same time also acknowledges the direct behaviour influencing
mechanism of dispositive contract law rules like those concerning defective
products.
918 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms on
consumer contracts, Official Journal L 095, 21.04.1993, p. 29-34.
919 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 233-234.
terms is unlikely to have any impact on the use and content of
standard form contracts916. Since the use of oppressive terms in
standard form contracts is not unlawful in itself, there is no reason
to leave them out.
Even if a court determines that the clause is invalid, there is no
reason to refrain from using the clause as a bargaining counter in
contracts with other consumers. These customers are most unlikely
to be able to discover whether or not a court has declared a clause
invalid, and the precedent may always be distinguished by introducing
a minor alteration in the contract917. Even when a list of terms that
will invariably or normally be regarded as being invalid is provided
in legislation (as in the annex to the EC Directive 93/13/EEC on
unfair terms on consumer contracts918), it cannot provide a complete
guide as to the sorts of terms which courts will find objectionable.919
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920 According to the article 12 of the EC Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC) “[t]he liability of the producer arising from this Directive may
not, in relation to the injured person, be limited or excluded by a provision
limiting his liability or exempting him from liability.” Also the Finnish
Consumer Protection Act (38/1978) chapter 5 on sale of consumer goods, as
an example, states in section 2 that “[a] contract term differing from the
provisions of this chapter to the detriment of the buyer shall be void unless
otherwise provided below.” It is important to note the restriction on the scope
of these rules. They primarily apply only to the consumer who either has
bought the product or suffers damages from its use. If the software is delivered
to the consumer through a channel of operators (importer, retailer etc.), the
mandatory rules do not make the liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses
between the delivery channel operators void. Also other product liability than
that basing on such mandatory rules can be agreed upon differently, as already
pointed out above.
921 Section 20, subsection 1, of the Consumer Protection Act 1978/38 reads as
follows: “The buyer shall be entitled to compensation for loss that he/she
suffers because of a defect in the goods. Indirect loss, referred to above in
section 10(3) and (4) shall, however, be compensated by the seller only if the
defect or loss is due to negligence attributable to it or if, at the conclusion of
the contract, the goods differed from an express representation of the seller.”
Under mandatory product liability rules like EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC) and those in national sale of consumer goods
laws, contract terms that differ from the standards provided in them
to the detriment of the buyer or the injured person done prior to the
damage are void920. This means that the limitation or exclusion of
liability is not allowed with contractual means at all. 
For example, the indispositive rules in the Finnish Consumer
Protection Act 1978/38 section 20, according to which the buyer is
entitled to compensation for indirect losses if the defect or loss is due
to negligence attributable to the seller or if, at the conclusion of the
contract, the goods differed from an express representation of the
seller, cannot be contracted to the detriment of the buyer921. The
lawful rights of the consumer under mandatory provision cannot be
limited. This has been restated by the Finnish Supreme Court in a
recent precedent 2004:123 concerning an injunction reinforced with
a threat of fine sought by the Consumer Ombudsman from the Market
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922 The case is available in Finnish at the Finlex Data Bank (http://
www.finlex.fi). The Supreme Court ruled that contract clauses limiting all
liability for consequential or indirect damages or losses cannot be deemed
unfair from the point of view of the consumer when the terms make explicit,
when judged in their wholeness, that they do not restrict the liability provided
in mandatory legal provisions.
923 The reason why the Supreme Court did not take an explicit position on the
question whether the exact contract term used by the company in this case is
unfair or not is that the Consumer Ombudsman had not invoked this basis for
unfairness. Note that such obiter dictum comments do not have the status of a
precedent and that under the Finnish legal system not even a judicial precedent
is binding. The lower courts (Courts of Appeal and district courts) may depart
from earlier decisions made by the Supreme Court and it can even itself depart
Court on the use of a contract term in a warranty for mobile phones
that limits the seller’s liability for indirect losses922.
Such unambiguous statements about the impossibility to limit
liability basically provide consumers with the knowledge about their
rights to compensation and have a greater potential to shield from
the psychological effect of the liability disclaimers and exclusions
clauses in software licenses. Such indispositive rules on defective and
insecure products hold a stronger expressive influence than the rules
that merely allow courts in individual disputes to adjust the terms.
Still their informative role is limited and their real potential in
shielding from psychological effect of the liability disclaimers and
exclusions clauses can be doubted. For example, the contract terms
stipulating that the consumer is not entitled to compensation for
indirect losses arising in the case of a defective product may give an
erroneous notion of the lawful rights of the consumer even under
the mandatory rules. Consumers cannot be expected to be generally
aware of the content of the mandatory provision on right to
compensation for defective products in consumer protection laws.
This is also the argument behind the Finnish Supreme Court ruling
2004:123 where the court, without taking an actual position, noted
that a contract term stipulating that the company does not in any case
have liability for indirect damages or losses might be deemed unfair
due to the erroneous notion of lawful rights that such a vague
formulation may give to the consumers923.
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from its earlier precedents. In practice, however, precedents of the Supreme
Court are followed in cases arising after the precedent has been given and
involving a similar point of law.
924 Contracting parties can act according to a contract that would be considered
invalid under the law, apply contractual terms that are against indispositive
rules, or even breach contractual obligations without consequences, unless
neither of the parties oppose to this or have a possibility or capability to do
this. As a regulatory mechanism, therefore, contracts have the potential to
regulate contract law itself in the sense of controlling and modifying its
application; even in relation to the mandatory (indispositive) consumer
contract rules as Hugh Collins argues in Regulating Contract Law, p. 16-17.
This is an extension to the above mentioned traditional perspective in
regulating contracts. In the Nordic doctrine the restrictions in the guidance
functions of contract law have been recognised, e.g., by Jan Hellner in
Lagstiftning inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 162-164. Note that this is often considered
to be infeasible as a conscious contractual technique at least in standard forms
because it exposes the vendors to the reactions of the consumer authorities
and other controlling organisations, and a plainly illegal contractual practice
might lead to severe damages to reputation if it becomes public. In general
terms, this has been pointed out, e.g., by Mika Hemmo, Sopimusoikeus III, p. 16-
17, in considering the limits to the freedom of contract in his textbook on the
technique and tactics of contracting.
The use of software licenses gives the vendor an argument against
the applicability of such indispositive rules, which can be used in post-
breach bargaining similarly to the liability disclaimers and exclusion
clauses. Even when the law imposes mandatory rules that cannot be
excluded by agreement (such as in consumer protection laws in Nordic
countries and especially product liability regulation deriving from the
EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), which command
instead of serve the contracting practice), there still is room left to
alter the legal status of the social behaviour in a way that circumvent
the indispositive rules. Contracting parties can structure their
relationship in ways that avoid the application of these rules924. 
In the software business such an effort is made by stating that
software is licensed for use, i.e., a limited right to use is given, not
sold and that no sale of goods occurs and no contracts for sale is
drafted. If this argument is accepted in courts, which is largely an
unresolved issue in many jurisdiction, the default liability rules both
in general and consumer contract laws and in specific product liability
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925 The validity of the licenses, especially in their mass-transaction form, is still
a matter of dispute and no clear priority has been given to the terms of the
license in deciding whether the provision of the software is that of license or
sale. Instead, the consideration typically goes by the factual characteristics of
the situation in question. Especially if no time limits for the license has been
provided and it is provided upon single payment instead of continuous license
fees, then the contract is more easily considered as the sale of goods than as
the license of the right to use. However, it has to be stressed that this is far
from clear as noted by Mika Hemmo, Vuoden 2000 ongelma ja siviilioikeus
[The year 2000 problem and civil law], p. 25-27, in relation to the Finnish
doctrine.
926 The effectiveness of this strategy under various jurisdictions is uncertain
especially in relation to consumer contracts in COTS software and, to an
increasing degree, also in commercial contracts where a contracting party is at a
weaker position.
927 Naturally there might be the possibility for courts to invalidate the terms in
individual disputes or to forbid their use in the future.
rules following the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC)
are inapplicable since they mainly apply to the sale of goods and
require the transfer of ownership925. Instead of transferring ownership
to the users, which is a prerequisite of applying the sale of goods rules,
the licenses only give a right to use the product (software is licensed
for use, not sold).
Despite the equivocal nature of this rather established contractual
practice in the software business926, it seriously affects the incentives
for secure software development and informing customers about the
vulnerability of their software. It not only makes the default dispositive
rules to look as inapplicable, but also the mandatory rules that
otherwise cannot be contracted to the disfavour of the buyer or the
injured person prior to the damage. 
Following the Finnish doctrine we can now separate three different
situations in the applicability of liability disclaimers. 1) If the contract
made about the transaction of COTS software is binding on the
parties, then so are the disclaimers927. Whether or not the transaction
is a license for use or a contract for sale has no relevance in this
situation. 2) If the software contract is not binding, the transaction
is a contract for sale instead of a license for use. The default rules
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928 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 229.
of defectiveness and other product liability rules apply. 3) If the
liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses in software licenses are
found by the court to be binding, but the transaction is found to be
a contract for sale, then the liability depends on the position of the
buyer. If the software is bought for business purposes the disclaimers
are binding. If the software is bought for private use by a consumer,
the interpretation of the transaction to be a contract for sale makes
the indispositive consumer protection rules applicable. In this case
it is possible that the liability disclaimers are not considered to be
binding.
This further strengthens the already strong bargaining power in
post-breach negotiations created by standard form contracts. When
a complaint is made, the vendor can point to clauses that exculpate
or greatly diminish the responsibility of the business, which serve to
discourage the pursuit of the complaint928. This further reduces the
buyer’s willingness to litigate over to contractual terms and dispute
about the defectiveness or insecurity of the software even though
grounds for argument could exists. The legal shields the buyer has
to break are strengthened in practice even though their validity might
be questionable at least under several consumer protection laws.
5.3.3 Implementation
Like most private law rules, the product liability rules are typically
implemented via ordinary civil proceedings. Normal sales law remedies
connected with the defective goods (conformity with contract)
provisions discussed above are available both to individual and
industrial buyers and the injured party has a possibility to seek
compensation for damages under specific product liability rules and
general tort law. 
This is characteristically a form of self-implementation. Application
of the rules is not watched over by any prosecuting or supervising
Using prescriptive rules: software product liability 379
929 There are exceptions in the case of consumer protection, such as in the case
consumer marketing regulations in Finland. Stig Strömholm makes the same
notion in relation to the implementation of indispositive private law rules in
Sweden in Rätt, rättskällor och rättstillämpning, p. 158. These will be discussed
below.
930 As noted by Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 64, in relation to the
regulation of contracts, monitoring compliance with the quality standards set in
private law and contractual clauses is delegated to the parties themselves.
authority929. Initiative for the process of applying the rules is left to
the parties themselves, or more specifically, to the party whose
interests have been violated930. The party wronged by a breach of
contract or by an extra-contractual tort can decide whether to address
any claims to the other party or the causer of the damage on this score
and whether she wishes to employ legal mechanisms in her attempt
to have these claims met. She has the discretion whether or not to
enforce the rules through an ordinary court procedure or to negotiate
a revision of the standards where possible.
This discretionary power exposes the implementation via court
proceedings for several hindrances. The injured party has to have self-
interest to take the issue to the court. In relation to software security
issues there are several shortcomings to this self-interest not just for
the individual consumers, but also for the industrial buyers. Some
of them are general to the type of self-implementation via ordinary
civil proceedings typical to private law and others specific to the
software industry. 
One assumption behind the effectiveness of this self-
implementation is that consumers and business purchasers, who are
allocated the task of inspecting their purchases for quality defects and
of identifying the damaging software, can actually do so. Even though
this applies to most search and large part of experience characteristics
of goods, in relation to credence characteristics (i.e., latent defects
which might only be detected as a result of inspection by persons with
technical expertise such as software vulnerabilities) it becomes
extremely difficult. Even users of the software simply lack the
Regulating Secure Software Development380
931 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 298, correctly suggests in relation to the
contractual regulation of quality that in the case of credence goods, public
regulation, where a substantial administrative apparatus is required to examine
samples from vendors, seems to be the only efficacious method to monitor
conformity. Certainly, selective regulation of potential design faults that
requires some components to conform to detailed technical specifications
monitored by a regulatory agency could play a certain role in the regulation of
secure software development. This is so despite the expenses related to such a
model resulting, e.g., from the need to use a team of inspectors examining
samples from vendors for their software products in order to determine
whether they meet the quality standard. However, the development of such
regulatory standards that would apply to different types of software used in a
variety of different context with altering security requirements has proven to be
problematic. The speed of change in the software business does not ease the
development of regulatory standards that would be stable and detailed enough
for the regulatory agencies to monitor. As a result, such a model of public
regulation might be applicable only in safety critical contexts and in relation to
critical infrastructures where human life is at stake.
932 As Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 150, notes in
analysing product liability rules worldwide in 2003, strict manufacturer liability
is often not much of an advantage for the injured parties. The plaintiff must
still show defectiveness and cause, and not having to prove fault is frequently a
small benefit at best. Liability has often been strict, or near-strict, under generic
contract or tort rules in practice anyway. It must be emphasised that traditional
tort or contract liability is not absolute. But neither is the liability under the EC
Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). The consumer expectation test as
well as the defences recognized in the Directive creates considerable loopholes.
It is evident that questions relating to the burden of proof continue to be
controversial, and are seen by many to be of real practical significance.
According to the perception presented by some of the consumer
representatives (i.e., consumer associations both at national and EU levels) in a
survey study on product liability in the EU conducted by John Meltzer, Rod
Freeman and Siobhan Thomson, Product Liability in the European Union, p. 47,
sophistication to police detailed technical features and even access
to such expertise is limited due to the prohibitive costs931. 
Lack of knowledge in software vulnerabilities, even access to
essential information and expertise has been emphasised many times
above. This is a real problem not just for the customers but also for
the judges. This results in difficulties in proving defectiveness and
causation even in strict (no-fault) product liability cases in consumer
goods932. Problems in detecting the lack of quality and security in
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consumers are unfairly disadvantaged by the burden of having to prove defect
and/or causation in product liability claims. The concern mainly arises from
perceived difficulties in proving claims due to a lack of legal or other resources
needed to investigate them properly, or to an inability to gain access to
essential information. Such problems are seen to be particularly acute in
relation to technical products, or where the alleged injuries are of a
complicated nature.
933 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 89-90.
934 Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 150. Liability has often
been strict, or near-strict, under generic contract or tort rules in practice
anyway. It must be emphasised that traditional tort or contract liability is not
absolute. But neither is the liability under the EC Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC). The consumer expectation test as well as the defences
recognized in the Directive creates considerable loopholes.
software combined with the consequent problems of proof about
the insecurity and defectiveness of product in the case of security is
a serious hindrance for implementation. Difficulties in proving that
a violation of a regulatory standard has occurred negatively influence
the decisions of injured parties to take the issue to the court. 
In general contract and tort law typical starting point is that those
who allege fault have to produce the initial evidence. Strict product
liability rules resolve this problem in the detecting and proving that
a breach of standard has occurred, by transferring the burden of
proving compliance onto the alleged violator. When the courts regard
proof of an unsatisfactory product quality and unreasonable product
security as sufficient evidence of breach of the regulatory standard,
the legal process can imitate public regulation by in effect requiring
the vendor to demonstrate the absence of fault. As Hugh Collins
notes, the capacity of private law to detect failures of regulatory
compliance turns crucially on such techniques for the reversal of the
burden of proof933. 
However, as Mathias Reimann notes in analysing product liability
rules worldwide, even strict manufacturer liability is often not much
of an advantage for the injured parties. The plaintiff must still show
defectiveness and cause, and not having to prove fault is frequently
a small benefit at best.934 
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935 Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the European Union, p. 47.
936 Despite the acknowledgement of these problems in the burden of having to
proof defect and/or causation in product liability claims, and the
considerations of the ways to mitigate the burden of the injured party, John
Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thomson in their report to the European
Commission on product liability in the European Union still do not
recommend changes to the directive. Of the different alternatives to mitigate
the burden of proof of the injured party, see also Mononen, Yritysten välinen
tuotevastuu, p. 28-29.
937 Meltzer et al. in Product Liability in the European Union, p. 34-37, provide
evidence of product liability claims in the EU becoming more successful in the
past 10 years. The factor that was most commonly identified by the
participants to their questionnaire as contributing to the increase in success of
product liability claims was greater access to legal assistance/advice. A
It is evident that questions relating to the burden of proof continue
to be controversial, and are seen by many to be of real practical
significance. According to the perception presented by some of the
consumer representatives (i.e., consumer associations both at national
and EU levels) in a survey study on product liability in the EU
conducted by John Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thomson
consumers are unfairly disadvantaged by the burden of having to
prove defect and/or causation in product liability claims935. The
concern mainly arises from perceived difficulties in proving claims
due to a lack of legal or other resources needed to investigate them
properly, or to an inability to gain access to essential information. Such
problems are seen to be particularly acute in relation to technical
products, or where the alleged injuries are of a complicated nature.936
In addition to the lack of information about the security and quality
of software together with the shortness in the access to expertise, also
another information problem certainly inhibits litigation. The still
relatively excessive uncertainty as to the very basis upon which a court
may decide certainly furthermore inhibits litigation. This emphasizes
in international transactions since the choice of law rules are by no
means clear even in relation to consumers. When not only the success
of the claim is uncertain but already issue of jurisdiction and choice
of law together with the applicable law and its basic interpretations
too, there is bound to be unwillingness to invest high litigation cost
on such uncertain ground937. Even though there are written laws with
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significant number of participants also identified the Directive as contributing
to the success of product liability claims. Harmonised rules provide a clear
basis for litigation.
938 As Jennifer Chandler explains in Improving Software Security, p. 10-11, security-
related software flaws on their own typically cause no losses. There can be
possible losses due to the need to repair the defective software even though
the vulnerability in it has not been abused. However, the losses are primarily
inflicted when a third party deliberately takes advantage of the vulnerabilities.
Of course the action of retailers, implementers such as IT consultants helping
in the strategic procurement and implementation, system integrators and
support firms providing training or technical support, are also important.
939 As Jennifer Chandler, Improving Software Security, p. 12, points out in relation
to the U.S. tort law, the plaintiff-purchaser cannot be held contributory
negligent for failing to apply patches to their software in situations where the
attack is launched before patches are ready. Still, the failure to take other self-
accompanied drafting material and guiding case law on different types
of goods that provide relative certainty in the area of consumer
product liability rules, in the case business relationships written laws
are scarce and, when exist, typically dispositive and open to
interpretations. 
When even some of the most basic questions concerning the
application of provisions of contractual and non-contractual liability
in the software business admit no easy or certain answer in many
jurisdictions, this uncertainty becomes excessive. Especially the cases
concerning COTS software are problematic mainly due to the above
mentioned use of liability disclaimers in licenses, the power of liability
disclaimers in post-breach negotiation, several layers of intermediaries
that may break the causal link between a defect and a damage938, and
the difficultness of specifying cause to a certain software product in
a system consisting of several highly interacting components from
several vendors and of which some could even be developed in-house.
The possibility of vendors of defective software to raise a strong
argument that the plaintiff-purchaser who has failed to apply patches
or to take other simple self-protective measures (such as using firewalls
or virus-scanning software) to the sufficient degree has been
contributory negligent by no means lower the threshold for
litigation939.
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protective measures may still constitute contributory negligence. However, the
degree to which average Internet users can be expected to be able to patch
their systems cannot be high. There simply are too many patches from too
many sources for the variety of software in use in a typical personal computer.
It would be unreasonable to expect home users to have the time and to be
capable of installing all the patches, at least as long as automated patching is
not sufficiently available and reliable enough.
940 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 87.
941 As Reimann notes in Product Liability in a Global Context , p. 152: “In
most countries, a victim’s access to court is also comparatively expensive [to
the U.S. system: author’s note] because their law does not permit a (full-
fledged) contingency fee system; without such a system, a plaintiff faces
potentially high up-front retainers as well as the burden of other litigation
costs. In addition, suing is often financially risky because in the majority of
systems, the loser has to pay not only his own attorney’s fees and but also the
other side’s lawyer; this doubles the cost risk and militates against going to
court”.
942 Note that the costs of the private law type of monitoring compliance with
regulation is considered to be much cheaper in total than the public
administrative control model of public regulation. However, the relevant issue
in here is that the costs to the individual who ponders upon the filing of a
complaint are high. To her, the overall cheapness of this type of monitoring is
not relevant. She only sees the private costs of litigation.
Another issue to consider is the costs of implementation. As Hugh
Collins notes, the absence of public financial resources to support
regulatory compliance tends to limit the ability to enforce the rules
to those with considerable wealth940. When the costs of litigation in
an ordinary civil court are often high941, the enforcement of those
security standards where the damage caused by the violation imposes
only minor costs on the plaintiff, i.e., the user of the software in the
case of insecure software, is often deterred. Users of the software are
reluctant to incur the expense of litigation in order to obtain the small
benefit of compensation or return of the price.942
It is important to note that these problems do not necessarily lead
to suboptimal enforcement from the regulatory perspective. For
example, the lack of self-interest among private individuals
(consumers) due to the slight financial losses compared to the
uncertainty and costs of litigation is not present to the same degree
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943 The speedy COTS software business seems to lack interest to take the issue
to court. This approach in COTS software business is verified in an empirical
research by Juhani Warsta in Contracting in Software Business, p. 139. This lack of
interest is present in COTS software business despite the weak connection
between the vendor and the buyer. The spot focus of the relationship could
lower the threshold for litigation in theory, since there hardly is a comparable
fear of losing a strategic partner as in more relational MOTS or tailored
software businesses. Note that longer term relationships and relational
contracts are used with channel operations with the resellers and in systems
integrator partnerships (Warsta, Contracting in Software Business, p. 181). Even
when separate contracting outside standard forms occurs, the incentive to
emphasise contractual entitlements is low due to its reputation damaging
effects as Hugh Collins emphasizes in Regulating Contracts, p. 174, with
extensive references in relation to contracting in general. The desire to
maintain a cordial ongoing relationship is not present to the same degree. In
longer term relationships the quest for legal remedies is not expected to be
high due to the primacy of relational and economic normative frameworks of
contractual behaviour compared to the contractual in the terms used by Collins
in Regulating Contracts, p. 128.
in the case of industrial buyers. They have a clear self-interest in taking
defective product cases into court. The vulnerabilities found in the
components of their systems not only can cause substantial damages
when the risk materializes, but can also hamper the sales of their own
system using the software as a component or damage the public image
when the existence of the vulnerability also in their systems (that uses
the vulnerable component) becomes widely known. 
However, in COTS software business the litigation threshold seems
to be relatively high. In addition to these cost increasing and litigation
threshold heightening factors there are hindrances for litigation that
stem from the characteristics of the software business. Due to the
rapid evolution of the business, companies do not have time to look
behind or ask for financial compensation in cases where the
component has not been delivered, lacks in quality, or produces risks.
Software companies are not eager to start fighting over broken or
unmet contracts943. Keeping pace with the development is considered
as such enough demanding and resource consuming. Also the
reputation damaging effect of excessive litigation might influence the
desire of networked businesses to start litigating. Litigation becomes
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944 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 329-339.
945 The availability of an inexpensive and readily accessible tribunal would
otherwise make it economically viable to bring relatively low-value product
liability claims to the Consumer Complaint Board. The negative impact of the
lower threshold (€500) in the article 9(b) of the EC Product Liability Directive
in Finland is pointed out also in a recent EU study on product liability by John
Meltzer, Rod Freeman and Siobhan Thomson, Product Liability in the European
Union, p. 50.
946 EU regulators have responded to the problems in the enforcement of
consumer protection laws at the internal market level. Directive 98/27/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions
for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests (the Injunctions Directive), OJ L
166, p. 51-55, establishes a common procedure to allow a qualified body from
one Member State to seek an injunction in another. Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004
on Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible for the
Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws (the Regulation on Consumer
Protection Cooperation) OJ L 364, 9.12.2004, p. 1-11, which applies from 29
December 2005, removes barriers for information exchange and cooperation
and empowers enforcement authorities to seek and obtain action from their
counterparts in other Member States. It is noteworthy that the Regulation does
an option only when the long-term relation does not seem to be
practicable anymore and the parties feel unable to achieve an
accommodation that preserves some diminished benefits for both944.
The costs structure for the consumers also changes when certain
jurisdiction, such as Finland and Sweden, provide with the possibility
of taking product liability claims into consumer complaints boards.
This offers consumers an accessible and inexpensive forum that lowers
the threshold of litigating. Even though the decisions are not binding,
they are usually followed by the parties to whom they are directed
at the specific jurisdiction in question. However, when the national
implementation of the EC Product Liability Directive (see art. 9 (b))
does not allow a consumer to sue for the first 500 Euros of damage,
this minimum threshold has a real impact on consumers945. The
damage suffered by an individual consumer due to insecure software
can often remain at a lower threshold. The force of such non-binding
national rulings can also be minimal when the business is essentially
international and the issues to be solved highly speculative946.
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not seem to apply to the enforcement of the Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC).
947 Even though the doctrine of privity of contract (or the principle of relative
effect) usually confines the plaintiff to a suit against the immediate retailer, this
doctrine has been modified in some jurisdictions in order to enable a direct
action between the consumer and the manufacturer for defective quality and
security also in product liability cases (Meltzer et al., Product Liability in the
European Union, p. 16-17). The direct contractual relation between the user and
the vendor without retailers in the between is often achieved through private
ordering in the form of manufacturer’s guarantees, which in effect promise the
cost of repairs directly to the consumer (Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 301). In
the COTS software business the same result is achieved by the use of EULA’s.
948 As Hugh Collins notes in Regulating Contracts, p. 301, the retailer may be in a
more powerful position than the consumer to threaten the use of non-legal
sanctions, such as an unwillingness to stock a particular product in future, so
that the liability rule has a powerful supplement.
949 Robert Bradgate in a special feature of the Journal of Information, Law and
Technology concerning the Y2K problem, Beyond the Millennium, heading
3.3.4 last sentence, argues on practical and policy reasons in the English legal
system for the issuance of liability for defective COTS software in a consumer
context primarily on the retailer. At the same time he argues against the
interpretation of the software user license (EULA) as establishing contractual
privity between software manufacturer and user. 
950 Under EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) the primary liable
parties are the manufacturer or parties that give the impression to be the
manufacturer. These include, e.g., party importing the product to the EC
markets or a party presenting herself as the producers by putting her name,
The enforcement could become more effective when the possible
legal avenue of seller liability under contract is used947. When the seller
has the possibility to make backward demands towards the channel
operators and the software house that developed and shipped the
insecure product, this could provide a more capable and both
financially and informationally better equipped party to demand more
secure software and to take the issue to the court when necessary948.
Also the national legal solutions might be more effective against the
retailer operating in national markets; at least there is a suitable
defendant to sue without invoking complex and vague choice of law
rules949. However, the EC product liability rules for consumers are
built for direct litigation possibilities950. Mathias Reimann identifies
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trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product (article  3 of the EC
Product Liability Directive). This emphasis the role of contractual product
liability rules also in consumer relations, since it is the seller of the software, to
which the consumer has the most direct connection with when the software is
delivered via the retail market and not purchased directly from the
manufacturer via the Internet. At the same time there is a  need to consider
security issues also under the indispositive default rules for defective products
in general contract law or doctrine.  If a software product is not secure enough,
then there ought to be a possibility to invoke contractual rules for defective
products. Due to the freedom of the plaintiff to choose the legal basis under
which to bring a product liability case into a court, this already is possible in
many European jurisdictions. This possibility is, however, of value only in
those situations where the software product has been bought from a retailer
and not directly from the developer.
951 Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 150.
the impossibility to sue anyone but the producer (and his alter egos)
as one of the serious disadvantages of the EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC) and the remedies fashioned after it also in
many non-European countries compared to general tort and contract
claims951.
Due to the concurrence of both contractual and non-contractual
(delictual) bases for liability in the case of vulnerable software the
plaintiff can avoid many of the caveats of specific product liability
rules by using the right to choose the legal category which will give
the most advantageous outcome. However, this would require
extensive knowledge of the disadvantages and benefits of different
legal avenues, which is not generally available. Understanding of the
wide legal basis for product liability is still relatively scarce even in
general, not to even speak about specific issues of the software
business.
In light of these difficulties faced by the software user in bringing
out a claim against the vendor, Jennifer Chandler makes an interesting
suggestion for these implementation level problems. Instead of
depending upon a purchaser of defective software to be the plaintiff
in a hypothetical lawsuit against the developer of unreasonably
insecure software, Chandler argues that a more promising suit could
be brought by victims of DDOS attacks. As plaintiffs they are not
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952 Chandler, Security in Cyberspace, p. 234. Chandler argues in Security in
Cyberspace, p. 258, that resulting greater attention to security at the software
development stage would have the positive side effect of reducing insecurity
generally even though lawsuits are most likely to be successful only in the
context of DDOS attacks. This is because the same types of vulnerabilities that
lead to DDoS attacks also lead to other nuisances such as the circulation of
malicious code in general.
953 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 88.
open to charges of contributory negligence as there is essentially
nothing they can do to protect themselves. They suffer the kind of
concentrated loss that would make litigation attractive. In addition,
they do not face the obstacle of contractual disclaimers and limitations
of liability within the software licence agreements that exist between
software vendors and the owners of the insecure computers used to
launch a DDOS attack.952
Even though the target of a DDoS attack might be the best suited
plaintiff in a lawsuit against the vendor of insecure software, there
is no reason to withhold from improving the institutional support
for the suits brought by the users of insecure software. At least they
have a right to compensation, even if the directive force of liability
rules would be sufficient in the current situation where only the
victims of DDoS attacks can effectively claim for damages. In
addition, software vendors are by no means the only parties that could
be held liable for DDoS attacks. A more likely alternative target for
liability suits for the victims of DDoS attacks could be found from
those who maintain the vulnerable machines and a party with even
deeper pockets could be found from the service providers that relay
the attacks trough the networks.
Even though the enforcement of private law regulation seems to
lack resources, this does not necessarily lead to a failure in achieving
an optimal level of enforcement. Compliance with the regulatory
standards can, and often does come also from other places than from
the enforcement of the rules. As Collins notes, the enforcement
mechanism provided by the law is usually a minor consideration in
the incentives for regulatory compliance953. As noted above, regulatory
compliance does not primarily rely on legal sanctions, but rather upon
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954 This emphasizes where the information about default can be disseminated
rapidly to other participants in the market as Collins notes in Regulating
Contracts, p. 114. This can be the case in relation to COTS software. Note that
vendors can, however, use license terms restricting product comparisons to
target such dissemination of information.
955 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 114. 
956 Government procurement has for this reason been seen as one of the
regulatory tools that could be used to influence secure software development.
For example, the NCSP (National Cyber Security Partnership) in Technical
Standards and Common Criteria, Appendix B, p. 2, recommends that the U.S.
Government should require vulnerability analysis of products as a separate
condition of procurement or part of the Common Criteria. The capacity of
government to influence secure software development via its procurement
policies calls for a separate analysis in subsequent studies.
kinds of non-legal sanctions such as refusal to do business and damage
to reputation954 and associated costs that are not directly linked to
the legal liability. 
The refusal to do business is a powerful sanction where the
deceiver derives much of its business or income from the other
contractor. It is most powerful in long-term relations between
enterprises. In relational contracts the key incentive to perform
contracts faithfully, particularly with regard to quality, derives from
the greater benefits to be achieved from the income from a stream
of future sales rather than one-off benefits from defaults955. In the
case of COTS software being used as a component in an information
system, the refusal to do business can become a powerful sanction
especially when the buyer is sufficiently large and influential such as
the government956.
Note that the communicative function of the adjudication process
is at its strongest. When the constitution of a market is considered
to depend heavily upon business reputation as a source of trust, then
the authoritative declaration by a judicial organ or any institution that
possesses the respect of the trading community (e.g., arbitrator,
consumer ombudsman) serves the function of collecting and
disseminating what participants in the market regard as reliable
information about trustworthiness. Participants in the market are then
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957 Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 124, considers this communicative function
to be more important than the legal sanctions attached to the breach of
contract.
958 According to Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 88-9, the situation where
there is a need to address the problem of the lack of resources inherent in the
design of the private law self-enforcement mechanism is present when
compliance appears to fall below an optimum level, and the enforcement
mechanism appears to provide weak additional incentives. I.e., the question of
the optimum level of resources to be spent on the enforcement must be
assessed in the light of information regarding actual levels of compliance with
standards in the absence of legal enforcement.
959 This is the argument made especially in chapter 2.
960 The costs associated with non-legal sanctions have not been foreseeable
enough to provide sufficient incentives for secure software development from
the societal point of view. One of the main non-legal sanctions, i.e., damage to
business reputation is not all that feasible in relation to credence characteristics
like the vulnerability of software. At the same time patching provides a
reasonably low costs alternative to product recall and repair as has been argued
above. Customers have also tolerated the vulnerabilities due to several
historical reasons and for their lack of capability and information to compare
products in terms of security. Consequently, shunning has not been a real risk
for software vendors, even though the climate is changing. Customer tolerance
of insecurity might, however, be vanishing over time. It remains to be seen
whether this is sufficient to improve the security of software in a sufficient
manner but, as the theoretical considerations presented above predict, it is not
likely to do so to the level sufficient to the networked society as a whole.
better able to adopt the typical non-legal sanctions to the merchant
whose reputation has been so damaged.957
Despite the force of non-legal sanctions there still is a pressing
need to address the problem of the lack of resources inherent in the
design of the private law self-enforcement mechanism in order to
improve the current level of security in software958. The actual level
of compliance with standards in the absence of legal enforcement
appears to fall below an optimum level as has been argued above959.
The non-legal sanctions and the costs associated with insecure
software have not been sufficient to improve the level of security in
software960. Also the enforcement mechanism appears to provide weak
additional incentives, especially when the possibly available cheaper
enforcement alternatives like ombudsmen and consumer complaint
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961 Product liability as a form of consumer protection is problematic from the
point of view of enforcement in the network level. The insufficiency of
national laws and their enforcement and the need for network level
implementation is emphasised in the characteristically internationally COTS
software business.
962 This juxtaposition of the parties is a weakness of the implementation
strategy basing on the threat of sanctions and their enforcement (deterrence),
as raised in sociolegal analysis of regulation such as Ayres and Braithwaite,
Responsive Regulation, p. 25.
963 The statistics gathered by Cem Kaner and David Pels in Software Customer
Dissatisfaction almost a decade ago already testify this.
boards are in a relatively weak position to influence international
software houses961.
Another type of implementation of product liability rules is via
persuasion, cooperation and negotiated solutions which are used
instead of punishment of deviant behaviour. Contractual negotiations
between the customer and the COTS software vendor together with
the negotiations between the representatives of the consumer interests
and the vendors are central implementation measures. This holds the
promise for better internalisation of the standards in the enterprises’
decision-making concerning secure software development and wider
acceptance of the rules because the juxtaposition and conflicts
between the parties are not emphasised. The implementation does
not originate from the assumption that the economic burden related
to the threat of sanctions and the related moral blame is necessary
in order to get the objects of regulation to comply962.
Consumer redress for poor quality and security COTS software,
like any other good, operates in practice almost entirely outside the
legal system. It is handled usually by complaints procedures of
manufacturers and retailers, which differ in their likelihood of
producing redress for the consumer. Traditionally, the software
industry has not succeeded well in this963. There are several feasible
explanations. 
Already the above mentioned weaker informational position of
the customers (both private individuals and industrial customers
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964 Even though industrial buyers are in a better informational position to
evaluate the products and vendors claims, they still are at the mercy of the
COTS software vendor largely because the lack the means (not only are white-
box methods largely unavailable, but also the tools for testing even on the
developer side are relatively undeveloped and not in wide use), financial
resources, and sufficient incentives to evaluate the products security.
965 The settlements, especially when done confidentially so that everything
from initial discovery through the actual details of a settlement are kept secret,
can lead to lower average quality inputs used and lower average security of
products sold, than that which would be produced if a firm were committed to
openness. This has been shown by two U.S. law and economic scholars
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum in Secrecy and Safety, p.
1074-1091. The final applicability of this argument and other conclusions made
about the effects of the choice between confidential or open settlements to the
settlements in software product liability cases is, however, uncertain and
requires context specific research in the future.
including competitors) with their possible representatives like
consumer organisations in relation to security related vulnerabilities,
causes problems to this cooperative model of self-implemen-tation964.
Further problems for the cooperative implementation are caused by
the same above mentioned reasons that lie behind the ineffectiveness
of the deterrence model of enforcement. 
The success of cooperative enforcement depends on the possibility
to detect and correct or compensate the situations where the level
of security is not high enough. When there are severe hindrances for
litigation and the possibilities to find out the low level of security and
quality or to use that knowledge, even when available, to negotiate
higher security standard next time, the COTS vendors might not be
sufficiently concerned with future encounters with the same customers
to resist the short-term temptation to minimize the development costs
at the cost of security. Harm causer will be likely to be able to settle
out of court for negotiated sums that are lower than those that would
create efficient levels of deterrence also because of the strong post-
breach bargaining position resulting especially from the seemingly
effective use liability disclaimers and exclusions clauses by the software
vendors965. The negotiation force of the customers alone might not
sufficient to shift the current balance under which COTS software
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966 The need for the participation of several actors is considered obvious as
noted by Thomas Wilhelmsson, Administrative Procedures for the Control of
Marketing Practices, p. 142-143 and 146, in relation to the regulation of
marketing. The different approaches to the regulation of marketing inside EU
has been highlighted also in the European studies on better regulation, such as
the Better Regulation Task Force’s (renamed as Better Regulation Commission
in the beginning of 2006) study on the use of alternatives to classic regulation
in the EU, Routes to Better Regulation, Annex 2.
967 It is important to note that the implementation of these rules is partly also
based on similar self-implementation via ordinary civil proceedings as product
liability rules. Thus, also the above considerations apply to their
implementation. Below, only those types of implementation that differ from
the product liability rules are considered.
vendors can get away with several security related vulnerabilities in
their systems.
Specific implementation issues in the duty-to-disclose rules. Since the legal duties
to disclose are somewhat based on different rules that are only partly
complementary to the product liability rules, a few separate notions
on their implementation is in order. The variety of material legal rules
establishing duties to disclose vulnerability information, varying from
rules on general unfair marketing practices (such as unfair advertising)
and unfair competition to the “lack of safety” standards in product
liability law and general contract and tort law can naturally be
implemented in various ways. Even in culturally and economically
relatively homogenous area like the EU the variations are extensive;
some rely on competitors as primary interveners of unacceptable
practices, others on consumer or similar organisations, self-regulatory
bodies, individuals as parties in court proceedings concerning
injunctions or damages, and even on administrative control966. Due
to the large variety in implementation methods the analysis or their
effects cannot be detailed or in depth. Only cursory notions on general
level can be made967.
In the case where the disclosure rules are based on legislation on
marketing practices, that in many countries (like the Nordic) concern
unfairness both from the point of view of consumers and
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968 In Finland, where a special legislation on unfair competition (Finnish Unfair
Business Practices Act 1061/1978) concerns practices that are unfair to other
entrepreneurs, even it is presented as having an indirect protective function
also in relation consumers. This is explicitly stated in the Government
Proposal 114/1978 and is repeated in the literature such as Castrén, EU-
Suomen markkinaoikeus, p. 237. As noted above, Finland has also regulation
on unfair contract terms that covers both enterprise and consumer relations.
969 Same argument in general is made by Thomas Wilhelmsson in
Administrative Procedures for the Control of Marketing Practices, p. 147-148.
competitors968 the function of a watchdog is entrusted to competitors.
Competitors can seek prohibition for unfair marketing from courts
(in Finland from special Market Court that also applies the similar
rules in the Consumer Protection Act). Even though competitors on
the average are more aware of their rights and can be expected to be
more knowledgeable of the security issues, they might not be incited
to take unfair marketing practices to the court. This is so especially
when they, as is the case of security related vulnerabilities in software,
are subjects to the same problems and might even conduct similar
marketing practices. In nearly monopolistic situations present
especially in operating systems software, there might not even be
competitors that could intervene against the marketing. 
Consumers incentives and possibilities to litigate under unfair
marketing practice provisions, where provided a possibility to do so,
is even more constrained, e.g., due to the lack of information, fear
of costs, small losses to the individual compared to the consumers
as a collective, and evidentiary uncertainty. Even when collective level
intervention, that is apart from the individual disputes, is enabled,
as is done in many EC countries (e.g., consumer organisation or
similar bodies are empowered to institute injunction proceedings
against unfair marketing practices) the results might not be sufficient
when a complex technological issue like the disclosure of
vulnerabilities is at stake. The organisations lack the economic
resources, expertise, and incentive due to the weak mutual
understanding between consumers and possible conflicting interests
(others, such as early adopters may favour new innovative features
more than security compared to average users that have no use for
such features).969
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970 Similar supervising administrative agencies exist, for example, also in UK in
the form of the Director General of Fair Trading and the Office of Fair
Trading. See the web pages of the Office of Fair Trading at http://
www.oft.gov.uk/ [20.1.2006].
971 Wilhelmsson, Administrative Procedures for the Control of Marketing
Practices, p. 143-144.
972 There is not a long way from the actions taken by the Finnish Consumer
Agency in advising the providers of broadband connections to inform their
customers of the need for security measures like firewalls, anti-virus software
and updated operating systems in the open networks, to advices given to
software vendors to inform about the vulnerabilities in their products. Of the
previous recommendation see the Press Release 24.11.2004 of the Finnish
Consumer Agency at http://www.kuluttajavirasto.fi [23.2.2006]. 
Another form of implementation that is used in relation to the
vague general marketing clauses forbidding unfair marketing and
unfair contract terms is the use of administrative control system that
in the Scandinavian countries is employed by the consumer
ombudsmen970. The public authorities have a central role in
supervising marketing to consumers and can conduct negotiations
with the enterprises and their organisations. In the Nordic countries,
the ombudsman also acts as a plaintiff in injunction proceedings
against entrepreneurs in the special courts.971
This form of implementation through administrative control, where
the public authority bases its work on a set of broad general clauses
on unfair marketing issued in legislation and the possibility to issue
injunctions against unacceptable marketing, has certain benefits that
could make it influential in relation to the disclosure of security related
vulnerabilities in software. The vague general legislative mandates
enable the public authorities to tackle with multitude of issue of which
the disclosure of vulnerabilities in software could be one even though
it currently is not in the agenda972. By mainly using negotiations with
the enterprises that behave in an unacceptable way (in this case, do
not inform sufficiently of the security of their products) and relevant
business organisations in order to create concrete and acceptable
standards for marketing behaviour, the internalisation of the standards
provided into the decision-making of the enterprises is made more
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973 Wilhelmsson, Wilhelmsson, Administrative Procedures for the Control of
Marketing Practices, p. 155.
974 Interests in information security concern much more traditional consumer
protection issues like the protection of personal data and payments in e-
commerce. For example, the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman in instructs for
Internet marketers states clearly how the transfer of personal data and the
electronic payments are secured. The common position of the Nordic
Ombudsmen is that if the transfers or payments are not sufficiently protected,
then the marketer has to inform the consumer about this. See the web pages of
the Finnish Consumer Authorities (agency and ombudsman) at http://
www.kuluttavirasto.fi [23.2.2006], also in English.
975 Both the administrative control system and the self-implementation of the
legislation concerning marketing practices lose much of their efficacy when a
consumer deals directly with a foreign vendor. As pointed out by John
Rothchild in Co-Regulating the Internet, p. 180, attempts to enforce the laws
of the consumer’s jurisdiction face both legal and practical roadblocks.
likely. This also helps in striving at a broad acceptance of the
principles, which is a prerequisite for efficiency that reaches further
than the single control measure and decisions.973
However, since the emerging COTS software business is not
particularly well-organised as a community, despite the powerful lobby
groups like the Business Software Alliance representing the big
commercial enterprises, and is essentially international in nature, the
national administrative control is not likely to be interested in software
vulnerability issues anytime soon974. Even if the security related
software vulnerabilities are raised as an important consumer issue,
the national administrative control system runs into problems in
countries whose software is mainly imported or bought directly from
abroad, e.g., via the Internet975. Due to the complexity and newness
of the issue the administrative control system is not likely to react
anytime soon when even the major players in the field are not aware
of the vulnerability issues.
In sum, due to the self-implementing nature and many
shortcomings of the private law implementation of the legal duties
to disclose and of the administrative control model, the deterrence
model of enforcement seems ineffective in relation to secure software
development. The expected costs of non-compliance are not increased
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976 This is emphasised by Janet R. Hunziker and Trevor O. Jones, Product
Liability axd Ixxovatiox, p. 13, in an overview of more traditional industries like
chemical, medical devices, automotive engineering, and general aviation
engineering mainly in the U.S. This is clearly visible also in the management
guides to computer security where legal issues, if considered at all, are
considered briefly together with other operational risk issues. From the
perspective of regulatory theory the fact that market actors see the law as a
source of risk (it is something uncertain and unpredictable; a risk that has to be
managed) is contrary to the traditional legal dogmatic view according to which
the private law plays essentially a facilitative role and provides a map of market
life by reflecting market practices, and calls into question these
conceptualisation of (private) law as argued by Julia Black in Law and
Regulation, p. 52-54. However, both views are typically present in dogmatic
legal analysis to the degree both the preventive and reparative (compensatory)
functions of private law are recognised.
to a degree that would turn the calculus assumption behind the
standard deterrence model in favour of compliance due to the several
shortcomings of the implementation. The value of expected costs
of compliance together with the punishment for non-compliance does
not easily exceed the value of expected benefits of non-compliance.
Thus, under this basic model, sufficient incentives to comply do not
seem to be present.
5.3.4 Reaction of objects
The assumption that can be seen to underlie the preventive or
deterrent theories is that the possibility of liability for damages caused
by defective products is seen by the producers as a risk. To them, the
law is something uncertain and unpredictable; a risk that has to be
managed. Product liability risk is a category of legal risks that the
vendors have to manage in any industry976. Enterprises as economic
actors in general can be assumed to endeavour to analyse the risk they
are subjected to in their line of business and their associated costs
and to minimize them. 
The expectation is that objects of regulation in the case of secure
software development take preventive measures in order to shield
against legal liability costs. The costs and benefits of liability
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977 The influence mechanism of liability regulation, i.e., signalling to potential
victims and potential injurers about the way they ought to behave, requires an
assumption that those whose behaviour the law is seeking to affect are rational.
They must be able to perceive that they can minimise their liability by taking
precautionary actions of a particular kind and amount as Cooter and Ulen, Law
and Economics, p. 330, explicate in relation to tort-liability system.
978 Schuck, Tort Liability, p. 485, makes this argument in his assessment of the
regulatory effectiveness of tort law. He refers to Latin H (1994) Good
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, University of California Los
Angeles Law Review, vol. 41. As research on risk has shown the majority of
citizens do not evaluate hazards in the way technologically sophisticated
analysts do. Instead of employing risk assessment, they rely on intuitive risk
judgements, typically called ‘risk perceptions’ (Slovic, Perception of Risk, p.
220).
management are assumed to be compared and an economically
efficient level of precaution in the form of risk management be taken.
Businesses are assumed to observe regulation, in this case the risk
of legal liability, as a cost which needs to be minimised by cost-
effective adjustments to their operations.
The assumptions of rationally self-interested and fully-informed
decision-makers that underlie this economic model of prevention977
can be closer to reality in the case of high-attention decision-makers
like product manufacturers than it would be in the case of private
individuals. They possess the opportunity, information, and incentive
to think rationally and in advance about the kind and the level of risk
they are prepared to create and the tradeoffs such choices involve.
These actors can be expected to be more readily deterrable by liability
regulation than ordinary private individuals acting as consumers who
do not make decisions about potential liability in this way978. 
Preliminary empirical research on the assessment of liability risks,
however, points to the direction that the intensity of the examination
of the risks of liability depends on the extent, size, time-scale and
general economic importance of the business transaction in question.
According to the respondents from business associations and
representatives from the legal professions to an EU wide questionnaire
on contractual and non-contractual liability from the year 2001, exact
and detailed liability risk analyses are undertaken only for very
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979 The results of the research have been reported by von Bar and Drobning in
Study on Property Law and Non-contractual Liability Law as they relate to Contract Law,
p. 413-414. According to von Bar and Drobning, insurance coverage replaces
the examination of liability in many cases. However, particular attention always
applies to questions of liability which are linked with the object of contract
itself such as the liability for defects and consequential damage. True liability
risk management is likely to be even scarcer in the software industry due to the
methods for legal risk management having not yet reached any level of
sophistication and having not been generally adopted in the IT industry, as
argued by a London based solicitor Rachel Burnett in Legal Risk Management
for the IT Industry, p. 61-67.
980 Fischhoff and Merz, The Inconvenient Public, p. 169.
981 Fischhoff and Merz, The Inconvenient Public, p. 171-172.
982 The differences in the ways companies in different industries manage the
risk of product liability is emphasised by Janet R. Hunziker and Trevor O.
Jones, Product Liability and Innovation, p. 13, in relation to more traditional
industries.
important transactions. With standard business transaction liability
risks are examined scarcely.979
As noted by Baruch Fischhoff and John F. Merz, available
empirical studies also suggest that when experts must rely on
judgement, their thought processes often resemble those of
laypeople980. They tend to exaggerate the extent of their knowledge
and to oversimplify policy issues. Since the feedback from the court
system about the requirements of the product liability law is severely
delayed, lacks in detail, and is of limited usefulness due to the lawsuits
arising from very small proportion of claims that are, in turn, a small
subset of the injuries associated with a product, also the experts have
real difficulties in making decisions that comply with the requirements
of the law981.
The precautionary measures vary according to the specific
characteristics of the industry, the product and its delivery982. Risk
management involves a variety of methods like quality assurance,
information disclosure (e.g., safe use instructions), contracting, and
insurance. Certain main strategies above the specific measures used
to manage product liability risk can, however, be categorised. Prevention
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983 Economic theory explains this in the following way. If the vendor
overestimates the legal standard (simply makes a small random error in
predicting the legal standard that could go either way) and since unnecessary
precautions costs them less than liability, the vendor is given an incentive to
take more precaution in order to create a margin of error within which they
will not be liable. Note that this applies to a negligence rule. In relation to the
rule of strict liability, court errors in computing damages distort precaution
more than errors in setting standards. (Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics,
p.319-320)
984 Preliminary empirical evidence from the research on the economic impact
of the development risk defence as provided by the EC Product Liability
Directive 85/374/EEC (Calderini et al., Analysis of the Economic Impact of the
Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for
Defective Products, p. 46-47) demonstrates that when faced with high uncertainty
and especially with possibly catastrophic consequences, only firms that have
the capability to correctly evaluate the risks and to enact activities are likely to
be efficiently incited to develop safer products. Other firms tend to over-react
and to decide with respect to worst-case scenarios. The consequence could be
the abandoning of the business altogether or, as seems to be the case in the
software industry, the adopting of opportunistic behaviour (strict liability
disclaimers) in order to reduce potential liability. This practice does not
increase the security of software and leaves the customers with little or no
protection.
985 By disclaiming liability the risk of liability for software defects is managed in
of risks is the primary method and includes measures like development
of more secure products, obtaining of information about product
risks and its dissemination, and product recall and repair. Limitation
and transfer of liability risks includes, among other things, contractual
measures and insurance.
As was noted above, vague and unpredictable product liability rules
leave software vendors uncertain about whether a particular level of
precaution will result in the court’s finding them liable or not liable
for product related damages. In such a situation, vendors can be
assumed to take excessive precaution983. In the case of COTS software
industry, the primary precaution seems to be avoidance or shift of
liability due to the uncertainties, instead of developing more secure
software984. The management of the risk of liability for defective and
insecure software has largely focused on the limitation or transfer of
risk by contracts. Liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses provide
a relatively cheap and easy way to manage risks985. Improvement of
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an international context with large customer base more easily and with lower
initial costs than by other risk management measures; even more easily than by
disclosing the vulnerability information. The argument made above that legal
risk management has not been generally adopted in the IT industry also
partially explains the heavy reliance on contractual risk management. It simply
provides to most easy way to manage the liability risk.
986 Liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses have been used successfully at
least as a post-breach bargaining tool and a psychological barrier. Liability has
not been foreseeable enough for the vendors to invest more in secure software
development.
987 Other risk management methods become relevant when the uncertainty
about the validity of the contractual risk management increases. The different
approaches among the legal systems of EU Member States to the validity of
liability exclusion clauses, pointed out by Christian von Bar and Ulrich
Drobning, Study on Property Law and Non-contractual Liability Law as they relate to
Contract Law, p. 177-178, in their study on the problems and obstacles for the
smooth running of the internal market resulting from differences in property
law, non-contractual (tortious) liability law and contract law in most of the legal
systems of the European Union, increase the uncertainty about the validity of
liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses. At least the considerations of the
extent to which liability limitation clauses are recognized and can be
implemented in different jurisdictions, the risk of actual legal action (and the
enthusiasm for litigation) together with costs of going to court all play an
important role. The variety of approaches in turn raises the costs of
the security of the software has not been of much concern986, perhaps
until recently, and insurances have not been available for long.
Despite the excessive reliance on contractual risk management
techniques and the relative unavailability and lack of use of many of
the other methods of liability risk management, in a regulatory analysis
we still need to consider how the other possible risk management
methods shape the influence mechanism of product liability rules on
secure software development. Since we are concentrating on the
capabilities of product liability rules to influence behaviour, and not
their actual influence on behaviour, the possible reactions of the vendors
need to be considered in order to see how the influence of product
liability could be shaped by the reactions of the objects. This widened
analysis is further justified by the increasing demands for regulation
through product liability rules both in U.S. and Europe and the
consequent increasing foresee-ability of liability related costs possibly
leading vendors to reconsider the validity of liability disclaimers and
exclusion clauses987.
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ascertaining what the legal position of a specific country is, if it is ascertainable
with anything like certainty. As Juha Pöyhönen, one of the leading contract law
scholars in Finland, notes in Törkeä tuottamus ja vastuunrajoitusehdot, p. 97,
the use of such liability risk management methods that are not legally certain,
i.e., are either wholly or partly invalid disclaimers, can give an overly positive
conception of the actual liability position for the vendor. Reliance on such
uncertain terms can, at worst, lead to inefficient management of business risks. 
988 This is inline with the perspective shared by most scholars in the field of
innovation economics and strategic management, who agree that the way in
which companies change and adapt to the environment consists in modifying
and introducing new procedures and norms. According to this perspective,
firms’ operations are essentially based on routines, norms and procedures that
may be formal or informal and tacit. As noted by Mario Calderini, Marco
Cantamessa and Alessandro Palmigiano, Analysis of the Economic Impact of the
Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for
Defective Products, p. 43, in their analysis about the economic impact of the
possible removal of the development risk defence provided by the European
Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC, according to this view, companies
will deal with a change in the legal liability regime by adapting their internal and
company-specific product development process to the extent that it is possible
or economically viable. 
As pointed out above, the assumption of the regulators in product
liability seems to be that the primary preventive measure is
improvement of the products quality and security together with
gathering and disseminating security related information988. The
emphasis ought to be on these preventive measures to the degree the
bugs are economically feasible to remove. The approach seems to
be that the risk management methods that try to transfer or limit
liability ought to be used only for the remaining risks. To the degree
preventive measures like more secure development and information
dissemination are taken due to the increase in potential liability costs,
the assumption about the ability of product liability to influence secure
software development is correct. 
COTS software business relies heavily on patching to correct the
bugs that are discovered from released products. Due to speed-to-
market and short term cost reduction considerations this can happen
even at the cost of initial secure software development, as has been
argued above. This is a central shaper of the influence of product
liability rules on secure software development. The focus of software
development does not necessarily turn to adding security from the
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989 As pointed out by Calderini et al. in Analysis of the Economic Impact of the
Development Risk Clause as provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for
Defective Products, p. 133, the effect on innovative activity is shaped by many
different industry specific characteristics, such as market structure, the pace of
innovation, product architecture and the product life cycle. In the terms of
Janet R. Hunziker and Trevor O. Jones in Product Liability and Innovation, p. 14
“[t]he synergy between the product liability system and innovation takes place
in a particular social, legal, and regulatory environment. The peculiar nature of
that synergy is influenced by trends in such things as the availability of
insurance, public attitudes toward risk, the body of statutory law that governs
products and processes, and how technological questions are dealt with by the
law.”
990 Viscusi and Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and
Innovation, p. 182.
start, instead the practice of release-and-patch could continue. This
is in case the companies seriously turn to quality and security assurance
as risk management methods, instead of strict liability disclaimers.
As has been argued above, contractual risk management has
dominated for long in the case of software security risks.
Effects on innovative activity. Product liability rules not only influence
the firms decisions to use secure software development measures,
but they can also affect their willingness to innovate. The effects on
innovative activity are, however, very difficult to analyse and subject
to many variables989. Only certain basic arguments can be made
without a detailed industry specific analysis that is not available at this
stage.
One of the strategies for firms to cope with increased uncertainty
and risk in a stricter liability regime, is a reduction of their innovative
output. However, the empirical evidence from more traditional goods
provided by Kip Viscusi and Michael Moore supports this approach
only partially990. Higher product liability costs provide incentives for
product safety improvements and increase product R&D intensity.
However they do it only initially, and at high levels of liability costs,
liability reduces innovative activity.
As argued by Kip Viscusi and Michael Moore at a theoretical level,
higher liability costs will increase product innovations directly related
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991 Viscusi and Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and
Innovation, p. 167. The empirical data used by Viscusi and Moore did not
enable them to distinguish the effects of product liability on safety-related
research and development expenditures and on the development of new
varieties of products (Idem., p. 182).
992 Viscusi and Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and
Innovation, p. 167.
to safety improvements and also those that introduce new technologies
if they decrease the costs of providing safety991. Thus, not only the
use of secure software development tools and methods would be
positively affected by increased liability, but also the security improving
innovations would be increased. However, innovations that do not
lower the marginal costs of providing safety will be depressed. In the
case of extreme liability costs, product novelty will be eliminated
altogether as the firm selects the no-risk corner solution.992
It has been argued that if the software vendors would face full
liability of the design defect types of software vulnerabilities, the costs
could be so big as to make not only the profitability of the product
but possibly even the firm itself precarious. It is true that the highly
innovative software firms that introduce new products with uncertain
implications for safety and security also run substantial liability risk.
When insurance is not available, and is not likely to be in the near
future for innovation fuelling SMEs due to the high costs, as will be
discussed below, the costs of stricter liability does seem unbearable
for many companies. In such a situation, the effects of liability rules
could be devastating.
In the case of COTS software, however, this would be unlikely.
Even though software vendors have feared the theoretical possibility
for full liability for any consequences (direct of indirect) of bugs and
malfunctions of the delivered software and issued exclusion clauses
into license agreement attached to the software, their actual extent
does not seem overwhelming. The many excuses and defences
provided by product liability rules lower the true liability risk. As the
above analysis of the substance of product liability rules showed, under
a deeper analysis the risk of liability does not seem unbearable at all
for the software vendors in many countries; even if it would be applied
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993 This has been pointed out in 2003 by Christian Egeskov and Jan
Christensen in Behovet for forsikring af softwareproducentens mulige
erstatningansvar, p. 51, in relation to the U.S. and the Danish markets, and in
2005 by Jay P. Kesan, Ruperto P. Majuca and William J. Yurcik in The
Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, p. 26 in relation to the U.S. insurance
markets. This situation has not changed much since 1977 when Peter Seipel in
Computing Law, p. 87, pointed out that “[l]iability insurance for programming
consultants, software houses, and similar categories is, however, available only
to a rather limited extent”.
994 As Connolly, Insurance: The Liability Messenger, p. 132, explains in
discussing the reasons why the insurance system sometimes fails: “For new
products, the data do not yet exist. And for complicated products, the available
data do not provide a sufficiently strong basis for making credible predictions”.
995 Premiums for cyber-insurance that cover several areas including losses
arising from DoS attacks, e-business interruption, electronic theft of sensitive
information etc, in addition to product liability suites, have been reported to
range from $5,000 to $60,000 per $1 million of coverage (Kesan et al., The
Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, p. 29). The prices can expected to
continue to remain high since the time and stability to develop statistical data
for actuarial tables is just not present in the case of rapidly moving software
security environment. Software products are in constant change and as a
consequence, flaws in software change dynamically and new attacks are
released daily. Future risks are unknown also because both crackers and
in its current form. But the high costs of developing more secure
software combined with increased liability and insurance costs might
negatively influence SMEs’ willingness to innovate. Research into these
issues is needed.
Use of insurance. Possible increase in the probability of liability for
insecure software is also likely to lead to increased demand for
insurance or financial coverage. However, cyber-insurance markets
are just emerging993. The costs of insecurity of such a relatively new
type of a complex product such as software have been unknown and
insurance has not been offered for long994. The possibility for insurers
to rely on measures of predictability to forecast probable risk and set
prices have been enabled only recently when scant historical and
actuarial data about the risks of product liability in the case of insecure
software is being gathered. For the same reasons, prices have remained
high995. They are relatively beyond reach of small and medium-sized
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protective technology is getting better. (Kesan et al, The Economic Case for
Cyberinsurance, p. 29)
996 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 50.
997 Calderini et al., Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause as
provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products, p. 70.
998 Connolly, Insurance: The Liability Messenger, p. 131-132. In the terms of
this study, they regulate the behaviour of the vendors with a market-based
instrument. Insurance would deserve to be studied as a type of regulatory
instrument in its own right. Only its relations to the liability rules are briefly
considered in here.
companies. Still, vendors’ insurance is certainly one way to provide
victims with compensation while also allowing companies to afford
high risk activities such as innovation and product development.
When considering the way the increased demand for insurance
shapes the effects of liability, despite the above problems of insurance
markets in dealing with losses arising from insecure software, we
cannot bypass the moral hazard problem. As explained in
microeconomic theory, moral hazard arises when the behaviour of
the insured changes after the purchase of insurance so that the
probability of loss or the size of the loss increases996. Insurance policies
are considered under this theory to affect firms’ incentive in taking
adequate care in product safety and security. However, the effect of
insurance policies on product security is unclear and multi-faceted997.
The influence of the insurance system for the management of
corporate liabilities is best understood, as explained by Dennis R.
Connolly, by considering the system as a message-bearer998. Insurers
send a message to insurance buyers whenever they set premium rates
and establish the terms and conditions of coverage. Already when
the insurance companies are in the position of monitoring injurer’s
procedures, the injurer will have an incentive to take efficient care.
However, since information asymmetries almost entirely prevent
efficient monitoring of software development practices, the insurer’s
control over company activities might not be effective in improving
the incentives for secure software development. As Mario Calderini,
Marco Cantamessa and Alessandro Palmigiano explain, insurers may
try to resolve information asymmetries by acquiring information and
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999 Calderini et al. in Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Development Risk Clause
as provided by Directive 85/374/EEC on Liability for Defective Products, p. 70. Most
common methods to minimize moral hazard are coinsurance and deductibles.
Under coinsurance the insured party shoulders a fixed percentage of her loss
and under a deductible plan, a fixed monetary amount of the loss, with the
insurer paying for all losses above that amount. Some insurance companies
also offer reductions in premiums for certain easily established acts that reduce
claims. (Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 51)
1000 Note that this does not have to restrict to external influencing by the
insurance companies. Info on the availability of premium reductive tools and
development methods can even change the preferences (intrinsic
predispositions) of vendors in relation to secure software (desire for security
instead of pure features and functionalities).
1001 Kesan et al., The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, p. 19. This is the
situation where the cost of a little more precaution (marginal cost) equals the
resulting reduction in the expected cost of harm (marginal benefit) (Cooter and
Ulen, Law and Economics, p. 301.
setting premium-performance schemes999. 
Basically, the insurance company can require software vendors
to undertake secure software development tools and practices and
to employ standards and development methods where available.
Premiums can also be tied to claims histories where available or
proactively to the insured firm’s investment in secure software
development. Naturally this is not without problems for example in
the establishment of correct standards and in their private enforcement
by the insurance companies. However, this should, at least in principle,
give sufficient incentives for the software vendors to improve the
security of their products contrary to the moral hazard argument1000.
The turn to insurance industry for help in the managing product
liability risks might not only lead to more secure software but also
to a level of security that is socially efficient. In the most positive
evaluations such as that of Jay P. Kesan, Ruperto P. Majuca and
William J. Yurcik the pooling of information by the insurance
companies and their superior expertise in assigning proper prices to
risk and in developing safety standards is seen as a way to set achieve
the socially efficient level of care1001. This might be an overly optimistic
view of the capabilities of the insurance companies, but it is true that
they can at least help in setting regulatory standards and make it easier
to find the socially optimal level of care.
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1002 As the Canadian law professor Jennifer Chandler also correctly emphasises
in Improving Software Security, p. 3, the problems of information security are
probably best tackled on many fronts simultaneously, including efforts to
enforce cyber crime laws, measures by internet service providers to help secure
the network, improvements in the security consciousness of end-users and,
concerted efforts to improve software security. However, secure software
development needs to be placed among the most important issues to be
tackled with. Despite the increasing interest, it still remains neglected when
compared to the issues of network security and computer crime.
6 Conclusions
As a partial answer to the question posed by Henrik Kaspersen about
the issues that should be enhanced in information security, this study
postulates that secure software is a central element. Secure software
development is one of the most crucial issues in information security
to be enhanced.  It ought to be an important public policy if we wish
to achieve a more secure network society and to maintain trust for
information products and systems in commerce. 
Of course, the entire blame for information insecurity cannot be
placed on the developers of vulnerable software. However, without
such a high amount of exploitable defects in software the attacks by
opportunistic criminals and the accidents due to the behaviour of
computer users would result in far less damage. A significant part of
the problem can be traced to poor software quality and security.1002
This is so especially now when we are moving to a mobile world
where services utilising Internet connections are more and more used
with portable devices. This trend together with the wider digital
convergence increases the complexity of systems and at the same time
brings new sources of information security threats to the mobile
networks, devices and services used therein and to their users. In
addition to a great number of conventional threats from the personal
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1003 In a recent research of the threats to information security in the use of
mobile devices, services and networks done for the Development Programme
on Trust and Information Security in Electronic Services (LUOTI) of the
Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ahonen et al., Information
Security Threats and Solutions in the Mobile World, p. 41-44, report such threats as
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, virus infections and spam.
1004 Basie von Solms and Emil Marais, From Secure Wired Networks to Secure
Wireless Networks – What Are the Extra Risks?, p. 634-635, identify such risks
as lack of proper risk analysis due to the easy installation of wireless networks,
eavesdropping, and ad-hoc peer-to-peer networks even without a need for a
wireless access point.
1005 As pointed out by Ahonen et al. in Information Security Threats and Solutions in
the Mobile World, p. 23, when the network infrastructures are converging
towards IP-based solutions, the control and responsibility of the information
security management is becoming fragmented.
1006 The possibilities for automated updating of the software in mobile devices
is not only currently under developed, but also includes a lot of difficulties, for
example, in maintaining the integrity of the updates and verifying the sources
of updates.
computing area that concern also mobile devices1003, a variety of totally
new set of security risks come along with wireless networks1004. 
In a situation where the level of information security management,
together with know-how about information security issues, varies
between different stakeholders in such a rapidly evolving field as
mobile communication, the reliance on reactive protection measures
is no longer sufficient. Especially not when mobile devices are used
in ever more critical situations (e.g., mobile devices in professional
business, radio frequency identification RFID in passports), and the
use of the devices and services, together with their development, is
no longer controlled by a single entity1005. The great number of
software versions in mobile devices together with the problems in
keeping them updated1006, unsatisfactory maintenance of software
by users (e.g., updating anti-virus software and backup of data) and
the more risk prone open programming interface of the new mobile
operating systems (e.g., use of a general purpose programming
languages like Java) emphasise the importance of the security of
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1007 These problems in the mobile world have been explicated, e.g., by Ahonen
et al. in Information Security Threats and Solutions in the Mobile World, p. 44-45.
software used in them1007. Security needs to be developed into the
systems form the beginning. Secure software development becomes
even a more crucial issue when software in a mobile device is being
used in an ever more ubiquitous manner. It is no longer sufficient
to rely on the software patching system alone (and the independent
security researchers who detect and publicize flaws) or the secondary
market in security software such as firewalls.
The argument has been that the state of the art in secure software
development in COTS markets is not sufficient for the needs of the
converging information infrastructure and the devices and services
used therein, where software products are increasingly being used
as components. The level of security just is not enough for electronic
services such as e-commerce or e-government. A central element for
the success of electronic services, i.e., trust in to the systems in use,
needs less vulnerability. Even more central the problem is for those
critical infrastructural systems, such as communications and electronic
networks that use COTS components. 
The traditional ways in which the state of the art in product safety
generally improves in an industry simply are not sufficient. For long,
COTS software industry have not dedicated sufficient amount of
resources to improve the security of their software. The care exercised
during the product development process, e.g., in requirements
engineering and product testing, are no longer sufficient and the
interest in the root causes of potential harm caused by vulnerable
software is not high. 
This has been mainly due to the immaturity of software engineering
as a discipline and consequent tradition of accepting defects in
software. Software security has not improved largely also due to the
lack of both demand from the customer side and of other incentives
for secure software development in the information economic
environment characterised by network effects and lock-in, where
market-driven software development occurs.
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1008 Canadian law professor Jennifer Chandler also emphasises this in her
recent article Improving Software Security, p. 22.
1009 Current market practice for developing COTS software seems to follow the
‘release and patch’ mode of selling software in the mass-market software
industry. Everyone is thought to understand and expect that complex modern
software will contain bugs. As Jennifer Chandler in Improving Software Security, p.
21-22 also notes, this customary practice can be a persuasive evidence of what
is considered to be the reasonable standard of care in the software industry.
Conformity with the custom usually is an indication of non-negligent
behaviour. However, compliance with custom is only a helpful evidence of the
exercise of reasonable care. It is not conclusive evidence. A court may
conclude that a custom is unreasonable and legislative activity can change the
required standard of care.
Not even the other mechanism in which state of art in product
safety generally improves have been sufficient to improve the security
of COTS software to the socially sufficient level, i.e., companies’
reaction to the information about the failures of their products on
the marketplace. Even though users are increasingly being enlisted
to help in finding errors in software products by making early releases
(beta versions) available, the problem is that this does not enhance
the security of the software products. Mainly due to the lack of skills
and motivation for conducting sophisticated security-specific testing
needed to find software defects causing security related vulnerabilities,
no amount of beta testing by customers at large will cover a sufficient
amount of bugs. As a result, an insufficient amount the security related
problems are reported to the developers. In addition, when patches
are released they often only fix the symptom of the problem thus
leaving the cause unaddressed, they often introduce new problems
due to them also being rushed out as a result of market pressures,
and often also go unapplied or are otherwise ineffective.
As the analysis made in this study suggests, it seems that industry
custom for mass-market software leaves significant room for
improvement1008. Current practices in the market-driven software
development do not necessarily reflect a reasonable level of care1009.
The costs of improvements in secure software development do not
yet equal the resulting reduction in the expected cost of harm when
considering all the societal costs. This means that it is possible to
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1010 Since greater security can be achieved, as has been argued several times
above, the relevant inquiry is whether the costs of improving security is more
or less than the value of the improved security (Chandler, Improving Software
Security , p. 20-21). Detailed calculations have not been made, but as the lack of
consideration for social costs by the vendors testifies, there is ample room for
improvement.
1011 Without downplaying the importance of the enhancement of the methods
and tools for secure software and information systems development, since they
are the means by which the security of software can improve, it must be
acknowledged that they are not improving without sufficient incentives.
1012 Even though the market failure considerations do not alone justify the need
increase the level of security in software, especially the amount of
security related defects in it, without losing the immense utility its
use have brought and can bring1010.
The sadder end result of this study is that even if the motivation
of the market actors would increase, e.g., customers would start to
demand secure software as we are currently witnessing, the level of
security will not rise to a level sufficient for the needs of the society
and its information infrastructure. As the considerations of such
market failures as externalities and inadequacy or asymmetry of
information suggested, the private motivation to enhance security
might not be sufficient to provide the amount of security that the
society as a whole needs for its information infrastructure. If the
market actors are left to themselves to enhance the technological and
methodological tools for software development, security of software
might not rise to a sufficient level from the societal point of view,
i.e., from the point of view of the security of the information
infrastructure that uses the software developed by the COTS software
industry1011.
If you accept my argument about the reasons for the lack of
security in software, the answers to the questions made by Henrik
Kaspersen about the factors that should be enhanced and the role
of regulation becomes more evident. The main problems that
regulation ought to try to solve in secure software development are
negative externalities and inadequacies or asymmetries in the
distribution of security related information1012. Negative externalities
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for regulation, since they are only one of the technical justifications for
regulation, they do show essential points to be regulated and tell about the
importance of regulation. They tell about the places where regulation is needed
and suggest what it can do. Welfare economic considerations are not the sole
justifications for regulation, but they are essential in depicting what to regulate
and how.
1013 Even though the concentration in this study is on the secure software
development part of information security, it needs to be stressed that the
regulatory tools analysed in this study influence, in addition to the behaviour of
software vendors and developers, also the attitudes of users and likely also the
users of COTS components.
are the costs spilled over to third parties due to the abuse of
vulnerabilities in common software product, such as system recovery
and upgrade, loosed business time, costs of dealing with the breaches
etc. Lack of adequate information about the quality aspects of security
in software leads to failure in the production and sale of information
in relation to the quality of software and its security features. The
informational asymmetry favouring the software vendor prevents the
underlying software products market from working properly and may
lead to more secure software products being turned out from the
market.
Two regulatory tools of vulnerability reporting and software
product liability were chosen for a deeper analysis in this study as likely
candidates for solving these problems. Both of them involve
theoretical potential for inciting improvements to the current secure
software development practices. They try to influence the above
mentioned mechanisms by which the state of the art in product safety
generally improves. Potential software product liability tries to increase
the motivation to dedicate resources to secure software development
and vulnerability disclosure mainly tries to improve the efficiency of
the feedback mechanism.1013
As regulatory tools, vulnerability reporting and software product
liability face several problems as has been argued above. Their
influence mechanisms are shaped by so many negatively shaping
factors that the practical effects are largely diluted. However, they
are not without capacity to influence. It is just that these regulatory
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1014 Similar to the role assigned for regulatory impact analysis in general in a
1997 collection of best practices in OECD countries (OECD, Regulatory Impact
Analysis, p. 7), the analysis of the regulatory capability of specific instruments
made in this study is not a sufficient basis for regulatory decision-making. At
best, it is only a guide to improve the quality of political and administrative
decision-making, while also serving important democratic values of openness,
public involvement and accountability.
1015 Product liability rules, are understood in this study to cover both laws
deriving from the EC Product Liability Directive (Council Directive
85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of laws, regulations and
administrative provision in the Member States concerning liability for defective
products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33, amended by directive 1999/34/EC OJ
L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21) and general doctrines for liability for damages
under contract law or tort law (delictual liability).
instruments would have to be altered in order to be able to influence
secure software development in practice.
It needs to be accentuated again that while considering ways to
enhance the efficacy of the two regulatory instruments analysed in
this study, the purpose is not to give direct advice in public policy.
The effort is to analyse different means to enhance certain public
policy, i.e., that of secure software development. Full evaluation of
the feasibility and desirability of different regulatory solutions for the
problems of developing secure software would require information
much more widely than just of the regulatory capabilities of
instruments. Issues like the efficiency, equity, manageability, legitimacy
and political feasibility of the specific instruments or their mixes
would, at least, be relevant. As the research also showed, several other
instruments would also have to be considered in similar vein.1014
6.1  Improving the influencing capacity
of software product liability rules
Justifications for change. The pressure to make product liability for defects
a serious threat for COTS software vendors has already increased1015.
It is no longer just the practitioners that are presenting demands for
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1016 Bear in mind that in this study, product liability rules are understood to
cover both laws deriving from the EC Product Liability Directive (Council
Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of laws,
regulations and administrative provision in the Member States concerning
liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33, amended by
directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21) and general doctrines for
liability for damages under contract law or tort law (delictual liability).
software product liability; also the political discussion is rising. The
demands for increased liability are likely to continue. 
For long, software industry has shielded itself from liability due
to the immaturity of the business and the methods of secure software
development. However, the argument that the state-of-the-art in
software development does not enable vendors to avoid security
related vulnerabilities or at least discover and correct defects that cause
them is no longer valid. Even though software development practices
traditionally have not acknowledged security related vulnerabilities
and cost-effective ways to avoid them have been scarce, with increased
interest in security related vulnerabilities such methods have evolved.
As has already been argued, despite the current inadequacy of the
methods and tools for secure software development there are well-
known technical and procedural ways to prevent at least the widely
known vulnerabilities; the state of the art no longer prevent vendors
from doing this. It is more of a result of the business environment;
first-to-market competition in the network economic environment
motivates to release early and often which tends to override the time
consuming and expensive security considerations.
Thus, the release of unfinished products should no longer be
excused from liability under the state of the art –defence, at least not
when information security is threatened. When vendors have cost-
effective means to discover and correct vulnerabilities, the beta-
release-as-a-final-version -type of practice, where the release is
followed by extensive patching and corrections in new releases, should
be allowed only to a degree. It no longer is an adequate justification
to ignore the expectation of security that software product users have.
Here we come to the degree to which software vendors are liable
under product liability rules1016.  The standard that the default rules
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1017 See chapter 2.
1018 The direct and indirect damages might be substantial, e.g., in the case of an
e-commerce site being shut down due to a DDoS attack via a vulnerability in a
component of the system. Cambell et al. in The Economic Cost of Publicly
Announced Information Security Breaches, p. 431-448, provide empirical
evidence also of significant negative stock market reactions for published
information security breaches involving unauthorised access to confidential
data (especially if personal data is accessed).
on defectiveness (conformity) and consumer product liability rules
set is dependent on the level of quality and security their customers
can reasonably expect.  
As has been argued above1017, customary practice in secure software
product development leaves significant room for improvement.
Current practice in secure software development is not optimal. Since
improvements seem to be cost-justified, current practice does not
reflect a reasonable level of care in software development. Neither
does it reflect the level of expectation users’ have on the security of
the software products that they buy.
Many issues have traditionally spoken against the expectation of
security on the customers’ side. It has been a widely repeated fact that
defect free software is an illusion and no customer can expect any
complex software products to be flawless. In addition, customers have
been accepting towards vulnerabilities (even security related) resulting
from the defects as a trade-of for new innovative features.
Currently, however, industrial buyers (as system developers) are
increasingly recognising their high self-interest in the security related
vulnerabilities. They are increasingly realising that vulnerabilities found
in the components of their systems not only will cause damages when
the risk materialises1018, but will also hamper their sales of the system
or damage their public image when the existence of the vulnerability
also in their system (that uses the vulnerable component) becomes
widely known. They thus have legitimate expectations for the security
of the components they use. Even the negative effect of vulnerabilities
(especially when they are widely discussed in the media, as they
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1019 Note that for the same reasons industrial buyers are more likely to
negotiate on these issues expressly in software contracts and have the leverage
to demand changes to the standard form contracts typically used in COTS
software business. Even though such practice is still rather rare, it will reduce
the importance of the default rules that depend on the expectations of the
users in general as the practice generalises. However, bear in mind that the
investment in security by one organisation in a networked environment creates
sizeable external benefits (positive externalities) of which the investor does not
get compensations and, similarly, the breach of security brings negative
externalities. The incentives to invest resources are lower than the societal
optimum when these costs and benefits are not considered. 
1020 As Chandler, Improving Software Security, p. 28, puts it in relation to tort
liability: “In the end, perhaps the strongest arguments about the reasonable
standard of care in software development can be made about common
currently are) on the overall trust of customer in the line of business
at least ought to speak in favour of the expectation of security.1019
Also private individuals in general at least ought to have good
reasons to expect security from software products. Even though their
self-interest in claiming damages or resorting to other remedies is low
due to the direct losses for the individual end-user in many cases being
close to insignificant (such as in cases of her computer being used
as an unconscious host for DDoS attacks), as a group they also suffer
significant losses due to vulnerabilities in their systems being abused.
In addition, the costs that users have to bear in trying to keep up with
the increasing pace of fixing bugs or replacing faulty software are
going to be high in the long run. 
As the software industry has matured and the vulnerability issues
have been widely discussed in the media, individual interest in the
level of security their software have also been increasing. Especially
in cases where security is the issue (such as firewalls, encryption
products, virus scanners etc.) the expectation of lack of security related
vulnerabilities can easily be justified.
What this means is that the customer expectation currently is
software that does not pose unreasonable risks. Customers still have
to extend reasonable tolerance when defects manifest themselves,
but it is clear that at least the expectation of the widely known security
related bugs not existing is justified1020. 
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implementation errors. It seems reasonable that, at a minimum, the presence of
well-known, easily detectable, and easily remediable flaws should be considered
negligent.”
1021 They are the main norm source in the interpretation of contractual
situations. The business practice is a secondary source, and the default rules in
sales of contracts regulations apply only if these legal sources are silent or
unclear. Information given of a software product is important also in relation
to the determination of the defectiveness of product under consumer product
liability rules. Under consumer product liability rules, such as the EC Product
Liability Directive (1985/374/EC) and its Finnish implementation (Product
Liability Act 694/1990) the specification of the required security standard is
dependent on a multitude of factors. Relevant factors can include, in addition
to the expected usage of the products and the information provided in
combination with the product and its use, issues like the expectations of the
users, the level of security in the relevant markets, applicable governmental
orders and relevant standards.
Under the law, the final level of quality and security that the buyer
has a right to expect is determined by the contracts and
complementary marketing information1021 and is dependent on the
level of security provided in the market and on the customary market
practices. However, acknowledgement of the general expectation of
security that the customers have on software products ought to be
already enough, however, to show that the reasonable expectation
of quality and security is higher than the level of security provided
today. The requirement for changes in the level of security provided
can be justified on the basis that customers expect higher quality and
security from the purchased software than is currently being provided.
The justified level of expectation has increased from what it has been.
If the argument of previous customer acceptance of insecurity is
taken seriously, the time when this tolerance vanished has relevance
to the determination of the defectiveness of the software. As the year
2000 problem taught, the time when the state of the art could have
enabled the vendors to develop secure software in a cost-effective
way shows the critical timeframe after which the customer
expectations for secure software are justified. However, if the time
when the customer expectations shifted is different, then this is
dominant.  Establishing such a timeframe is a question to be solved
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1022 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of
laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member States concerning
liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985 pp. 29-33, amended by
directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, pp. 20-21
1023 See heading 5.2 above.
in practical cases and would require further analysis of the technical
possibilities and practices in software business. No overall timeframe
is likely to be established that would concern all types of software
or even all types of defects.
Means for change. Product liability rules, as understood in this study
to cover both laws deriving from the EC Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC)1022 and general doctrines for liability for damages under
contract law or tort law (delictual liability), involve theoretical potential
for inciting improvements to the current secure software development
practices as is shown above in the analysis of the influence
mechanism1023. This investigation of the efficacy of private law liability
as a form of regulation of product quality and security suggests that
liability rules possess considerable capacities to influence secure
software development. 
The default defectiveness rules in contract and product liability
together with marketing rules and tort law rules seem to provide
incentives both for developing more secure software and disclosing
vulnerability information to the customers. There are limitations and
vagueness’s but by making the assumption that these rules are applied
and effective they seem to provide effects that are overall beneficial
for secure software development. The implicit argument is that
product liability rules ought to be applied to COTS software.
The influence mechanism of product liability rules is shaped by
many intervening factors; even to the degree that their effect on secure
software development might be diluted altogether. This is why product
liability system would have to be altered in order to be more
efficacious in its regulation. Without repeating the structural
weaknesses of private law system of regulation in standard setting,
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1024 See heading 5.3 above.
1025 Suppliers may validly argue that increased liability will drive up the costs of
software. Customers should realise, however, that the increase in the upfront
cost may in the long run be less than they are currently spending on attempting
to fix bugs or to replace faulty software. See chapter 2 above. The same
argument is made also by Dominic Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan in Who
monitoring and enforcement discussed above1024, we can say that the
one of the most important factors shaping the effects of product
liability rules on secure software development, which is at the same
time characteristic for contracting in the COTS software market, is
the current contractual practice in the mass-market software industry
of extensively excluding and disclaiming liability.
Software vendors have feared the theoretical possibility for full
liability for any consequences (direct of indirect) of bugs and
malfunctions of the delivered software and for this reason issued
exclusion clauses into license agreement attached to the software.
However, the actual extent of product liability does not seem
overwhelming in a deeper analysis. The many excuses and defences
provided by product liability rules seem to lower the true liability risk.
As the above analysis of the substance of product liability rules
showed, under a deeper analysis the risk of liability does not seem
unbearable at all for the software vendors in many countries; even
if it would be applied in its current form.
Neither are the arguments from the industry, e.g., that innovation
would be hampered if liability costs are increased, convincing under
the evidence from more traditional industries. However, due to the
specificities of the software industry more research is needed in order
to validate this claim. Only if it can be shown that software vendors
can manage even under renewed liability rules (e.g., when the
uncertainty about the liability risks diminish, and this is a work for
the regulators), are changes in the vendor’s ability to shield herself
from liability for defective software feasible. Even then changes might
be feasible only to the degree vendors can still make profit under the
new liability rules, i.e., the possible legal actions would not cripple
them)1025. It is not wise to alter the industry practice without context
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Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?, p. 60. One thing that requires further
research is the likelihood in the increase of piracy if the upfront costs would
increase, together with the possible increase in the market share of open-
source software.
1026 The consequences of using unfair terms that shift the burden of risks by
externalising the costs in question, as is the case in liability disclaimers and
exclusion clauses in EULAs’, have been put forward in a short manner by the
European Commission in its Report on the Implementation of Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, COM(2000)248 final, p. 13, in relation to unfair contract terms in
general: “firstly, the prices of products and services do not reflect true costs,
creating distortions to competition in favour of less efficient firms and leading
to lower quality products and services; secondly, the costs incurred by society
are higher, because the risks and obligations are borne by persons other than
those who could bear them most efficiently from the economic viewpoint”.
specific knowledge since the production of software has for long been
made possible with the liability disclaimers. Still, the social benefits
from increased liability are large enough to put the regulatory approach
in a favourable light even without such context specific knowledge.
In addition, a change in the vendors’ liability for defective software
is likely as the industry matures.
However acceptable the shifting of liability to the users might be,
which still is largely a matter of dispute especially in consumer
relations, the vendor incentives to develop more secure software and
to disclose vulnerabilities do not seem to be sufficient at the presence
of extensive liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses. When even
the basic defectiveness rules on fitness for purpose or use are
disclaimed and the force of mandatory rules is circumvented by
licensing the software instead of selling it, the incentives for secure
software development and disclosure of vulnerability information
are widely diluted in the software industry. 
The incentives provided by product liability rules are close to non-
existent in relation to secure software development as long as standard
form liability disclaimers are successfully used (i.e., are uphold in
courts, are given legislative approval, continue to be untested in courts,
or invalidating court cases do not receive sufficient media attention)
and the vendors continue to rely on them extensively1026. Substantial
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1027 The trend been reported in the U.S., e.g., by Dennis Fisher in an article
published in the eWeek on April 15, 2002, Contracts Getting Tough on
Security, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1658531,00.asp
[29.3.2006].
1028 The OWASP Secure Software Development Contract Annex is developed
by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), an open source
community accompanied with a not-for-profit charitable organisation
(OWASP Foundation). One of the stimuli for its development is the silence of
contract on conditions related to the security of the software to be delivered, as
pointed out in the “Introduction” to the OWASP Secure Software
Development Contract Annex, available at http://www.owasp.org/
documentation/legal.html [5.1.2006].
changes in contractual practice (especially EULA’s) would be required
for the liability rules to have a real effect on secure software
development.
The most desirable path to changes in software contracting
practices towards more balanced approaches to liability for defects,
that could turn the incentives for software development towards
security, is for the market actors themselves to change the contractual
practices. Currently, most contracts are still silent on conditions related
to the security of the software to be delivered. This is so despite
certain firms experimenting with the use of contractual clauses setting
the software vendor liable for security breaches connected to its
software1027.
In certain sectors, however, such as in web applications, legal and
especially contractual work is enhancing in terms of security. The
OWASP Legal Project provides materials that help participants in
the software market to discuss security and to capture the important
legal aspects of secure software1028. The purpose of the OWASP
Secure Software Development Contract Annex is to enable software
developers and their clients to negotiate and capture important
contractual terms and conditions related to the security of the software
to be developed or delivered. Instead of taking security issues to court,
cases involving weak application security are settled by informal
means. The set of negotiable terms that it spells out are intended to
be appended to software development contracts. Also organisations,
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1029 Dave Stampley, in Privacy Compliance Enforcement, Part I, provides a list
of privacy enforcement actions related to application security from the U.S.
between 2000 and 2005.
1030 Note that this standard comes close to the one provided in the EC Product
Liability Directive 85/374/EEC with the possibility for the state-of-the-art
–defence (Article 7 (e)) where there is no liability for defects that could not be
discovered under the state of the art at the time when the product was put into
circulation. Note that there is significant controversy over the state-of-the-art
–defense in the EU. Examples of its successful use in courts in any EU
country are difficult to find. However, the insurers and those producing goods
clearly continue to regard it as important, whereas representatives of
consumers suggested it be abolished (Meltzer, Freeman and Thomson (2003,
p. vi). According to a recent EU study on the economic impact of this so called
“development risk clause” provided by the EC Product Liability Directive
85/374/EEC Article 7(e) (Calderini, Cantamessa and Palmigiano 2003, p. 3), it
has played a crucial role in finding the right balance between consumer
protection and innovation in Europe, well beyond its limited use in courts.
1031 Valtionhallinnon tietoturvallisuuden johtoryhmä, Valtion tietotekniikka-
hankintojen tietoturvallisuuden tarkistuslista, VAHTI 6/2001. Only in Finnish.
This is an important complement to the standard conditions of IT
procurement contract in the Finnish Government (VYSE 1998), where
information security is considered only in relation to the contracting for
hosting services and maintenance. It can also be used in relation the
multilaterally drafted Finnish contract template IT2000 Terms and Conditions
for IT Procurement in Finland.
like the U.S. Federal Trade Commision, are enforcing rules that require
especially those processing personal data to take security measures1029.
The OWASP Secure Software Development Contract Annex is
an example of a turn towards more balanced approach to contracting
in secure software development. Developers are assumed to take the
risk for problems that were covered in the requirements accepted by
the customer as part or the provided security documentation or should
be covered by reasonable testing efforts. Remediation of other security
problems, called “novel” security issues, i.e., those not covered by
the security requirements or outside the reasonable scope of security
testing, is to be paid for by the customer.1030
As a national example, the Finnish Government Information
Security Management Board (VAHTI) has produced a set of checklist
for the use of government procurers in 20011031. The guideline
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1032 As has been argued in this study, under the principles of the private law of
contract (such as rules on defectiveness) buyers’ have a reason to expect certain
level of security from software products. This is why courts should read in
some basic security requirements into contracts that are silent on the specific
information security issues.
suggests best practices for different types of procurements, including
prefabricated software products. The importance of clear contracts
and the need to negotiate security terms in the very beginning of the
procurement process is underlined. Central information security issues
and requirements ought to be in the know and be clearly presented
already when inviting for tenders.
The promise of such cooperative implementation measures is that
the standards for secure software development can not only be drafted
by the market participants in a much more cost-efficient way than
any court could, but they might also be internalised better in the
enterprises’ decision-making concerning secure software development.
This can be expected to lead to wider acceptance of the rules because
the juxtaposition and conflicts between the parties are not emphasised.
The private law system of regulation could also use these
contracting guidelines to help in reading basic security requirements
into contracts that are silent on the issue1032. The contracting guidelines
and checklists are good starting points in defining such reasonable
requirements that both parties would have agreed to if the topic had
been discussed. Naturally, it is much more beneficial for the software
industry if the buyer and the developer work out the real security
requirements for the project and capture them in the contract, rather
than rely on what a court might read into the contracts when no
specific requirements have been negotiated.
Unfortunately, such voluntary approaches alone might not be
enough to raise the level of security sufficient for the needs of the
network society. Contracting for the delivery of COTS software
typically uses standard terms that are handed on take-it-or-leave-it
basis. The room for individual contracting is very limited. In addition,
the normal legal presumptions of approximate equality of bargaining
power and comparable sophistication in evaluating benefits and risks
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1033 Even though industrial buyers are in a better informational position to
evaluate the products and vendors claims than consumers, they still are at the
mercy of the vendor largely due to the lack the means (not only are white-box
methods largely unavailable, but also the tools for testing even on the
developer side are relatively undeveloped and not in wide use) and financial
resources to evaluate the products security (high costs involved).
1034 Exceptions are buyers with special needs for security, such as many
mission-critical governmental systems. Many of the big established COTS
vendors have also started to license their source code for security purposes for
these customers.
are simply not correct in the context of software security. A typical
purchaser, excluding only the largest industrial buyers that have the
resources to use the expensive and scarce expertise, is only slightly
more experienced than a consumer and should not thus be treated
as having sufficient information for rational decision-making on costs
of software vulnerabilities1033. 
Buyers’ (including industrial buyers’) possibility to assess the
vulnerability of the software and conduct security testing is reduced.
This is not just due to the access to source code issues, but also due
to the diminishing expertise of software development among IS
developers (increased use of components and outsourcing instead
of in-house development). All but the largest and most capable buyer
organizations lack the resources or expertise to evaluate the security
of a software product. Even though the higher stakes involved for
industrial buyers justify measures to avoid the common information-
deficiency problems that consumers face, the outright unavailability
of information on the quality aspects of security together with the
high costs of acquiring it due to the lack of methods to gather such
information and the underdeveloped state of metrics in the quality
aspect of security means that not even industrial buyers have sufficient
information for sound decision-making. More importantly, no
reasonable and knowledgeable person would expect them to be able
to do so. Buyers that search for information only as much as it is
justified on cost-benefit basis cannot be expected to use scarce and
expensive experts to gather information that the COTS software
vendors could much more easily deal with1034. In the case of private
consumers the information acquisition is even more constrained.
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1035 Even though this often is the case at least in the Nordic countries, the
contract templates typically do not take software security issues into wider
consideration.
1036 This has been emphasised by Hugh Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 302.
Standards negotiated in individual contracts are thus unlikely to
take a balanced approach to security in any time soon. At least not
as long as the standard conditions for contract are drafted unilaterally
by software vendors or by industrial organisations representing only
them. In order for the security interest to be taken into consideration,
standard conditions for COTS software contracts would have to be
drafted at least bilaterally with the representatives of the buyer
community1035. The negotiation force of the customers alone is not
sufficient to shift the current balance under which COTS software
vendors can get away with several security related vulnerabilities in
their systems.
This is why liability rules need to be combined with the capacity
to supervise these endorsed standards. Since the purchasing party
does not have sufficient information to bargain for terms that express
her security interests, it is doubtful that self-regulation can achieve
a socially efficient standard. The self-regulative approach needs
external controlling by courts in order to ease the problems caused
by the informational asymmetry. 
The supervisory role of courts in needed also to redress the other
predictable problem of self-regulation, i.e., the failure to take into
account externalities1036. This is especially important in the case of
software security. Due to the interdependent nature of network
security and the negative externalities created by security related
vulnerabilities, not even the demands for more secure software made
by a sufficiently big group of the largest and most capable user
organisations might be enough to leverage the current practices
disfavouring security in software development. Even though it can
be assumed that vendors have to respond by providing more secure
software if, at the margin, a sufficiently big group of the largest and
most capable user organisations start to use contractual clauses setting
the vendor liable for security related defects in delivered software
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1037 Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 52.
1038 This is part of the development in the legal doctrine towards the protection
of the weaker party. It is a reaction to the widening acceptance of the validity
of standard form contracts in general. Another development in the doctrine for
standard form contracts, which for its part balances the interests of the vendor
and the buyer, is the interpretation of unclear standard terms to the detriment
of the party who drafted them. Also the doctrine that perfectly valid liability
disclaimers and exclusions clauses in standard form contracts are interpreted
narrowly, i.e., in a way that limits the liability as little as possible, for its part
balances the interests. Of these in the Finnish doctrine, see Hemmo,
Vahingonkorvausoikeuden oppikirja, p. 206; Hemmo, Sopimusoikeus II, p. 75;
Wilhelmsson, Vakiosopimus, p. 55. Note that especially the effects of the last
two of the doctrines are easily circumvented by slightly changing the contract
product, it is still questionable whether the security level would rise
to be sufficient for the society as a whole. The private interest of the
rationally self-interested purchasing companies might not alone,
without the supervisory role played by the courts, be enough to
improve the level of security in software to meet the needs of the
network society.
Dispositive product liability rules, such as those in general tort and
contract doctrines, include the potential to regulate secure software
development and to raise the level of security in software to the
socially optimal level. Improvement through changes in the reasoning
in private law to being more concerned with the social and economic
effects of its interventions, which have already happened to a degree
due to welfare regulation, could provide a way to develop private rules
applicable to enhance secure software development. The relevance
of non-legal reasons, i.e., the empirical information about the impact
of regulation and how the subjects of regulation have altered their
conduct to adjust regulation, would have to be increased in the legal
reasoning process. Following Hugh Collins, these non-legal reasons
could provide the argument for fresh private law regulation by means
of reinterpretation of the principles of private law1037.
Stronger emphasis of content-based considerations in the
conditions according to which the standard terms become part of
the contract is one such development that holds the potential to alter
the situation1038. In this approach towards the binding force of
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terms.
1039 This has been presented especially by Thomas Wilhelmsson in
Vakiosopimus, p. 88 onwards.
1040 This is the idea of “semi-compulsoriness” of default rules as presented at
least by Juha Pöyhönen, The Law of Obligations, p. 91-92, and Mika Hemmo,
Sopimusoikeus II, p. 293, in relation to Finnish contract law and by Jan Hellner,
Lagstiftning inom förmögenhetsrätten, p. 160, in relation to the Swedish contract law.
1041 The application of provisions that permit judges to invalidate unfair,
unreasonable, or unconscionable terms is a dominant pattern in the European
regulation of standard form contracts issued to consumers. Main provisions can
be found from the EC Directive 93/13/EEC of April 1993 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts, Official Journal L 095, 21.4.1993, p. 29-34 
1042 This is so at least in countries where there are similar rules for the
regulation of contracts between enterprises as there is for contracts between
consumers and enterprises. This is the case, for example, in the Finnish
doctrine where the Act on the Regulation of Contract Terms Between
Enterprises (1062/1993) [L elinkeinonharjoittajien välisten sopimusehtojen
sääntelystä] make it possible for the Market Court or even for the Consumer
Ombudsman to forbid enterprises, accompanied with a threat of a fine, to use
standard form contract terms, comprehensive considerations taking
into account the characteristic features and requirements of the type
of contract and the economic activity in question are used instead
of formal criteria such as the manner or form in which the terms are
presented1039. This content-based approach is visible especially in the
doctrine of surprising and severe standard terms according to which
terms that significantly increase one party’s obligations in comparison
to default rules in indispositive law or to what is normal and ordinary
for the type of contracts in question have to fulfil more stringent
criteria in order to become binding1040.
Similar effects could be induced when courts apply their
possibilities to adjust and invalidate unfair, unreasonable, or
unconscionable terms1041. Especially when the satisfaction of fairness
or reasonableness is not determined solely with reference to the
contractual clauses, but is determined in the entire context of the
circumstances as it ought to be. This could be the case even in
enterprise relations if the material justifications for the use of the terms
on software business are not accepted anymore1042. A widely published
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contract terms that are considered unfair against another enterprise.
1043 Recent argumentation in liability law also in the Nordic doctrine, especially
by Thomas Wilhelmsson in Senmodern ansvarsrätt increasingly recognises the
possibility of constructing new standards (norms) via litigation as a regulatory
mechanism. Preventive effect of liability litigation is not related solely to the
breach of rules explicitly set elsewhere, but litigation can also create altogether
new rules (Wilhelmsson, Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 53). However, as Wilhelmsson
points out in Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 186, liability litigation used as a tool for
micropolitics in this new rule generating form involves numerically marginal
cases since majority of tort litigations involve small damage cases with more
common issues.
1044 Influence on the behaviour of other vendors than just those represented in
the litigated case would require high media attention. This could arouse public
interest into the specific software security issues in a fragmented society and to
feed the necessary moral discourse. This learning process in the form of moral
education through litigation, depicted in the Finnish doctrine especially by
Thomas Wilhelmsson in Senmodern ansvarsrätt, p. 103-134, can also happen
without much publicity through the system of precedents or through
information provision to the legislators and other regulators (Idem., p. 161-
162), but at least the precedent system presumes the use of expensive advice of
expert lawyers from specific jurisdictions to gather any useful guide about the
requirements of the standard
1045 Since the contractual practice in the software business categorically deviates
from the default rules provided in contract and tort law, the courts could
court case establishing the abolishment of the most extensive product
liability disclaimers in the case of security could alter the incentives
for secure software development. 
A clarification, restatement or even the promulgation of a totally
new standard for conduct in a product liability lawsuit1043 and the
subsequent publicity given to it could also ease the uncertainty as to
the very basis upon which a court may decide cases involving security
related vulnerabilities in a software product. Already a clarification
of the availability of the remedies provided by product liability rules
when insecure software results in damages, could be enough to induce
software vendors to re-examine their development practices by stating
the obligations of software vendors1044.
A change in the level of security provided could thus be induced
by a court disallowing the use of extensive liability disclaimers and
exclusion clauses on the basis of insufficient justifications1045. In the
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require good justifications for the deviation from such default allocations that
involve significant policy choices behind them.
1046 Of the reasons for the almost universal use of contractual liability
disclaimers, see heading 5.3.2 above.
1047 See heading 5.3.4 above.
consideration of the binding force of surprising and severe terms the
factor that is of crucial importance is whether there has been a well-
founded reason for the use of such terms based on the business
activity in question. Several such reasons have been given and accepted
for the use extensive liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses in the
software business1046. However, the acceptability of these liability
disclaiming and excluding clauses in relation to security related
vulnerabilities can still be questioned. 
The objective of clarifying the legal status of the parties, which
is one of the objectives of standard form contracts, is naturally
acceptable in the situation where the law is as equivocal as the product
liability rules are in relation to software products. However, when
the private regulation via contracting leads to situation that is more
unfavourable than what would be the result under dispositive contract
and tort law rules, the use of extensive liability disclaimers and
exclusions clauses in the case of security becomes questionable.
Especially because the legal status of the vendors is unilaterally
improved in their favour.
Especially questionable is the argument that liability disclaimers
and exclusion clauses should be allowed in the software industry due
to their contribution to innovative activity in young markets. As has
been argued1047, not all innovation would be negatively affected. Only
at high levels of liability costs is liability likely to reduce innovative
activity. At lower levels, product liability costs provide incentives for
product safety improvements and increase product R&D intensity.
However, it is unlikely that product liability costs would be unbearable
for the software markets. The many excuses and defences provided
by product liability rules combined with the institutional and
procedural hindrances for product liability lawsuits together lower
the true liability risk. 
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1048 Callaghan and O’Sullivan, Who Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?, p.
58, with reference to the case Sam Business Systems Limited v. Hedley and
Company [2002] EWHC 2733. They consider the U.K. Unfair Contract Terms
Act 1977 (UCTA) that includes a test akin to reasonableness in order for any
contract clause attempting to exclude or restrict liability to be enforceable.
Section 11 of the UCTA requires a number of factors to be considered
(bargaining position of the parties, whether the goods are bespoke, the
resources of the parties and the cost and availability of insurance. As Callaghan
and O’Sullivan point out in Who Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?, p.
59, footnote 17, courts have in practice considered these factors in any
situation where UCTA has required a test of reasonableness to be applied,
even though the Act only requires them to be taken into consideration in
respect to specified sections of the Act.
In addition, the argument that efficiently minimised liability risk
enhances customer choice by allowing willing customers to take the
risk of using possibly unfinished products and to take the possibly
highly useful piece of software into use earlier becomes questionable
when the quality aspects of security are considered. As has been argued
several times before, even those customers that would be willing to
take this risk, cannot separate between insecure and secure products.
This means that their risk taking is not based on sufficient
information, and they may take a level of risk that they were not
willing to take, or pay a price that does not reflect the risk associated
to the software in question. Even more importantly, they may
consume an insecure product in such high amounts that severe
damages to information security of third parties are caused. 
This does not mean the clauses excluding or disclaiming liability
should not be accepted at all. All that it hints is that software vendors
ought to be allowed to exclude their liability for security related defects
in software only to the degree that the costs would be unbearable.
As Dominic Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan argue in relation to U.K.
law, clauses that limit rather than exclude liability and that are capped
at an amount that is justifiable rather than arbitrary are more likely
to be enforced1048. 
For example, a cap that is proportionate to the value of the contract
and the amount of the supplier’s insurance policy is likely to set a
balance between the incentives to release new products that imply
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1049 For example, the indispositive rules in the Finnish Consumer Protection
Act 1978/38 section 20, according to which the buyer is entitled to
compensation for indirect losses if the defect or loss is due to negligence
attributable to the seller or if, at the conclusion of the contract, the goods
differed from an express representation of the seller, cannot be contracted to
the detriment of the buyer. Section 20, subsection 1, of the Consumer
Protection Act 1978/38 reads as follows: “The buyer shall be entitled to
compensation for loss that he/she suffers because of a defect in the goods.
Indirect loss, referred to above in section 10(3) and (4) shall, however, be
compensated by the seller only if the defect or loss is due to negligence
attributable to it or if, at the conclusion of the contract, the goods differed
from an express representation of the seller.”
1050 See heading 5.3.4 above.
significant liability risks and the incentives to develop more secure
software. In Finland, for example, clauses that limit the liability for
direct damages to 15 percent of the price of the delivered software,
and disclaim all liability for any indirect or consequential damages
have been accepted as part of the multilaterally drafted IT2000 Terms
and Conditions for IT Procurement templates. In consumer contracts,
however, the limitation of all indirect or consequential damages might
not be valid due to the mandatory provisions entitling consumers to
compensation also for indirect losses1049. 
As the cyber-insurance industry matures, the limitation of the
liability to a cap that is proportional to the value of the contract and
the amount of the supplier’s insurance policy could prove to be an
efficacious way of encouraging secure software development without
diminishing the motivation to introduce potentially highly useful new
software products to the market overmuch. Due to capabilities of
insurance companies to pool information, together with their superior
expertise in assigning proper prices to risk and in developing safety
standards, increase use of insurance could be a way to achieve the
socially efficient level of care among software vendors1050. 
This might, however, be an overly optimistic view of the
capabilities of the insurance companies. As has been argued above,
the current level of uncertainty under traditional insurance policies
combined with the unavailability and high costs of cyber-insurances
results in under-investment in insurance, and thus an insufficient
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1051 This argument is made by Jay P. Kesan, Ruperto P. Majuca and William J.
Yurcik in the The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance, p. 20.
1052 E.g., in Sam’s case (Sam Business Systems Limited v. Hedley and Company
[2002] EWHC 2733) the presence of such clause led the Court to conclude
that it was reasonable in the circumstances of that case for the supplier to
exclude all liability other than that arising from misrepresentation. Dominic
Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan in Who Should Bear the Cost of Software
Bugs?, p. 59, advocate even an approach where the presence of an undertaking
to fix all bugs during an acceptance/warranty period, without the money back
guarantee requirement, should logically also give the supplier some scope for
reducing their exposure. Whereas Sam’s case involved a contract between two
commercial parties, Callaghan and O’Sullivan advocate a similar approach even
to the assessment of reasonableness of exclusion and limitation of liability
clauses in contracts with consumers.
1053 Callaghan and O’Sullivan, Who Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?, p.
amount of profit-smoothing by firms and an inefficient level of risk-
sharing throughout society1051. It is true, however, that the turn to
the insurance industry can at least help in setting more specific
regulatory standards and make it easier to find the socially optimal
level of care. This requires a significant improvement in the availability
and prices of cyber-insurance. The insurance industry would have
to mature a lot in relation to the liabilities resulting from software
defects.
Further U.K. development, where courts are more willing to allow
suppliers greater scope for limiting liability if the supplier undertakes
to fix free of charge all bugs during an acceptance/warranty period
coupled with money back guarantee during that period, is not
favourable in terms of incentives for secure software development1052.
Such an approach would only mean that the current practice of report-
and-patch or even penetrate-and-patch would be accepted and no
incentive of original secure software development given. Even though
Dominic Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan correctly point out that the
adoption of the test akin to the ‘satisfactory quality” for all software,
regardless of mode of delivery would offer benefits to both suppliers
and customers, their normative argument in favour of a greater scope
for limiting liability if an acceptance/warranty period is in place turn
out to be harmful in terms of security1053. 
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59-60. Note that Callaghan and O’Sullivan concentrate on the quality aspects
of software bugs and only briefly refer to the security aspects; they do not deal
with the special issues of secure software development and especially not the
quality aspects of security (i.e., the security related vulnerabilities).
1054 This is what Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 53-55, refers to as productive
disintegration of private law where the former general rules of private law are
replaced with more contextual rules informed by a more purposive approach
to regulation. At the same time the private law becomes more refined in its
differentiation and normative orientation. In other terms, private law in its
application learns from its environment about the effects of its rules on the
Callaghan and O’Sullivan argue that a general test that is not
dependent on the mode of delivery, together with a greater scope
for limiting liability if an acceptance/warranty period is in place would
offer benefits to both suppliers and customers in that it would
encourage suppliers to incorporate such acceptance/ warranty periods
in their contracts and that would encourage them to (a) spend more
time removing bugs prior to releasing software, (b) promptly rectify
bugs that are uncovered after software is released, and (c) clearly
explain in simple terms in the contract specifications what the
software will and will not do. The fault in the influencing logic of
(a) and (b) is that, since patching is such a cheap way to remove bugs,
the incentives for original secure software development would be
minimal. The penetrate-and-patch approach simply is negative in
terms of secure software development. In the case of (c) it has to
be noted that in the case of COTS software contracting the
specifications are likely to be uninformative due to their standard
form nature. In addition, the licenses are rarely read and understood.
This type of reasoning pattern in private in private law could enable
it to develop capacity for setting standards that can truly guide
behaviour. However, private law would have to forgo the flexibility
of abstract principles in favour of a more explicit rationalisation of
the policy behind the law. The policy statement combined with general
principles could then produce more determinate guidance, which could
be generalised across a series of transactions. The clarity of the
regulatory standard supplied by this type of private law reasoning
depends upon the explicit articulation of the policy objectives of the
rule imposed by the decision.1054
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subjects of regulation, which then permits further refinement of the legal rules
in order to modify their effects. A typical example can be found from
consumer transactions where private law rules have been adjusted in a ways
that incorporate the kinds of consequential considerations of policy that lead
to the creation of these categories in economic and social regulation.
1055 Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts, p. 82-87, provides a deeper analysis of the
expertise of ordinary courts in setting private law standards.
1056 The use of amicus curiae might not be all that helpful in the case of
software security in countries like Finland where there are no real active
pressure groups that could enrol the experts of secure software development in
the field. In such countries expert testimony would remain at the hands of the
representatives of a specific litigation.
Naturally, it can be doubted whether courts posses the expertise
and information to device general, stable regulations that provide
adequate guidance for software markets1055. They typically do not have
information on the operation of software markets and of the possible
effects of regulation. However, private law system of regulation has
means to acquire the needed information. Procedural rules, for
example, that permit amicus curiae for interested pressure groups and
use of experts in litigation combined with encouragement for their
usage are especially helpful in order for the courts to be able to set
more specific regulatory standards1056. This would give courts access
to empirical and more systematic information on the operation of
markets and of the possible effects of regulation. Courts would thus
be enabled to better comprehend such information in order transform
it into practical regulation of such a highly complex issue as insecurity
of software.
Another mechanism to improve the guiding function of private
law rules is to combine liability rules with reflexive strategies towards
industrial standardisation, so that it derives its quality standards from
the sectoral product specifications and quality assurance processes.
The courts can incorporate the quality standards set through technical
specifications of the software industry as part of their standard-setting
function, so that satisfactory quality and security are always defined
in part as compliance with industry technical standards. 
Conclusions 437
1057 For a somewhat comprehensive compilation of technical information
security standards from the United States in 2004, see NCSP, Technical Standards
and Common Criteria, Appendix C. A roadmap for the ICT security standards is
provided by the International Telecommunications Union’s
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) where both the
standardization organisations, approved standards and standards under
development and new proposed standards are presented. See the ITU-T Study
Group 17 ICT Security Standards Roadmap v1.0, November 2005, at
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/ict/index.html [updated
25.1.2006, visited 1.2.2006]
1058 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
Regions of 6.6.2001, Network and Information Security: Proposal for a
European Policy Approach, COM(2001)298 final, p. 18.
1059 This requirement is presented, for example, by Hugh Collins in Regulating
Contracts, p. 295-296.
1060 There is already a class action suit pending at the State Superior Court in
Los Angeles, California, USA against Microsoft for its allegedly insecure
software and failure to provide adequate notice of the vulnerability of online
data and of information transmitted through Microsoft operating system
(Hamilton vs. Microsoft). According to the complaint, which is available at
http://www.sans.org/resources/mscomplaint.pdf [7.5.2006] someone
obtained unauthorised access to the social security number and bank account
information of Ms. Hamilton and the proposed class representative. The data
A variety of such technical specifications exist in the information
security arena in general and in software security especial1057. There
is no lack of standardisation efforts. Instead, the great number of
competing standards and specifications has lead to fragmentation of
the market and to non-interoperable solutions. As the European
Commission correctly pointed out in 2001, there still is need to
coordinate the current standardisation and certification activities1058.
In addition, these technical standards are the product of market actors
and, for example, might not consider externalities. A court should
always be empowered to require a higher standard, or at least to insist
that mere compliance with the industry standard does not guarantee
that satisfactory goods have been supplied1059.
Under this light we could expect interpretations of private law rules
that take into account the specific circumstances of software business
in relation to security1060. However, this is not likely to happen anytime
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was stored on the computer of the victim of the identity theft.
1061 This point has been made by two leading experts of consumer law in the
European Union, Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson in 1997 in their
article EC and US Approaches to Consumer Protection – Should the Gap be
Bridged?, p. 263.
1062 As Mathias Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 150, notes in
analysing product liability rules worldwide, even strict manufacturer liability is
often not much of an advantage for the injured parties. The plaintiff must still
show defectiveness and cause, and not having to prove fault is frequently a
small benefit at best. The purchasers of COTS software are unfairly
disadvantaged even by the burden of having to prove defect and/or causation
in product liability claims. The concern mainly arises from perceived difficulties
in proving claims due to a lack of legal or other resources needed to investigate
them properly, or to an inability to gain access to essential information in
relation such a complex technical product as modern software products that
often involve complicated injuries.
This pretty much downplays the capacity of private law, emphasised by Hugh
Collins in Regulating Contracts, p. 93, in relation to the private law of contract as
a system of regulation, to overcome or diminish many of its structural
weaknesses by using the burden of proof for the purpose of detecting
violations for the regulatory standards. 
1063 Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 152-153.
soon. Litigation is not a likely regulatory instrument for product
liability in Europe. Not only is private law reasoning still so deeply
rooted in abstract principles that outright policy considerations and
regulation on policy basis seems far fetched, but it also tends to favour
corrective justice arguments instead of preventive and consequential
claims. Private litigation is neither seen as powerful means to monitor
overall product safety or security nor to send indirect behavioural
requirements1061. 
As noted by Mathias Reimann, in addition to the institutional and
procedural realities that seriously discourage vigorous use of product
liability remedies in most European states, such as the burden of
having to proof defect and/or causation even in product liability
claims involving strict manufacturer liability1062, there is also an
attitudinal factor1063. From the European point of view, the purpose
of private litigation is limited to compensation in individual cases.
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1064 As Hugh Collins points out in Regulating Contracts, p. 292, even though
private law as a system of regulation has the capacity to introduce externalities
into its standard setting, there plainly is a danger that in the enforcement of
standards private parties will have no incentive to monitor compliance and to
compel conformity.
1065 As Hugh Collins points out in Regulating Contracts, p. 123-125, this type of
contribution can happen even without ever invoking the power to impose legal
sanctions. The influence upon contractual behaviour stems instead from the
independent reactions of participants in the market to the authoritative
judgements about business reputation issued by these respected bodies.
According to Collins this informative influence is more important in liability
law than legal sanctions.
It has little, if anything, to do with larger safety or security issues1064.
If product liability litigation has been scarce in the EU, then its use
as a regulatory tool has been even more so.
The problems of private law enforcement are especially problematic
because neither do the non-legal sanctions such as refusal to do
business and damage to reputation and associated costs that are not
directly linked to the legal liability, on which regulatory compliance
typically rely on more than on the enforcement of legal rules, seem
to be able to provide sufficient incentives for secure software
development. The non-legal sanctions and the costs associated with
insecure software have not been sufficient to improve the level of
security in software. 
As has been pointed above, the legal process or any other
institution that is respected by the trading community as an impartial
and reliable finder of fact or truth (e.g., a consumer ombudsman, a
committee of a trading association or an arbitrator) does, however,
contribute to the imposition of informal sanction. They function as
an organised reputation mechanism collecting and disseminating what
participants in the market regard as reliable information about
trustworthiness.1065
This informative function of the authoritative declarations about
trustworthiness such as in the case of a court determining that a
person has broken a contract could serve as a catalyst for change in
the software business. However, in relation to the contracting in the
software business such a catalyst could come, instead of a court, from
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an ombudsman or a consumer complaints board or any other organ
that is more easily reachable and quicker to respond than on ordinary
court. Arbitrators in the current form do not seem to fulfil this
requirement. Their decisions are not public and the process involves
huge costs. 
Even if consumer ombudsmen and consumer complaint boards
could be better institutions in the future to enhance the use of non-
legal sanctions, their use in a business area that is essentially
international and the issues to be solved highly speculative could turn
out to be less efficacious. It can be doubted whether they are able
to justify their decision and equipped to publish their decisions in
a manner that would have real impact on the international software
business. The national varieties in the availability of such organs
further hinder their informative role. At least, much deeper
international cooperation would be required in the area of software
contracting
Possible legislative actions? If were private litigation an unlikely means
for raising the level of security in software to be sufficient for the
needs of the network society, then what about legislative action? A
legislative action changing substantive law in a way that would restate
the rights of users for compensation in software product liability cases
could also alter the contractual practice towards a more balanced
approach to vulnerability issues similar to a widely published court
case. 
Already a legislative amendment stating at least that the lack of
safety test provided in product liability rules or a test akin to the
satisfactory quality/fitness for purpose test in contract law ought to
be the criterion for defectiveness that would be applied to COTS
software as a whole, regardless of the mode of delivery, would bring
clarity to the standard of conduct applied to secure software
development. A clear statement of the applicability of product liability
rules would significantly diminish the uncertainty surrounding the
issue, and at least lower the psychological threshold for litigation for
its part and thus improve the efficacy of product liability rules.
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1066 Even though UCITA was drafted by the U.S. National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) with the need for clarity in
the law in mind, as the Prefatory Note and many comments in final version of
UCITA states (The Act that is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucita/2002final.htm [2.1.2006]), it is not likely to  result in much more clarity as
Cem Kaner, among others, argues in Software Engineering and UCITA, Chapter
VI “UCITA interferes with the practices of independent software engineers
and small consulting firms”, section 8 “UCITA’S Drafting will Drive Up
Businesses’ Legal Expenses”.
1067 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of
laws, regulations and administrative provision in the Member States concerning
liability for defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29-33, amended by
directive 1999/34/EC OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, p. 20-21
1068 Even though litigation may not be enough to bring the required specificity
to the standard due to the difficulties in generalising the standards produced by
case law (they are so closely tied to the facts of the particular case that the
advice of an expensive expert lawyer is needed), there is at least some
experience of the ways to apply the standards.
As has been argued, the standards of satisfactory quality/fitness
for purpose or use and the lack of safety test provided still do not
bring much specificity to the expected behaviour. However, more
specificity to the standard of conduct in software development could
also be provided via legislative action. 
Although a more precise standard is a tempting solution for the
problems in the directive force of private law system of regulation,
the US experience with Uniform Computer Information Transaction
Act (UCITA) suggests that it may not result in any greater clarity1066.
As such a more precise legislative standard for conduct in secure
software development thus might not provide added value to the
efficacy of product liability rules. Especially because the current tests
for lack of safety in the European Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC)1067, followed by most jurisdictions with a special
product liability regime, and for satisfactory quality/fitness for purpose
or tests akin to them in general contract law, have the advantage of
having been considered in case law in many countries1068.
If a legislative action is taken, the best solution may be for a statute
to apply the lack of safety test provided in consumer product liability
law for all software regardless of the mode of delivery rather than
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1069 Note that secure software markets might (and are likely to) be in the state
of disequilibrium due to the increasing awareness and increasing customer
demand. In this situation extreme care has to be taken not to set standards on
levels that might prove to be harmful under the new equilibrium.
1070 See sections 2.7 and 2.8 above. As Hugh Collins points out in Regulating
Contracts, p. 70, it is especially the weakness of the private law contract system
of regulation in considering any third party spill-over effects that often
provides the justification for much more interventionist styles of regulation
that are designed to compel the parties to a transaction to internalise the costs
of spill-over effects such as risks to the safety of other persons or the security
of their property. Even though Collins advocates the capacity of private law of
contract to incorporate considerations of externalities in its formulation of
regulatory standards and the application of its remedies, e.g., by regarding the
parties to the transaction as representative members of a group such as
consumers, in the case of contracting for secure software litigation is unlikely
to be effective against the use oppressive license terms in software contracts.
Their use continues even after courts have considered them as void due to
their post-breach bargaining power function.
1071 Whereas the criterion of fitness for purpose and other similar constructions
rely heavily on the terms of the contract between parties, the criterion for
defectiveness in the European Product Liability Directive (“lack of safety”) and
similar construction in jurisdictions that follow its example emphasises the
importance of the safety expectations of the consumers in relation to the
possible personal injuries or damages to private property resulting from
defective products. 
attempting to introduce a more detailed specific standard against
which software could be judged1069. The need to apply the lack of
safety test instead of the test for satisfactory quality/fitness for
purpose or use derives from the need to correct both the problems
resulting form the asymmetry of vulnerability information and the
lack of consideration for externalities. Since contracting seems to be
inefficient in allocating the risks caused by security related
vulnerabilities mainly due to the several informational problems and
the inability to consider externalities1070, there is a need to apply an
objective test instead of a criterion that relies heavily on the terms
of the contract between parties. This is exactly the additional value
that the lack of safety test provides when compared to the satisfactory
quality/fitness for purpose or use test1071. 
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1072 The normative argument favouring the use of indispositive rules in the
regulation of information security in consumer markets from the Nordic point
of view has already been made in 1997 by Ahti Saarenpää and Tuomas Pöysti
in their research report for the Finnish Ministry of Finance on the regulation of
information security in Finland (Saarenpää and Pöysti, Tietoturvallisuus ja laki, p.
526-527).
1073 Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan, Who Should Bear the Cost of Software
Bugs?, p. 58-59.
1074 According to the article 12 of the EC Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC) “[t]he liability of the producer arising from this Directive may
not, in relation to the injured person, be limited or excluded by a provision
limiting his liability or exempting him from liability.” Also the Finnish
Consumer Protection Act (38/1978) chapter 5 on sale of consumer goods, as
The use of indispositive rules is indispensable for the protection
of the weaker party in software contracting. As has been argued above,
the unequal bargaining power combined with the asymmetrical
information positions puts the buyer of COTS software in so much
a weaker position that the use of default negotiable rules is not
sufficient1072. Dispositive rules that can be circumvented via
contracting are not enough to alter the current practices in software
development towards more security consciousness.
The same normative argument in favour of the satisfactory
quality/fitness for purpose test has been made also by Dominic
Callaghan and Carol O’Sullivan1073. Since they concentrate on the
quality aspects and only briefly refer to the security aspects of
software bugs, they miss the special issues of secure software
development and especially the quality aspects of security. They do
not acknowledge that contracting seems to be inefficient in allocating
the risks caused by security related vulnerabilities mainly due to the
several informational problems and the inability to consider
externalities.
This would provide additional incentives for secure software
development. Unambiguous statements about the impossibility to
limit liability by contractual means under mandatory product liability
rules, like EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC) and those
in national sale of consumer goods laws1074, basically provide
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an example, states in section 2 that “[a] contract term differing from the
provisions of this chapter to the detriment of the buyer shall be void unless
otherwise provided below.” It is important to note the restriction on the scope
of these rules. They primarily apply only to the consumer who either has
bought the product or suffers damages from its use. If the software is delivered
to the consumer through a channel of operators (importer, retailer etc.), the
mandatory rules do not make the liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses
void between the delivery channel operators. Also other product liability than
that basing on such mandatory rules can be agreed upon differently, as already
pointed out above.
1075 Mandatory rules on defective and insecure products hold a stronger
expressive influence than the rules that merely allow courts in individual
disputes to adjust the terms.
1076 As has been argued, contracting in the software business involve means to
circumvent even the indispositive rules. When the law imposes mandatory
rules that cannot be excluded by agreement (such as in consumer protection
laws in Nordic countries and especially product liability regulation deriving
from the EC Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), which command
instead of serve the contracting practice), there still is room left to alter the
legal status of the social behaviour in ways that avoid the application of these
rules. In the software business such an effort is made by stating that software is
licensed for use, i.e., a limited right to use is given, not sold and that no sale of
goods occurs and no contracts for sale is drafted. If this argument is accepted
in courts, which is largely an unresolved issue in many jurisdiction, the default
liability rules both in general and consumer contract laws and in specific
product liability rules following the EC Product Liability Directive
(85/374/EEC) are inapplicable since they mainly apply to the sale of goods
and require the transfer of ownership.
consumers with the knowledge about their rights to compensation
and equips them with a greater potential to shield from the
psychological effect of the liability disclaimers and exclusions clauses
in software licenses1075. 
Unfortunately, neither do the indispositive laws of many countries
that focus on protecting the consumer in the cases of defective
products and unfair contract terms seem to be able to alter the diluted
incentives. This is due to the strong post-breach bargaining position
provided by the liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses strengthened
by the license instead of sale argument present in typical COTS
software licenses1076. As the post-breach bargaining power argument
emphasised by Hugh Collins shows, such regulation might not be
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1077 As pointed out in 2005 by two practitioners of UK law, Dominic Callaghan
and Carol O’Sullivan in Who Should Bear the Cost of Software Bugs?, p. 56,
this peculiar situation where the mode of delivery of software can impact the
standard by which the software will be judged (e.g., whether it is some type of
a satisfactory quality/fitness for purpose test in contractual liability law for
tangible items or some type of a statutory requirement on the supplier to use
reasonable skill and care as in the contractual liability for the supply of services)
and also whether it is possible to exclude liability for failing to meet that
standard (typically not in consumer contracts for tangible items, more easily
allowed in contracts concerning the supply of service) exists in the private law
of a number of European countries (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain and
the UK) more generally than just in product liability law. For example, in
Finland two leading experts in product liability Thomas Wilhelmsson and Matti
Rudanko still argue in 2004, Tuotevastuu, p. 79-81, that such intellectual product
as software can be products under the definition of the Finnish Product
Liability Act (694/1990) only if their physical existence is connected some
tangible object such as a computer, a cd- or a dvd-rom, etc., in which case
other software than operating systems that clearly are integral parts of
computers, can be products under the legal definition only when they are
delivered in a cd- or a dvd-rom. Note that this is a special problem in the
coverage of the Product Liability Act in Finland. Software more clearly is a part
of the definition of a product under the Finnish Sale of Goods Act (355/1987)
enough to change the current practices in software development. The
use of extensive liability disclaimers and exclusion clauses would
continue despite of them.
Even if the wider application of the lack of safety test provided
in consumer product liability rules in Europe for all software,
regardless of the mode of delivery, might not directly mean that the
rules would be efficacious in inciting secure software development,
at least it would cure the peculiar situation where different standards
are applied depending on the mode of delivery. This would already
be a significant improvement to the current situation and ease the
uncertainty surrounding the standards applicable to COTS software.
For its part, it would lower the threshold for litigation and also provide
expressive influence. At least the threat of liability for insecure
software would become little more probable for the vendor.
The argument that product liability rules ought to apply to all
COTS software regardless of the mode of delivery is contrary to the
current interpretations of substantive law in many countries1077.
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as Marko Mononen also points out in Yritysten välinen tuotevastuu, p. 104-105.
1078 See the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) as
promulgated by the U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1999 and amended in 2000 and 2002. The act and
up-to-date information about its adoption can be found from the NCCUSL
web pages at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/  (see Final Acts & Legislation –
Computer Information Transactions Act) [17.3.2006].
1079 An example of this approach is the Government Proposal 231/2005
amending the Finnish Communications Market Act (393/2003) where the
However, the provision of COTS software ought to be considered
as a sale of goods in all situations and thus covered by product liability
rules in general contract and specific product liability rules. Otherwise,
the artificial separation of COTS software into products and services
would lead to untenable situations. For example, the liability of a
vendor of COTS software would differ in cases where she delivered
the software through the Internet from those where a physical delivery
channel with channel operators such as retailers was used. 
Due to the extensive routine-like disclaiming of dispositive contract
law and other liability rules, it is evident that they do not fulfill the
facilitative role prescribed to them. In the U.S. this has spoken for
altering the law to conform to the trade practices, i.e., to develop new
default rules for transactions in computer information1078. However,
this has not been very successful as the experience with the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) testifies. It has
been severely opposed to in the U.S. even after amendments in 2000
and 2002, which were made due to the criticism. So far it has been
adopted only by two states (Maryland and Virginia). 
In Europe, the approach is likely to be that it is the contracting
practice that is flawed, instead the law. Long tradition for example
in the Nordic countries in consumer protections laws is not likely to
change. This is why legislative amendments applying new liability rules
on software have not been presented in Europe and are not very likely
in the future. The potential for change in secure software development
lies essentially in the improvement of the enforcement mechanisms
of existing product liability rules and in the restatement and
clarification of existing rules1079.
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explicit purpose is to clarify the legal relationship between a consumer and an
enterprise in adherence to the Finnish doctrine of consumer protection and
basic contract law principles (Government Proposal 231/2005, heading 4.1).
The proposal intends to clarify the role and the rights of the consumer by
restating the contractual liability rules for defective services developed in
consumer protection legislation and general contract law doctrine in relation to
the specific context of communications services in the Communications
Market Act. 
1080 This is raised by Mathias Reimann in Product Liability in a Global Context,
p. 153-154, in relation to the harmonisation via the EC Product Liability
Directive (85/374/EEC).
1081 It is no surprise then that the patchy empirical evidence agrees only on the
issue that the practical effect of product liability rules have been very limited at
best. See footnote 45 and surrounding text in chapter 5 above.
1082 Reimann, Product Liability in a Global Context, p. 153-154.
Even if legislative action would be considered, it would have to
overcome hindrance for legislative efforts to alter the practice of
extensively disclaiming and excluding liabilities stemming from the
legislators desire to harmonise just the substantive law on the books
instead of unifying the law in action1080. When the ultimate goal of
legal harmonisation does not lie in the approximation of practical
results, enacting uniform substantive black-letter rules is easily
considered to be enough. This is understandable for political reasons
and as a starting point for a longer journey, but this does not ensure
that the harmonized rules have real meaning for real parties in real
cases1081. According to Mathias Reimann such an effort would at
minimum “require an inclusion of the rules’ larger context, e.g., their
interplay with existing regimes, and of the overall environment in
which they will be employed, i.e., of the incentives, mechanisms, and
chances to enforce them. As far as I can see, projects of that nature
have yet to be launched.1082”
As a short conclusion, we can say that changes in the interpretation
of rules and contractual practices, together with legislative
amendments, of product liability rules seem laudable from the
perspective of enhancing secure software development. Unfortunately,
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1083 Even though Gordon et al. in 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security
Survey, p. 2, explicate the low use of cybersecurity insurance in the U.S. as one
of their key findings, they still are optimistic that it will gain momentum (idem.,
p. 11).
1084 This is a generalisation of the conclusion made in relation to the capacities
of tort law especially in the area of environmental protection in 1997 by Gert
Brüggemeier in The Control of Corporate Conduct and Reduction of
Uncertainty by Tort Law, p. 74, where informational regulatory alternatives are
raised as a more promising approach than liability law.
1085 See heading 5.3.2 above.
they seem unlikely. Much depends on the development of cyber-
insurance markets, which is slowly catching on1083.
While concluding that the possibilities for controlling corporate
conduct through liability law in practice should not be overrated, we
now turn to the informational approaches and make some conclusions
about their capacity to influence secure software development1084.
6.2  Improving the influencing capacity
of vulnerability reporting
Vendors have the primary duty to disclose the vulnerabilities existing
in their software products. In most jurisdictions they also have certain
limited obligations to disclose the vulnerabilities in their software
products under the law. However, for long they ignored the issue and
were even unresponsive even to the vulnerability reports made by
the interest group. 
As become visible in the analysis of the duties to disclose safety
information under the law, they are by no means efficacious in relation
to the security vulnerabilities in software product1085. The same reasons
that hindered the efficacy of product liability rules in general are at
play: most importantly the fact that vendors can circumvent their
duties to disclose by disclaiming all liabilities in software licenses or
by disguising the provision of software product as a license for use
instead of selling a good. Thus, even though vendors might, and in
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most jurisdiction do, have certain limited obligations to disclose the
vulnerabilities in their software products under the law, the probability
of the sanctions and liabilities occurring especially in the global context
is so low that they currently do not have a sufficient weight to
influence the incentives of vendors to disclose security related
vulnerabilities.
Even though liability rules together with statutory obligations to
inform are frequently called into action in favour of secure software
development, the analysis made in this study shows that currently
their capacity to incite information provision on security related
vulnerabilities is seriously downsized. Serious amendments and
different emphasis in interpretations would be required. They are
unlikely in any short amount of time. A stronger influence for the
legal duties to disclose is possible in the long-run, if vendors alter their
contractual practices and start to assume at least some liability as a
competitive factor. 
Anyhow, the legal duties to disclose might be more of academic
interest than of practical relevance. Majority at least of the big software
houses have already started to disclose vulnerabilities. There is no
clear need to strengthen the legal duties to disclose. Vulnerability
reporting has already made most of the vendors responsive to reports
and eager to disclose at least the vulnerabilities reported to them by
the external parties. Vulnerability reporting has for its part elicited
a change of perspective among the vendors. They have come to realise
the potential of vulnerability reporting in helping testing and saving
costs (as a valuable asset and a way to reduce costs of testing), even
to the degree of over-reliance.
Even though a lot seems to expected from the product liability
for defects in software, my analysis shows that it is not a likely to be
an efficacious regulatory instrument. While the liability rules evolve
and before they really start to affect the creation of secure information
systems, if they ever do, external reporting of vulnerabilities seems
to provide a feasible means to improve the current state of software
security. Vulnerability reporting has been seen one of the most feasible
and likely means to improve the current state of software security.
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1086 Even though this is most clearly visible in the cyber-security policy of the
United States as critically discussed, e.g., by James Andrew Lewis in Aux
Armes, Citoyens, p. 821-830, together with the reason for such a high reliance
on the private sector initiatives in cyber-security, as a general approach the
reliance on the private sector is also the starting point in Europe. However, the
European approach involves a stronger role for the government as already the
Commission Communication on Network and Information Security: Proposal
for a European Policy Approach COM(2001)298 final testifies in emphasising
certain market failures. 
1087 Summing up. If the action desired by the reporters comes through it would
lead to net benefits for the society as a whole, which seem to be part of the
objectives of the reporters. The reporters would also, in addition to personal
gratifications, like to see the enhancement of secure software development and
have better software to use. The vendors would, at the same time, achieve low-
cost assistance in their software development efforts. Finally, the users would
get, in addition to greater security, also costs savings in the form of higher
quality software and less damages from attacks and accidents.
1088 The theory of coinciding interest, presented in the literature on policy
strategies, instruments, and styles by Evert Vedung and Frans C.J. van der
As an informational regulatory instrument it is both politically
attractive, at least more attractive that many of the more intrusive
instruments, and seems to involve a great influencing potential. It
is also in line with the general policy approach to the regulation of
information security where reliance is mainly on market forces, i.e.,
voluntary and cooperative action by the private sector1086.
The attractiveness of the regulatory instrument is increased by the
mutual benefits that it could provide for all of the stakeholders in the
vulnerability reporting process. In theory, the interests of the
regulators (reporters), the implementers (especially vendors) and the
final objects of regulation (users) can be seen to be consistent. At least
in the current form of consensus based responsible vulnerability
reporting framework. The actions desired by vulnerability reporters
(protective measures by the users and issuance of patches by the
vendors) are also in the private interest of both the vendors and the
users1087. 
This coinciding of interest speaks in favour of the efficacy of the
use of vulnerability disclosure as an informative regulatory instrument
to solve the problems of secure software development1088. Necessary
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Doelen in The Sermon, p. 107-109, partly explains when informative
regulatory instruments should be used.
1089 This is what the recent history of vulnerability disclosure testify. The
reporters turned to full and immediate disclosure when they felt that the
vendors are not taking their non-coercive reports seriously. Coerciveness still
remains as a central part also in the more responsible and cooperative forms of
reporting that have largely replaced full and immediate disclosure after the
vendors’ interest has increased and the process of reporting has matured. Note
that empirical evidence on the influence mechanisms together with their
efficacy is still largely lacking.
voluntary compliance is a reasonable expectation when the interests
of all the parties are closely aligned. Vulnerability information is
especially useful because the users wish to engage in the desired
behaviour but have been prevented from doing so by ignorance or
lack of pertinent information and also the vendors that produce both
information and patches are also to gain. The arguments in favour
of the cooperative form of implementation of the vulnerability
reporting parallel with this.
However, the above analysis showed several hindrances to the
efficacy of this type strategy of regulation by information. Not only
do the interests vary in practice or are even contradictory in certain
aspects, which seriously reduces the efficacy of non-coercive
regulation by information1089, but there are also several issues that
need further research and interest from the practitioners. One of the
main issues is the lack of capability to influence initial secure software
development. 
As has been pointed out above, the concentration in vulnerability
reporting is mainly on the disclosure of vulnerabilities found after
the release of a software package to the public. It affects secure
development only in terms of patching (i.e., post the release of the
software). Initial secure software development is not the primary
concern. However, if the vulnerability disclosure is truly desired to
influence secure software development this lacking needs to be
redressed.
The ongoing deeper unification and codification of the different
approaches to vulnerability reporting into the common policies and
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guidelines that are accepted by most of the stakeholders, together with
the increasing reliance on them while handling vulnerability disclosure
and other improvements in the vulnerability disclosure process is not
enough as such. As long as the concentration is on post-release
problems in the form of patching and the avoidance of vulnerabilities
in the development phase is left relatively unaddressed, not even the
consensus seeking guidelines provide relief to the central limitation
of vulnerability reporting.
Whether or not it is possible for vulnerability reporting to really
influence secure software development depends heavily on the ways
the users of software products and their vendors utilise the provided
information. At least three ways in which vulnerability reporting can
influence initial secure software development was identified in the
preliminary analysis.
In the first, historical data about the vulnerability of a specific software
package and about the responses its vendor has given to the reporters
can be useful in software acquisition. At least it can be useful in
considering the switch to competing products. To the degree the
responsiveness of the vendor to the reports become public, as they
do when the disclosure is made directly to the public if the vendor
is not responding, information about the trustworthiness of the vendor
is also disseminated. Even though this data does not fully reflect the
security of next release of the software package in question, it can
be used as indication of the seller’s attitude towards secure software
development in general. In the COTS software markets this can be
an influential mechanism since there are not a lot of other sources
of trustworthiness of the vendor and the security of its software beside
business reputation.
However, this information is not readily accessible to the (potential)
buyers of software products. It is scattered in a variety of sources and
is not necessarily presented in a form comprehensible to all concerned.
Only large enterprises and true experts can be assumed to be able
to use the general existing scattered vulnerability knowledge. However,
they can be such an influential group of users that if they, at the
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1090 The differences in the disclosure of financial information and disclosure of
vulnerability information need to be acknowledged as Cavusoglu et al. point
out in Emerging Issues in Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure, p. 7.
margin, engage in comparison shopping on the basis of the
vulnerability of software products and the responsiveness of vendors,
suppliers will have to respond. Not all even have to understand or
reach the information, because at the margin it is enough that a
sufficient group of influential users do.
Since not even this is certain, there is a need to gather the scattered
vulnerability information into a more readily accessible form and by
an actor that is seen as a reliable source of information on the
trustworthiness of the products and their vendors. Fine-tuning this
information provision with the insights from marketing research or
research in the economics and accounting areas where financial
disclosure has been investigated for a long time could prove to be
useful1090.
One development towards better efficacy of vulnerability reporting
could be to rely more on governmental CSIRT teams or other
organisations that are deemed reliable as intermediaries that collect
and disseminate what participants in the market regard as reliable
information about trustworthiness of software product and their
vendors. Since they gather information about vulnerabilities on single
sources that are relatively easy to access and are more likely be seen
as impartial and reliable finders of fact or truth or as authoritative
parties to judge the issue than external reporters, their possibilities
to disseminate information about the trustworthiness of the software
product and to facilitate the application of non-legal sanctions, like
refusing to purchase, is enhanced. Especially when noting that it is
not just about credibility in the eyes of the vendors that is at stake,
i.e., that the vulnerability reports are heard and taken seriously by the
vendors when they get the vulnerability report from a reliable source,
but also the credibility in the eyes of the potential purchasers.
Better image of impartiality and reliability as finders of security
related vulnerabilities is especially needed in relation to the vendors
since the vulnerability reporting process involves a lot of conflicting
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1091 Whereas the validity of the reports is essential to the vendors, which could
be improved, e.g., with a more intensive dialog between the reporters and the
vendors as pointed out by Tiina Havana in Communication in the Software
Vulnerability Reporting Process, p. 69, the perceived trustworthiness of the source
of vulnerability information is more important to the potential purchasers and
to the current users if to be used for comparison shopping.
1092 According to Karthik Kannan and Rahul Telang, An Economic Analysis of
Market for Software Vulnerabilities, p. 4, this is due to the possibility of
information leakage in profit-based mechanism. Even if the leakage is
prevented, they show that a profit-based mechanism performs better than a
non-profit-based mechanism only under certain conditions (idem. p. 11).
However, Hasan Cavusoglu, Huseyin Cavusoglu and Srinivasan Raghunathan
interests and the reporters were for long seen to be acting against the
vendors. More importantly, reliability in the eyes of the potential
purchasers and current users is needed even more1091. If participants
in the market do not respect the body as an impartial and reliable
finder of fact or truth that can give authoritative judgements about
the trustworthiness of the software product or about the business
reputation of the vendors, then they are not likely to use the non-legal
sanctions such as to refuse to purchase the vulnerable product. In
the current high media activity surrounding software vulnerabilities,
a mere hint is no longer enough to evoke an adverse reaction from
customers and potential buyers.
From this perspective, the current development towards increased
use of national CSIRT teams such as CERT-FI group in Finland and
better cooperation at the supra-national or even international level
which is one of the objectives of the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) could be really helpful. They
are at the position to provide the vulnerability information in a form
that is likely to be perceived as impartial and reliable in the eyes of
the potential vendors. Initial theoretical considerations imply that non-
profit-based organisations such as the governmental CERT teams
almost always perform better in terms of social welfare than profit-
seeking organisations that pass the vulnerability knowledge to their
clients ready pay for advance notifications and that encourage other
people to submit vulnerability information to them to get paid in
return1092. However, substantial improvement in their operation is
Conclusions 455
sucpect in Emerging Issues in Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure, p. 24-25,
the ability of non-profit-based mechanisms to yield a higher social welfare than
profit-based mechanisms because the role of the vendor is downplayed and call
for future work that would consider the role of the vulnerability handling
process of the vendor.
1093 According to the analysis made by Urs E. Gattiker in CERTs, vendors,
alert services – can they deliver vital information for protecting your digital
assets during public holidays? EU-IST News from CyTRAP labs, dated January
4th, 2006, published in weekly online serial publication EU-IST News from
CyTRAP labs (ISSN 1600-1869), 7(2): news no. 3, January 8th, 2006, available
at http://security.weburb.dk/frame/newsletter/InformationSecurity/677
[10.1.2006], the ones that provided the most complete information about the
Microsoft VMF (Windows Meta File) vulnerability case were, without
exception, all non-governmental organisations.
1094 For example, when the public disclosure of vulnerability is presented as an
ideological argument of the freedom of information and its positive
relationship to security, the intention is to shape the intrinsic predispositions of
the participants in the vulnerability reporting process. However, since this
ideological argument is not deemed to be correct as such, and possibly is not
compatible with existing institutionalised values where some form of
responsible disclosure dominates, it may thus create increased objections
towards the practice of public disclosure and erode its legitimacy. The
continuity and compatibility with existing institutionalised values has been
still needed. For example, even though governmental CSIRT teams
and alike governmental organisations possess best capabilities to
influence secure software development, they are currently
unfortunately far behind non-governmental organisations in providing
all the needed information quickly and correctly1093. 
Note that increased disclosure of vulnerabilities as such serves to
raise awareness of security issues and can thus help in the mobilisation
of social pressure even without the vulnerability information actually
being used in comparison shopping. This is the intrinsic predisposition
shaping effect that the vulnerability reporting can have. However,
it largely depends on the degree to which vulnerability disclosure is
accepted as a correct practice in information security and the way the
actors perceive its role. Due to the conflicting interest and the time-to-
time heading debate, special care is required from the intentional use
of vulnerability disclosure as an intrinsic predisposition shaping
mechanism1094.
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raised as one of the necessary conditions for the law to generate the
internalisation of new attitudes implicit in the conduct required by the new law
is raised by William M. Evan in Law as an Instrument of Social Change, p. 557-
558. Even more important it is for the less coercive regulatory mechanisms
such as the vulnerability reporting.
1095 Only a little over half of the receivers of the reports answered in a survey
conducted by Tiina Havana in 2002, as reported in Havana and Röning,
Communication in the Software Vulnerability Process, p. 8, that they pass the
information further to their software developers with the intention of
preventing similar vulnerabilities occurring again. Of all the respondents to the
survey only 15 per cent do this, and when they do it, the information does not
have an essential role in the software development process. Thus, the
information gathered during the reporting process is not widely utilised for the
benefit of secure software development.
In the second, vulnerability reporting can influence initial secure software
development more forcefully if the information provided is
internalised by the vendors. This would require the vendors to
distribute the information about discovered defects to their software
developers and to make that information an essential part of the
software development process. However, such internalisation of the
vulnerability information into the secure development process is not
done all that commonly1095. It would require a much deeper
commitment to initial secure software development than is currently
present in the COTS software market. Vulnerability reporting would
have to initiate software houses into changing their development from
release-early-and-patch-later approach to real commitment to initial
secure software development.
There are, however, certain mechanisms by which vulnerability
reporting could be used to initiate such deep changes in attitudes, but
it is not solely in the hands of reporters of vulnerabilities. It would
require a closer cooperation between the actors in the development
of vulnerability disclosure policies. As was pointed out above,
currently even the common policies and the guidelines for vulnerability
reporting do not provide any rules, practices, procedures, or demands
for the information communicated to be used for the benefit of initial
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1096 For example, there typically are no demands for the vendors to pass the
information about discovered vulnerabilities to their software developers in
order to prevent similar vulnerabilities in the future. See heading 4.3.3 above.
1097 For example, the main function of CERT-FI is to promote security of the
information society by assisting its clients (every finnish private individual,
company or representative of the government) in preventive actions for
computer security incident and the minimisation of the risk of vulnerability.
CERT-FI also receives the telecommunications operators' reports on
information security incidents and threats demanded by Section 21 titled
”informaton security notifications”of the Finnish Act on the Protection of
Privacy in Electronic Communications (516/2004). An unofficial translation of
the Act is available via Finlex at http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/
2004/20040516 [31.10.2005]. See version 1.1 of the charter of the CERT-FI
headings 3.1-3.4, published 7.6.2004, available in pdf -format at, http://
www.ficora.fi/suomi/tietoturva/certtoiminta.htm (in finnish) [31.10.2005].
The charter is based on Interet Engineering Task Force’s best practice as
presented by Brownlee and Guttman, Expectations of Computer Security Incident
Response, in RFC 2350.
1098 See, for example, the web pages of the US-CERT, http://www.uscert.gov/
aboutus.html [31.10.2005]. Such national security interest might somewhat
hamper international cooperation in the area as the fear of U.S. centricity
expressed in Europe show. The European Commission raised its special fear
of the worldwide coordination being done through partly U.S. government
funded CERT/CC and that CERTs in Europe are dependent on its
information release policy in its communication on network and information
secure software development1096. By developing such requirements,
the normative policies for vulnerability disclosure could be used to
gain a deeper involvement in the secure software development
process.
The most likely parties to develop and to be able to enforce such
requirements in their policies and guidelines for vulnerability reporting
are national coordinators (like US-CERT, Aus-Cert, etc.). Of the
policies set up by coordinators, the objective of enhancing the public
interest in information security and to aid to reach a level of security
that is sufficient for the whole society is most clearly protected by
the national governmental teams1097. National security interests, such
as the protection the critical infrastructure, are also high in the list
of objectives of national teams1098. This raises the importance of the
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security, COM(2001)298, p. 21. As a response, EU is studying ways to
strengthen cooperation between EU member state CERTs and CSIRT teams
and other similar organisation. The establishment of the European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA, http://www.enisa.eu.int/) is part of
this. See Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 10 March 2004 establishing the European Network and
Information Security Agency, Official Journal L 077, 13/03/2004, p. 1–11.
1099 Due to their role in enhancing the public interest, the national coordinating
teams are in an especially good situation to develop disclosure policies that
minimize total social costs, and not just private costs of a specific stakeholder.
Cooperation at an international level is a minimum requirement for this to
happen. The priority of governmental funded coordination under welfare
economic considerations is shown by Kannan and Telang in An Economic
Analysis of Market for Software Vulnerabilities.
1100 Usually there is no obligation to invoke a coordinator in a reporting
process; direct contact between the vendor, the discoverer, and the users of the
product is also widely used.
1101 Even though the national teams are in the best position to enforce socially
optimal reporting policies due to their role in advancing the public interest, it is
not clear that they could or even should do so. Since they act as mediators in
the process, their policies would only be complied widely (assuming that the
socially optimal reporting policy is not the one that gains wide acceptance by all
stakeholders) if there would be an obligation to invoke a coordinator in the
reporting process. Since the role of coordinators is just to assist and advance
the communication and cooperation between the main actors (the vendors and
disclosure policies advocated by national coordinators, since they
posses the ability to use the policy as a leverage to modify the
incentives other stakeholders face for the benefit of the society at
large1099.
National governmental teams acting as coordinators and being
funded by the government are also in a unique position to compel
others to follow their typically more public interest biased policies.
However, this is not typically done and the policies for vulnerability
reporting concern only those who utilise the national coordinating
teams in their reporting1100. National CSIRT teams and alike do not
use their regulatory capacity in the public interest at the level of
policies. The public interest is sought by means of informing and
assistance, not by developing socially optimal reporting policies1101.
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the reporters), this might be desirable only if the vendors and the reporters
could not cooperate in socially optimal way. More research needs to be done in
order to verify this.
1102 The formal life-cycle model of vulnerabilities presented both in the OIS
Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting and Response, p. 2-3, and in the
recommendation for NIAC guidelines presented by Chambers and Thompson
in Vulnerability Disclosure Framework, p. 13-16, begins with discovery. However,
the NIAC guidelines at least acknowledges the introduction of the vulnerability
into the product and then starts with the resolution of the vulnerability. Even
though this could be explained by the shorter writing style of the OIS
guidelines, it still represents the differences in attitudes and objectives. The
major software vendors and security companies behind the OIS guidelines may
not want to admit the existence of their liability for the vulnerabilities found
from their software.
Another path would be to set requirements for the use of
vulnerability information in the initial secure software development
in the common policies and guidelines for vulnerability reporting.
Even thought these policies and the guidelines currently provide no
procedural support for this and the concentration is purely on fixing
the problems that occur after release, they could be used to initiate
such changes. The use of the common policies and guidelines as
signals of the responsible behaviour of the vendor could be used as
a leverage for the demands of deeper commitment to initial secure
software development. This would, however, require substantial
improvement since currently the common guidelines do not even
emphasise the introduction of a vulnerability into a product and the
life-cycle of a vulnerability depicted in them begins with discovery
of the existence of a vulnerability in a specific software product1102.
Also research on the ways and forms in which vulnerability info
is reported to the vendors could show ways to improve the efficacy
of this instrument in influencing initial secure software development.
Knowledge of the parties to whom the info is reported and of the
channels that are used together with the organisational position of
those processing vulnerability information could show paths to
improvement. For example, if the information about reported
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1103 This is made explicit in the OIS Guidelines for Security Vulnerability Reporting
and Response, p. 1.
1104 See, e.g., Graff and van Wyk, Secure Coding, from 2003 and Viega and
McGraw, Building Secure Software, from 2002.
vulnerabilities and customer feedback, for example, about defects
in functionality that more typically is made part of the software
development process and especially part of the requirement of the
next release, is divided and processed by altogether separate actors
inside an organisation, the likelihood of vulnerability information
being utilised in initial secure software development is low.
In the third form, the reporting of vulnerability information could also
contribute to improving the engineering quality of software products,
by supporting the academic and research communities’ ongoing efforts
to identify common security vulnerabilities, the conditions under
which they occur, and methods to avoid them1103. The knowledge
of vulnerabilities, not just of their existence but also of their details
(like the specific coding or implementation error) could also be used
to train current and to educate future software developers more widely
to avoid the causes of the vulnerabilities. Due to the current lack of
teaching material such knowledge, especially if codified, could serve
as an important educational resource. For example, recent textbooks
on secure software development use known vulnerabilities especially
as examples to clarify and make things more concrete1104. 
Even though the influence on the initial secure software
development is the most important issue to be tackled with if the
vulnerability reporting is really desired to have an impact on the
software development practices, there is still strong need to develop
the vulnerability reporting process as such. The issue of post breach
correction continues to be important for long. It is going to remain
as an essential part of the general post-release improvement of existing
software products. Even though external reporters of vulnerabilities
at the first glance seem to provide information that the vendors ought
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1105 As the analysis of the default product liability rules suggested, software vendors
ought to test for security and to inform their customers of vulnerabilities. These
obligations are just bypassed with the current contractual practices.
1106 Baron, Private Politics, p. 47-53.
to disclose themselves, in fact external parties are always are going
to find vulnerabilities that the vendor could not have found even if
it had conducted sufficient quality and security assurance. As has been
acknowledged several times before, a number of vulnerabilities are
always going to be contained in released software products despite
the best efforts of the developers. This is why the development of
the vulnerability reporting process as such is important.
However, if the lack of influence for initial secure software
development is not addressed properly, vulnerability reporting is not
likely to be efficacious in enhancing secure software development
in other forms than just assisting in the post-release patching of
software. It will not be able to alter the current high reliance on post-
release correction of vulnerabilities. At the same time it may cause
further problems for initial secure software development by promoting
such over reliance on patching. The external discovers would continue
to be used to replace the testing work that the software vendors
already ought to do under product liability rules1105. This calls especially
for more empirical research on the influence capacity of vulnerability
reporting as a regulatory instrument following the research agenda
for private politics presented by David P. Baron1106.
6.3  The way forward
The wider regulatory approach adopted in this study showed many
interesting paths that call in question the force of the law in the
regulation of secure software development. At the same time it
enabled the identification of the regulatory function of many issues
that typically are not considered as regulation and showed that they
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shape secure software development much more significantly than any
law currently does. This might partly be due to the youngness of the
information security as an art and a science. There have not been
efficacious governmental regulatory solutions in place that could have
been used tackle with the problem of insecure software or, at least
could have been adapted for that purpose. Vulnerability disclosure
has for long been the only somewhat efficacious method of regulating
secure software development in a short period of time.
At the same time it also tells about the necessary diversification
of regulators and regulatory solutions especially in a rapidly developing
field like the software business. Because there were no efficacious
regulatory means to influence secure COTS software development,
the users sought for new instruments. The original unresponsiveness
of software vendors to the vulnerability reports, the easy means of
communicating especially inside active groups of 
enthusiastic IT users, and the high media attention providing a means
to inform also the general public led to an increased regulatory use
of vulnerability disclosure. In the strictest sense it meant immediate
public disclosure of all information.
It is questionable whether the future enhancement of such an
important area of information security as secure software development
could be left to such an ad hoc mechanism as vulnerability reporting.
Not even with the more mature and responsible disclosure schemes.
With the increasing awareness of information security issues among
policy makers and legislators, and the maturing of information security
as a central art and science in the future development of the networked
society we can expect that legal regulation in its many forms is going
to play an increasing role in the future. Already the notion of the policy
evaluation studies about the escalation of regulatory instruments
predicts this. So far the reliance has largely been on less coercive
informative instruments. 
Governmental regulation has already started to play a more
important role. Not only is the avoidance of stricter and more intrusive
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1107 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2
December 2001 on general product safety, OJ L 011, 15.1.2002, p. 4-17. Public
regulation has been considered to be the best measure for product safety in
Europe as noted, e.g., by Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson in EC
and US Approaches to Consumer Protection, p. 225. Private litigation in the
European tradition has been considered to be limited to compensation in
individual cases and has not been seen to have much to do with larger safety
issues.
governmental mandates about software security a central impetus for
the recently emerged more favourable approach to vulnerability
reporting, but vulnerability disclosure already takes place in the shadow
of government.  Governments encourage such activity and support
it by establishing organisations to coordinate reporting such as national
CSIRT teams. 
It can be expected that governmental regulation will increase in
the long run. Especially if the joint governmental and private sector
type of regulation does not efficaciously start to influence initial secure
software development, i.e., vulnerability disclosure does not develop
into the direction where it could influence initial secure software
development. In other words, if vulnerability reporting as a process
is not developed into the direction that it really would start to
influence initial secure software development and the effects of
software product liability rules remain as slight as they would seem,
we can expect that stricter and more intrusive governmental
regulations are enacted in the future. The regulation of secure software
development is coming of age for more stricter forms of regulation.
Probably they will come in the form of sectoral product safety
regulations that lay down relatively general essential requirements of
security similar to the Directive 2001/95/EC of General Product
Safety1107. The task of harmonising technical specifications and setting
of more specific requirements for software security would then be
left to the recognised national standard bodies and to the designated
European standardisation bodies such as the CEN (European
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1108 CEN is a system of formal process to produce standards founded by the
national standards bodies in Europe. See the web pages of CEN at
http://www.cenorm.org/cenorm/index.htm [13.2.2006].
1109 CENELEC is a non-profit technical organisation set up under Belgian law
and composed of the National Electrotechnical Committees of 28 European
countries. See the web pages of CENELEC at http://www.cenelec.org/
Cenelec/Homepage.htm [13.2.2006].
1110 ETSI is an independent, non-profit organisation officially responsible for
standardisation of information and communication technologies in Europe.
Web pages at http://www.etsi.org/ [13.2.2006].
1111 For a complete story behind the European style of product safety
regulation, see the five volume series of Working Papers from the European
University Institute (EUI) written by Christian Joerges, Josef Falke, Hans W.
Miclitz, and Gert Brüggemeier, European Product Safety, Internal Market
Policy and the New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standards.
1112 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security is a standard for
evaluating information technology products and systems, such as operating
systems, computer networks, distributed systems, and applications. It states
requirements for security functions and for assurance measures. It has been
developed on the basis of several national and larger regional security
evaluation criteria and there is also an equivalent ISO standard 15408. For
critical analyses and suggestions for the improvement of the Common Criteria
process see especially Fred B. Schneider Trust in Cyberspace, p. 199-209, from
1999 and the report on Technical Standards and Common Criteria, Appendix B, p.
2-3 and Appendix E, provided by the U.S. National Cyber Security Partnership
(NCSP) in 2004.
Committee for Standardisation1108), CENELEC (European Committee
for Electrotechnical Standardisation1109) and ETSI (European
Telecommunications Standards Institute)1110. Software developed
according to these harmonised standards would then enjoy a
presumption of conformity with the essential requirements.1111
Of course such development presumes that such standards can
be developed. Research into the metrics on the basis of which software
security could be measured is just emerging. Of course there are a
variety of standards for information security in general as already
pointed out above, but for software security they are scarce; excepting
the Common Criteria which has largely been considered too expensive
and bureaucratic for the evaluation of many software products1112.
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1113 This has been emphasised by Henrik Kaspersen already in 1991 in one of
the first conferences ever considering the role of law in securing computer
networks. See Kaspersen’s paper “How to Advance Computer Security by
Legal Instruments?” in the proceedings, p. 92.
1114 In the original Action Plan to implement the National Information Security
Strategy, adopted by the National Information Security Advisory Board in
spring 2004, there were projects targeting the safeguarding of fundamental
rights as required by the Finland’s National Information Security Strategy (see
Ministry of Transport and Communications Finland, Turvalliseen
tietoyhteiskuntaan,heading 4.1 at p. 31). However, already in the first progress
report at the end of 2004 the Advisory Board, Creating a Safer Information Society,
p. 9, had given priority to other projects and arranged the project aiming to
ensure fundamental rights into groups with other projects, each supporting the
higher priority projects. In the second progress report at the end of 2005 the
Advisory Board, Tietoturvalliseen tietoyhteiskuntaan, p. 8 and p. 39-41, had
altogether absorbed the action of ensuring fundamental rights into the larger
priority project of information-secure electronic services and to the review of
related legislation. More information about Finland’s National Information
Security Strategy and of the work of the Advisory Board, see the web pages of
the Ministry of Transport and Communications Finland, at http://
www.mintc.fi/ (at the English language portal see Communications –
The problems in the development and implementation of the
Common Criteria and similar previous evaluation schemes also tell
about the complexity and difficultness of developing standards for
software security. No single technical standard suffices since the
requirements differ between types of software and the context of use.
Neither can the implementation and functioning of these standards
be evaluated merely with regard to their technical qualities. In order
for software security standards to be a means of achieving an adequate
level of security for the needs of the network society, their
implementation needs to be evaluated also with regard to ethical and
legal principles and in the light of the basic constitutional rights1113.
This has, unfortunately, proved highly cumbersome. Even in
Finland, where the role of information security in state action and
society is relatively well developed, the review of the protection of
basic rights in the regulation of information security has turned out
to be a highly complex and time consuming task1114. This is partly
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Information Security and Privacy Protection – National Information Security
Strategy) [16.3.2006].
due to newness of the issue. What we need is general principles and
deeper analysis of the role of information security among the central
tenets of the constitutional state and the system of basic rights
together with the place of information security among central legal
principles. Only a comprehensive and systematic understanding of
the versatile principles of information security and the various
connections it has to constitutional rights can provide means for
genuine evaluations of ensuring of fundamental rights both in the
technical standards and in the regulation of information security more
generally.
In line with the general argument made in theory of regulation,
it is clear that no single regulatory instrument alone is enough to
improve the current state of security in COTS software. The analysis
has shown that software product liability and vulnerability reporting
as regulatory instruments in their current form do not provide
sufficient incentives to alter the practices in software development
towards better security consciousness. With significant changes and
in combination possibly even with other regulatory instruments they
could be enough to alter the incentives for secure software
development. Especially because the general awareness of security
issues among the various types software users seems to be increasing.
Even though a regulatory mix where several instruments are
combined probably would be the best solution, such an approach
would require a coordinated policy approach. This implies a more
general argument. The underlying argument of this study is that secure
software development, as an important societal objective, is that kind
of a conduct that would be desirable for the law and regulation in
general to promote or encourage, to give some motive or ground for
or, at least, not to hamper unnecessarily. As a public policy, it must
be taken into consideration while drafting laws and other regulation
that may have effects on secure software development and not just
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1115 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Public Law No. 105-304,
signed to law in 28th October 1998, implements WIPO (World Intellectual
Property Organization) Copyright Treaty into U.S. Federal law.
1116 The problems that have appeared in practice have been described especially
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in Unintended Consequences:
Five Years under the DMCA, v. 3, September 24, 2003, available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/?f=unintended_consequences. html
[14.2.2006]. EFF is a non-profit civil liberties advocacy and legal organisation
for the networked world based in the U.S.
1117 Especially article 6 of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10-19. This is the EU
implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
1118 This was expected by Bernt Hugenholtz, a professor of Intellectual Property Law
and director of the Institute for Information Law of the University of Amsterdam
(IViR) who chairs the Intellectual Property Task Force of the Legal Advisory Board of
the European Commission, already in 2000 when he wrote an opinion to the European
Intellectual Property Review (EIPR), Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and
when drafting specific standards for secure software development.
If taken seriously as an important public policy, effects on secure
software development would have to be raised among the issues to
be considered when initiating any type of regulation that might
influence software development.
This concerns especially the central property rights rules relating
software. So far the effects on information security in general and
on the incentives for secure software development especial have not
been considered appropriately. For example, the U.S. experience with
the anti-circumvention provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA)1115 codified in section 1201 of the United States Code
title 17 on Copyrights show that they have been used to stifle free
speech and scientific research in information security1116. Also in
Europe, the anti-circumvention provisions in the EU Copyright
Directive (EUCD)1117 were drafted with intense lobbying and public
debate that has not ended to the EU level. Another round of extensive
lobbying and resistance has appeared at the national implementation
level1118.
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Possibly Invalid, p. 501-502.
1119 See Valtioneuvosto, Hallituksen esityksen laatimisohjeet. 
The main reason for the intense outcry was the legislators’ lack
of consideration of consumer protection issues and concerns of basic
rights and liberties especially when drafting the copyright rules. What
the legislators’, at least in Finland, largely ignored was the newly
established importance of copyright for the functioning of the network
society. Former highly specific and marginal legal issue had become
a central element for the functioning of both the new e-business and
the network society in general. Especially the potential chilling effects
for security research in general and vulnerability research especial
remained largely hidden. Also the effects of the technological
protection measures to the quality and usability of informational
product like software, which is a central consumer protection issue,
was largely ignored. It not only concerns the right to take copies for
private purposes, but also the functioning of the products altogether.
Protection of the consumers’ expectations of quality in relation to
informational goods was largely bypassed.
Good development towards integration of the considerations for
the effects on secure software development is the inclusion of the
requirement to consider the possible effects of parliamentary laws
on information security in general, as part of the effects on the
information society, in the guidelines for the drafting of government
proposals in Finland given in 20041119. This holds the possibility that
the effects parliamentary laws may have on secure software
development are considered in the process of drafting them. 
Unfortunately, the government officials drafting laws typically do
not have the expertise to conduct such an analysis and, at least in
Finland, the voice of the experts of software development is not
present due to the lack of the use of expert advice and hearings of
experts in the drafting process. Finland is also going towards the
European type of lobbying in the drafting of laws and forsaking its
tradition in using expert committees and councils to give advice in
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1120 For a critical overview of the Finnish consultation process see the OECD
review of regulatory reform in Finland from 2003, Government Capacity to Assure
High Quality Regulation in Finland, p. 25-29. For the European style of
consultation in regulatory drafting, see the report of the Better Regulation Task
Force (renamed as Better Regulation Commission in the beginning of 2006)
Get Connected, where also the limited role of the comitology system together
with the role of expert groups and advisory committees in the EU is
acknowledged. At the same time the report proposes a less competitive model
of consultation than lobbying where stakeholders, instead of battling for
influence in order to seek favourable policy outcomes for a particular set of
interest, would see consultation as a co-operative dialogue that helps to shape
EU legislation in ways that maximise the benefits for all.
1121. Lainvalmistelun kansliapäällikköryhmä, Tehokkaampaa, suunnitelmallisempaa ja
hallitumpaa lainvalmistelua, p. 211-212.
1122 The central role of risk analysis and the usefulness of its methods in legal
the drafting of parliamentary laws. The voice of the experts in software
development and information security typically does not get heard
because active civil rights groups that could enrol the experts in the
field are still lacking in Finland. We still do not have such influential
public interest groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) in the U.S. that gathers the voice of experts to draw attention
on emerging civil liberties issues such as the protection of privacy.
This is a crucial lacking in a situation where moral discourse in the
network society and changes in the paradigms of secure software
development widely remain at the shoulders of civil rights groups
and alike, especially in those countries where class action suits are
not available1120. 
Moreover, the requirement to consider the possible effects of
parliamentary laws on information security has unfortunately remained
only as a statement of the importance of information security. The
drafting guidelines are not widely used in practice of law-drafting as
a report published in autumn 2005 on the state and development of
law-drafting in Finland shows1121. 
This calls for an emphasised role for risk analysis and management
not just in software and information system development, as is
currently fashionable to argue, but also in the regulatory field1122. At
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decision-making has been recently illustrated by Peter Wahlgren in Juridisk
riskanalys.
the same time it further emphasises the need to develop
comprehensive and systematic understanding of the versatile principles
of information security and the various connections it has to the basic
tenets of a constitutional state and the protected basic rights. Only
when armed with such an understanding can genuine considerations
of the effects of parliamentary laws and other regulation on
information security in general be made.
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1123 This is similar to what Michel Foucault does in his analysis of the technologies of
power. This point about Foucault’s work has been made, e.g., by David Garland,
Punishment and Modern Society, p. 169, in a brilliant discussion of the major social
theories of punishment.
1124 See e.g., Weimer and Vining, Policy Analysis.
1125 This point is made by Peters in The Politics of Tool Choice, p. 552. This
dismissal of the value base is a general problem in the dominating regulatory
Epilogue: value protection 
and decentred regulation
I have been arguing that such partially self-enforced regulatory
instruments like software product liability and even such joint
regulation like vulnerability reporting could be used to, with
modifications, to achieve or at least to come closer to the security
of COTS software as a social objective. In the analysis of regulatory
capacities of these instruments I have abstracted away from real
situations and have discussed the capacity of specific regulatory
instruments without reference to the actual values1123. I have discussed
regulation as a set of means or capacities which may be put to a variety
of uses; the social objective of achieving secure software could be
one. With this, I have left aside the larger question of values.
In doing so, I have rendered myself guilty of the basic vice of the
discussions of the use of indirect regulatory instruments; the
disconnection from the value base. When concentrating heavily on
how to best design and implement policy, the normative concerns
of what that policy should be or what values ought to be pursued
easily become a secondary question. For example, the basic textbooks
on policy analysis portray the analysis and selection of policy
instruments as a rational, linear and technical exercise1124 and in doing
so oversimplifies the process of instrument choice by ignoring the
important political factors involved, including ideologies and values1125.
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literature deriving from the effectiveness-based critique of regulation according
to which “…regulation is not achieving what it set out to achieve … usually
accompanied by prescription of what techniques should be used instead, with
greatest attention given in most recent literature to the ‘decentred’ techniques”.
Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 22. Similar notion is made by Tala
in Lakien vaikutukset, p. 139.
1126 Peters in The Politics of Tool Choice, p. 552-564, considers the effects of
political decision-making on values to the choice of traditional tools like
prescriptive rules and market-based instruments.
1127 Horne, Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Norms, p. 4.
1128 This argument has been made, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum in How Computer
Systems Embody Values, p. 118-120.
1129 This is a forceful argument in relation to information security. Not only are
deep political controversies (concerning issues like privacy, anonymity,
freedom of speech etc.) involved in the implementation of different technical
or procedural ways to secure systems, but these techniques and procedures can
also be used for so many purposes (e.g., to enhance national security, to
enhance privacy, to protect IPRs or other corporate property).
Value decisions, their makers and ways of doing them are, however,
not only present in making the policy for regulating, but also in the
choice of instruments. Because the instruments as such include certain
values, to decide what instrument to use already is a value decision.
In addition to the relatively clear case of influence of values to the
choice of prescriptive rules and market-harnessing instruments1126,
value-decisions are also present in the choice of other regulatory tools.
Cultural values are embedded in social norms. As Christine Horne
points out from the perspective of sociology, one way of
understanding the internalisation of norms is by individuals coming
to value the behaviour specified by a norm for its own sake1127. When
individuals internalise social norms or groups try to induce certain
norms (e.g., with the use of law) they, therefore, make a choice among
different values. 
Values can also be embedded into technology1128. As the famous
argument of Lawrence Lessig in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace spells
out (freely interpreted), the code (architecture of cyberspace) embeds
fundamental, sometimes even ‘constitutional’, values, and to choose
among variety of available code is, therefore, to make important
choices between different values1129.
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1130 Black, Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I, p. 598; Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p.
80-81 and 139-140. This problem of instrumentalism actually is part of a more
general form of critique according to which regulation is not directed at the
appropriate goals, and/or that it is not being pursued in accordance with, or
made subject to, certain values. Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, p. 22.
In relation legislation, see Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 75-82.
1131 Smith, What is Regulation?, p. 39; Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 79. While the
ideal of legal reasoning is internal coherence and autonomy from operational
or outcome considerations, with regulation, by contrast, problems in widely
diverse domains tend to entail quite context specific goals and techniques. The
policy maker or regulationists is interested only in which rules (or other
techniques) work best.
1132 Only the role of cost-benefit analysis, regulatory impact analysis (e.g., the
examination of the effects of a law reform), and the research and expertise
concerning them is discussed. The message typically is limited to explicating
that they cannot be a substitute for political decision-making, but rather a
valuable complement to the latter. This is typical in the tools approach to
governance. See, e.g., Tala, Lakien vaikutukset, p. 214; Peters, The Politics of
Tool Choice, p. 563; Salamon, The Tools Approach and the New Governance,
p. 606-607.
1133 Black, Decentring Regulation, p. 143.
The focus on instruments diverts attention form the issue of how
the desired ends and values should be defined and by whom, despite
the radical rethinking of the ways in which societal ends can be
achieved that the focus on the techniques has elicited1130. The
instrumental rationality behind most regulation tends to divert the
regulatory scholars and practitioners attention away from the
considerations of consistent values or of coherence of principles1131.
Only a lip service to the need to address the substantive value
concerns and to make the important political considerations when
deciding on the instruments used is often made without further
consideration on how to do this1132.
The definition of regulation as an intentional, systematic attempt
at problem-solving, adopted in this study leaves the door open for
the discussion of the value base regulation should be subjected to
and according to which it should be made legitimate and/or
accountable in some way as pointed out by Julia Black1133. However,
I am not going to go through that door in this study. The value base
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1134 In a constitutional democracy the regulation should be public. By using
non-transparent instruments the agenda (values and ends) behind the
regulation can be hidden from public scrutiny.
1135 Of this discussion in Finland see, e.g., the most recent contribution of
Tuomas Pöysti in ICT and Legal Principles, p. 560-600.
1136 At this individual level information security protects our identity and our
right to informational self-determination. Note that this is not an established
interpretation. Of this discussion in Finland, see the report of the Institute for
Law and Informatics to the Ministry of Transport and Communications
Finland, Saarenpää et al., Sähköinen viestintä, tietoturvallisuus ja perusoikeudet. The
report is part of coordination of the actions implementing Finland’s National
Information Security Strategy that has been the task of the National
Information Security Advisory Board since it began its work in spring 2004.
More information about Finland’s National Information Security Strategy and
of the work of the Advisory Board, see the web pages of the Ministry of
Transport and Communications Finland, at http://www.mintc.fi/ (at the
English language portal see Communications – Information Security and
Privacy Protection – National Information Security Strategy) [16.3.2006].
depends too much on the national context and the special
circumstances of the employment of the instruments that
generalisations are difficult to make. I simply confine to note that due
to the possibility of avoiding political responsibility by hiding the
agenda with the use of invisible instruments using indirect means of
influence1134, it is important to keep in mind that transparency is a
strong argument when choosing between different instruments. It
might not be the most forceful, but transparency of the instrument
should weight a lot when there are alternatives to choose from.
It is, however, important to note that information security can be
seen both as a collective good, a guarantee of the functioning of the
network society1135, and as a part of our fundamental right to security
at the individual level; as an individual right instead of a collective
good1136. Due to the strong relationship with constitutional rights,
there is a need to elaborate a little further the question of the way
values are protected and of who can protect them. 
Under the strong legalistic Finnish regulatory culture it is by no means
clear that other than parliamentary laws can be used when
guaranteeing the use of basic informational rights. This odyssey is
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1137 The basis for this approach is section 80 subsection 1 of the Constitution
of Finland (731/1999) concerning delegation of legislative powers according to
which ”…the principles governing the rights and obligations of private
individuals and other matters that under this Constitution are of legislative
nature shall be governed by Acts”, i.e., laws issued by the parliament
(Parliamentary Acts). I do not intend to imply that this provision or the whole
Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that necessitates the use of
Parliamentary Acts in the regulation of information security. Instead, I only
point out that the legislative culture in Finland tends to overemphasize the
need to regulate issues at the level of Acts of Parliament. This critique is raised
also by the OECD in its review of regulatory reform in Finland from 2003,
Government Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation in Finland, p. 5-6 and 29-30.
1138 See, e.g., Black, Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I, p. 598-599. However, I
am not going deeper into the form the participation should take. For further
discussion, see the effort of Black in Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I and
Part II. Note that this type of proceduralisation is not a distinctive type of
moral theory of regulation because it presupposes a prior and independent
theory of the moral criteria applicable to regulatory choices (Adler, Beyond
Efficiency and Procedure, p. 268-269). True moral theories of regulation give
intrinsic, not just instrumental, significance to the fact that the regulator
followed or failed to follow some specified type of procedure (a decision-
making process). These are what Adler in Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, p.
267, refers to as the proceduralist theories of regulation.
1139 There is a research and practice area in its own right called legislative
drafting. From the Finnish point of view, see Niemivuo, Kansallinen
made important by the notion, made especially in constitutional law
in Finland, that the procedural rules to protect the essential values
of private individuals (the constitutional rights), like the demand for
democratic decision-making, speaks about the need of governmental
regulation and especially the use of parliamentary laws in the
protection of constitutional rights such as information security1137.
Regulatory literature also makes a serious general suggestion that
the substantive value concerns should be determined by a particular
mode of decision-making; i.e., participation and deliberation1138. This
implies the political element; the decisions concerning values ought
to be made collectively. For those educated in law this seems to be
a familiar solution. Traditionally, and especially when looking law from
the inside as legal scholars do, this kind of democratic decision-making
is present in the legislative drafting1139. More generally, this is what
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lainvalmistelu.
1140 This is an argument made by Tuori in Kriittinen oikeuspositivismi, p. 234 and
repeated by him in Tuomarivaltio, p. 916. Another control mechanism is the
separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary.
1141 This does not mean that basic rights and democratic decision-making are in
conflict; instead, they are complementary, as pointed out in the Finnish
constitutional discussion by Tuori in Oikeus, valta ja demokratia, p. 269-281 and
by Viljanen in Perusoikeuksien rajoitusedellytykset, p. 357. A purely formal
conception of democracy will not be sufficient in any event, as a society where
the decision-making procedures are democratic in the formal sense, but where
the basic rights of individuals are not respected, cannot be considered to be a
democracy in any meaningful sense. And at the same time, a functioning
democratic decision-making procedure is usually a prerequisite for the true
realisation of basic rights. However, basic rights as written in constitutions are
not absolute in the sense that they could not be restricted in any way, manner
or form, at least in general terms.
parliaments and governments are for. So, in the case of the law, as
an instrument of regulation, and other direct state-centric regulatory
instruments, this democratisation is present; laws are formulated in
democratic processes where participation and deliberation are inside
the process.
There are also other constitutional mechanisms that can be used
to restrict the excessive instrumentalism of the ‘centred’ regulators
(i.e., parliament, government, ministries, regulatory agencies etc.)
leading to the disconnection from the value base. A central mechanism
is the necessary self-restraint of the law put into practice mainly
through basic (constitutional) rights control1140. In the background
of the constitutions of democratic states there is an assumption of
efficiency of the state machinery to which the constitution sets limits.
Central limitations to the power of this machinery is set by the basic
rights provisions; basic rights and liberties, stated not just in national
constitutions but also in international conventions on human right,
are prerequisites for democracy that have to be protected also from
the abuses of power by the state1141.
From the internal point of view (legal scholarship), the legislative
process (providing legally based regulation) is a combination of
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1142 Tuori, Kriittinen oikeuspositivismi, p. 150-153. See also Tala, Lakien vaikutukset,
p. 2.
1143 Naturally countries differ in this. Finland is similar, for example, to
Germany and United Kingdom where the proportion of Acts of Parliament is
high as pointed out by Harmathy in The Influence of Legal System on Models
of Implementation of Economic Policy, p. 256-7. However, the reliance in
primary legislation that is very specific and detailed command and control type,
is extremely high in Finland due to the strong legalistic tradition. And the
choice of instruments is even further limited by the new constitution
(731/1999) which requires many matters to be regulated by parliamentary acts
rather than secondary legislation or other instruments, for example, issues
concerning basic rights and liberties, as pointed out also by the OECD in its
review of regulatory reform in Finland, Government Capacity to Assure High
Quality Regulation in Finland, p. 30. In Finland, the traditional view is that basic
rights function as a check on the competence of the legislature. But this is no
longer realised only in procedural tests of forms of regulation, but also material
guarantees of basic rights are considered significant. About the Finnish
discussion see, e.g., Viljanen, Perusoikeuksien rajoitusedellytykset.
political and legal practices1142. The political argumentation follows
a goal oriented model where legislation is a means to achieve societal
goals. Even though this is an instrumental view of legislation (as a
tool) it still manages, with the help of constitutional practices, to add
the checks of consistence and coherence of the legal order into the
legislative process. For example, the content of legislation cannot
conflict with the constitution (especially not with the procedures
followed in legislating, but also not with the basic rights and liberties)
or with the international conventions. The use of legal regulation may
be limited also in hierarchical level; at the presence of basic rights and
liberties, regulation, when essentially concerning the legal status of
a person (her rights and obligations), has to be at the level of
parliamentary law1143.
This is build into the constitutional systems and theories of, at least,
western constitutional democracies – the rule of law states. This is
the way law operates for those who look it from the inside; it is not
just a way of regulating the behaviour of others, it is also a constraint
on the behaviour of the regulator. In western constitutional
democracies the control of the realisation of basic rights is the main
tool used in this.
Regulating Secure Software Development478
1144 Habermas, Between Facts and Norm, p. 426, 440-442.
I am not going to argue contrary. Instead, the effort is to widen
the ways to protect, and the regulators who can protect fundamental
rights. In the light of the decentring and pluralism theses adopted
in this study, a requirement of the use of parliamentary laws in the
protection of constitutional rights need a re-evaluation.
At first hand, the above considerations seem to speak in favour
of state-centred actors, legal instruments and constitutional protection
when deciding on the use of regulatory tools for the enhancement
or protection of certain values in a situation requiring regulation. It
is easy to make the excessively restrictive notice that the participatory
and deliberative processes needed in deciding about the substantive
values protected in certain regulation are present only within the
legislative drafting. In other decision-making processes the
participatory and deliberatory functions easily just does not seem to
be present in a sufficient degree. And that the decision-making about
values should be collective, which is the role of governments. 
It is equally easy to limit the sufficient tools for the protection of
basic rights to those of parliamentary laws: for many (of those
educated in law) the requirement of the constitutional restriction of
regulation - constitutional protection from the misuse of power by
the regulator – calls out the use of governmental regulation and
especially parliamentary laws (or regulatory powers deriving from
parliamentary laws). The correct desired values held by the population
in question just seems not to be protectable otherwise.
Despite the correctness of the arguments that seem to favour
governmental regulation, they are not adequate. They lack in scope.
I see at least five reasons for this.
Firstly. Deliberation, as a means for deciding about the substantive
values enhanced by regulation, need not be restricted to legislature
and the courts, not even if introduced into the administration as
Habermas seems to desire1144. There is no need to undertake the
inadequate conception of deliberative democracy existing only within
a constitutional state (state following the rule of law). Deliberation
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1145 Black, Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II, p. 35-36.
1146 Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net, p. 752 and 754-755.
1147 This is the argument of David G. Post in his critique of Lessig’s Code and
Other Law of Cyberspace, What Larry Doesn't Get, p. 1450-1459, in relation to
the values in the architecture in the Lessigian sense. Post uses the example of
and participation as the basis for norm formation can occur also
outside the state apparatus.
This is actually what Julia Black argues by developing the
Habermasian discourse principle into the basis of norm formation
outside the legislature, courts and administration; deliberation in
accordance with the discourse principle but involving a fragmented
state1145. She deviates from the Habermasian implication that
deliberation in accordance with the discourse principle occurs only
in the legislature and the courts (and ought to be introduced into the
administration). For Black, this is too great a restriction on the
potential for other loci of deliberation. This is also what Michael
Froomkin implies when he suggest that complex non-governmental
international rulemaking discourse conducted by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a concrete example of a rulemaking
process that meets Habermas’ notoriously demanding procedural
conditions for a discourse capable of legitimating its outcomes1146.
Secondly. Choices made about value-laden regulatory tools need
not always be political decisions that should necessarily be subject
to collective decision-making inside the state. In relation to the indirect
instruments, especially social norms or technology harnessing and
market-based instruments, the same choices between different
regulatory tools and the embedded values can also be an aggregate
outcome of uncoerced individual decisions. 
This may even be a better way. Without a central plan, i.e., a
collectively decided public policy of the tools, there is a more diverse
set of offerings before the members of the public in response to their
diverse needs and preferences. The values can be protected by
allowing the widest possible scope for uncoordinated and uncoerced
individual choice among different values and among different
embodiments of those values1147.
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the development of language and the role of collective decision-making in that
process. This is actually also the message of welfare economics studies in
regulation. Actors in a ‘market’ should be left free to make decisions, unless the
decision-making process is disturbed in a way that prevents the socially best
outcomes. Naturally, under the influence of network effects both the provision
of cultural values and the different market for technologies can lead to winner-
take-it-all situations and customer lock-in (thus leading to near monopolies),
but it necessarily does not have to do so. The relevance of collective protection
of values becomes relevant only when there is a real possibility of this.
1148 Lessig, The New Chicago School, p. 688.
‘Can’ is enough; one does not have to subscribe entirely to this
argument. The possibility of other ways to make the decisions
concerning values embedded in regulatory tools is sufficient to
straighten the monopolistic conception that collective decision-making,
together with participation and deliberation, is needed to make
decisions about values and regulatory tools that embed those values.
Thirdly. Neither are the necessary self-restraints for regulation
present in constitutional systems applicable only to parliamentary laws.
The constitutional constraints on regulation apply also to the indirect
forms. When a direct constraint on behaviour (e.g., through law)
conflicts with basic rights or with other self-restraints of basic rights
control, it raises concerns whether that same constraint should be
allowed to be effected indirectly through the market, social norms,
or technology1148. Even though the question of constitutional self-
restraints applying to indirect forms of regulation is somewhat
uncertain and has not been widely discussed, there is a logical appeal
in the argument. Why should regulators be able to circumvent the
constitutional protections for basic rights and liberties merely by using
indirect regulatory means?
Fourthly. Neither do the basic right provisions only protect
individuals and groups from government interference. The
constitutional constraints on regulation work also towards other
regulators than just the legislature. This can be derived from the role
of basic rights and liberties as subjective rights that express
fundamental value decisions in society and as legal principles that
require optimization. Basic rights no longer express the fundamental
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1149 Of special problems in the legal systems in USA see, Berman, Cyberspace
and the State-Action Debate.
1150 Mainly the legislature due to the principles of democracy and distribution
of powers. Tuori, Tuomarivaltio, p. 929 and 939.
1151 Section 22, titled Protection of basic rights and liberties, states that the
public authorities shall guarantee the observance of basic rights and liberties
and human rights. The Constitution of Finland is available in English from the
web pages of the Ministry of Justice at http://www.om.fi/uploads/
54begu60narbnv_1.pdf [22.2.2006]. The distinction between basic rights and
their guarantees is emphasized by Luigi Ferrejoli in Fundamental Rights, p. 23.
order of state or the public authorities, but the basic order of the
whole society. The argumentation involves two trends in current basic
rights theory: horizontal effects and obligation to secure realisation.
First of all, as expressions of societal value decisions and as legal
principles basic rights no longer have an effect only on the vertical
relationship between the individual and the state, but also on the
horizontal axis between individuals and the whole society. Current
constitutional doctrine acknowledges the horizontal effect of basic
rights and liberties; they protect individuals and groups not only from
governmental interference but also from the interference of other
individuals or groups1149. In addition to having force in the
interpretation and application of parliamentary laws, the basic rights
provisions also are directly applicable norms. 
Secondly, as expressions of societal value decisions and as legal
principles basic rights require realisation: the public authorities1150 have
an obligation to secure the realisation of basic rights and liberties and
human rights as acknowledged in current constitutional doctrine and
explicitly laid down in the Section 22 of the renewed Constitution
of Finland (731/1999)1151. The legislature is thus constitutionally
obliged to protect one group of private actors from other private
actors’ intrusions on their freedom.
NSAs as regulators do more than a merely exercise individual
freedom; they also do more than simply exercise economic or social
power. A private governing body does not act purely in its own
interests; it has an impact on the freedoms of others in the interest
of third party (e.g., in the case of lawyers association this third party
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1152 This argument has been developed, e.g., by Amir N. Licht (2005) in Social
Norms and the Law: A Social Institutional Approach, p. 36, Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya, Radzyner School of Law, Working Paper , available at
http://www.faculty.idc.ac.il/licht/PSN7.4-SSRN.pdf [22.2.2006]
would be the customers or clients of the lawyers that are members
of the association). When NSAs regulate behaviour, they do not only
enjoy the protections of the constitution, but they also are subject
to the constraints in basic rights systems towards their regulatees.
Fifthly. Even if bringing the regulation by NSAs, networks or
hybrids under the self-restraints in basic rights provisions makes sense,
the use of basic rights control is not the only possible way to restrain
the use of power. It is not necessary to rely solely on doctrine of basic
rights as expressions of societal values or as legal principles. Cultural
values in relation to social norms operate in a similar way; they
delineate the constraints for and give meaning to individual behaviour.
The use of social norms in regulation is constrained by the general
social environment that gives meaning to actions, defines what is
socially acceptable, and exercises social control through sanctioning.
The social environment is shaped by the values individuals have
adopted because, to the extent individuals have acquired culture, they
can predict how their actions would likely to be perceived by others
in their environment, such as professional peers, family, the media,
and so forth.1152
In sum, neither the decision-making in relation to substantive
values of regulation, nor the protection of constitutional values require
the use of parliamentary laws or speak only in favour of state-centric
regulation. Questions concerning values can also be determined in
other places than just inside the democratic procedures of
constitutional states. The protection of those values neither requires
that only parliamentary laws are used nor sets a prerequisite for
regulation by the state centred actors. The regulation of information
security does not have to be based, at least not solely, on parliamentary
acts. No matter how we systematise information security among
constitutional rights, which is largely a matter of controversy, there
is no need to rely purely on parliamentary acts in the regulation of
information security issues.
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